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Abstract
Health systems in most high-income countries provide protection against the financial 
risks associated with ill health on a broadly universal basis, although many impose 
measures that lower financial protection, for example, by offering a limited package of 
benefits or requiring beneficiaries to pay part of the cost of health care at the point of use. 
This last measure, known as cost sharing or user charges, is a policy tool applied mainly 
to raise revenue for the health system and to enhance efficiency. The neo-classical 
economic argument for user fees posits that moral hazard exists in health insurance 
markets, and user fees help combat this “overconsumption” of care. The simultaneous 
policy argument is that cost sharing reduces unnecessary consumption of prescription 
drugs, which leads to both expenditure reductions and health improvements.
While literature investigating these cost sharing arguments exists, there are still 
unanswered questions as many of the papers are outdated, others only focus on specific 
populations, and there are methodological issues surrounding some studies. As estimates 
vary widely between studies, a methodological approach that obtains an “adjusted” or 
“composite” price elasticity from the literature by pooling the existing estimates would 
provide a broad measure of elasticity. Updated estimates of the price elasticity of demand 
for the general population, the elderly, and low-income individuals in the United States 
would also be useful for American policymakers given recent changes to public and 
private insurance coverage. The calculation of estimates for elderly Americans also 
provides a useful backdrop for comparing estimates from the elderly in British Columbia, 
Canada. There is a need for economic and policy discussions related to economic 
efficiency, policy arguments for efficiency in user fees, and equity in the literature.
We contribute to filling these gaps by estimating the price elasticity of demand in three 
main settings: a collection of elasticity estimates from the existing literature, the 
American population, and the older population in British Columbia, Canada. Based on 
our results, we determine that the price elasticity of demand is relatively low in all of 
these settings, even among the low-income group and the general population. Our 
adjusted price elasticity estimate is an insignificant -0.16, while the elasticity estimates 
from the American analyses range from an insignificant -0.11 for the elderly to -0.25 for 
the general population. We obtain an estimate o f-0.30 for the elderly in British 
Columbia. Overall, the sensitivity to user fees depends on the institutional setting, the 
level of cost sharing, the specific subpopulation examined, and other factors.
The implications of these relatively low estimates can be viewed from both an economics 
and policy perspective. While cost sharing leads to greater efficiency when we define 
efficiency in a neo-classical economic sense, from a policy perspective user fees may 
negatively affect beneficiaries’ health and equity. The implication is that policymakers 
should set transparent policy goals and openly discuss whether any detrimental effects of 
cost sharing are considered acceptable from a policy standpoint.
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Asymmetric information -  a situation in which ithae parties con opposite sides of a 
transaction have differing amounts of relevant inforrmiation
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responsibility to pay the initial amount of medicad eexjpendituires up to a stated amount
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Equity - equal access to health care for those in raeeedl of medlical care.
Endogeneity — when there is correlation betweem thhe; error teerm and at least one of the 
covariates in the model, often caused by omitted waariiables.
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prepayments to the insurance company.
Kaldorian (or Hicks-Kaldor) principle -  a reallocation of resources is a social 
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Multi-tier formularies -  typically contain two or three tiers; the first tier consists of 
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tier formularies where the preferred brand-name drugs have a lower co-payment than the 
non-preferred drugs.
Pareto efficiency - an allocation of resources that cannot be changed to make one 
individual better off without simultaneously making another feel worse off.
Price elasticity of demand -  the percentage change in the quantity demanded brought 
about by a one percentage change in the price of the good or service.
Principle of the law of large numbers -  in repeated, independent trials with the same 
probability p  of success in each trial, the chance that the percentage of successes differs 
from p  by more than a fixed positive amount, a>0, converges to zero as the number of 
trials goes to infinity for every positive a.
Reference pricing system - the maximum price for a group of equal or similar drugs that 
the insurer will reimburse the user. If the user chooses a drug that costs more than the 
reference price, he or she must pay the difference.
Risk -  uncertainty about possible states of the world.
Sample selection -  the inability to determine whether the zero consumption represents a 
true choice of no consumption.
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Chapter 1
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Thesis background and scope
In most high-income countries there is generally universal protection against the 
financial risks associated with ill health, although many health systems impose 
measures that lower financial protection; for instance, by limiting coverage of medical 
benefits or forcing beneficiaries to cover part of the health care cost at the point of 
use. This last measure, known as demand-side cost sharing or user fees or charges, is 
a policy tool generally employed to raise revenue for the health system and to enhance 
efficiency. The revenue-raising motive is more common in low-income countries as it 
may be driven by the need to generate private sources of funding where public 
sources are insufficient or to contain public spending by shifting some of the 
prescription drug expenditure burden to individuals. Theoretically, the third-party 
payer can shift the saved funds to more cost-effective areas of the health care system. 
Meanwhile, the efficiency motive is meant to negate the third-party payment-related 
problem of ex-post moral hazard and to guide patients towards more cost-effective 
care and patterns of health care use.
As illustrated in Table 1.1, demand-side cost sharing exists in various forms and may 
be applied to any type of health service. An important note is that although cost 
sharing can be applied at the patient or provider level, any time we refer to cost 
sharing in this dissertation, the implicit reference is for demand-side cost sharing and 
not supply-side cost sharing.
While there is significant variation in the extent to which user charges are applied to 
physician visits and inpatient care among OECD countries, almost all oblige health 
insurance recipients to pay user fees for prescription drugs1. Yet, the types of cost 
sharing, the burden placed on users, and the exempt populations differ by country.
The universality of prescription charges reflects anxiety about the rapid rate at which 
pharmaceutical budgets have grown over time, particularly because pharmaceutical 
expenditures as a percentage of total health expenditures have generally been rising 
faster than inflation over the past decade in a number of the wealthiest countries 
(OECD, 2005). However, many of these countries required cost sharing for 
prescription drugs before rising drug budgets became a pressing policy matter, 
suggesting that a belief in demand-cost sharing as a primary policy tool was 
widespread at the time.
In the late 1960s Arrow (1968) and Pauly (1968) were instrumental in forwarding the 
theoretical arguments for cost sharing in medical services. Further papers that 
implicitly or explicitly used neo-classical theory as the basis for empirical tests of 
moral hazard were soon published by Feldstein (1970; 1971), Newhouse and Phelps 
(1974); Phelps and Newhouse (1972), and Rosett and Huang (1973), among others. In 
fact, the neo-classical economic arguments in favor of cost sharing appear to have 
influenced health care policy since the 1970s because cost sharing has become an
1 For example, there is no cost sharing for prescription drugs in Wales, and at the time of this writing, 
Scotland is considering a similar proposal.
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entrenched part of the various health insurance systems in the United States (Nyman, 
2004). Traditional economic theory posits that individuals shielded from the full cost 
of health care through insurance provided by a national health service, sickness fund, 
or private health plan will use health services beyond the point at which the marginal 
benefits of use outweigh the marginal costs (Pauly, 1968). This behavior creates a 
welfare loss as scarce resources might be better spent on other goods and services2. 
The premise behind cost sharing is that when the patient faces out-of-pocket payments 
for health care, he is inclined to reduce his additional consumption
Table 1.1. Direct and indirect forms o f cost sharing for prescription drugs and their 
incentives
Form Definition Incentives
D irect
Co-payment The user pays a fixed fee (flat rate) pa- item or 
service unit.
Patient may decrease volume o f  drugs consumed or 
decrease the number o f  prescriptions filled while 
increasing the size o f  each prescription. Patient has 
no incentive to consume cheaper alternative 
medications unless co-payments are lower for these 
medications.
Co-insurance The user pays a fixed proportion o f the total cost Patient may decrease volume o f  drugs consumed 
and may only request a larger pack size if  this 
produces savings. Patient has an incentive to 
consume cheaper therapeutic medications.
Deductible The user bears a  fixed quantity o f  total prescription 
costs; deductibles can apply to specific cases or to a 
period o f  time.
When patient is not close to the deductible level, he 
may decrease the volume o f  drugs consumed and/or 
switch to cheaper therapeutic alternatives. As he 
nears the deductible limit, he has an incentive to 
consume more drugs aid  more expensive drugs to 
exceed the deductible.
Indirect
Reference pricing 
(RP)
A reference price refers to the maxinum price for a 
group o f  equal or similar drugs that the insurer will 
reimburse die user. If the user chooses adrug that 
costs more than the reference price, he or she must 
pay the difference.
Patient is likely to decrease his or her consumption 
o f  drugs that are priced above the reference price 
and switch to alternative drugs priced at or below 
the reference price.
Multi-tier formularies Typically, these formularies contain two or three 
tiers. The first tier consists o f generic drugs, which 
have the lowest co-payment. The second and third 
tiers generally comprise brand-name drugs, which 
can be split into preferred and non-preferred drugs 
in the three-tier formularies. The preferred brand- 
name drugs have a lower co-payment than the non- 
preferred drugs. Multi-tier formularies are most 
commonly used in the United States.
Patient has an incentive to switch from brand-name 
medications to generic medications and from non­
preferred medications to preferred medications.
Although cost sharing became an important part of the health care system in America, 
other developed countries have been more reluctant to shift such a large burden of 
costs to patients (Cutler, 2002b). European nations, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand all seem to have strived for more of a balance between reducing moral hazard
2 Moral hazard may also lead to higher premiums.
2
Chapter 1
*5
without significantly reducing equity . Interestingly, there is relatively little demand- 
side cost sharing for health care services in developed countries outside of the United 
States, but as mentioned previously, virtually all developed health systems impose 
user fees on prescription drugs (Saltman and Figueras, 1998). Although it is unclear 
why this is the case, the fact that prescription drug coverage is less generous than core 
medical care across the board in the developed world implies that, at least when cost 
sharing provisions were first enacted, there was a general consensus regarding the 
necessity of prescription drugs. However, significant exclusions from prescription 
charges are prevalent (Saltman and Figueras, 1998), usually for children, older 
people, and low-income groups, indicating that policymakers were still concerned that 
significant user fees for prescription drugs would adversely affect certain populations.
While user fees for all types of medical care are still prevalent in the United States, 
and prescription charges are common in the developed world, the arguments 
regarding cost sharing in the health care sector have shifted since the original neo­
classical theory was presented. Rice (1992) and Nyman (1999), for instance, have 
suggested that the neo-classical theory is inherently flawed, particularly in relation to 
health insurance. Both present alternate theories for health care demand and 
hypothesize that moral hazard is less of a problem than previously predicted. 
Economists like Culyer and Evans (1996) and Reinhardt (1992) have instead argued 
that although the neo-classical economic theory is sound, the theory is only of limited 
application to health care policymakers because they have other policy goals in mind. 
In particular, health policymakers are concerned with maximizing societal health, 
maintaining or improving equity, and remaining within a budget constraint. User fees 
can have varying effects on each of these policy goals, although the effects depend 
crucially on the design of the cost sharing system.
There is a significant body of literature investigating the link between cost sharing for 
prescription drugs, the demand for treatment, and health. The initial concentration in 
the literature was from the perspective of neo-classical theory and the focus was on 
determining whether a moral hazard effect existed. The most influential studies 
regarding cost sharing have used data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, 
which was conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s and used an experimental 
design (Rice and Morrison, 1994). Non-elderly participants were randomly assigned 
to 0 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, and 95 percent coinsurance plans, and their use of 
medical services was tracked over a number of years. Even today, the findings from 
the RAND regarding prescription drugs and other health services are widely cited as 
elasticity benchmarks in the literature, despite the fact that it has been over 25 years 
since the experiment was conducted. Meanwhile, later papers focused on specific 
groups within the population to examine whether some were more adversely affected 
by cost sharing. More recent papers also focused on newer forms of cost sharing such 
as reference pricing and tiered co-payment systems. Overall, the literature has been
3 A full discussion of equity, including a definition and the relationship between equity and cost 
sharing, is given in Chapter 8. However, it is worth mentioning here that we take equal access for equal 
need as the working definition o f equity in this chapter. Because the burden of cost sharing typically 
falls on the poor and heavy users o f health care (unless these groups are given sufficient exemptions), 
many argue that cost sharing reduces equity.
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overwhelmingly empirical in nature and has established that cost sharing leads to a 
lower volume of prescription drugs for all populations considered. The elasticity of 
demand for cost sharing is typically less than one, indicating that consumers are not 
very responsive to changes in price.
Given the discussion above, there are a number of reasons for delving deeper into this 
area. One of the most important reasons is that price elasticity estimates are of interest 
to policymakers, as these estimates shed some light on the economic efficiency, 
“health care efficiency”4, and equity concerns. If those who are the most medically 
needy, for instance the poor and the elderly, are still sensitive to out-of-pocket price 
changes, cost sharing may have a detrimental effect on health. In terms of equity, cost 
sharing that is applied across the board is clearly inequitable. But even if  cost sharing 
differs between different population groups, the mechanism may still be inequitable. 
For instance, the wealthiest of the elderly are sometimes well protected from user fees 
even though they can more easily afford their prescription medications. The lack of 
economic or policy discussions of these considerations in the literature highlights the 
need for this dialogue.
Since the RAND experiment there have been developments in econometric 
methodology, which allow the researcher to test whether different specifications are 
more appropriate to model the demand for prescription drugs. Despite these novel 
techniques, few researchers in the area of prescription drugs have taken advantage of 
econometric models that simultaneously account for panel data, endogeneity, and 
other data characteristics. Thus, the application of newer methodology to the problem 
is an interesting prospect.
From a policy perspective most economists have focused on the Pareto efficiency5 
effects of moral hazard and the relationship to the elasticity of demand, but health 
care policy typically encompasses additional goals such as health care efficiency and 
equity. There is a clear need for a broader discussion of demand-side cost sharing that 
considers not only the economic perspective but also other aspects of the health policy 
perspective.
Although the literature has reached broad conclusions regarding the influence of cost 
sharing on the general population, there are still a number of unanswered questions. 
One problem is that price elasticity estimates tend to vary widely from one study to 
the next, partially depending on the country being analyzed, the group of individuals 
considered, the time frame of the study, and the statistical techniques employed. As 
such, there is a need to statistically obtain an “adjusted” or “composite” elasticity 
estimate that accounts for heterogeneity between studies, giving policymakers and 
economists a benchmark price elasticity value for developed countries that can be 
used for individual country and subpopulation elasticity comparisons.
4 Although this distinction is not always made explicitly, economic arguments for efficiency are 
typically based on Pareto efficiency, while health care arguments for efficiency are more concerned 
with maximizing population health. Pareto efficiency will be defined and discussed in Chapter 2, while 
health care efficiency and equity and the differences between economic efficiency, health care 
efficiency, and equity will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 8.
5 For example, see Ellis and McGuire (1993), Pauly (1974), or Zeckhauser (1970).
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Given the wide range of existing estimates, there is still a need for a more robust 
statistical analysis. Some studies did not account for potential sample selection, which 
can occur when the decision not to purchase any drugs in a given year may not be a 
true consumption choice. While the decision to obtain health insurance that offers 
prescription drugs may be endogenous to the number of prescription drugs 
consumed6, few studies that considered individuals with privately purchased health 
insurance accounted for this potential endogeneity. Finally, when longitudinal data are 
available, the application of panel data regression techniques provides certain 
advantages, particularly, the ability to account for omitted variable bias. The failure to 
account for some or all of these factors in non-experimental settings may have led to 
biased estimates that subsequently misinform policy responses. Thus, to highlight the 
contribution of price to the consumption of prescription drugs and inform 
policymakers and insurance companies about the sensitivity of consumers to price 
changes, a robust price elasticity estimate is needed.
Another missing piece is how prescription drug cost sharing influences the elderly 
population, a prevalent user group of prescriptions. Few studies have calculated price 
elasticity values for this population. The existing estimates are either for subsets of the 
elderly (individuals living in one region, those without employer-sponsored insurance 
or Medicaid, or those with a specific ailment), or only capture recent drug 
consumption. It would be useful to compare price elasticity values between the 
elderly and the general and low-income populations. It would also be informative to 
compare elasticity values of the elderly between the US and Canada and to 
hypothesize why estimates might differ between the two countries.
This thesis aims to address these specific gaps. In doing so we analyze three different 
datasets: one constructed from the existing price elasticity values from the literature, 
one of the population in the United States, and one of the older population in British 
Columbia (BC), Canada. The populations of the US and BC are comparable in that 
both are similar in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and 
culture. Yet, their health insurance systems are widely divergent because America 
relies more on public insurance for the poor and elderly and private or no insurance 
for the rest of the population, while British Columbia provides universal health 
insurance coverage for most health services. Even a broad comparison of these two 
systems would provide a deeper understanding of the fundamental relationships 
between cost sharing, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, and the 
demand for prescription drugs, as well as highlighting health system differences that 
may be amenable to policy initiatives.
Our findings indicate that the price elasticity of demand is relatively low, even among 
the low-income group and the general population. Our “adjusted” price elasticity 
estimate for non-aggregate data is a non-significant -0.156, while the elasticity 
estimates from the American analyses range from -0.108 (though not significant) for 
the elderly to -0.250 for the general population. We obtain an estimate o f-0.295 for
6 Endogeneity may also arise if the co-payment is computed from total out-of-pocket expenditures and 
total prescription drugs purchased; in a situation where there are deductibles mixed with co­
payments/coinsurance and out-of-pocket limits, there is a non-linear price schedule.
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the elderly in British Columbia. Overall, the sensitivity to user fees varies depending 
on the institutional setting, the level of cost sharing, the specific population examined, 
and other factors.
1.2. Background on cost sharing in the United States and British Columbia
Before discussing the research aims and objectives and providing an outline of the 
organization of the thesis, it is useful to set the context of health care in the United 
States and British Columbia. The United States and Canada have followed divergent 
paths with respect to health coverage beginning in the mid-1960s when both created 
their own unique brands of public coverage. In 1965 the US Federal government 
established Medicaid to provide coverage for low-income groups, and in 1966 they 
established Medicare to provide coverage for the elderly (CMS, 2005a). Employer- 
sponsored insurance was already a significant source of coverage for the working 
population, and the government chose to leave this coverage in place rather than 
extending public coverage to the entire population.
In contrast to the United States, Canada went down the route of universal health 
insurance coverage for core medical services beginning in 1966 with the Medical 
Care Act (Grootendorst, 2002). Prescription drug coverage was left to the territories 
and provinces, and all have enacted public drug coverage for the low-income and 
elderly groups. Although the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada 
(Romanow, 2002) recommended in a widely cited report that prescription drug 
coverage be integrated into core health services in Canada to ensure appropriate 
utilization, the Canadian government has not taken action on this recommendation.
These two different paths have also influenced the uptake of cost sharing provisions 
within each country. In the United States competition between insurers is assumed to 
be more efficient than a single purchaser system, and even within government- 
financed health care, policymakers have introduced competition between insurers. 
Around 15 percent of the US population is uninsured, but many of the current 
administration’s proposals for extending coverage involve tax credits or deductions 
(Cogan et al., 2005) or health savings accounts (Cannon and Tanner, 2005), both of 
which are more market-oriented ideas. There seems to be a theme throughout time 
among a significant (or at least powerful) group that neo-classical/market-oriented 
economics can determine the health care system that is best for society. This belief is 
reflected in the attitude among some policymakers towards the uninsured7 and the 
argument that moral hazard is prevalent and should be dampened (Jost, 2007) as 
reflected in recent provisions allowing Medicaid to charge higher co-payments and 
the significant cost sharing requirements enacted in Medicare Part D. Thus, the 
prevalence of cost sharing provisions within both public and private coverage is not 
only based on a desire to limit drug expenditures, but also on an assumption that the
7 Specifically, some researchers and policymakers argue that health care resources should be allocated 
according to ability to pay and thus other concepts such as need are irrelevant (Jost, 2007). It is 
important to note that this is generally an agenda associated with certain right-wing groups in the 
country.
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lessons from economics regarding moral hazard should be applied to the health 
system to benefit society.
In Canada some economists and policymakers have tried to inject economic 
arguments into government policy, but they have generally been less successful as 
Canadians strongly support equity, fairness, and solidarity (Romanow, 2002). 
Concerns about equity and health maximization have typically outweighed the 
economic arguments, at least for what Canada defines as core health services. Yet, in 
the area of prescription drugs, there is significant cost sharing across the country, with 
private financing making up about 46 percent of total drug expenditures in 2005 
(CIHI, 2006). The real objective of these policies for prescription drugs may be to 
contain prescription drug expenditures by shifting a significant portion of the burden 
to patients. Policymakers in British Columbia do seem concerned with preserving 
access and equity, though, as low-income groups have always faced lower user fees 
than residents who are non-elderly. Moreover, the government of British Columbia 
enacted Fair PharmaCare in 2003, which bases prescription charges on income.
1.3. Thesis research objective and aims
This research has three primary aims: (i) to use previous price elasticity estimates 
from the literature and run a meta-regression to calculate a standardized estimate of 
the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs across multiple countries and 
settings, (ii) to empirically test the hypotheses regarding the effect of cost sharing on 
drug utilization that stem from the neo-classical economic theory of insurance, and 
(iii) to discuss the economic and policy implications of the results. The first aim, as 
well as providing an aggregate quantitative estimate of price elasticity, also sets a 
baseline against which newer estimates can be compared. The intent of the second 
aim is to determine whether user fees reduce the quantity demanded of prescription 
drugs in the United States and British Columbia, Canada. This also permits us to 
investigate whether certain individuals are more adversely affected by increases in 
out-of-pocket fees and allows us to broadly compare drug consumption among the 
elderly in these two countries.
While a large body of literature that investigates the relationship between cost sharing 
and demand for prescription drugs exists, this dissertation contributes to the literature 
by (i) utilizing an econometric model which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, 
sample selection, and the potential endogeneity of the co-payment, (ii) considering the 
impact of user fees on access to prescription drugs for both the entire population and 
various groups within the population, (iii) calculating the price elasticity of demand 
for prescription drugs for both the United States and British Columbia, (iv) using the 
most recent datasets available, and (v) drawing policy implications for each of the 
considered regions and for society as a whole.
The research involves empirical estimation on three datasets. We construct one of the 
datasets by pulling relevant information from the prescription drug cost sharing 
literature. Studies which reported price elasticity estimates or which reported enough 
information for us to calculate a price elasticity estimate by hand were chosen.
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Contextual information was pulled from each paper and inputted into the database. 
The second dataset includes a sample of non-institutionalized individuals from the 
United States. The third database provides information on elderly beneficiaries in 
British Columbia, Canada. Different statistical techniques are employed for each 
dataset depending on the objective of the analysis, the information available in the 
dataset, and the nature of health insurance coverage for the studied population.
The hypotheses that we intend to test are context specific. For the meta-regression 
analysis, which is more an extension of the literature review, we are primarily 
interested in obtaining a composite price elasticity value and quantifying the study- 
specific factors that determine this estimate. Based on these two uses of the meta­
regression, the main hypotheses that we aim to test are:
Hla: The price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs is less 
than one
Hlb: The price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs is 
greater than zero
Hlc: The quality of the medium within which the elasticity estimate 
was published influences the elasticity estimate
Hid: The characteristics of the study within which the elasticity 
estimate was published affect the elasticity estimate
Hie: The institutional setting of the data that generated the 
elasticity estimate affects the estimate
This thesis also aims to test hypotheses related to prescription drug cost sharing in two 
regional contexts. The main hypotheses regarding user fees in the United States and 
British Columbia, Canada are:
H2a: As out-of-pocket prices for prescription drugs increase, 
quantity demanded decreases
H2b: When patients do not face the full cost of prescriptions, the 
price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs is greater than zero
By considering these hypotheses, we can explore estimates within and between 
different contexts and draw broad economic and policy conclusions regarding cost 
sharing for prescription drugs. Moreover, based on these hypotheses, we formulate the
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main research questions for each studied region in Chapters 6 and 7. The specific 
research questions, however, differ between the United States and British Columbia 
because of the unique institutional and demographic characteristics of each area and 
the availability of data.
1.4. Organization of the thesis
The dissertation is comprised of nine chapters, including this introduction. In Chapter 
2 we present the neo-classical economic theory of insurance and the economic 
literature that has followed this traditional theory. The primary focus of the chapter is 
on the moral hazard effect of insurance and the associated welfare loss. Not only has 
the concept of moral hazard shaped cost sharing policy in the United States, but 
because ex post moral hazard is prevalent in all health systems, there has been a 
contentious debate over the implementation of user fees in some countries such as 
Canada. As the traditional economic theory has been an impetus for empirical 
literature and for policy change in the United States, we provide the neo-classical 
framework as a means of setting the context. There are a number of critiques of the 
traditional economic theory, and those critiques are useful for highlighting the 
shortcomings of the economic arguments in the context of policy. Despite these 
criticisms, the neo-classical theory provides a valuable framework for predicting and 
estimating consumer behavior in the face of higher prices.
Chapter 3 then offers an overview of the literature that has covered cost sharing for 
medical services. This chapter provides a brief outline of studies that have considered 
cost sharing for medical services in general, inpatient services, and physician services. 
The intent is to place the prescription drug elasticity estimates in the context of price 
elasticity estimates from other sectors of health care. As prescription drug cost sharing 
is the focus of this thesis, significantly more attention in the chapter is given to the 
related literature. The section on cost sharing for prescription drugs also considers 
how various supply- and demand-side explanatory variables concurrently affect 
demand. To indicate why we chose to focus on the particular research questions and 
the specific settings, Chapter 3 also includes information regarding the limitations of 
existing studies and existing empirical gaps.
Chapter 4 is an extension of Chapter 3 in that it statistically summarizes the various 
price elasticity estimates from the literature using a meta-regression analysis. The 
result is that we obtain a “composite” or “adjusted” elasticity estimate. A meta­
regression analysis requires that the researcher pull selected information from relevant 
studies, including information regarding the quality of the study, the institutional 
setting of the paper, and the dataset used for the analysis. This information is then put 
together in a database, and the researcher uses an econometric model to obtain a 
composite price elasticity estimate. In addition, a meta-regression analysis provides 
information on the study-specific characteristics, such as the standard error, that have 
a significant influence on the elasticity estimate. The adjusted elasticity estimate is 
particularly important for this thesis in that it gives us a baseline comparator for the 
estimates that we obtain for the United States and British Columbia.
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Another gap highlighted in the literature review is the need for updated price elasticity 
estimates from the United States, comparisons of different populations (based on age 
and income) within one country, and general comparisons of elasticity estimates 
between two similar countries. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are all related to these aspects of 
the dissertation. Chapter 5 begins by setting the policy context and offering a detailed 
overview of health insurance and prescription drug insurance coverage in the United 
States and British Columbia. Not only does the description of each health care system 
provide some motivation for the specific econometric model chosen for each setting, 
but the policy background also sets the scene for later policy analysis in Chapter 8 
based on the results of the empirical work.
Chapter 6 provides an econometric estimation of the relationship between cost sharing 
and the demand for prescription drugs in the United States. We employ the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey, an unbalanced rotating panel dataset covering the years 
1996 to 2004. The analysis considers the adult population and more vulnerable 
populations, such as the elderly and low-income individuals. The chapter then 
calculates price elasticities of demand for each of these population groups. Important 
demographic, socioeconomic, and health-related explanatory variables are included in 
the model as covariates, and the econometric specification accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity, sample selection, and endogeneity.
Chapter 7 focuses on British Columbia for price elasticity estimates. The analysis 
employs the British Columbia Linked Health Database, a panel covering all recipients 
of PharmaCare drug coverage in the province. Because we are unable to determine 
whether non-elderly recipients of public drug coverage in British Columbia 
simultaneously have private drug coverage, the analysis is restricted to the elderly.
The model includes important demographic, socioeconomic, and health-related 
explanatory variables, and the specification considers the non-linearity of the 
dependent variable and unobserved heterogeneity.
Chapter 8 provides a comparison and policy discussion of the results. The chapter 
broadly compares the results from the United States and British Columbia, offering 
insight into why the estimates might differ between the two areas. As the original 
motivation of cost sharing was to dampen the moral hazard effect of insurance, we 
then provide a discussion of our elasticity results from a neo-classical economic 
perspective. However, policymakers are often concerned with goals that may be 
unrelated to economic efficiency, and we also consider the meaning of the elasticity 
estimates in terms of equity and health care efficiency. This leads to a broad set of 
policy implications for developed health systems and then a narrower set of policy 
implications for the American and British Columbian health care systems.
Finally, Chapter 9 wraps up the dissertation by reviewing the other eight chapters in 
the thesis. Chapter 9 also provides some direction for future research related to the 
question put forward in this thesis. In particular, some of the suggested research 
extends the work of this thesis. Another avenue of research involves work that is 
related to cost sharing for prescription drugs but involves different questions than the 
ones put forward in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2: The theory of health insurance
2.1. Introduction
As explained in Chapter 1, the neo-classical theory of insurance1 underlies many of 
the empirical models in the literature that have been used to estimate the price 
elasticity of demand for prescription drugs. It is important to present the insurance 
theory as the theory motivates our empirical specifications for the United States and 
British Columbia. Although the literature on insurance market failure encompasses a 
number of issues, including asymmetric information, the conditions necessary for an 
insurance market to function, and industrial organization, among others, this chapter 
is not intended to be a textbook overview of all these aspects of insurance. Instead, the 
chapter is meant to highlight the characteristics of insurance, mainly moral hazard and 
adverse selection (to some extent), that determine the level of cost sharing individuals 
face for prescription drugs. We refer the reader to texts such as Cutler and Zeckhauser 
(2000) and Zweifel and Breyer (1997) for more detailed explanations of insurance 
theory.
The focus of this chapter is primarily on moral hazard rather than adverse selection 
because of a large body of theoretical and empirical literature related to moral hazard, 
which has influenced demand-side cost sharing decisions in the United States and 
sparked a fierce debate on user fees in other countries such as Canada2. The existence 
of this debate highlights the fact that moral hazard is persistent in all health systems, 
whether the systems are based on social or private insurance or a tax-based regime. 
Recent theoretical developments that extend our conceptual understanding of the 
traditional neo-classical theory of moral hazard add another perspective to the debate. 
Generally, this chapter draws upon references such as Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), 
Folland et al. (1997), Pauly (1968), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), and Zweifel and 
Breyer (1997) for the fundamental explanations of insurance theory.
We begin our discussion with a basic competitive model that introduces insurance in 
the absence of asymmetric information. The model describes how consumers 
maximize their expected utility from the purchase of insurance subject to the zero 
profit constraint of insurance companies. However, in reality, various distortions 
occur once the insurance market has evolved. For example, consumers are likely to 
have more information about their likelihood of falling ill (Folland et al., 1997), and 
high-risk individuals have an incentive to hide their true risk type to avoid paying 
higher premiums. This inevitable existence of heterogeneity in the health insurance 
market changes the equilibrium outcome, and we briefly discuss this situation.
Another type of asymmetric information is moral hazard where the existence of 
insurance either induces consumers to alter their likelihood of falling ill (ex ante
1 Another possibility is to approach the elasticity of demand for prescription drugs from the Grossman 
(1972) human capital model of demand perspective. However, our primary concern in this thesis is 
examining the moral hazard effect of insurance and whether it is significant. The Grossman model is 
more relevant for determining the importance of other factors like age that influence the individual’s 
production of his own health.
Another reason to focus on moral hazard is that we did not have premium information in our data 
(which would have permitted empirical investigation of adverse selection).
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moral hazard) or to increase their consumption of medical care (ex post moral hazard) 
(Zweifel and Breyer, 1997). As ex post moral hazard has been the main focus of the 
literature and an important determinant of health policy since Pauly’s (1968) pivotal 
article, we focus on this aspect of moral hazard in the chapter. There has also been 
debate within the health economics literature over the extent to which ex post moral 
hazard exists and the applicability of the neo-classical model. Given this debate, we 
provide a discussion of this literature and the implications for this dissertation. An 
important note regarding this chapter is that we provide the basic mathematical 
models and conceptual descriptions, but more detailed information is available in 
Appendix A.
The organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 provides a general 
discussion of the insurance purchase where we assume symmetric information. This is 
followed by a relaxation of the symmetric information assumption in Section 2.3; this 
section briefly discusses adverse selection and provides a more detailed explanation 
of ex post moral hazard. Section 2.4 then goes over the alternative theories and 
models regarding moral hazard, and Section 2.5 relates the theory to the subsequent 
analyses in Chapters 6 and 7. Section 2.6 offers concluding remarks.
2.2. A general approach to specifying the insurance purchase
Before we discuss moral hazard, which is the main focus of this chapter, it is 
important to clarify the insurance purchase decision. The purpose of health insurance 
is to reduce the variability in income that occurs because medical spending is 
unpredictable. By pooling a large number of individuals, insurance companies can 
reduce the variability of insured individuals’ incomes because of the principle of the 
law of large numbers (Pauly, 1968). We begin by discussing the demand side of the 
market, then we present the conditions for the supply of insurance, and finally we 
discuss equilibrium in the insurance market.
2.2.1. The demand for insurance contracts
In this section, we first derive the individual’s expected utility when he is uninsured, 
and we then compare this outcome with his expected utility when he purchases 
insurance. For simplicity, assume that there are only two states of the world: sickness 
and health. With probability n  the individual falls ill, and he faces an exogenous loss 
m, the amount of medical spending required to restore him to good health. His income 
that period3 is W, and without insurance his utility is u(W -  m) .With probability 1 - n  
he remains healthy, incurring no losses, and his utility is u(jV). The uninsured 
individual’s expected utility is thus:
E U ^  = x * u [ W - m ]+ (1 -  x)*u[w]  (2.1).
Assume he now has the option of purchasing health insurance, and in the event of 
illness, the insurance company pays him a pre-determined amount I. If the insured
3 We assume that illness has no effect on his earnings.
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individual finds himself in poor health, his wealth is: y s = W -  p -  m + 1 , where p is 
the insurance premium. If he remains in good health, his disposable income is 
y h = W -  p . Letting s = /  -  p the vector Q = (p,s) describes the health insurance 
contract. Thus, his expected utility is:
EUiK= K * u [ f V - p - m  + l ]+( l -K)*u[ fV-p]  (2.2).
Whether the individual chooses to purchase insurance depends on the contract: if 
either the premium is too high or the payout is too low, such that his expected utility 
is lower than the utility associated with being uninsured, he will forego insurance.
2.2.2. The supply of insurance contracts
Given that the individual chooses to insure based on his expected utility of wealth, the 
task is now to resolve how insurance companies decide which contracts should be 
offered on the market and which customers should be allowed to purchase specific 
contracts. Unlike the risk-averse purchasers, insurance companies are assumed to be 
risk-neutral and concerned only with expected profits. The market is competitive, and 
insurance firms are willing and able to sell any number of contracts they believe will 
make an expected profit. To simplify the analysis we assume that there are no loading 
costs. The profit q for a contract Q that is associated with a probability n of ill health 
is:
q(n,Q) = 7 i* ( p - / ) + ( l -  n)* P (2.3).
The first term represents the insurance company’s loss if the consumer falls ill 
because the company must make a payout. The second term is the profit if the 
individual remains healthy. Because the market is perfectly competitive, q(n, Q) = 0. 
Solving equation (2.3) for q(n, Q) = 0 yields the optimal insurance premium:
P - n ^ l  (2.4).
This is the actuarially-fair premium and equals the probability of illness multiplied by 
the generosity of insurance coverage. We can thus see that better information 
regarding the risk level of the consumer allows the insurance company to offer a 
premium closer to the break-even level.
2.2.3. Equilibrium in the insurance market
The equilibrium set of contracts can be determined based on the given supply- and 
demand-side equations for health insurance. An important assumption regarding the 
competitive insurance market is that consumers can only buy one insurance contract, 
implying that insurance companies control the prices and quantities of contracts4. We 
also assume that all consumers have the same probability of illness. The competitive 
equilibrium set of contracts is determined by maximizing consumers’ expected
4 For a defense of this assumption, see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
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utilities under insurance subject to firms’ zero profit constraints (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz, 1976).
The equilibrium of supply and demand is illustrated in Figure 2.1, where the 
horizontal axis represents the consumer’s income when he is in good health, and the 
vertical axis represents his income when he is ill.
Figure 2.1. Equilibrium with identical customers
wealth in sick 
state
u:
l/ya wealth in healthy 
state
The point E with the coordinates {W°,W°)  in Figure 2.1 represents the amount of 
wealth that the individual has when he is uninsured, and the indifference curve in the 
diagram is derived from the function in equation (2.1). When the individual purchases 
an insurance contract Cl, he moves from point E to the point 
(W* -  /?,W2a + 1 -  p  - m ) ,  represented by Q* in Figure 2.1.
The line EF, termed the fair-odds line, represents the set of all policies that provide 
insurance companies with zero profits (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). With identical 
customers the equilibrium policy Q* is at the point of tangency between the 
indifference curves and the fair-odds line. Additionally, the 45°-line indicates all 
points where the consumer will have equal income in both states of the world. Since 
consumers are risk averse, the equilibrium policy Q* is also located at the 
intersection of the 45°-line and the fair-odds line.
Mathematically, we can solve for the optimal insurance policy that the individual 
should purchase under these conditions. The consumer will maximize his utility of 
wealth in the insured state by considering the possible insurance payouts that he could 
receive in the event of illness (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). The result is that the 
insurance payout must equal his medical losses such that I = m,  indicating that if 
insurance is actuarially fair, the optimal policy for a risk averse individual is full
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insurance. He does have the option of foregoing insurance altogether, so he will only 
purchase insurance if EUins > EUuins. A derivation of this result is available in 
Appendix A.I.
2.3. Insurance and asymmetric information
The previous model of equilibrium in the health insurance market assumed that 
symmetric information exists. In reality, insurers and consumers are likely to possess 
different levels of information, and there is often a cost to bridging the information 
gap. Analyzing this phenomenon is important to this dissertation because the 
existence of asymmetric information is likely to affect the insurance contracts offered 
on the market and consumption once insurance has been purchased. Moral hazard and 
adverse selection are two such types of asymmetric information that frequently arise 
in insurance markets. These problems occur when three conditions take place in the 
market: (a) there is a risk, (b) there is a contract that implicitly or explicitly transfers 
this risk from one agent (or group of agents) to another agent (or group), and (3) the 
parties to the contract have different information about the relevant states of nature 
(Louberg6, 1991). Since the focus of this dissertation is on moral hazard, we only 
provide a brief overview of adverse selection in this chapter.
2.3.1. Asymmetric information and adverse selection
One form of information asymmetry, adverse selection, occurs when consumers have 
more information than insurers about their expected level of health, and insurers 
cannot easily distinguish between individuals who belong to different risk classes. If 
plans could charge premiums based on individuals’ expected costs, the market would 
efficiently sort consumers into plans that reflected their expected costs (Cutler and 
Zeckhauser, 2000; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). The problem is that high-risk 
individuals prefer to obtain generous insurance5 without paying higher premiums and 
often attempt to mask their true risk profiles as a result. Even in the absence of 
information asymmetries, determining an individual’s risk profile is difficult due to 
technology constraints, and charging someone a higher premium simply because he is 
sickly may also be considered socially unacceptable (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000)6. 
As mentioned above because the focus of this dissertation is on quantifying the moral 
hazard effect of insurance through the price elasticity of demand, we only provide a 
brief overview of adverse selection in this section. A general understanding of adverse 
selection is important, though, because the existence of adverse selection in the 
American setting has an important influence both on the insurance contracts offered 
on the market and on the contracts chosen by consumers. This has implications for the
5 Generous insurance refers to lower cost sharing requirements and fewer restrictions on covered 
services.
6 One option is for insurance companies to charge an average premium, but this entails low-risk 
individuals paying more than their actuarially fair premiums and high-risk customers paying less. 
Generous plans will attract disproportionate amounts of ill individuals, moderate plans will attract a 
larger number of healthier individuals (Arrow, 1985; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000), and some low-risk 
individuals may decide to forego insurance altogether. To cover the costs of insuring against higher 
risks, generous plans will have to charge higher premiums than moderate plans (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz, 1976).
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econometric specification chosen, a consideration that is detailed in Section 2.5. More 
in-depth mathematical and diagrammatical representations of adverse selection and 
the insurance purchase are available in Appendix A.2.
Where there are consumers with different risk types and those consumers do not 
reveal their risk profiles to insurers, there is no pooling equilibrium insurance contract 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). If equilibrium does occur in the market (see Appendix 
A.2 for the necessary condition), then it will be a separating equilibrium where high- 
risk persons have complete health insurance coverage and low-risk individuals only 
have partial insurance coverage.
In terms of the relationship between this theory and cost sharing, when there is a 
heterogeneous population and consumers choose not to reveal their risk type, there 
will be differing insurance contracts offered on the market. High-risk individuals will 
choose the complete insurance package and thus face minimal user fees and extensive 
coverage of health services, including prescription drugs. Lower-risk consumers, 
however, may choose contracts that do not include prescription drug coverage or may 
involve significant out-of-pocket requirements for prescription drugs and other health 
services.
2.3.2. Asymmetric information and moral hazard
Once individuals are sorted into insurance plans, another form of asymmetric 
information, moral hazard or hidden action, arises (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968; Pauly, 
1974; Zeckhauser, 1970). This phenomenon occurs when the existence of a contract 
between the consumer and the insurer causes the consumer to alter his behaviour in 
such as way that may change his probability of falling ill (ex ante moral hazard) 
and/or his expected cost of illness (ex post moral hazard). Both ex post and ex ante 
moral hazard are phenomena that occur whenever there is insurance, whether the 
insurance coverage is public or private.
Ex ante moral hazard occurs when the purchase of insurance reduces the individual’s 
incentive to engage in preventative effort (self-protection), potentially altering his 
probability of falling ill. Ex ante moral hazard would not be a problem if the insurer 
was able to observe the level of preventative effort undertaken because the insurer 
could impose an insurance premium that was inversely related to the individual’s 
level of preventative effort (Zweifel and Breuer, 2005; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997). 
Because this is not the case in reality, insurers offer different insurance contracts to 
induce patients to either engage in more preventative effort or pay higher premiums. 
As ex ante moral hazard has been a less important factor in shaping health policy and 
because we do not have data on preventative effort or premiums (which would allow 
us to consider ex ante moral hazard), we do not provide any further information on 
this type of moral hazard.
Another variant of moral hazard, ex post moral hazard, occurs because individuals 
with insurance face lower marginal prices for medical care than they would in a free 
market without insurance, and there is an inevitable increase in the consumption of
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health care (Pauly, 1968). Ex post moral hazard is a problem because the insurer 
cannot always determine the marginal benefit of medical care, and even if it could, 
monitoring each purchase is too costly. There is further uncertainty because medical 
technology is not advanced enough for medical practitioners to always determine the 
value of treatment. According to the neo-classical economic theory, the presence of 
this information asymmetry leads to over-consumption of medical care, creating a 
welfare loss (Feldstein, 1973) because the resources spent on health care could be put 
towards other goods and services with marginal benefits that outweigh the marginal 
costs.
Ah additional problem with moral hazard is that it conflicts with risk-spreading goals 
(Zeckhauser, 1970). Insurance companies are forced to trade off the benefits of risk 
spreading against the costs of moral hazard that arise from more generous insurance 
by transferring risk to insured individuals. This risk transfer takes the form of higher 
demand-side cost sharing or gaps in medical coverage.
There is also a third type of moral hazard: supplier-induced demand (SID). Although 
there is not an agreed upon definition for SID, one definition posits that SID is 
demand that exists beyond the amount that a well-informed patient would have 
chosen (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993), and this excess demand is caused by provider 
moral hazard. Not only are doctors sometimes shielded from the true costs of medical 
care, but there is also asymmetric information between the doctor and the patient and 
the doctor and the third-party payer. Another definition indicates that SID occurs 
when the physician provides medical care for the patient that is contrary to his 
interpretation of the best interest of the patient (McGuire, 2000). Thus, in both 
definitions, the physician uses his hidden information to create demand; for instance, 
by ordering additional unnecessary tests for the patient or requiring the patient to 
make additional office visits. Although this is an important aspect of moral hazard, 
supplier-induced demand will not be considered in this research because we are 
concerned with how the existence of demand-side cost sharing influences patients 
rather than the factors that are motivating moral hazard.
The aim of the next section is to provide a brief discussion of ex post moral hazard in 
insurance markets. The subsequent analysis follows from work completed by other 
researchers (Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970; Pauly, 1974; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 
2000). The models introduced in this section are an extension of the basic insurance 
model with a risk-averse utility maximizing individual facing two states of the world: 
sickness and health. The section does not provide mathematical derivations, but more 
in-depth presentations are available in Appendix A.3.
Ex post moral hazard
By definition ex post moral hazard occurs because more generous insurance coverage 
increases the amount of care that the individual consumes in his sick state. If the 
insurer could observe the insured’s health status, then the optimal insurance would be 
a lump-sum payout to the individual in the event of illness (Zweifel and Breuer, 2005; 
Zweifel and Breyer, 1997; Zweifel and Manning, 2000). The insured individual could
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then choose his own amount of treatment, although he would have no incentive to 
over-consume medical care because his payout is fixed and related to his health status. 
There is evidence that real-world insurance plans consider the individual’s health 
status (Blomqvist, 1997). For example, some health insurance plans refuse to cover 
pre-existing conditions for a period of time, while the provisions for dental coverage 
are often different than the provisions for other types of coverage. Nevertheless, there 
is still uncertainty surrounding the individual’s health status, and resolving this 
uncertainty is costly. Thus, the subsequent analysis will consider the situation where 
the insurer can only observe health expenditures rather than health status.
We first approach the analysis of ex post moral hazard through the traditional 
diagram, and then we provide a brief description of the utility maximizing 
mathematical approach. A more detailed mathematical derivation of this approach is 
provided in Appendix A.3.
The traditional method of considering moral hazard is one put forth by Pauly (1968). 
Because demand curves are downward sloping, the insured consumer increases the 
quantity of medical care consumed when he purchases insurance. This is because 
insurance lowers the marginal cost of care, where full insurance corresponds to a price 
of zero for medical care. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
The individual in this diagram faces two states of the world: in one state, he becomes 
ill with probability n, and in the other state he remains healthy and incurs no medical 
expenses. His demand for medical care in the unhealthy state is represented by the 
line, D2, and his demand in the healthy state is represented by the inelastic curve Z), 
(which corresponds with the vertical axis). In the unhealthy state the quantity 
demanded of medical care is not only dependent on price but also other factors such 
as income, preferences, and morbidity (Pauly, 1968).
Figure 2.2. The demand for medical care with moral hazard
Price or 
Cost
MC
Q^max Quantity of 
Medical
A
Q
Care, Q
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If the patient was uninsured, his consumption decision would be represented by 
(A >22 )• Assuming that the price of medical care is one (P2 = 1), the expected value 
of his medical care expenses is:
m = n * Q 2 *l + ( l -7r )*0*l  = 7r*Q2 (2.5).
His other choice is to purchase insurance and pay a premium of:
Pmh = 7T * £?2 max (2.6).
The value of $mh is greater than the premium the individual would pay if moral 
hazard were nonexistent .
Thus, the premium for medical insurance has two components: the pure cost of 
protection against risk and the extra resource cost due to moral hazard. This additional 
consumption of medical care beyond the equilibrium quantity demanded in the 
presence of no insurance could create a net welfare loss. The extent of this welfare 
loss may differ between consumers depending on their individual demand curves and 
levels of risk aversion. Thus, from an actuarial standpoint some events may not be 
insurable for certain individuals (Pauly, 1968), for example if the individual is 
extremely risk averse. The implication is that the optimal level of insurance is 
individual-specific, and the responsiveness to cost sharing is likely to differ between 
broad population groups such as the elderly and low-income groups. However, it is 
often assumed that groups of individuals share the same risks and risk preferences for 
insurance, allowing insurers to offer insurance at the group level.
This situation can also be approached using utility-maximizing equations. Total 
medical expenditures m can be broken into two components: price p  and quantity Q. 
To simplify the analysis we normalize the price of medical care to one such that the 
quantity of health care consumed can be represented by m (as m = Q* 1). The 
consumer has a choice between consuming the homogenous health good m and other 
goodsy.
At the beginning of the period, the individual does not know whether he will be sick 
or healthy during the period. If he falls ill, his disposable income is:
y * = W - $ - m  + I  (2.7),
but if he remains healthy, his budget constraint becomes:
y h = W -  p (2.8).
7 If there was no moral hazard, the premium would be based on consumption at point Q2 .
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Further assume that medical services are valuable to the individual when he falls ill 
but useless when he is healthy. As a result, he has two different utility functions for 
each state of the world: us [m, y s J and uh [m, y h J.
There is likely to be uncertainty surrounding the individual’s health status, such that 
the insurance company can observe the individual’s medical expenditures but not his 
health status. This means that the insurance company must use medical expenditures 
as a proxy for health status such that /  = I(m) . Although the insurer has multiple 
options for shifting some of the costs to the individual, for simplicity we only 
consider the existence of a constant coinsurance rate c (0 < c < l), which depends on 
medical expenses. By including the coinsurance rate, the insurance payout can be 
expressed as:
l(m ) = ( l - c ) * m  (2.9),
indicating that the consumer bears some proportion of his medical expenses.
The analysis begins with the consumer choosing the quantity of medical care that 
maximizes his expected utility in the sick state, us [m,ys J (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997). 
He then determines the relationship between medical expenditures and the 
coinsurance rate by maximizing the result with respect to his medical expenditures 
and the coinsurance rate. The conclusion from this exercise is that decreasing the 
coinsurance rate increases his demand for medical care in the event of illness (Zweifel 
and Breyer, 1997).
Once the consumer has determined his optimal choice of medical care based on an 
exogenous coinsurance rate, he enters the second stage where he finds the value of c 
that maximizes his expected utility. He takes into account the possibilities of being ill 
or healthy and the fact that his premium depends on the coinsurance rate as pointed 
out in equation (2.9). The result is that the optimal rate of coinsurance is positive, and 
as the probability of falling ill rises, the optimal coinsurance rate rises (Zweifel and 
Breyer, 1997).
The existence of ex post moral hazard affects the types of insurance contracts offered 
and the individual’s utility maximizing levels of insurance coverage and cost sharing. 
When there is ex post moral hazard, full coverage is suboptimal if the presence of 
insurance leads the utility-maximizing individual to increase his medical expenditures 
in the sick state. Choosing an insurance contract with a coinsurance requirement is 
advantageous to the individual because he gives himself an incentive to be more cost- 
conscious. As a result, he faces a lower premium than if he were to consume up to the 
point of satiation.
Ex post moral hazard and efficiency
Given the existence of asymmetric information, one concern in the economic 
literature is the most efficient level of insurance coverage that can be achieved.
Within the literature efficiency is most commonly defined as Pareto efficiency
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(Reinhardt, 1992), which is an allocation of resources that cannot be changed to make 
one individual better off without simultaneously making another feel worse off 
(Reinhardt, 1992).
One avenue of research on efficiency is the calculation of the net welfare effect of 
health insurance. Evidence indicates that there would be a net welfare gain if 
individuals bore more risk and the price of medical care was lower (Blomqvist, 1997; 
Feldman and Dowd, 1991; 1993; Feldstein, 1973); in other words, a more efficient 
outcome would be somewhere in between no insurance and full insurance coverage.
Based on the assumption that excess health insurance gives rise to a welfare loss, 
researchers have attempted to determine the most efficient level of cost sharing 
(Blomqvist, 1997; Zeckhauser, 1970), but there is disagreement over the optimal 
level. Some evidence indicates that the optimal situation is one of cost sharing that is 
non-linear in expenditure (Blomqvist, 1997; Zeckhauser, 1970) and that the most 
efficient level of cost sharing may be relatively low (Blomqvist, 1997). Others suggest 
that cost sharing should be higher, even up to the 45 percent rate (Manning and 
Marquis, 1996). Another option that has been suggested is to charge higher user fees 
to patients that choose high-cost treatment and lower user fees to patients that choose 
low-cost treatments (Chemew et al., 2000), although this applies only to the case of 
severe, observable illnesses.
2.4. Alternative theories and models regarding ex post moral hazard
There are, however, economists who argue that die neo-classical economic theory 
incorrectly measures the welfare loss of excess insurance. Given that one justification 
for demand-side cost sharing is to reduce supposed over-consumption of medical care 
when there is full insurance, it is important to outline the alternatives to the traditional 
model.
Rice (1992; 1993) argues that the demand curve for medical care does not accurately 
reflect individual utilities, mainly because consumers do not cut back on services of 
the least marginal benefit to them first when faced with user fees. To refute the neo­
classical model for moral hazard, he cites evidence from the Lohr et al. (1986) study, 
which found that patients reduced their consumption of both necessary and 
unnecessary medical services when faced with cost sharing. Possible reasons for this 
anomaly are that patients may have insufficient information and experience to make 
their own health care choices and that medical practitioners may not provide optimal 
care given their own objectives (Rice, 1992). The alternative definition of welfare loss 
that he offers is more useful for policymakers in that it considers the necessity of 
health care services; that is, he argues that a welfare loss occurs when medically 
unnecessary health care is provided (Rice, 1992). Thus, insurance can influence this 
alternative definition of welfare loss in two ways: (1) by lowering the price of care 
and improving access to health services, and (2) influencing provider incentives to 
provide appropriate care8.
8 For instance, insurance companies may carry out drug utilization reviews.
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Nyman (1999) argues that the findings from Lohr et al. (1986) are consistent with 
neo-classical economic theory. Instead of the analysis put forward by Rice (1992), 
where rational and informed consumers rank their medical care by effectiveness, 
Nyman (1999) presents an alternative interpretation of the Lohr et al. (1986) results. 
When faced with two different medical procedures or goods of varying effectiveness9, 
consumers demand more of the most effective procedure at any given price. For 
instance, given the extensive literature on the benefit of statins (La Rosa et al., 1999), 
we should not be surprised if patients facing an equal co-payment for statins and 
fibrates demand more statins than fibrates. Nonetheless, higher cost sharing will still 
cause patients to reduce their consumption of both effective and non-effective care, as 
predicted by the inverse relationship between the out-of-pocket price and the quantity 
demanded.
Although Nyman (1999) contends that it is still possible to use the demand curve to 
measure the value of health care procedures, he argues that Pauly’s (1968) moral 
hazard framework needs modification. Pauly (1968) assumes that patients’ health care 
purchases are unresponsive to income, but the empirical findings that income 
elasticities are positive and significant implies that Pauly’s assumption does not hold 
for health care demand. By relaxing Pauly’s assumption, Nyman (1999) instead 
contends that part of the increase in quantity demanded due to full insurance is 
because of an income transfer from the healthy insured group to the unhealthy insured 
individual, and part of the consumption increase is due to a decrease in the out-of- 
pocket price of care. The amount of income transferred to the ill patient is positively 
related to the probability of illness, and this increased level of income in turn 
determines the amount of medical care consumed by the ill patient. This income effect 
of insurance should not be included as part of the net welfare loss calculation because 
the income gain for the unhealthy insured patient equals the income loss from the 
healthy insured consumers.
Nyman’s (1999) alternative net welfare loss calculation takes into account the gain 
from the consumer transferring risk to the insurer, the welfare loss of insurance due to 
the price effect on consumption, and other gains from insurance not mentioned in the 
neo-classical theory. The neo-classical estimates of the risk-bearing gain are based on 
the expected utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstem, 1947), which can only 
apply to medical expenses that would have occurred in the absence of insurance, and 
therefore existing estimates of the values of risk-bearing based on total medical 
expenditures overestimate the true value. Despite the lower predicted value of risk- 
bearing under his framework, Nyman purports that other aspects of insurance add 
value. In particular, insurance allows access to medical services that the uninsured 
would be unable to afford. Because new health care technologies such as medicines 
for the treatment of kidney failure or end-stage renal disease are effective but also 
vastly more expensive than other alternatives (Bunker et al., 1994), this is a welfare 
gain. An additional aspect of health insurance is that it increases consumption of 
medical care that is affordable to the uninsured group, and it increases consumption of 
other goods and services in the ill state (through the income transfer). Given that
9 Nyman (1999) also assumes that the effectiveness of procedures is known and that patients value 
higher effectiveness.
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consumers purchase insurance because the expected value of income with insurance 
exceeds the expected value of the premium foregone in the present state (Zweifel and 
Breyer, 1997), the transfer from the healthy to the unhealthy is a societal gain 
(Nyman, 1999). By incorporating the smaller gain from risk-bearing along with the 
gain from improved access to affordable medical care and other consumption in the ill 
state, the net welfare loss of insurance from Nyman (1999) is likely to be smaller than 
the conventional welfare loss put forward by Pauly (1968).
Blomqvist (2001), while arguing that Nyman’s criticisms of the traditional model are 
correct, claims that the biases inherent in the traditional model that Nyman discusses 
are not necessarily significant. Blomqvist’s argument relates to the fact that most 
health care analyses of the welfare loss of insurance are concerned with evaluating 
insurance at the margin rather than the entire welfare loss. As a result, Nyman’s 
framework is less useful except for the situation where the researcher is considering 
the gain of changing from no insurance to insurance. First, Blomqvist (2001) indicates 
that because health insurers have recognized that flat coinsurance rates for all medical 
services, including catastrophic expenses, are less efficient, most insurance plans 
provide better coverage for large expenses. The implication is that purchasing more 
generous insurance may have little or no effect on affordability, and thus this aspect 
of insurance (affordability) not considered in the traditional model may be less of a 
bias than Nyman indicates. Second, because health insurance plans are designed to 
limit catastrophic spending, the relevant individual budget share devoted to out-of- 
pocket health expenditures is generally lower than Nyman estimates. The result is that 
the elasticity estimates from the empirical literature, particularly the RAND study, are 
less biased than Nyman claims. Thus, because of this and another technicality that 
Blomqvist mentions10, Nyman’s (1999) framework underestimates the welfare loss of 
health insurance.
One issue with Blomqvist’s criticism of Nyman’s affordability bias is that 
affordability may differ vastly from low-income to high-income consumers. In 
particular, health plan deductibles have been increasing significantly since the 
beginning of this century, and the average deductible in a family employer-sponsored 
plan ranges from $751 per family in health maintenance organizations to $3511 in 
Health Savings Accounts (KFF/HRET, 2006). Furthermore, the KFF/HRET survey 
indicates that 51 percent of individuals in employer-sponsored plans face cost sharing 
for inpatient services in addition to the deductible, and about half of this group faces a 
coinsurance rate. This suggests that insurance companies have not moved away from 
coinsurance rates and high cost sharing for high-cost and possibly necessary services, 
implying that affordability may be a significant issue for many insured individuals. 
The fact that non-group insurance is less generous than employer-sponsored insurance 
suggests that affordability is likely an even greater issue among this group of the 
insured. A further related consideration is that a low-income individual may find it 
more difficult to devote 3 percent of his income to health than a high-income 
individual, as other consumption goods, such as housing and food comprise a larger
10 Nyman (1999) takes the relevant budget share for his revised elasticity estimates as the share of each 
family’s total spending on medical care, but Blomqvist argues that the relevant budget share should be 
the share of each family’s out-of-pocket spending on health care.
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portion of the low-income individual’s budget. In fact, out-of-pocket limits for private 
health insurance are unrelated to income (although they were in the RAND 
experiment, which Blomqvist uses as his example). Around 22 percent of workers 
with employer-sponsored insurance have no limits on out-of-pocket spending. Of the 
workers that do face annual maximums, these limits may not include spending on 
certain services such as prescription drugs or spending below a deductible, effectively 
increasing the annual out-of-pocket limit. Thus, particularly for poor individuals 
ineligible for public coverage, more generous insurance coverage may improve 
affordability.
2.5. Economic theory, the research hypothesis, and the econometric model
The neo-classical theory of insurance and moral hazard and the extended theories of 
moral hazard provide some indication of expected results for the empirical analysis. 
Ideally, a dataset would contain information related to the insurance contracts: the 
premiums, cost sharing requirements, and any exclusions. Few datasets contain this 
information, though, and most datasets with medical utilization information only 
contain variables related to user fees. Nonetheless, the theory of insurance and 
adverse selection indicates that the level of cost sharing is affected by the insurer’s 
inability to fully assess consumers’ risk profiles, leading to multiple insurance 
contracts that are each meant to attract a different risk profile.
The importance of the adverse selection discussion is not to suggest a theoretical basis 
to test for adverse selection as our data are not rich enough to permit this. Instead, the 
discussion indicates that in a private market, adverse selection may contribute to 
issues of endogeneity. This issue is relevant in a place such as the United States where 
a large proportion of the population chooses between various prescription drug 
insurance options (or chooses between health plans offering varying levels of 
prescription drug coverage). Thus, the insurance contracts offered on the market to 
counteract adverse selection along with the consumer’s expected prescription drug 
consumption in the period may influence the generosity of insurance coverage chosen, 
i.e. the level of the prescription drug co-payment. It is important to note that other 
factors may contribute to an endogeneity bias; for instance, the inability to measure 
consumption expectations or past consumption and the non-linearity of the price 
schedule, and it may be impossible to disentangle the sources of endogeneity. 
Nonetheless, the theory of adverse selection and the confirmation of its existence in 
the literature imply a need for us to empirically test for endogeneity.
Adverse selection is less of an issue in public insurance markets, and it has no bearing 
on cost sharing requirements in public systems such as those in Canada. As a result, 
any estimations that we carry out on samples in countries with universal prescription 
drug coverage need not account for endogeneity related to the consumption 
expectations or adverse selection.
In contrast to adverse selection, ex post moral hazard affects cost sharing within both 
the private and public insurance markets. Although there are a few competing theories 
of moral hazard, as discussed earlier in this chapter, this fact does not change the
24
Chapter 2
nature of our empirical analysis, although it does influence the interpretation of the 
elasticity results. Specifically, the various theories yield different policy implications, 
and we will discuss these in Chapter 8.
In terms of the empirical analysis, the neo-classical economic theory and Nyman’s 
(1999) extension provide a useful framework. The implication of Rice (1992), 
however, is that the demand curve for medical care is not an accurate representation 
of preferences. Because of the criticisms of Rice’s model discussed in Section 2.4, we 
feel that the demand curve is still a useful measure of preferences. We choose not to 
account for Rice’s framework in our empirical analysis. Both Pauly (1968) and 
Nyman (1999) confirm that the demand curve is downward sloping and that holding 
all other measures constant, the price elasticity of demand measures consumer 
responsiveness to changes in out-of-pocket prices. These other measures are the 
traditional determinants of demand, such as income, consumer preferences for 
prescription drugs, and the prices of substitute and complement goods and services. 
Thus, regression analysis considers these other demand determinants as covariates in 
the model.
Preferences for prescription drugs can encompass a variety of factors as mentioned in 
Section 2.3.2. One issue is the patient’s perceived need for prescription medications. 
Age, for example, is likely to determine whether the patient feels that his illnesses are 
pressing enough to merit prescription treatment. Older people generally face more 
medical conditions, may be more risk averse as adverse outcomes can be more 
detrimental to their health, may perceive a shorter time horizon within which to 
improve their health, and may believe that substitutes for prescription drugs such as 
lifestyle changes are less appealing. Similarly, illness is also important as this 
influences the need for medical care and the perceptions of pharmaceutical treatment 
(based on the seriousness of the illness, noticeable symptoms, and the perceived 
effectiveness of the relevant medication). Other perceptions such as those regarding 
the riskiness of foregoing medical treatment, the safety profile of prescribed 
medicines, and general preferences for medical care and pharmaceutical treatment 
may also be important predictors of pharmaceutical demand.
Unfortunately, due to data limitations researchers are rarely ever able to control for all 
variables that influence the demand for health care. Yet, failing to account for 
important predictors can lead to omitted variable bias (Baltagi, 2002), indicating that a 
panel data framework is needed to capture the effect of unobserved variables. Another 
important empirical issue that economic theory highlights is the correlation between 
the variables that proxy the determinants of demand. For example, age partially 
reflects the need for medical care, particularly because older people typically suffer 
from more morbidities than their younger cohorts. The same is true for income as 
there is a positive correlation between income and better health (Macinko et al.,
2003). The implication is that regression analysis is necessary to hold the effect of 
covariates constant and to test for interaction effects. As a result, our strategy for 
estimating the elasticity of demand for prescription drugs is based on econometric 
methodology.
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One interesting implication of using regression analysis is that we may capture some 
of the income effect of insurance that Nyman (1999) discusses, although in practice it 
is impossible to determine if this is the case given the limitations of the dataset. 
Specifically, if we use income net of health expenses not including premiums, this 
partially represents disposable income and is held constant in the regression. An 
increase in disposable income could either reflect an increase in income or a decrease 
in out-of-pocket expenses, either due to more generous insurance coverage, lower 
medical consumption, or consumption of less expensive medical care. Nonetheless, 
because we cannot determine what care the consumer would have consumed in the 
absence of insurance in order to estimate Nyman’s welfare effect of insurance, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to empirically examine this theory.
2.6. Conclusion
This chapter has covered the neo-classical economic theory of insurance and some of 
the extensions within the health care arena. The primary focus has been on the moral 
hazard effect of insurance and the importance of theory in providing a basis for our 
analysis.
Assuming no asymmetric information in the market, we determined that the optimal 
insurance contract for the consumer is one of full insurance. However, the assumption 
of symmetric information is restrictive given the reality in the market. By relaxing this 
assumption, we determine that adverse selection and moral hazard are two 
characteristics of the insurance market. The existence of adverse selection leads to a 
separating equilibrium (if equilibrium occurs) with high-risk individuals purchasing 
more generous insurance coverage than low-risk individuals. Moral hazard means that 
the consumer alters his behavior because of the insurance purchase. Ex post moral 
hazard means that the consumer increases the quantity of health care that he demands 
when he has insurance coverage, leading to higher premiums for all of the insured and 
a potential welfare loss. This welfare loss has been a subject of debate within the 
literature; some researchers have argued over the size of this welfare loss given the 
traditional theory, and other authors have argued that the traditional economic theory 
leads to an incorrect calculation of this welfare effect.
The implication of this insurance discussion is that it provides a useful framework for 
empirically estimating the price elasticity of demand. Specifically, the theory provides 
insight into the magnitude of the elasticity estimates we should expect to find in the 
prescription drug market given different settings. As Pauly (1968) pointed out, the 
optimal level of insurance differs between individuals, and thus we would expect the 
responsiveness to price to differ between various groups of the population. 
Furthermore, the theory of insurance highlights the factors that influence the demand 
for prescription drugs as the demand curve in the moral hazard analysis is dependent 
upon individual incomes, preferences for prescription drugs, and levels of illness. As 
the neo-classical theory of moral hazard spawned a large body of empirical research 
on cost sharing and the demand for medical care, including prescription drugs, this 
chapter is a natural precursor to the next chapter which covers the empirical literature 
on user fees.
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Chapter 3: Cost sharing literature review
3.1. Introduction
As the seminal papers from Arrow (1968) and Pauly (1968) sparked a large body of 
literature that attempted to quantify the moral hazard effect of insurance, a natural 
extension of insurance theory is a chapter providing an overview of the empirical 
literature. The intent of this chapter is thus to provide a basic overview of this 
literature, with a primary focus on cost sharing for prescription drugs. Since Pauly 
(1968), who posited that price elasticities should differ between various types of 
medical care depending on factors such as risk aversion and the randomness of 
medical events, research on user fees has generally been divided between different 
types of medical care. The main areas that researchers have studied are medical care 
in general, inpatient services, physician and outpatient care, and prescription drugs. 
Many of the original papers were from authors such as Davis and Russell (1972), 
Feldstein (1971; 1977), Newhouse and Phelps (1976), and Phelps and Newhouse 
(1974). By the end of the 1970s, interest in the area had increased, and the RAND 
experiment was a large scale effort intended to provide insight into user fees. In fact, 
it appears that the considerable research in the area influenced US health care policy 
(Nyman, 2004) given the importance of user fees in public and private insurance that 
now dates back over 30 years.
While the focus of this dissertation is on prescription drugs, it is important to provide 
an overview of the literature on cost sharing and other forms of medical care. This 
puts the prescription drug literature in the context of the medical care literature, 
allowing us to make general statements about whether reactions to prescription drug 
cost sharing differ from reactions to cost sharing for other medical services. This 
contextualization is important for policy, as cost sharing for prescription drugs has 
traditionally been higher than for other medical services, but there may not be a clear 
justification for this distinction. By comparing prescription drugs with other medical 
services, we can comment on these differences in out-of-pocket burdens from a policy 
perspective (in Chapter 8).
Although a small body of published literature and working papers that have conducted 
literature reviews on cost sharing for prescription drugs exists (Gerdtham and 
Johannesson, 1996; Gleason et al., 2005; Hitiris, 2000; Hurley and Arbuthnot- 
Johnson, 1991; Huttin, 1994; Lexchin and Grootendorst, 2004; Rice and Matsuoka, 
2004; Thomson and Mossialos, 2004), there is a need to review the subject with our 
specific research questions in mind. Most of these review papers have only looked at 
specific populations such as vulnerable groups or have only considered a small subset 
of the literature, such as studies from the US and the UK or the main papers in the 
area. However, we are particularly interested in the existing gaps in the literature 
related to the price elasticity of demand, and thus there is a need to comprehensively 
cover all of the papers that have considered this outcome variable. In addition to 
covering all papers in the area published in English, the literature review includes a 
number of papers published in other languages. Furthermore, to better understand the 
relationship between cost sharing and various outcomes, it is first necessary to
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investigate the impact of cost sharing on medical services in general. This provides a 
basis for comparison and offers some insight into whether responses to the prices of 
prescription drugs are different than responses to the prices of other types of medical 
care.
The organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the search strategy 
that was utilized to identify relevant papers in the literature. To provide a general idea 
of the findings related to the literature on cost sharing for other medical services, 
Section 3.3 offers a basic literature review of cost sharing for medical services in 
general, hospital services, and physician services, and the main focus is on the volume 
of services obtained and the price elasticity of demand. Abbreviated literature reviews 
of other outcome variables such as expenditures and health care are available in 
Appendix B, and more study-specific information is also provided in Appendix B. 
Section 3.4 then offers a comprehensive overview of the literature on cost sharing for 
prescription drugs with a focus on the volume of prescriptions obtained and the price 
elasticity of demand. Again, additional literature reviews of other outcome variables 
and more detailed information regarding the study samples, methods, approaches, 
findings, and limitations is available in Appendix B. Meanwhile, Section 3.5 
discusses the main limitations that can occur with analyses, while Section 3.6 
identifies some of the gaps in the literature related to the price elasticity of demand for 
prescription drugs and explains how this dissertation will contribute to the area. 
Finally, Section 3.7 wraps up the findings and discussion from this chapter.
3.2. Search strategy
A number of strategies were used to identify papers related to cost sharing for the 
various types of medical services. The search was limited to articles detailing cost 
sharing in developed countries, as developing countries may have different reasons 
for implementing user charges. In addition to the standard forms of cost sharing, the 
search included papers that analyzed the impact of insurance on medical care, 
hospital, physician, and prescription drug utilization. We did not limit our collection 
to studies that used regression techniques as we were interested in determining the 
adjusted and unadjusted effects of cost sharing on demand.
An important note is that because the primary focus of this dissertation is on cost 
sharing for prescription drugs, the literature search for that specific topic is 
comprehensive. However, the literature search for papers related to medical, inpatient, 
and physician services is not intended to be comprehensive; it is only intended to 
provide an overview of the main papers in the literature.
Cutler’s (2002c) literature review of cost sharing for medical services, Nyman’s 
(2003) review of relevant cost sharing articles, and a number of other previously 
performed literature reviews of cost sharing for medical services and prescription 
drugs (Hitiris, 2000; Hurley and Arbuthnot-Johnson, 1991; Huttin, 1994; Lexchin and 
Grootendorst, 1999; Lexchin and Grootendorst, 2004; Rice and Morrison, 1994;
Smith and Kirking, 1992; Thomson and Mossialos, 2004) all served as the basis for
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the literature search. We electronically traced forward in time the articles from these 
literature reviews by looking for studies that cited these articles. Additional searches 
were run on the Internet and relevant databases such as PubMed, EconLit, 
Blackwell’s Synergy, and Ingenta with combinations of the keywords listed in Table
3.1.
Table 3.1. Keywords used to search for relevant literature
Main keyword(s) Combined with these keyword(s)
cost sharing health
user charges prescription drugs
user fees medical services
copayments medical visits
co-payments hospital services
coinsurance hospital visits
inpatient services
inpatient visits
physician services
physician visits
doctor services
doctor visits
While we did not require that a paper was published after a certain time period, our 
search for relevant articles ended in December 2006. In-country experts helped to 
identify some of the papers in languages other than English, which were then 
translated by colleagues. Although a number of the papers included in the original 
literature reviews were related to additional types of medical services, such as dental 
services, specific preventative services, and others, these articles were catalogued but 
no attempts were made to find additional ones in these categories.
We use tables to summarise our main findings and cite references, using the text for 
more detailed discussion. As a measure of quality, the tables specify the type of study 
carried out, the type of data analyzed, and the techniques used for analysis. Some 
studies are experimental (ES), some are based on a natural experiment (NS), and 
others are observational (OS). Data analysis is cross-sectional (CD), time-series (TD), 
panel (time-series, cross-sectional or longitudinal) (PD)1, or survival analysis (SA).
1 While time-series data can also be classified as aggregate or macroeconomic data, cross-sectional and 
panel data can be classified as non-aggregate or microeconomic data. Aggregate data is defined as data 
collected at the macroeconomic level such that individual-specific or household-specific information is 
not identifiable.
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As most researchers used large datasets, we do not include information on sample 
size. The majority of studies used regression techniques to analyze data (R), but some 
reported descriptive statistics alone (NR). We do not go beyond this in assessing the 
quality of the research we review, mainly because efforts to determine the most 
appropriate method of analysis for each study depend on the study’s objectives and 
sample characteristics. In general, however, results did not vary based on study 
characteristics.
3.3. Literature review of cost sharing for medical care, inpatient services, and 
physician services
For comparability purposes it is useful to obtain an idea of the literature on cost 
sharing for medical services in general. As mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, since Pauly (1968) posited that elasticity values should differ between 
various types of medical care, the literature has fragmented along these lines. A 
comparison of these different elasticity estimates is useful for researchers and 
policymakers in that it leads to a natural discussion of why these estimates might 
differ. An in-depth discussion of the utility of comparisons between prescription drug 
elasticities and medical care elasticities is beyond the scope of this chapter, but more 
attention is given to this topic in Chapter 8.
The literature on cost sharing for medical services, inpatient services, and physician 
visits covers a number of dependent variables, including the number of services 
purchased, the elasticity, expenditures, and health. Because this dissertation is focused 
on the moral hazard effect of insurance (albeit prescription drug insurance), this 
section focuses on outcomes relevant to our research questions: the volume of medical 
services and the price elasticity of demand. A literature review of studies related to the 
other outcome variables is available in Appendix B. We begin by discussing the 
literature that has considered all medical services in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, and later 
we cover the literature that has looked at inpatient and physician services specifically. 
Inpatient care is covered in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, while physician and outpatient 
care is covered in Sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6.
3.3.1. Medical care: the effect of cost sharing on volume
Given the economic theory of moral hazard, a relevant question that has been 
addressed in the empirical literature is whether insurance coverage leads to 
consumption of medical services beyond the no insurance equilibrium. As the law of 
demand predicts a negative relationship, the empirical methods for examining this 
question have been based on quantifying the relationship between the out-of-pocket 
price and the number of services purchased.
This relationship has been investigated at various levels of aggregation, mainly using 
individual-level, household-level, and time-series data. Most of the studies focused on 
the United States, but country investigated a Swedish population. The literature has 
considered various subpopulations such as individuals of all ages, children, adults, the
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non-elderly, the elderly, pregnant women, low-income individuals, and persons with 
HIV. A summary of the findings is presented in Table 3.2.
Virtually all studies found that cost sharing, whether it was through a co-payment, a 
coinsurance rate, or some other type of system, had a negative effect on the total 
number of medical services purchased. Approaching the question from another angle, 
researchers also determined that having insurance coverage increased the number of 
services obtained as compared with the no insurance equilibrium. Interestingly, 
Wolfson et al. (1982) found no relationship between user fees and the use of medical 
services among crippled children in one US state. It is possible that a crippled child is 
less likely to reduce his use of medical services because he suffers from a debilitating 
condition. Additionally, medical decisions for children are made by guardians who 
may be less inclined to risk the child’s health by foregoing medical services.
Table 3.2. Medical care: cost sharing and the volume o f medical services
Variable Volume Studies
Co-payment - Elofsson et al. (1998) [SW, OS, CD, R]
Co-payment 0 Wolfson et al. (1982) [US, NS, TD, R]
Coinsurance -
Lohr et al. (1986) [US, ES, CD, R]; Manning et al. (1981) [US, ES, CD, R]; 
Manning et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, R]; Manning and Marquis (1996) [US, ES, CD, 
R]; Scitovsky and Snyder (1972) [US, NS, CD, NR]; Scitovsky and McCall (1977) 
[US, NS, CD, NR]
Mixed system - Rosett and Huang (1973) [US, OS, CD, R]
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) + Overpeck and Kotch (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; Spillman (1992) [US, OS, CD, R]
Country: SW = Sweden; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study 
Type o f model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model 
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
3.3.2. Medicare care: the price elasticity of demand
Quantifying how various magnitudes of changes in cost sharing for medical services 
is useful as it provides a clearer picture of cause and effect. However, comparability 
across papers can be difficult because of different measurement units. The price 
elasticity of demand2 is a unitless measure that allows us to measure consumers’
2 Although there are various types o f  elasticity estimates, the three main types are: price elasticity, 
expenditure elasticity, and income elasticity. The price elasticity measures the percentage change in the 
total number o f  drugs consumed that is associated with a one percent change in the out-of-pocket price, 
and is usually considered a reflection o f  the uncompensated demand curve. The expenditure elasticity 
measures the percentage change in total prescription drug expenditures that is associated with a one 
percent change in the out-of-pocket price, and is typically considered a reflection o f the compensated 
demand curve. Meanwhile, the income elasticity measures a change in prescription drug consumption 
associated with a change in income.
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sensitivity to price along the demand curve. The most common methods of calculating 
elasticities are: (i) arc elasticity methods, which measure the percentage change in 
price and quantity between two points on the demand curve, (ii) point elasticity 
methods, which measure the elasticity at a particular point on the demand curve, 
usually the mean, and (iii) constant elasticity methods, which often use log-log 
regressions and assume that elasticity is constant along the demand curve (Phelps, 
1997).
Table 3.3 summarizes the price elasticity results from the literature. All of the articles 
used cross-sectional data from the United States to compute the elasticity.
Table 3.3. Medical care: the price elasticity o f demand
Author (Year) Type of cost sharing Price elasticity
Manning et al. (1981) [US, ES, CD, R] Coinsurance -0.20
Manning et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, R] Coinsurance -0.14 t o -0.10
Manning and Marquis (1996) [US, ES, CD, R] Coinsurance -0.18
Rosett and Huang (1973) [US, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -1.50 to -0.35
Country: US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; OS = observational study 
Type o f model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model 
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques
Comparing the elasticity estimates from various studies is difficult because of the 
different datasets employed, the various subpopulations studied, and the different 
price ranges considered. Nonetheless, we can reach broad conclusions regarding the 
price elasticity, particularly considering that most analyses found that the demand for 
medical services was inelastic, although the price elasticity estimates ranged from - 
1.50 to -0.10. The largest elasticity estimate (-1.50) was likely due to the authors’ 
specification of the co-payment (Rosett and Huang, 1973) because they assumed that 
the patient covered 80 percent of his medical care expenses, indicating that the 
respondents in their study were being measured at higher points on the demand curve.
3.3.3. Inpatient care: the effect of cost sharing on volume
While investigating the relationship between cost sharing and general medical 
services offers insight into the impact of cost sharing on the health system, there is 
also the question of whether price sensitivity varies by types of medical care. For 
example, perhaps user fees lead individuals to decrease the use of physician visits but 
have little impact on hospital visits, which may be more related to need rather than 
prevention. In Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 we cover cost sharing for inpatient care, while 
in Sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 we discuss user fees for physician and outpatient care.
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Table 3.4. Inpatient and emergency room care: cost sharing and the number o f  
admissions and length o f stay
Variable
Number of 
admissions
Length of 
stay Studies
Co-payment - N/A
Ahlamaa-Tuompo et al. (1998a) [FI, NS, CD/PD, R]; Ahlamaa-Tuompo et
al. (1998b) [FI, NS, CD/PD, R]; Roemer et al. (1975) [US, ES, CD, NR]; 
Selby et al. (1996) [US, NS, CD, R]
Coinsurance - -
Freiberg and Scutchfield (1976) [US, OS, CD, R]; Newhouse (1993) [US, 
ES, CD, R]
Coinsurance - N/A
Babazono et al. (1991) [JP, NS, TD, R]; Bhattacharya et al. (1996) [JP, OS, 
SA, R]; Kupor et al. (1995) [JP, OS, CD, R]; Manning et al. (1987) [US, ES, 
CD, R]; Newhouse (1993) [US, ES, CD, R]; O ’Grady et al. (1985) [US, ES, 
CD, R]; Phelps and Newhouse (1974) [US, NS, CD, R]
Coinsurance N/A - Phelps (1975) [US, OS, CD, R]
Deductible - N/A Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Mixed system - - Feldstein (1971) [US, OS, TD, R]; Feldstein (1977) [US, OS, CD, R]
Mixed system - N/A
Davis and Russell (1972) [US, OS, TD, R]; Greene and Gunselman (1986) 
[US, NS, CD, NR]; McAvinchey and Yannopoulos (1993) [UK, OS, TD, R]; 
Rosenthal (1964) [US, OS, TD, R]; Siu et al. (1986) [US, ES, CD, R]; 
Williams (1966) [US, OS, CD, NR]
Mixed system 0 - Hill and Veney (1970) [US, ES, CD, NR]
Mixed system 0 N/A Lewis and Keairnes (1970) [US, ES, CD, NR]
Mixed system N/A -
Newhouse and Phelps (1974) [US, OS, CD, R]; Newhouse and Phelps (1976) 
[US, OS, CD, R]; Rosenthal (1968) [US, OS, CD, R]; Scheffler (1984) [US, 
NS, CD, R]
Insurance coverage N/A
Primary (vs. none) + N/A
Billings and Tiecholz (1990) [US, OS, CD, NR]; Blendon et al (1992) [US, 
OS, CD, NR]; Harmon and Nolan (2001) [IR, OS, CD, R]; Monheit et al. 
(1985) [US, OS, CD, NR]; Patrick et al. (1992) [US, OS, CD, R]; Van der 
Gaag and Wolfe (1991) [US, OS, CD, R]
Primary (vs. none) N/A + Hadley et al. (1991) [US, OS, CD, R]; Spillman (1992) [US, OS, CD, R]; Young and Cohen (1991) [US, OS, CD, R]
Primary public (vs. 
private)
+ + Fleishman and Mor (1993) [US, OS, CD, R]
Primary public (vs. 
private)
+ N/A Hahn (1994) [US, OS, CD, R]; Van der Gaag and Wolfe (1991) [US, OS, CD, R]
Primary public (vs. 
private) N/A
+ Nolan (1993) [IR, OS, CD, R]
Supplementary (vs. 
none)
+ N/A Holly et al. (1998) [CH, OS, CD, R]; McCall et al. (1991) [US, OS, CD, R]
Supplementary (vs. 
none) N/A
+ Christensen and Shinogle (1997) [US, OS, CD, R]
Country: BE = Belgium; CH = Switzerland; FI = Finland; IR = Ireland; JP = Japan; NE = the 
Netherlands; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model; SA = survival analysis model; TD =
time-series model
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
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Cost sharing can influence the volume of hospital services via two main pathways: 
one possibility is that individuals may visit the hospital less, perhaps choosing to 
utilize physician services instead. Another possibility is that individuals will still visit 
the hospital but may leave earlier to recover at home. Table 3.4 provides an overview 
of the literature that has examined both of these outcome variables.
Across co-payments, coinsurance rates, deductibles, and combinations of these types, 
cost sharing negatively influenced the number of inpatient and emergency room 
admissions. Not surprisingly, the existence of insurance had the opposite effect on 
hospital admissions. However, an interesting finding was that compared with private 
insurance beneficiaries, public insurance beneficiaries had more inpatient admissions. 
This result was consistent across the United States and Ireland and was somewhat 
surprising given that we might expect significant barriers in access to care in these 
countries. However, publicly insured populations tend to be less healthy on average 
than privately insured populations, and even in studies that controlled for health 
status, the cost sharing variable may have picked up some of this need effect.
Hill and Veney (1970) and Lewis and Keaimes (1970) were the only studies that 
found a link between user fees and the number of admissions, although an interesting 
observation is that both of these studies were from the same dataset and neither of 
these studies used regression analysis. The underlying dataset was from one county in 
Kansas, which is a very rural state, and thus the results may not be applicable to a 
larger population.
In terms of length of stay, the results for this variable were consistent across all of the 
countries and the different cost sharing regimes considered. Not only did cost sharing 
reduce inpatient length of stay, but a number of studies found that the existence of 
insurance coverage and the type of insurance coverage (whether public or private) 
mattered. Individuals with public insurance coverage appeared to have longer 
inpatient stays, although this result could have been due to unmeasured need.
3.3.4. Inpatient care: the price elasticity of demand
Across the United States and the United Kingdom, various studies have used 
microeconomic and macroeconomic data to calculate the price elasticity of demand 
for hospital services under cost sharing. Table 3.5 provides a summary of the price 
elasticity results from the literature, distinguished according to total inpatient visits 
and length of stay.
Researchers have found a wide range of price elasticity values for inpatient visits, 
from a low of -0.04 to a high of -0.85. The likely reason for this range is that each 
study examined a different population and used a different type of data (time series 
and cross sectional). For instance, McAvinchey and Yannopoulos (1993) separated 
elasticity values by public and private hospitals. In general, price elasticity values for 
private care appeared to be larger than for public care, likely because rationing for 
private care was through cost sharing, while rationing for public care was through 
waiting lists. We can also see that the time-series estimates were generally higher than
34
Chapter 3
the estimates from cross-sectional datasets, a result that is generally consistent with 
greater noise in time-series data.
Table 3.5. Inpatient care: the price elasticity o f demand
Author (Year) Type of cost sharing Elasticity (inpatient visits) Elasticity (length o f stay)
Davis and Russell (1972) [US, OS, TD,
R]
Mixed system -0.46 to -0.32
Feldstein (1971) [US, OS, TD, R] Mixed system -0.74 to -0.21
Feldstein (1977) [US, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.24 to -0.04 -0.44 to 0.08
Freiberg and Scutchfield (1976) [US, 
OS, CD, R] Coinsurance -0.07
McAvinchey and Yannopoulos (1993) 
[UK, OS, TD, R] Private care, mixed system -0.68 to -0.29
McAvinchey and Yannopoulos (1993) 
[UK, OS, TD, R]
Public care, no cost sharing -0.85 to -0.79
Newhouse and Phelps (1974) [US, OS, 
CD, R] Mixed system -0.10
Newhouse and Phelps (1976) [US, OS, 
CD, R] Mixed system -0.06
Newhouse (1993) [US, ES, CD, R] Coinsurance -0.31 to -0.17
Phelps and Newhouse (1974) [US, NS, 
CD, R] Coinsurance -0.05
Phelps (1975) [US, OS, CD, R] Coinsurance -0.03
Rosenthal (1968) [US, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.70 to 0.44
Country: UK = United Kingdom, US = United States
Type o f study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study 
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model 
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques
The elasticity estimates for inpatient length of stay were also widely variable with 
some estimates being positive, although all of the positive estimates were 
insignificant. In general, most of the estimates were closer to zero when the analysis 
was not broken down according to specific inpatient procedures. Interestingly, 
Rosenthal (1968) examined price elasticities across a number of different medical 
categories, which accounts for the wide range of elasticity values that he obtains. This 
suggests that other factors such as patients’ preferences for inpatient care, the 
availability of substitutes, perceptions of need for certain types of care, and other 
unmeasured variables are important determinants of the elasticity.
3.3.5. Physician and outpatient care: the effect of cost sharing on volume
The demand for physician and outpatient services are interesting outcome variables 
because the physician may be best suited to assessing a patient’s health through 
repeated contact and because the physician can potentially identify health problems 
early. Yet, the patient is typically the primary decision-maker regarding primary
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contact with the physician and may unnecessarily visit the doctor for minor health 
complaints if the marginal cost is minimal.
Thus, an important question regarding physician and outpatient cost sharing is: do 
user fees reduce the number of visits? Across a number of different countries, authors 
have employed various microeconomic and macroeconomic datasets to answer this 
question. Table 3.6 provides an overview of the literature on this area.
Table 3.6. Physician and outpatient care: cost sharing and the volume o f services
Variable Volume Studies
Co-payment -
Beck (1974) [CA, NS, CD, R]; Beck and Horne (1980) [CA, NS, CD, R]; Cameron et al. 
(1988) [AU, OS, CD, R]; Cherkin et al. (1989) [US, NS, CD, NR]; Cockx and Brasseur 
(2003) [BE, NS, PD, R]; Helms et al. (1978) [US, NS, CD, R]; Scott et al. (2003) [NZ, 
OS, CD, R]; Van de Voorde et al. (2001) [BE, NS, TD, R]
Coinsurance -
Babazono et al. (1991) [JP, NS, TD, R]; Bhattacharya et al. (1996) [JP, OS, SA, R]; 
Chiappori et al. (1988) [FR, NS, CD, R]; Kupor et al. (1995) [JP, OS, CD, R]; Newhouse 
et al. (1981) [US, ES, CD, R]; Phelps (1975) [US, OS, CD, R]; Shapiro et al. (1986) [US, 
ES, CD, R]
Coinsurance 0 Chiappori et al. (1988) [FR, NS, CD, R]; Shapiro et al. (1986) [US, ES, CD, R]
Mixed system -
Barnett et al. (2000) [NZ, OS, CD, RJ; Colie and Grossman (1978) [US, OS, CD, R]; 
Feldstein (1970) [US, OS, TD, R]; Fuchs and Kramer (1972) [US, OS, TD, R]; Goldman 
and Grossman (1978) [US, OS, CD, R]; Gribben (1996) [NZ, OS, CD, R]; Newhouse 
and Phelps (1974) [US, OS, CD, R]; Newhouse and Phelps (1976) [US, OS, CD, R]; 
Nolan (1993) [IR, OS, CD, R]; Scheffler (1984) [US, NS, CD, R]; Wedig (1988) [US, OS, 
CD, R]
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) +
Blendon et al (1992) [US, OS, CD, NR]; Christensen et al. (1987) [US, OS, CD, R]; 
Fleishman and Mor (1993) [US, OS, CD, R]; Freeman et al (1990) [US, OS, CD, NR]; 
Grana and Stuart (1996/1997) [US, OS, CD, R]; Hahn (1994) [US, OS, CD, R]; Link et 
al. (1980) [US, OS, CD, R]; McDonald et al (1974) [CA, NS, CD, NR]; Monheit et al. 
(1985) [US, OS, CD, NR]; Patrick et al. (1992) [US, OS, CD, R]
Primary (vs. none) 0 Link et al. (1980) [US, OS, CD, R]
Supplementary coverage (vs. 
none)
+ Buchmueller et al. (2002) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Buchmueller et al. (2004) [FR, OS, CD, R]; 
McCall et al. (1991) [US, OS, CD, R]; Vera-Herndndez (1999) [SP, OS, CD, R]
Public supplementary coverag: 
(vs. none)
+ Hurd and McGarry (1997) [US, OS, CD, R]
Country: AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; CH = Switzerland; FR = France; IR = Ireland;
JP = Japan; NE = the Netherlands; NZ = New Zealand; SP = Spain; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data
model
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
Across the various types of cost sharing tools that third-party payers can employ, most 
studies determined that cost sharing decreased the volume of physician and outpatient 
services demanded. The existence of some type of insurance coverage increased this 
volume, whether the insurance was primary or supplementary.
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There were a few studies that found no significant relationship between cost sharing 
and physician or outpatient services for some subgroups or particular types of 
physician visits. For instance Chiappori et al. (1988) determined that French patients 
were insensitive to changes in coinsurance for GP office and specialist visits but 
sensitive to price changes for GP home visits, likely because office visits were a 
cheaper substitute. Link et al. (1980) also determined that among chronically ill 
patients, there was no difference in physician visits between those with private 
insurance and those with no insurance, likely because chronically ill patients view 
medical care as a necessity. In line with the result from Link et al. (1980), Shapiro et 
al. (1986) found that cost sharing had no effect on physician visits among patients 
suffering from serious illnesses.
3.3.6. Physician and out patient care: the price elasticity of demand
Across Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States, a number of articles 
have calculated the price elasticity of demand, and both non-aggregate and aggregate 
estimates are available. The elasticity results from the literature are listed below in 
Table 3.7.
In terms of physician visits, almost all of the price elasticity estimates were less than 
one, ranging from -0.51 to -0.01, indicating that consumers are not particularly 
responsive to changes in out-of-pocket prices. Phelps (1975) may have obtained an 
elastic estimate because he calculated this elasticity at the mean co-payment rate. 
Since some individuals did not have insurance in the sample, these persons would 
have driven up the mean coinsurance rate, likely causing the elastic estimate. 
However, Feldstein (1970) obtained positive elasticity values for physician visits, and 
he argued that because of medical ethics, physicians are constrained in their ability to 
charge higher prices. To compensate physicians charge lower prices but are selective 
about which patients they choose to treat. This situation leads to excess demand, and 
thus the elasticity of demand for physician visits is positive. Colie and Grossman 
(1978) and Goldman and Grossman (1978) also considered a quality-adjusted price of 
physician visits and found estimates ranging from -0.04 to -0.03, although their 
estimates were insignificant. The relatively inelastic price elasticity values indicate 
that better perceptions of physician quality are correlated with less price sensitivity.
Most price elasticity estimates for outpatient visits were similar to the elasticity 
estimates for physician visits. In general, the estimates ranged from -0.22 to -0.06. 
Interestingly, the values from Feldstein (1970) were well above those in other studies, 
perhaps because Feldstein considered the period of 1948-1966. Medicare and 
Medicaid were not implemented until 1966 and thus the substantial group of 
uninsured or underinsured individuals in America during that period may have 
accounted for the large sensitivity to changes in out-of-pocket prices.
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Table 3.7. Physician and outpatient care: the price elasticity o f demand
Author (Year) Type o f cost sharing Elasticity (doctor visits)
Elasticity 
(outpatient visits)
Cockx and Brasseur (2003) [BE, NS, 
PD, R] Co-payment -0.18 t o -0.01
Colle and Grossman (1978) [US, OS, 
CD, R] Mixed system -0.15 t o -0.10
Feldstein (1970) [US, OS, TD, R] Mixed system 0.16 to 0.36 -1.05 t o -0.90
Fuchs and Kramer (1972) [US, OS, 
TD, R] Mixed system -0.36 to -0.06
Goldman and Grossman (1978) [US, 
OS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.11 t o -0.02
Manning et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, R] Coinsurance -0.21 t o -0.13
Newhouse (1993) [US, ES, CD, R] Coinsurance -0.22 t o -0.17
Newhouse and Phelps (1974) [US, OS, 
CD, R]
Mixed system -0.06
Newhouse and Phelps (1976) [US, OS, 
CD, R] Mixed system -0.08
Phelps (1975) [US, OS, CD, R] Coinsurance -1.38 t o -0.18
Phelps and Newhouse (1972) [US, NS, 
CD, NR] Coinsurance -0.14 t o -0.07
Phelps and Newhouse (1974) [US, NS, 
CD, R] Coinsurance -0.51 t o -0.28
Scitovsky and Snyder (1972) [US, NS, 
CD, NR] Coinsurance -0.14* -0.06“
Van de Voorde et al. (2001) [BE, NS, 
TD, R] Co-payment -0.39 t o -0.10
Wedig (1988) [US, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.23 t o -0.16
“calculated by this author using the arc elasticity formula:
= (te  -  Q\ )/(&+Q, )X te  + )K h  -P,))
Country: BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; NE = the Netherlands; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data
model
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
3.3.7. Conclusion on the literature related to cost sharing for medical services, 
inpatient care, and physician and outpatient care
By summing up the literature on cost sharing for medical services, inpatient care, and 
physician and outpatient care, we can infer what findings we might expect for 
prescription drugs. Across the different developed countries, subpopulations, and 
forms of cost sharing, the results were relatively consistent. That is, higher user fees 
decreased the volume of health care goods and services obtained. Given this 
consistent result, we would expect to find the same relationship between prescription 
charges and the demand for prescription drugs.
Of even more relevance to this thesis, though, is the price elasticity of demand, as we 
are interested in knowing whether the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs
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falls within the range of elasticities for medical care. Table 3.8 lists the main ranges of 
price elasticity estimates from the previous sections. Note that we only include the 
elasticity values for inpatient admissions as patients are less likely to have discretion 
over the inpatient length of stay.
Table 3.8. Health care: the price elasticity o f demand
Outcome variable Price elasticity
Medical care -0.20 t o -0.10
Inpatient care (admissions) -0.85 to -0.04
Physician and outpatient care -0.51 t o -0.01
Although the price elasticities of demand for each of the relevant outcome variables 
appear to be inelastic, there is a wide range of values from the literature. This seems 
to be due to the different populations considered, the types of medical care services 
examined, the statistical techniques employed, the time period considered, and a host 
of other factors. For instance, the elderly are likely to be less sensitive to price 
changes because they have a shorter time horizon within which to improve their 
health and because it generally takes more health inputs to improve the well-being of 
this group (Grossman, 1972). Another example of why estimates might differ is that 
some authors such as Rosenthal (1968) and Van Vliet (2004) looked at different types 
of medical care, such as specific types of surgery or GP and specialist care. The 
implication is that elasticity values might vary between different forms of medical 
care based on consumer preferences for those types of care, beliefs about utility, 
consensus in the medical literature on effectiveness, and other factors.
Given that most estimates seem to fall within between -0.30 and -0.04, we might 
hypothesize that among the general population, the demand for prescription drugs 
falls within a similar range. Importantly, this hypothesis requires that we look at 
prescription drugs as an entire class rather than at specific drugs or drug classes, as the 
price elasticity is likely to vary widely between these classes. A more interesting 
question is whether the prescription drug elasticity of demand lies near the upper or 
lower boundaries of this range or whether the elasticity is actually outside this range, 
as this offers more insight into how consumers value prescription drugs in comparison 
to other forms of medical care. This consideration is discussed in Chapter 8.
3.4. Literature review of cost sharing for prescription drugs
In contrast to physician visits where the patient is usually the primary decision-maker 
regarding whether to initiate contact, the patient has less input into the decision to 
initiate pharmaceutical treatment. The early literature on the subject, however, seemed 
more interested in establishing whether moral hazard in the area of prescription drugs 
existed and the extent to which moral hazard was a problem. Most papers have
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investigated the impact of specific cost sharing requirements on the demand for 
prescription drugs, although some have considered how the generosity of insurance 
influences the uptake of prescriptions. Later studies have moved away from 
quantifying the relationship between prescription charges and the demand for drugs 
and have focused more on the ability of patients to correctly value their medications. 
This literature has thus considered other outcome variables, such as the uptake of 
essential and non-essential medications and adherence to medicines.
Given the primary research questions in this dissertation, the main focus of this 
section is on two main outcome variables: the volume of prescription drugs purchased 
and the price elasticity of demand. However, as alluded to above, the literature has 
also addressed a number of other topics, for instance the use of essential and non- 
essential drugs, the use of substitutes and complements, and prescription drug 
expenditures, among others. To give the reader an idea of these additional topics, we 
provide tables of the literature and brief explanations of these tables in Appendix B. 
More comprehensive information on the methodology, results, and limitations of each 
study is also available in Appendix B.
Within each of the two main outcome variables, the literature related to the volume of 
prescription drugs purchased and the elasticity of demand is broken into three main 
groups: the general population, the elderly and chronically ill groups, and the low- 
income population. Specifically, we would expect the elderly and chronically ill to be 
the least sensitive to changes in cost sharing. Given the relationship between income 
and health (as a proxy for need), we also separate the discussion into low-income 
groups and the general population, as the effect of cost sharing is also likely to differ 
between these groups. The literature review is further categorized according to the 
specific form of cost sharing employed (e.g. co-payments or coinsurance).
Furthermore, in the section that covers the volume effect of user fees, we consider 
various independent variables that have been used in the literature as covariates.
These controls are important in that they provide guidance as to what personal and 
institutional factors are important predictors of the demand for prescription drugs and 
thus should be included in our empirical analysis if possible.
3.4.1. Prescription drugs: the effect of cost sharing on volume
The relationship between cost sharing for prescription drugs and the volume 
purchased provides an indication of whether any moral hazard effect exists in the 
prescription drug market. To get a feel for what has already been published in the 
literature and what has been found regarding this relationship, we provide the results 
of the studies that investigated the effect of cost sharing on volume in this section.
Prescription drug user fees: the general population
One place to start is to consider the general effect of cost sharing across the entire 
population. The volume effect for the general population is useful as a benchmark
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against the volume effect among other more vulnerable populations, and Table 3.9 
provides an overview of the literature that has focused on the general population.
There generally appears to be a negative relationship between prescription charges 
and drug use, regardless of the form(s) of cost sharing in place. In most cases 
insurance coverage had a positive effect on volume, while the existence of a limited 
(positive) list of prescription drugs qualifying for reimbursement had a negative effect 
(O’Brien, 1989; Ryan and Birch, 1991).
Table 3.9. Prescription drugs: the effect o f cost sharing on volume, the general 
population
Variable
Volume Studies
Co-payment -
Birch (1986) [UK, NS, CD, NR]; Brenna et al. (1984) [IT, NS, TD, R]; Cameron et 
al. (1988) [AU, OS, CD, R); Delnoij et al. (2000) [NE, NS, CD, R]; Gardner et al. 
(1996) [NZ, OS, CD, NR]; Harris et al. (1990) [US, NS, TD, NR]; Hughes and 
McGuire (1995) [US, NS, TD, R]; Lauterbach et al. (2000) [DE, OS, CD, R]; 
Lavers (1989) [UK, NS, TD, R]; Lundberg et al. (1988) [SW, OS, CD, R]; 
McManus et al. (1996) [AU, NS, TD, R]; O ’Brien (1989) [US, NS, TD, R]; Ryan 
and Birch (1991) [UK, NS, TD, R]; Smith and Watson (1990) [UK, OS, CD, R]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2- 
tiers)
0 Motheral and Henderson (1999) [US, NS, CD, R]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2- 
tiers) -
Fairman et al. (2003) [US, NS, CD, R]; Gibson et al. (2005) [US, NS, PD, R]; 
Landsman etal. (2005) [US, NS, TD, R]; Motheral and Fairman (2001) [US, NS, 
CD, R]
Coinsurance -
Foxman et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, R]; Liebowitz et al. (1985) [US, ES, CD, R]; 
Lohr et al. (1986) [US, ES, CD, NR]; Puig-Junoy (1988) [SP, OS, TD, R]; 
Steffensen et al. (1997) [DK, NS, CD, NR]
Deductible - Socialstyrelsen (1997) [SW, OS, CD, NR]
Mixed system -
Anderson et al. (2006) [SW, NS, TD, R]; Carrin and Van Dael (1991) [BE, OS, 
TD, R]; Grootendorst and Levine (2001) [CA, OS, CD, R]; Smith (1993) [US, OS, 
CD, R]; Van Vliet et al. (1999) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Mixed system 0 Anderson et al. (2006) [SW, NS, TD, R], Ong et al. (2003) [SW, NS, TD, R]
Change from
co-payment to coinsurance . Van Doorslaer (1984) [BE, NS, TD, R]
coinsurance to deductible - Friis et al. (1993) [DK, NS, CD, NR]
Insurance coverage 
Primary (vs. none) + Danzon and Pauly (2002) [US, OS, CD, NR]
Supplementary (vs. none) +
Caussat and Glaude (1993) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Greenlick and Darsky (1968) [CA, 
OS, CD, NR]; Weeks (1973) [US, NS, CD, NR]
Limited list + O’Brien (1989) [US, NS, TD, R]; Ryan and Birch (1991) [UK, NS, TD, R]
Country: AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; FR = France; 
IT = Italy; NE = the Netherlands; NZ = New Zealand; SP = Spain; SW = Sweden; UK = United 
Kingdom; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
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A few studies found no relationship between cost sharing and volume. Interestingly, 
two different Swedish articles (Anderson et al., 2006; Ong et al., 2003) found no 
effect of increased cost sharing on use, possibly because prescriptions were heavily 
subsidized, particularly for individuals suffering from chronic diseases (Anderson et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, other cost sharing changes, such as the introduction of multi­
tier formularies, may negatively affect the volume of drugs that become relatively 
more expensive under these policies but may have little impact on overall volume as 
patients switch to less expensive medications.
In summary, among the general population there appears to be some sensitivity to 
changes in out-of-pocket prices, and this sensitivity seems to depend on the country- 
specific context. For instance, countries with low overall user fees or a large 
proportion of heavily subsidized individuals may appear to have little sensitivity to 
user fees on average. This highlights the importance of considering the demographic, 
cultural, and institutional factors of each country when discussing the policy 
implications of demand-side cost sharing.
Prescription drug user fees: the older and chronically ill populations
We would expect that compared with the general population, those who are older or 
chronically ill are less sensitive to out-of-pocket price changes. Both groups require 
more health care resources to regain good health. The elderly may feel that there are 
fewer substitutes for prescription drugs, particularly because they may not have the 
time in which to implement lifestyle changes for health improvements. Meanwhile, 
the chronically ill may perceive their medications as necessary to survival or well­
being and thus be averse to reducing consumption. Table 3.10 provides an overview 
of the literature related to cost sharing and the use of prescription drugs among those 
who are older or taking medications for chronic illnesses.
Most of the literature has found a negative relationship between cost sharing and the 
volume of medications purchased. While a handful of papers found either no 
relationship or a positive link, all of these studies considered chronically ill 
populations. For instance, Anderson et al. (2006) examined a group of patients taking 
medications for some chronic illnesses in Sweden. They found that co-payments only 
had a negative effect immediately after implementation, but subsequent increases in 
the co-payment had no effect on consumption. Blais et al. (2001) and Pilote et al. 
(2002) also investigated a sample of individuals with serious chronic conditions. Their 
insignificant results implied that individuals with serious chronic conditions may be 
more willing to forego spending on other goods or services to purchase prescription 
drugs. Along these lines, Stuart et al. (2000) determined that cost sharing had no 
effect on a nursing home sample. Not only is this sample likely to be insensitive to 
price because of the reasons given above, but caretakers may be making the decisions 
regarding medications on behalf of nursing home residents and thus may feel that the 
patient’s health is their obligation.
Grootendorst and Levine (2001) obtained a small positive correlation between price 
and volume among older people in Canada, perhaps because public drug coverage for
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seniors in Canada is relatively generous, and older people may perceive few 
substitutes for prescription drugs (Grootendorst and Levine, 2001).
Table 3.10. Prescription drugs: the effect o f cost sharing on volume, the elderly and 
chronically ill
Variable Volume Studies
Co-payment -
Anessi Pessina (1997) [IT, OS, TD, R]; Anis et al. (2005) [CA, OS, PD, R]; Balkrishnan et 
al. (2001) [US, NS, PD, R]; Begg (1984) [UK, OS, CD, NR]; Gardner et al. (1997) [US, 
NS, TD, R]; Hux et al. (1997) [CA, NS, CD, R]; Johnson et al. (1997a) [US, NS, CD, R]; 
Johnson et al. (1997b) [US, NS, CD, R]; McManus et al. (1996) [AU, NS, TD, R]; Scott et 
al. (1990) [US, NS, CD, NR]; Starmans et al. (1994) [NE, NS, TD, R]; Watt et al. (1992) 
[NZ, NS, CD, NR]
Co-payment 0 Soumerai et al. (1987)1 [US, NS, TD, R]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- 
or 2-tiers) - Rector et al. (2003) [US, OS, CD, R]
Coinsurance - Johnson et al. (1997a) [US, NS, CD, R]; Johnson et al. (1997b) [US, NS, CD, R]
Deductible - Blais et al. (1999)' [CA, NS, TD, R]
Mixed system -
Anderson et al. (2006) [SW, NS, TD, R]; Carrin and Van Dael2 (1991) [BE, OS, TD, R]; 
Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, R]; Li et al. (2006)' [CA, NS, PD, R]; Tamblyn 
et al. (2001)' [CA, NS, TD, R]
Mixed system + Grootendorst and Levine (2001) [CA, OS, CD, R]
Mixed system 0 Anderson et al. (2006) [SW, NS, TD, R]
Change from
co-payment to coinsurance - Van Doorslaer (1984)1 [BE, NS, TD, R]
co-payment to deductible 
and coinsurance - Tamblyn et al. (2001)1 [CA, NS, TD, R]
coinsurance to deductible 
and coinsurance - Blais et al. (2003)1 [CA, NS, TD, R]
coinsurance to deductible 
and coinsurance 0 Blais et al. (2001) [CA, NS, TD, R]; Pilote et al. (2002) [CA, NS, CD, R]
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) +
Artz et al. (2002) [US, OS, CD, R]; Coulson and Stuart (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; 
Fillenbaum et al. (1993) [US, OS, CD, R]; Gianfrancesco et al. (1994) [US, NS, CD, NR]; 
Shih (1999) [US, OS, CD, R]
Primary (vs. none) 0 Stuart et al. (2000) [US, OS, CD, R]
Coulson and Stuart (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; Fillenbaum et al. (1993) [US, OS, CD, R];
. ,  . Coulson eta l. (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; Davis e ta l. (1999) [US, OS, CD, NR];
supplementary (vs. none; + Grootendorst et al. (1997) [CA, OS, CD, R]; Poisal and Chulis (2000) [US, OS, CD, NR];
Poisal and Murray (2001) [US, OS, CD, NR]; Stuart et al. (2000) [US, OS, CD, R]
Prescription limit - Soumerai et al. (1987)' [US, NS, TD, R]; Soumerai et al. (1994)' [US, NS, TD, R]
Reimbursement limit - Hsu et al. (2006) [US, OS, PD, R]
Country: AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; IT = Italy; NE = the Netherlands; NZ = New  
Zealand; SW = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States 
Type o f study: NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model 
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
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Thus, it appears that in some cases chronic drug users may not be sensitive to changes 
in their out-of-pocket costs, at least at the levels of cost sharing observed in these 
studies.
Prescription drug user fees: the low-income population
The relationship between user fees and consumption among the low-income 
population may be different than among the elderly, chronic users, and the general 
population. On the one hand, with less disposable income to spend on prescription 
drugs, low-income individuals may be more likely than other subgroups to reduce 
consumption when faced with user fees. On the other hand, the experience of the low- 
income group may tend more toward that of the elderly and the chronically ill because 
there is a positive relationship between income and good health (Macinko et al.,
2003). Moreover, low-income groups in most developed countries, including the 
United States, generally receive greater subsidies for prescription drugs, and thus 
empirical studies may measure these groups on a lower portion of the demand curve. 
To shed more light on these possibilities, Table 3.11 provides an overview of the 
literature that has examined cost sharing among the low-income group.
Table 3.11. Prescription drugs: the effect o f cost sharing on volume, the low-income 
groups
V ariable Volume Studies
Co-payment -
Begg (1984) [UK, OS, CD, NR]; Brian and G ibbens (1974) [US, ES, CD, NR]; 
L u rk  et al. (2004) [US, NS, CD, R]; Nelson et al. (1984) [US, OS, TD, R]; Reeder 
and Nelson (1985) [US, NS, TD, R]
Co-payment 0 Reeder and Nelson (1985) [US, NS, TD, R]; Soum erai e t al. (1987)2 [US, NS, TD, 
R]
Coinsurance - M artin  and McM illan (1996) [US, NS, TD, R]
Deductible - Blais et al. (1999)' [CA, NS, TD, R]
Mixed system -
C arrin  and Van Dael2 (1991) [BE, OS, TD, R]; G rootendorst and Levine (2001) 
[CA, OS, CD, R]; Li et al. (2006)'2 [CA, NS, PD, R]; T am blyn  e ta l. (2001)2 [CA, 
NS, TD, R]
Change from
co-payment to coinsurance - Van D oorslaer (1984)2 [BE, NS, TD, R]
co-payment to deductible 
and coinsurance - Tam blyn et al. (2001)2 [CA, NS, TD, R]
coinsurance to deductible 
and coinsurance Blais et al. (2003)1 [CA, NS, TD, R]
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) + Sm ith and G arner (1974) [US, NS, CD, NR]
Supplementary (vs. none) + G rootendorst et al. (1997) [CA, OS, CD, R]
Prescription limit 
1____ T
- Soum erai et al. (1987)2 [US, NS, TD, R]; Soum erai et al. (1994)1 [US, NS, TD, R]
2_____ • . . .  -------------------------------------------------
Country: BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States 
Type o f study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study 
Type o f data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model 
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
44
Chapter 3
The findings were relatively consistent across the literature; user fees reduced 
consumption of prescription drugs, regardless of the form of cost sharing employed. 
Only two papers found no significant relationship between cost sharing and the 
volume of drugs obtained among the poor (Reeder and Nelson, 1985; Soumerai et al., 
1987).
The results from Reeder and Nelson (1985) were varied as they found that the 
implementation of a $0.50 co-payment led to lower use for some therapeutic groups, 
but not all therapeutic groups experienced a significant decline (e.g. analgesics and 
sedatives). Factors such as substitutes for drugs within the therapeutic groups, 
patients’ and physicians’ perceptions of the necessity of drugs within these groups, 
and others may be important reasons for the differences in significance. Soumerai et 
al. (1987) found that when a limit on the number of prescriptions among the Medicaid 
population in the US was applied, there was a decrease in drug consumption among 
this group. However, when the prescription cap was replaced with a $1 co-payment, 
consumption resumed to the pre-cap levels. The likely reason for this is two-fold: 
first, there is a psychological effect of receiving better coverage after a reduction in 
generosity even if the latest coverage is not as generous as the initial coverage 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Second, the $1 co-payment was relatively minor and 
could be waved if the patient was unable to afford that amount.
Overall, it appears that low-income groups are sensitive to price changes, although the 
degree of this sensitivity is discussed later in this chapter when we look at price 
elasticity estimates for prescription drugs.
3.4.2. Prescription drugs: the effect of other covariates on volume
While the primary focus of this dissertation is on prescription drug user fees, it is 
important to control for other factors that may influence the demand for prescription 
drugs. Otherwise, the prescription charges variable may pick up the effect of these 
other factors. In line with the Section 3.5.1, we classify the relevant literature 
according to the population considered: (i) the general population, (ii) the elderly and 
the chronically ill, and (iii) the low-income group. While the determinants of demand 
for prescription drugs might be relatively similar across the three populations we 
consider, the importance of specific factors might differ between populations. For 
example, age could have a positive effect in the general population but a negative 
effect within the elderly as the oldest of the elderly may be unable to handle a large 
cocktail of drugs. As a result, the following section discusses the findings from the 
literature in light of these potential differences. Because we are interested in the effect 
of user fees at the individual-level, the discussion of the literature in this section is 
restricted to studies that have examined cost sharing at the micro-level.
Other determinants o f demand for prescription drugs: the general population
As a baseline comparator for other more vulnerable populations, we begin by 
examining the influence of different determinants on the volume of prescription drugs
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obtained among the general population. Table 3.12 provides an overview of the 
findings.
Among the general population we would expect that being female, older, having more 
education, and being in poor health would have a positive effect on the volume of 
medications purchased. The effect of household size on consumption measured at the 
individual-level is likely to be negative as disposable income must be divided between 
more members. The influence of income, however, might go either way in an 
empirical study. While we would expect the effect of income to be positive according 
to traditional economic theory, there is also the consideration that the physician is 
making the primary decisions regarding which medications are necessary. Given the 
positive relationship between income and health (Macinko et al., 2003), if  health is 
not fully controlled for in the regression, income may pick up some o f its effects, and 
thus income may exhibit a negative effect on volume.
Table 3.12. Prescription drugs: the effect other covariates on volume, the general 
population
Variable Volume Studies
Female + Foxman et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, R]; Cameron et al. (1988) [AU, OS, CD, R]; Caussat and Glaude (1993) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Motheral and Henderson (1999) [US, NS, CD, R]
Age +
Cameron et al. (1988) [AU, OS, CD, R]; Smith and Watson (1990) [UK, OS, CD, R); 
Caussat and Glaude (1993) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Lundberg et al. (1988) [SW, OS, CD, R]; 
Motheral and Henderson (1999) [US, NS, CD, R]
Income + Caussat and Glaude (1993) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Van Vliet et al. (1999) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Income -
Foxman et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, R]; Smith and W atson (1990) [UK, OS, CD, R]; Van 
Vliet et al. (1999) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Education + Lundberg et al. (1998) [SW, OS, CD, R]
Household size - Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Poor health +
Foxman et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, R]; Cameron et al. (1988) [AU, OS, CD, R]; Smith 
and Watson (1990) [UK, OS, CD, R]; Van Vliet et al. (1999) [NE, OS, CD, R]; Van Vliet 
(2001) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Physical health problems + Cameron et al. (1988) [AU, OS, CD, R]; Caussat and Glaude (1993) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Chronic illness + Cameron et al. (1988) [AU, OS, CD, R]; Motheral and Henderson (1999) [US, NS, CD, R]; Van Vliet et al. (1999) [NE, OS, CD, R]; Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Country: AU = Australia; FR = France; NE = the Netherlands; SW = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; 
US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques
In line with the explanation above regarding the effects of various covariates on 
volume, the findings from the literature are relatively consistent with the expected 
results. As mentioned above, the effect of income could be positive or negative, and 
interestingly, there were mixed results in the literature regarding this variable. Van 
Vliet et al. (1999), for instance, found that income increased volume up to a certain
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point, beyond which there was a negative association between the two variables. The 
other varying income results were likely due to institutional factors in the populations 
studied. Specifically, the Caussat and Glaude (1993) paper considered demand for 
prescription drugs in France, where the low-income population was generally less 
protected from user fees than their higher-income counterparts at the given time. As 
the high-income group generally purchased supplementary prescription drug 
insurance, this may have explained the positive association between income and 
volume, particularly if the insurance variable did not fully control for this effect of 
insurance in Caussat and Glaude’s regression. Notably, in the other studies that found 
a positive effect of income, the low-income population had greater subsidies for 
prescription drugs than the higher-income population.
Other determinants o f demand fo r  prescription drugs: the elderly and chronically 
ill
Among the elderly and chronically ill, certain determinants of demand, for instance 
age and morbidity, may play a different role than in the general population. To 
account for these possibilities, we provide the findings from the literature that 
examined these subgroups in Table 3.13.
Table 3.13. Prescription drugs: the effect other covariates on volume, the elderly and 
chronically ill
Variable Volume Studies
Female + Shih (1999) [US, OS, CD, R]; Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, R]
Age + Grootendorst et al. (1997) [CA, OS, CD, R]
Age -
Coulson and Stuart (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; Coulson et al. (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; 
Shih (1999) [US, OS, CD, R]; Kiick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, R]
White (vs. other race) + Fillenbaum et al. (1993) [US, OS, CD, R]; Shih (1999) [US, OS, CD, R]
Income -
Coulson and Stuart (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; Grootendorst et al. (1997) [CA, OS, CD,
R]
Education + Shih (1999) [US, OS, CD, R]
Household size + Grootendorst et al. (1997) [CA, OS, CD, R]
Poor health + Coulson and Stuart (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; Grootendorst et al. (1997) [CA, OS, CD, R]; Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, R]
Physical health problems + Coulson and Stuart (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]
Number o f  limitations to activities 
o f  daily living
+ Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, R]
Chronic illness + Coulson and Stuart (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, R]
Prior hospitalization + Fillenbaum et al. (1993) [US, OS, CD, R]; Coulson and Stuart (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, R]
Number o f  doctor/outpatient visits + Fillenbaum et al. (1993) [US, OS, CD, R]; Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD,
R]
Country: CA = Canada; US = United States
Type o f study: OS = observational study
Type o f  data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques
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The factors that we would expect to have a positive influence on consumption are: 
education, poor health, and greater past consumption of medical care. In the elderly 
population, age could have a mixed effect. Specifically, a number of chronic 
conditions tend to afflict individuals when they are near-elderly or young-elderly, 
causing a sharp rise in expenditures (Zweifel et al., 1999). Advances in medicines 
have allowed these individuals to live longer in a healthier state. Evidence from other 
research on aging and expenditures (Kildemoes et al., 2005) indicates that prescription 
drug consumption rises with age but seems to peak between 60 and 70 years of age 
and either levels off or decline afterwards. Also, among the oldest of the elderly, the 
use of numerous medications increases the risk of adverse events (Gurwitz and Avom, 
1991) such that physicians may prescribe fewer medications for this group.
In countries like the United States where the public health insurance system for the 
elderly only recently began offering any help for most outpatient prescription 
medications, the elderly face more difficulty obtaining prescription drug insurance 
and face higher premiums, higher cost sharing requirements, and exclusions for pre­
existing conditions and certain medications under any insurance they can acquire. 
These circumstances may exacerbate the effects of aging on health consumption, 
causing a sharper decline in consumption as the elderly age.
The effect of income could be either positive or negative for the reasons explained 
above. Furthermore, the effect of household size could also be positive or negative. 
While larger households may have to spread disposable income among more 
members, larger households with elderly or chronically ill members may actually 
have a positive effect on consumption for these individuals if other family members 
are involved in their prescription purchase decisions.
In terms of the empirical results, there were mixed results for age, although these 
variations are likely due to the country-specific contexts. For reasons listed above, 
older populations in the United States may experience sharper declines in prescription 
drug consumption as they age. The same may not be true in Canada if the effect of 
generous insurance outweighs other factors that may lead to a negative relationship 
between aging and drug consumption. Interestingly, all of the studies that found a 
negative relationship between aging and volume were from America, while the one 
study that found a positive relationship was from Canada (Grootendorst et al., 1997).
The income findings were also interesting. The two studies that found an effect of this 
variable determined that the effect was negative (Coulson and Stuart, 1995; 
Grootendorst et al., 1997), perhaps because the poorest of the elderly in these samples 
were heavily subsidized for prescription drugs.
Other determinants o f demandfor prescription drugs: the low-income groups 
There were no papers that reported the effect of individual-specific covariates, such as 
income, age, and health, on die volume of prescription drugs obtained among the low- 
income population.
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3.4.3. Prescription drugs: the price elasticity of demand
As discussed earlier in Section 3.4.2, the price elasticity of demand provides a clearer 
picture for policymakers and researchers as it offers a unitless measure that quantifies 
the effect of cost sharing on use. Because the elasticity can differ vastly between 
different subpopulations, we again break the discussion into three main groups: (i) the 
general population, (ii) the elderly and chronically ill, and (iii) the low-income 
population. While we would expect the elderly and chronically ill to be the least 
sensitive to price changes, it is not clear whether the general population or the low- 
income group are more sensitive to user fees. While low-income groups have less 
disposable income to spend on prescription drugs, they may also be more protected 
from user fees than the general population. Thus, empirical studies of the low-income 
group may measure the effect of cost sharing at a lower point on the demand curve.
In some cases the authors of a paper may have reported an elasticity other than the arc 
or point elasticity. Where possible we have recalculated their estimates to reflect the 
standard definitions of elasticity. Whether we used an arc, point, or constant elasticity 
calculation depended on the type of statistical analysis used and the information 
reported by the authors. The elasticity values that have been recalculated are marked 
in the table.
Price elasticity o f demand for prescription drugs: the general population
Examining the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs at the level of the 
general population is useful for two main reasons: (i) it provides an average estimate 
for policymakers who are interested in determining the effect of cost sharing changes 
at the population level, and (ii) it provides a baseline against which we can assess the 
price elasticity of demand among other more vulnerable populations. Table 3.14 
provides the existing price elasticity estimates for the general population.
At the aggregate level the price elasticity values range from -0.80 to -0.09, while at 
the individual-level the elasticity values ranged from -0.58 to -0.02. While the range 
of estimates is rather large for both types of datasets, macroeconomic estimates appear 
to be higher than the microeconomic estimates, a result that is not surprising given the 
greater noise in aggregate datasets. The wide range of estimates at the individual level 
is likely to due study-specific factors such as the extent of prescription drug subsidies 
in the population, the magnitude of the cost sharing increase, unmeasured general 
attitudes toward prescription drugs, and other factors.
The range of elasticity values for brand-name drugs is even larger (-1.60 to -0.03).
This result can be expected, though, given that the demand for brand-name drugs 
should be very inelastic when there are few therapeutic and no molecular substitutes 
and much higher when there are generic drugs available. The price elasticity for 
generics also varied widely, likely due to the availability of other generic and 
therapeutic substitutes.
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Table 3.14. Prescription drugs: the price elasticity o f demand, the general population
Study Type o f cost sharing Price elasticity Price elasticity (brand)
Price elasticity 
(generic)
Carrin and Van Dael (1991) [BE, 
OS, TD, R] Mixed system -0.35
Gibson et al. (2005) [US, NS, PD, R] Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1 -or 2-tiers) -0.04 -0.27 to -0.03
Grootendorst and Levine (2001) 
[CA, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.04
Harris et al. (1990) [US, NS, TD, 
NR] Co-payment -0.17® to -0.06*
Hughes and McGuire (1995) [US, 
NS, TD, R] Co-payment -0.37 to -0.32
Lavers (1989) [UK, NS, TD, R] Co-payment -0.22
Liebowitz et al. (1985) [US, ES, CD,
R]
Coinsurance -0.10b
McManus et al. (1996) [AU, NS, 
TD, R] Co-payment -0.80® to -0.50*
Mortimer (1997) [US, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -1.60 t o -0.07 -0.56 to -0.03
Motheral and Henderson (1999) 
[US, NS, CD, R1
Multi-tier formulary 
(vs. 1 -or 2-tiers) -0.32*
O’Brien (1989) [US, NS, TD, R] Co-payment -0.64 to -0.23
Puig-Junoy (1988) [SP, OS, TD, R] Coinsurance -0.13
Ryan and Birch (1991) [UK, NS, 
TD, R] Co-payment -0.11 t o -0.09
Smith (1993) [US, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.10
Smith and W atson (1990) [UK, OS, 
CD, R] Co-payment -0.58b
Van Doorslaer (1984) [BE, NS, TD,
R]
Change from co­
payment to coinsurance -0.60
Van Vliet et al. (1999) [NE, OS, CD, 
R]
Deductible -0.02
“calculated by this author using the arc elasticity formula:
= ( t o  -  a  ) / t o  +  a  )X te  + ^  ) / t e  -  p, ))•
bcalculated by this author using a log-linear calculation: = BjX, where Bj represents the coefficient
on the price variable and X  is the mean price.
Calculated by this author using the point elasticity formula: ed =  ((Q2 -  Qx )/(£}, )\(P\ ) /(P 2 “  f  ))
Country: AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; FR = France; IT = Italy; NE = the
Netherlands; SP = Spain; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model
Price elasticity o f demand fo r  prescription drugs: the elderly and chronically ill
In general, we would expect the elderly and chronically ill groups to be less sensitive 
to increases in user fees. To determine if this is indeed the case, Table 3.15 lists the 
price elasticity values from the literature for the elderly and chronically ill 
populations.
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Among the elderly and chronically ill, the price elasticity values range from -0.40 to - 
0.09 at the aggregate level and from -0.56 to 0.14 at the micro-level. Interestingly, the 
range of values is larger at the micro-level, which is likely due to the specific context 
of each study. The positive estimate of 0.14 (Grootendorst and Levine, 2001) 
indicated that among older Canadians, demand for prescription drugs actually 
increased as price increased (albeit by a small proportion). This may have been due to 
unobservable variables; in particular, when out-of-pocket costs rise and patients face 
flat fees, physicians may increase prescription sizes to ease the financial burden. 
Alternatively, when patients face out-of-pocket costs proportional to actual drug costs, 
doctors may prescribe cheaper drugs (Grootendorst and Levine, 2001). At the other 
extreme Klick and Stratmann (2005) found an estimate of -0.58, although the authors 
excluded those with Medicaid and employer-sponsored insurance, and the remaining 
sample was likely to be the most sensitive to price changes.
Table 3.15. Prescription drugs: the price elasticity o f demand, the elderly and 
chronically ill
Study Type of cost sharing Price elasticity
Anessi Pessina (1997) [IT, OS, TD, R] Co-payment -0.75 to -0.07
Carrin and Van Dael (1991 )b [BE, OS, TD, R] Mixed system -0.09
Coulson and Stuart (1995)b [US, OS, CD, R] Primary insurance (vs. none) -0.18*
Gardner et al. (1997) [US, NS, TD, R] Co-payment -0.38 to -0.23
Grootendorst and Levine (2001) [CA, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.40 to 0.14
Grootendorst et al. (1997) [CA, OS, CD, R] Supplementary insurance (vs. none) -0.13* t o -0.09“
Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.56
Li et al. (2006) [CA, NS, PD, R] Mixed system -0.20b to -0.11
Soumerai et al. (1987)b [US, NS, TD, R] Co-payment -0.05*
Van Doorslaer (1984) [BE, NS, TD, R] Change from co-payment to coinsurance -0.40 to -0.06
Calculated by this author using the arc elasticity formula: ed = ((Q2 - Qj/ iQ + Q\)X(p + T)/(p ~ ^i))- 
bsubgroup also includes low-income individuals
Country: AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; FR = France; IT = Italy; NE = the
Netherlands; SP = Spain; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model
Although economic theory leads to a prediction that demand would be relatively 
inelastic among the elderly and the chronically ill, this is not what has been found in 
the literature. Overall, it is unclear what the true range of price elasticities for this 
group should be.
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Price elasticity o f demand fo r  prescription drugs: the low-income group
As discussed earlier the sensitivity to prescription charges among the poor could 
either be significantly lower or higher than among the general population. A few 
papers from the literature have considered the elasticity among this subpopulation, 
and the results from these studies are provided in Table 3.16.
Table 3.16. Prescription drugs: the price elasticity o f demand, the low-income 
population1a
Study Type o f cost sharing Price elasticity Price elasticity (brand)
Price elasticity 
(generic)
Carrin and Van Dael (1991)b [BE, 
OS, TD, R] Mixed system -0.09
Coulson and Stuart (1995)b [US, 
OS, CD, R]
Primary insurance (vs. 
none) -0.18*
Grootendorst and Levine (2001) 
[CA, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.10
Li et al. (2006)b [CA, NS, PD, R] Mixed system -0.20b
Mortimer (1997) [US, OS, CD, R] Mixed system -1.91 t o -1.66 -0.65 to -0.35
Nelson et al. (1984) [US, OS, TD, R] Co-payment -0.06*
Soumerai et al. (1987)b [US, NS, 
TD, R] Co-payment
trx
O9
Van Doorslaer (1984)* [BE, NS, TD,
R]
Change from co­
payment to coinsurance -0.40
“calculated by this author using the arc elasticity formula:
= ((&  - e , ) / ( &  + e ,) X t e
bsubgroup also includes the elderly
Country: AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; FR = France; IT = Italy; NE = the
Netherlands; SP = Spain; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Type o f study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model
At the aggregate level there were two studies from Belgium (Carrin and Van Dael, 
1991; Van Doorslaer, 1984) and two studies from the United States (Nelson et al., 
1984; Soumerai et al., 1987). The range of price elasticities was from -0.40 to -0.05. 
The wide range of elasticity estimates may have occurred because the Belgian studies 
had relatively few observations.
At the micro-level Grootendorst and Levine (2001) obtained an estimate of -0.10, 
while Li et al. (2006) also reported an estimate o f -0.20. Both of these estimates were 
from British Columbia, Canada. In the United States we calculated a price elasticity of 
-0.18 from Coulson and Stuart (1995). It is not clear whether we should expect lower 
elasticity estimates from Canada, though. On the one hand, Canadians can substitute 
free inpatient, outpatient, and physician care for prescription drugs. On the other hand, 
low-income individuals in Canada are relatively well protected from user fees. In the 
case of the estimate from Grootendorst and Levine (2001), it seems that the effect of
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measuring prescription charges along the low-end of the demand curve outweighed 
the ability of Canadians to substitute free core health care services. However, Li et al. 
(2006) found a higher elasticity estimate among the poor, and their sample consisted 
of individuals with rheumatoid arthritis who we would expect to be less sensitive to 
price.
The wide range of estimates for generic and brand-name drugs from Mortimer (1997) 
is expected given that elasticities can vary significantly based on the number of 
therapeutic and generic substitutes available. The author considered all of these 
possibilities, from drugs with monopoly status to drugs with a significant number of 
competitors.
In sum, the price elasticity for the low-income population appears to depend on the 
country-specific context (particularly whether the low-income population is well 
protected from user fees), whether the measure is for a specific groups of drugs, the 
availability of substitutes, and whether the elasticity is measured at the aggregate or 
individual level. More research is clearly needed to shed light on the topic.
3.4.4. Prescription drugs: conclusions related to the literature review
Section 3.4 has covered the two main outcome variables from the literature on cost 
sharing for prescription drugs: the volume of prescription drugs purchased and the 
price elasticity of demand. Across the general population, the elderly and chronically 
ill group, and the low-income population, user fees lowered the demand for 
prescription drugs, regardless of the form of cost sharing employed. Meanwhile, 
insurance coverage increased the volume of drugs demanded, whether it was primary 
or supplementary insurance coverage.
In addition to the cost sharing variable, the main determinants of demand appear to be 
gender, age, income, and health, although other variables such as education and race 
have sometimes been found to be important. The effect of these variables, however, 
seems to depend on the sample characteristics. Age, for instance, exhibits a negative 
effect beyond a certain point in samples of elderly Americans. Yet, the opposite effect 
is generally picked up in estimations on the general population, the low-income 
group, or elderly individuals in other countries like Canada. Another interesting 
observation is that only a few of the estimations accounted for individual-specific 
factors that may be not be measurable, such as consumer preferences for medical care 
and wealth, even though the failure to account for these may bias the results.
In terms of the price elasticity of demand, Table 3.17 lists the main micro-level 
elasticity ranges found for each of the three subpopulations that we considered.
The large range of prescription drug price elasticity values for the general population 
offers little insight into an average value for this group. There were not many studies 
that considered the low-income population, but interestingly, elasticity estimates from 
the existing studies were relatively low (in absolute value).
53
Chapter 3
Table 3.17. Prescription drugs: the price elasticity o f demand
Population group Price elasticity
General population -0.58 to -0.02
Elderly and chronically ill -0.56 to 0.14
Low-income population -0.20 to -0.05
Although it is clear that the general population and the low-income population are 
relatively insensitive to changes in out-of-pocket prices, it is possible that the elderly 
could be relatively insensitive or unaffected by out-of-pocket price changes. While we 
would expect some variation in elasticity estimates, the ranges of estimates for the 
elderly and chronically ill are rather large, and it is difficult to determine if the 
midpoint is even close to a “true” estimate for this group. The implication of these 
estimate ranges is that more research is needed in the area.
3.5. Limitations of cost sharing studies
While a number of conclusions have been drawn from this literature review, it is 
important to keep in mind that several limitations can occur in the design and use of 
datasets. There are always limitations to the datasets employed, and the assumptions 
and statistical techniques employed by various authors are not always robust. This 
section discusses a few of the main limitations that typically occur in statistical studies 
of cost sharing. More detailed information regarding the specific limitations of each 
study is available in Appendix B, Table B.14.
Problems may arise when datasets are limited to certain subpopulations such as 
individuals with employer-sponsored insurance or persons attending a certain health 
care clinic. These studies inform the reader about how cost sharing influences the 
demand for prescription drugs among specific populations, however, the findings may 
not be extendable to other populations. For example, individuals in employer- 
sponsored plans may be healthier and may have more income than an average person 
in the population.
Of the studies that do analyze a larger population of individuals, many only use cross- 
sectional data. There are a number of disadvantages to using cross-sectional datasets, 
including omitted variable bias and an inability to account for the dynamics of 
change, but these issues are discussed in Appendix B.l.
Another limitation may surface because all or some of the variables in a dataset are 
self-reported. Individuals sometimes have an incentive to hide or skew information, 
often fearing that the data will not be kept confidential. Particularly with self-reported 
health status, individuals with the same condition and the same level of severity may 
have different perspectives of their health status based on their own perceptions of 
pain and suffering, their cultural background, their reaction to prescribed drugs, and
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other factors. These unmeasured differences in individual responses may bias the 
results.
The statistical method used in the analysis also affects the quality of the results. 
Endogeneity can occur through different pathways. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
existence of adverse selection in a private insurance market may cause endogeneity 
problems. Specifically, the insurance contracts available on the market are affected by 
high-risk consumers who do not reveal their risk characteristics, and these unobserved 
risk characteristics of each consumer influence both the preferred insurance contract 
and the number of prescription drugs consumed. Another source of endogeneity may 
occur because individuals that are more likely to purchase insurance are also more 
likely to increase their consumption of prescription drugs once they have insurance. 
Although it may be impossible to determine the source of endogeneity, a failure to 
account for endogeneity from any source may mean that the estimates will be biased 
and inconsistent and that the statistical tests will be invalid (Dougherty, 2002). A third 
source of endogeneity may occur if the co-payment variable is computed from a non­
linear price schedule (for instance, there is a mix of deductibles, co-payments, 
coinsurance, and/or out-of-pocket limits); in this case the average co-payment 
depends on the level of consumption.
A significant number of studies, particularly from the United States where a large 
proportion of insurance is purchased in the private market, did not account for 
endogeneity issues when there was potential for these to exist, indicating that 
coefficients on the cost sharing variables may have been biased. Another problem that 
may occur is sample selection; in this situation the dependent variable is only 
observed for a restricted, non-random sample. For example, consumption of 
prescription drugs is only observed for individuals that purchase any prescription 
drugs. Some individuals may have no need for any prescriptions in a given year, but 
we would like to know how cost sharing would influence their demand for 
prescriptions if they did fall ill. Because there is a concentration of zeros for 
individuals that purchased no prescription drugs in a given year, regression estimates 
that do not account for sample selection will be biased.
Although insurance typically increases the number of prescriptions that an individual 
demands, there is uncertainty as to whether the marginal benefits of these 
prescriptions outweigh the marginal cost. Based on the data, the researcher is often 
unable to determine whether additional prescriptions are inappropriate or suboptimal 
for the patient. This measurement problem is confounded by the fact that doctors may 
unknowingly prescribe nonessential treatments. Determining whether the 
prescriptions obtained are appropriate would be useful in estimating whether cost 
sharing has a negative influence on the future health of individuals.
3.6. Gaps in the literature on cost sharing for prescription drugs
While there have been a number of different outcome variables considered in the 
literature as highlighted in this chapter and Appendix B, important questions still 
remain, particularly given some of the limitations of studies highlighted in the
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previous section. Many of these issues are related to the relationship between equity, 
the inappropriate use of medications, the true value of the welfare loss of prescription 
drug insurance, and the use of new technologies, but the consideration of these issues 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Thus, this section focuses on the gaps in the literature related to the price elasticity of 
demand. The relationship between user fees and the volume of prescription drugs 
obtained has been well-answered in the literature. Whether or not the analysis was 
robust, virtually all papers have found that cost sharing reduces the number of drugs 
demanded. Nonetheless, because the relationship between user fees and the volume of 
prescription drugs naturally falls out of the calculation of the price elasticity of 
demand, we provided an overview of the literature on this particular dependent 
variable.
A more interesting area is the analysis of the price elasticity of demand because it 
quantifies the relationship between user fees and volume in a unitless measure, 
allowing us to compare sensitivities across different countries and population groups. 
Importantly, there are a number of questions remaining regarding the price elasticity 
of demand. As highlighted in Section 3.5.4, the estimates from the literature vary 
widely across different settings and even within specific population groups, implying 
the need for more research. One specific implication is that a statistical analysis which 
the compares the various estimates, taking into account the type of dataset, the quality 
of the study, the institutional setting, and other factors, would offer a better idea of the 
“true” elasticity and how this elasticity might vary according to specific 
characteristics.
Although numerous papers have investigated vulnerable subpopulations such as the 
elderly and low-income individuals, no papers have provided comparisons of the 
prescription drug elasticities of demand for the vulnerable populations and the general 
population. This is despite a number of papers in the literature discussing the potential 
adverse effects of cost sharing on the poor and chronically ill (Evans and Barer, 1995; 
Kutzin, 1998; Robinson, 2002). While it is possible to compare elasticity estimates 
from different investigations, differences between the methods of data collection, the 
culture of the population considered, the institutional setting, the time period of the 
analysis, and other factors mean that the comparison of elasticities based on one 
dataset may offer a clearer picture. Within each country a comparison of this type 
would better highlight the heterogeneity in responses to cost sharing across 
subpopulations and allow decision-makers to tailor cost sharing requirements. For 
example, if the elderly are not particularly responsive to changes in prices of 
prescription drugs while the poor are very responsive, third-party payers might 
consider minimal user fees for the poor and higher user fees for the wealthier, older 
groups. Thus, an analysis that compares elasticity estimates among these different 
subpopulations using a dataset drawn from the same overall population could shed 
more light on these questions for policymakers.
Given the discussion of limitations in the previous section, the methodology of many 
investigations in the area is one aspect that could use improvement. The Duan et al.
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(1983) study sparked a debate over whether the Heckman two-step or the two-part 
model proposed by Duan et al. (1983) was more appropriate in the context of the 
censored dependent variables (Jones, 2000). The advantage of this debate was that it 
highlighted the need for non-linear regression techniques in the analysis of cost 
sharing for medical services, and a number of papers since then have explicitly taken 
this into account. Yet, few of these studies have simultaneously accounted for 
unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection even though panel data can overcome 
some of the shortcomings of cross-sectional data3. An even farther problem with 
studies that include privately insured individuals in the sample is the potential 
endogeneity of the cost sharing variable, a limitation that was discussed in the 
previous section. However, only a few papers have tested for this problem, and even 
fewer have employed corrections.
3.7. Conclusion
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the literature covering the relationship 
between cost sharing for various medical services and the demand for medical care. 
Section 3.1 provided the intuition for performing the literature review, while Section 
3.2 discussed the search strategy that was employed. Because prescription drugs are 
one portion of the overall health care that a patient receives, we provided a brief 
overview of the literature related to user fees for medical care in general, inpatient 
care, and physician and outpatient services in Section 3.3. While there was little 
disagreement that user fees reduced the number of services obtained, within each 
outcome variable, there were ranges of estimated price elasticity values. Interestingly, 
the ranges of elasticities for inpatient and physician care were relatively close, while 
the range of elasticities for medical care was rather small at -0.20 to -0.10. 
Nonetheless, the price elasticity of demand for medical care, inpatient care, and 
physician services appeared to be relatively inelastic, which led us to expect the same 
result for prescription drugs.
Section 3.4 offered a more comprehensive overview of the relationship between 
prescription charges and the volume of drugs demanded and the price elasticity of 
demand. The literature was split into three categories: studies that examined the 
general population, studies that examined the elderly or chronically ill, and papers that 
considered the low-income population. Across all three of these groups and the 
various forms of cost sharing employed, user fees consistently reduced the volume of 
services demanded. Section 3.4 also considered the other covariates that were 
employed in the literature, and the main determinants of demand appeared to be 
gender, age, income, and health. The importance and effect of these variables, 
however, seemed to be related to the subpopulation being considered. In terms of the 
price elasticity of demand, estimates varied widely across the general and elderly 
populations, and there was little indication of whether the average estimates for these 
populations were different. There were only a few price elasticity estimates for the 
low-income group. The price elasticity results for prescription drugs imply a need for
3 Hsu et al. (2006) and Anis et al. (2005) both considered a two-part model that accounted for 
unobserved heterogeneity, but no other studies simultaneously employed these corrections.
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more research in the area to shed light on the “true” or “corrected” elasticity estimate 
and the differences in estimates between population groups.
Section 3.5 then highlighted the main limitations of papers from the literature, many 
of these being methodological in nature. Issues such as sample selection, endogeneity, 
and unmeasured heterogeneity are common, and yet few studies have explicitly 
accounted for these specific pitfalls. Based on these limitations of studies in the area 
and the wide range of calculated price elasticity values, Section 3.6 highlighted the 
need for more research in the area of user fees for prescription drugs. In particular, the 
focus of this section was on the need for a “corrected” elasticity estimate and an 
analysis that compared price elasticity values across different subpopulations drawn 
from the same overall population.
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Chapter 4: Meta-regression of the price elasticity of demand for prescription 
drugs
4.1. Introduction
The previous chapter highlighted the considerable variation in prescription drug price 
elasticity estimates between studies. The estimates differ significantly by the 
institutional setting, the extent of public financing, the aggregation of the data, the 
methods employed, and other factors. As an extension to the literature review, an 
interesting exercise is to obtain an “adjusted” or “composite” price elasticity value, 
holding these study-specific factors constant. Meta-regression analysis (MRA) is a 
technique that extends the literature review into a simple regression to output the 
adjusted elasticity value. Not only is a composite price elasticity estimate useful as a 
baseline value for policymakers, but a composite estimate is also valuable for this 
dissertation. MRA provides an average estimate across the developed world, which 
offers a useful comparator for the subsequent elasticity estimates that we obtain for 
the United States and British Columbia.
A continuous problem with published elasticity estimates is that journals tend to select 
estimates which confirm existing hypotheses regarding the elasticity (Stanley and 
Jarrell, 2005). While literature reviews of the existing studies offer some information 
regarding the range of estimates, it is argued that even when weights are employed, 
there is considerable subjectivity in specifying the range of an elasticity estimate 
(Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). An increasingly popular methodological alternative to 
such a review in the medical, science, and psychological literature is meta-regression 
analysis. This technique involves integrating and evaluating the empirical results from 
different studies to obtain a hypothetically unbiased estimate which depends on the 
current state of the empirical literature (Stanley, 2001). MRA reduces the subjectivity 
implicit in empirical research and allows the researcher to test the sensitivity of the 
estimated parameters to changes in study characteristics.
The aim of this chapter is to use MRA to obtain an adjusted estimate of the price 
elasticity of demand for prescription drugs that accounts for the existing heterogeneity 
in three main factors: the institutional setting, the study characteristics, and the 
publication determinants. This estimate can then be judged against the primary 
estimates for the United States and British Columbia (obtained in Chapters 6 and 7) to 
consider why the elasticity values might vary between settings. The organization of 
the chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 is devoted to a brief review of the literature that 
has covered cost sharing and the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs. 
Section 4.3 describes the methodology employed, specifically meta-regression 
analysis. Section 4.4 goes over the results of the regression, while Section 4.5 offers a 
discussion. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the chapter and discusses the limitations of 
this study.
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4.2. Brief review of the literature on the price elasticity of demand
This chapter complements the earlier work in Chapter 3 by providing a meta-analytic 
overview of the price elasticity of demand based on the existing literature. To 
motivate the need for meta-regression analysis, we highlight the significant variation 
that exists in the existing price elasticity estimates. Many of the papers are quite 
recent because (i) data on drug prices and drug utilization has been made public 
relatively recently in a number of cases, and (ii) the quality of the data has improved 
over time. In any case, the intent is not to give a systematic overview of the literature 
but to highlight major differences across studies that may account for differences in 
calculated estimates of price elasticities.
The earliest investigations used aggregate data to obtain an elasticity value. Two 
Belgian studies (Carrin and Van Dael, 1991; Van Doorslaer, 1984) considered both 
the working population and a subsample of widows, invalids, orphans, and retired 
persons with incomes below a certain level. These investigations reported larger 
estimates (-0.60 to -0.35) for the employed population, but the estimate for the non­
employed group (unemployed, retired, etc.) was not significantly different from zero 
in the Carrin and Van Dael (1991) study. However, both of these investigations were 
hampered by relatively small sample sizes. A number of papers (Hughes and McGuire, 
1995; Lavers, 1989; O’Brien, 1989; Ryan and Birch, 1991) also used aggregate data 
to examine changes in co-payments over time for the United Kingdom, and these 
results ranged from -0.64 to -0.09, with most estimates falling in the middle of this 
range.
Using aggregate data a similar study from Spain (Puig-Junoy, 1988) determined that 
the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs was -0.13, although this analysis 
also suffered from a small sample size. An Australian investigation (McManus et al., 
1996) distinguished between the use of essential and discretionary medicines among 
the non-elderly population and found inelastic but comparatively large values for both 
classes of medicines, potentially indicating that consumers were unable to distinguish 
between unnecessary and necessary medications. Interestingly, a Dutch study (Van 
Vliet et al., 1999) used individual-level data aggregated to the policy level and 
determined that the elasticity of demand for prescription drugs was -0.021 in the 
Netherlands.
Other researchers have used non-aggregate data to calculate the price elasticity of 
demand. Smith (1993) looked at individuals from employer-groups covered by a 
national managed care company and calculated an elasticity of -0.098. Meanwhile, 
Motheral and Henderson (1999) considered a similar population and reported an 
estimate of -0.32. Coulson and Stuart (1995) and Klick and Stratmann (2005) have 
examined a more vulnerable population: the elderly. Their elasticity estimate of -0.56 
indicated that although demand is relatively inelastic among this group, there is still 
some sensitivity to price. A fifth American paper (Mortimer, 1997) considered 
individuals receiving antidepressants and beta blockers and found wide ranges of 
elasticity values, depending on the type of medication, whether the drug was a brand 
or generic, and the number of competitors.
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Outside of the United States, there was one study from Canada (Grootendorst and 
Levine, 2001) that reported elasticities for the elderly, individuals receiving social 
assistance, and the rest of the population. There were a wide range of calculated 
values, depending on the subpopulation and the class of drugs considered, although 
most estimates were inelastic. Another Canadian study (Li et al., 2006) examined a 
group of seniors with rheumatoid arthritis and found price elasticities of -0.20 and - 
0.11 for the low-income and non low-income elderly, respectively. Additionally, 
Anessi Pessina (1997) investigated the elasticity of demand for particular classes of 
medications in Italy, and his findings ranged from -0.75 to -0.07. This wide range of 
estimates was likely due to the degree of substitutability between the investigated 
classes and other forms of care, the perceived necessity of the specific medications, 
and other factors.
Overall, most of the literature has obtained inelastic estimates for demand, although 
Grootendorst and Levine (2001) found positive elasticities for some subgroups. There 
appears to be significant heterogeneity as the type of data has differed by study, the 
subpopulations considered have varied, and other factors have differed between 
investigations. Beyond this basic inference about the elasticity, it is unclear how these 
estimates are influenced by country effects, other characteristics of individual studies, 
or even the mediums where the estimates are published.
4.3. Methods for the meta-regression analysis
The main thrust of this chapter is to examine the extent to which the predicted meta­
regression elasticity differs from zero ( p, * 0) or unity ( P, * 1) and to determine the
adjusted magnitude of the elasticity estimate. A general problem with the first 
consideration, the testing of the hypothesis that the price elasticity differs from a 
certain value, is that of publication bias which can occur because (Card and Krueger, 
1995):
(i) referees and editors may be more likely to accept articles that are 
consistent with their personal views,
(ii) researchers may be predisposed towards models that confirm conventional 
results (e.g. models that confirm a significant negative effect for the price 
elasticity), and
(iii) researchers, reviewers, and editors may be more likely to treat statistically 
significant results favorably.
Publication bias is a problem in empirical economics as it can cause empirical effects 
to appear larger than actuality, and thus methods that neutralize this problem need to 
be considered (Stanley, 2001), particularly since a number of other papers employing 
MRA have encountered this bias (Ashenfelter et al., 1999; Card and Krueger, 1995; 
Rose and Stanley, 2005). To account for this difficulty, we expanded our literature 
search to include papers published outside of journals and included the standard error 
of the elasticity estimate as a variable in the model. The following sections describe 
the data and methodology used to investigate these elasticity issues.
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4.3.1. Meta-regression analysis
While the literature review has revealed that the price elasticity of demand for 
prescription drugs appears to be inelastic, there is a wide range of estimates and 
considerable uncertainty as to the correct magnitude of this estimate. Thus, the 
elasticity may not be significantly different from zero or even unity. The purpose of 
MRA is to resolve these questions while controlling for differences in study 
characteristics.
Meta-regression analysis is a quantitative technique which allows the researcher to 
combine and evaluate empirical estimates from the literature in a systematic manner 
and identify the determinants that influence the precision of specific estimates 
(Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). The analysis treats each elasticity estimate from the 
literature as an individual observation drawn from a general overall statistical 
population, and the conditions associated with each value are recorded as covariates. 
This compiled dataset permits testing of the hypotheses that the price elasticity of 
demand is different from zero or unity. The dataset can also be used to determine if 
various features of the analyzed studies influence the elasticity estimate.
Numerous meta-regression analyses have been carried out, and the studies have 
encompassed topics such as the effect of common currencies on international trade 
(Rose and Stanley, 2005), the effect of immigration on wages (Longhi et al., 2005), 
the gender wage gap (Stanley and Jarrell, 1998; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 
2005), and the income elasticity of money demand (Knell and Stix, 2005). Typically, 
meta-regression studies have contained between 20 and 100 observations, although 
this number has differed by the study purpose and area of study. For instance, 
Geleijnse et al. (2002) employed 36 observations, Greenwood et al. (1999) employed 
51 observations, Sexton (2005) used 31 observations, while Rose and Stanley (2005) 
utilized 34 observations.
The intuition behind performing MRA is that literature reviews are generally a 
subjective exercise. The researcher determines which studies to include in the review, 
how to interpret the results, and what reasons contribute to the differences across 
studies. While a systematic review overcomes some of these pitfalls, there is still 
considerable subjectivity in the interpretation of the results and the attribution of 
various factors to differences in results. Moreover, a systematic review still does not 
produce a consensus on estimates from the literature. Thus, the ultimate objective of 
the methodology is to obtain an “estimate of estimates” with some acceptable 
precision (Stanley and Jarrell, 2005).
MRA therefore begins with a collection of N  estimates of the statistic of interest, in 
this case the price elasticity arising from out-of-pocket expenditures on prescription 
drugs. The collection of N  estimates should consist of the entire empirical literature on 
the variable of interest. Defining this as p ,, we have i= l,...,N  individual estimates
upon which the MRA can be estimated. We identify the k  characteristics of the 
diverse studies in the literature and integrate the findings as follows:
P/ = p + 2 X z * + ^  (4-0-
k=i
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This allows us to calculate a composite estimate of the price elasticity, controlling for 
a number of study characteristics. The reported elasticity estimate of each study ( p,) 
is the dependent variable and equals the adjusted elasticity estimate ( p ) adjusted for 
the k  characteristics ( Z ik) of each published study. Finally, each parameter ( a^)  
represents the magnitude of how specific characteristics may lead to different 
elasticity estimates (Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). In other words each a k can be 
considered the average bias introduced by misspecifications in the original studies 
(Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). The Z ik are variables measuring the characteristics of the
study, e.g. the impact factor of the journal, dummy variables related to data 
characteristics like outlier observations, as well as numerical continuous variables 
accounting for other data characteristics like the study size. A dummy variable for the 
institutional setting is included to permit comparability of different health care 
settings.
Given that estimates are obtained by varying degrees of precision, we control for 
publication bias by including the standard error of each elasticity observation. The 
intuition behind the inclusion of this variable is that studies with smaller sample sizes 
are liable to produce statistically insignificant results and will need to search more for 
models that produce significant effects (Stanley, 2001). The resulting effects from 
small sample sizes are thus likely to be larger than effects found with larger sample 
sizes. Under the assumption that journals are more likely to publish significant 
estimates, the averages of effect magnitudes will be biased upwards across this 
literature. Thus, a significant coefficient on the standard error would imply that 
precision or publication bias exists.
In specifying a model that is based on estimates from previous models, it is important 
to examine the distributional properties of the data. MRA coefficients are expected to 
be unbiased and consistent (Stanley and Jarrell, 2005), but given the heterogeneity of 
the revised studies, differing sample sizes, and various controls and methods, meta­
regression errors may be heteroskedastic. A common method of visually identifying 
irregular behavior of observations in MRA is to use a funnel graph (Stanley, 2001), 
which depicts publication selection by comparing precision versus the non­
standardized effect.
The precision can be measured in a number of ways (Stanley, 2001), although we use 
the inverse of the standard error, and the non-standardized effect is the elasticity 
estimates. In the absence of publication selection, the graph will resemble an inverted 
funnel, where small sample studies will comprise the mouth of the funnel and larger 
sample studies make up the stem. Figure 4.1 provides examples of two funnel graphs: 
one funnel graph is for regression errors that are not heteroskedastic, and the second 
funnel graph is for regression errors that are heteroskedastic. Note that Figure 4.1 is 
drawn for a hypothetical distribution that centers around
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Figure 4.1. Example funnel graphs o f elasticity estimates
No publication bias
200.0
- 0.90 -0 8 0
0.0
- 1.30- 1.40 - 1 .20 1.10 - 1.00 - 0.70 - 0.60
elasticity estimates
Publication bias
200.0
0.0
- 1.40 - 1.30 - 1.20 -1.10 - 1.00 - 0.90 - 0.80 - 0.70 - 0.60
elasticity estimates
Thus, the funnel graph is a useful visual tool for determining if publication bias is a 
likely problem with the dataset. Not surprisingly, it is common practice in MRA to 
test for heteroskestadicity and apply weighted least squared (WLS) estimates by 
dividing (4.1) by the standard error of p, (Sp) if heteroskedasticity is confirmed. 
Accordingly, the dependent variable becomes the t-statistic:
P , P J f * C L k Z ik LI
t, = —  = —  + >  (4.2).
I r i  r i  Z - J  C  C
^ p  k =1 *Jp »Jp
Assuming no further misspecification, this model controls for specific meta-effects. 
One way to determine the sensitivity of a model to misspecifications is to measure the 
effect of varying independent variables. These independent variables ( Z ik) identify
the processes which explain the production of empirical results (Stanley and Jarrell, 
2005).
Another important consideration is homogeneity, in particular, the existence of a 
common mean. This can be tested using the Q = ^ ( p ,  -  Pvar(p))2 /var(P^) statistic,
where p, is each elasticity estimate, p^p) is a weighted average of each elasticity
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estimate corrected by the variance of the estimate, and var(p; ) is the variance of each 
estimate. The null hypothesis is homogeneity, and Q is distributed as %2N_X where N  is
the number of studies. As an alternative to the g-statistic, the I  -statistic assesses the 
proportion of inconsistency in individual studies that is not explainable by chance 
(Higgins et al., 2003). Values of the /-statistic that are close to 100 percent indicate a 
significant degree of heterogeneity. Overall, the existence of heterogeneity implies the 
need for regression analysis.
4.3.2. Data selection
In terms of the information that we selected from each study, there are a number of 
study-specific variables that may have an impact on the elasticity value. Based on 
previous meta-regressions from the economic literature (Stanley and Jarrell, 1998), 
the independent variables can be classified as:
(i) study-specific characteristics (e.g. number of observations),
(ii) institutional setting (e.g. health system),
(iii) method or data specific controls (e.g. presence of outliers), and
(iv) publication or dissemination effects (e.g. type of journal).
Ideally, each of these effects would capture specific biases that influence the 
dependent variable. An example of a dissemination effect is that economic journals 
might be biased towards publishing studies with negative elasticity estimates, which 
confirm the expected predictions from standard consumer theory and suggest a 
negatively sloped demand for drugs. Study characteristics such as the number of 
observations and whether the study relies on aggregate or individual-level data might 
be important for determining the precision of the specific estimates. The institutional 
setting is key to health-related studies given that the extent of health insurance 
coverage and specific health system characteristics are likely to influence the response 
to different cost sharing structures. A number of these characteristics might also be 
thought of as quality controls; for example, papers with more observations or papers 
published in journals with larger impact factors may be of higher quality.
Details on the literature search that was performed to identify relevant papers are 
available in Chapter 3. From the literature review we selected the papers which 
investigated the link between prescription charges and the volume of drugs obtained. 
An important point is that MRA is intended to reduce the existing subjectivity in the 
selection of empirical elasticity estimates. Accordingly, all papers that reported an 
elasticity estimate were retained, and all papers where we could calculate both an 
elasticity value (Coulson and Stuart, 1995; Grootendorst et al., 1997; Liebowitz et al., 
1985; Motheral and Henderson, 1999; Smith and Watson, 1990) and the associated 
standard error (Anessi Pessina, 1997; Coulson and Stuart, 1995; Grootendorst and 
Levine, 2001; Grootendorst et al., 1997; Hughes and McGuire, 1995; Lavers, 1989; 
Liebowitz et al., 1985; McManus et al., 1996; Motheral and Henderson, 1999; 
O’Brien, 1989; Ryan and Birch, 1991; Smith, 1993; Smith and Watson, 1990; Van 
Doorslaer, 1984; Van Vliet et al., 1999) from the data were also retained.
The pre-screening of the relevant studies and then the selection and classification of 
each investigation allowed us to create a database of estimates and potential
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explanatory variables. We employed four main elasticity formulas, which are listed in 
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Elasticity estimation methods
Regression specification Statistical model Elasticity formula
Linear Y i ( * /  y )
Log-log >n(v) =  Y 0+ Y ,  ln (x)+e Yi
Linear-log ^  =  Yo +  Yi ln (x)+e Y i ( i h )
Log-linear ln(>,) =  Y o + Y i ^  +  e Yi*
Note that when we had specific data points from the demand curve, we used the arc 
elasticity formula following Phelps and Newhouse (1972), as the point elasticity 
formula is sensitive to values chosen for the initial price and quantity1. When an 
investigation used a count data model, either the log-log or log-linear elasticity 
formula was used to calculate the elasticity estimate, depending on whether the price 
variable was also in logarithms. Although a number of papers have examined the 
relationship between cost sharing and health service utilization based on the RAND 
experiment, only one paper from the RAND study (Liebowitz et al., 1985) reported 
enough information for us to calculate an elasticity estimate for prescription drugs. 
Table 4.2 lists the studies that reported price elasticities and the papers that detailed 
enough information for us to calculate elasticities with their estimated standard errors2.
Obtaining the standard errors was more difficult in some cases. When the study 
reported a standard error for the price variable, we simply used the same formula for 
calculating the elasticity, except that we substituted the standard error of the price 
variable for y, (the coefficient on the price variable). However, a number of papers 
reported the t-value associated with y, rather than the standard error, and in this 
instance, we first had to calculate the standard error of Yj. This was accomplished by 
using the formula for the t-value:
t-v a lu e  = \  (4.3),
s.e.(Yi)
1 For studies that focused on the introduction o f  user charges, we also used the arc elasticity formula, as 
it is impossible to divide by zero in the point formula and as point estimates are sensitive to chosen 
values that are close to zero.
2 It is important to note that Table 4.2 does not include all studies mentioned in the literature review as 
some studies did not report elasticity estimates or sufficient information for us to calculate elasticities 
or standard errors.
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substituting in the known values of y, and the t-value, and solving for ■y.e.fyj). 
Further difficulties occurred where the authors only reported whether the study was 
significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent level. In this instance we used the 
t-value associated with the reported significance level and calculated the maximum 
standard error that could be associated with y, using formula (4.3).
Table 4.2. Range o f  elasticity estimates used in the meta-regression
Study Range of elasticities
Anessi Pessina (1997) -0.75 to -0.07
Carrin and Van Dael (1991) -0.35 to -0.09
Coulson and Stuart (1995) -0.18a
Gibson et al. (2005) -0.05 to -0.04
Grootendorst and Levine (2001) -0.16 to 0.09
Grootendorst et al. (1997) -0.13® to -0.09®
Hughes and McGuire (1995) -0.37
Klick and Stratmann (2005) -0.56
Lavers (1989) -0.22 t o -0.18
Li et al. (2006) -0.20 to -0.11
Liebowitz et al. (1985) -0.10a
McManus et al. (1996) -0.80 to -0.50
Motheral and Henderson (1999) -0.32b
Nelson eta l. (1984) -0.06*
O'Brien (1989) -0.64 to -0.23
Puig-Junoy (1988) -0.13
Ryan and Birch (1991) -0.11 t o -0.09
Smith (1993) -0.10
Smith and W atson (1990) -0.58c
Soumerai et al. (1987) -0.05*
Van Doorslaer (1984) -0.60 to -0.06
Van Vliet et al. (1999) -0.02
a calculated by authors o f  this paper using the arc elasticity formula:
= ( ( &  - a ) / f e  + a ) X ( A + ^ , ) / ( a  -p ,))-
b calculated by the authors o f  this paper using the point elasticity formula:
e „ = ( ( f t - a ) / ( f l ) X t r , ) / ( A - / >,))
Calculated by the authors o f  this paper using a log-linear calculation: ed = BjX,  where Bj represents 
the coefficient on the price variable and x is the mean price.
4.4. Results
This section covers the results of the estimations. We first discuss the descriptive 
results and offer some basic insight into the publication bias that appears to exist in
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our sample. We then present the regression results and provide estimated price 
elasticity values based on the regression results.
The final dataset consisted of 58 observations from a total of 23 studies (some papers 
reported more than one elasticity estimate). The analysis of the dataset was carried out 
in STATA 9.2, and all of the regressions used the [regress] command.
4.4.1. Descriptive statistics
Before proceeding with the econometric estimation, it is useful to explore some of the 
characteristics of the data. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, we can visually inspect the 
funnel graph to determine if publication bias is a consideration for the sample. Based 
on Figure 4.2, it appears that publication selection is a problem as the scatter plot 
resembles only half of a funnel.
Figure 4.2. Funnel graph o f elasticity estimates
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Given the exploratory nature of the study, it is also useful to examine the summary 
statistics, and Table 4.3 lists these statistics along with definitions of the variables.
The summary statistics indicate that the mean elasticity is around -0.211, and the 
corresponding mean standard error of these estimates is around 0.027. Approximately 
16 percent o f the studies were published in economic journals, and the average journal 
impact factor is 0.86. The average number of observations for each elasticity estimate 
is roughly 9240, although there is significant variability around this estimate. Over 50 
percent of the observations in our dataset are derived from aggregate datasets, and the 
mean age of a study from which an observation is obtained is 11.3 years. Around 14 
percent of the observations are for health care systems which imposed coinsurance 
rates on patients, while around 35 percent of the observations are from systems that 
employed various combinations of cost sharing arrangements. Approximately 67
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percent of the sample is derived from tax-based insurance systems, and 16 percent of 
the sample is derived from social health insurance systems.
Table 4.3. Definitions o f the variables and summary statistics
V ariable Definition Mean* M edian 10,hpercentile
90,h
percentile
absolute value o f  
the elasticity
absolute value o f  die elasticity 0.211
(0.027) 0.140 0.019 0.561
standard error standard error o f  the elasticity 0.072(0.009) 0.056 0.011 0.156
study published 
in economic 
journal___________
indicates whether the estimate was 
published in an economic journal
0.155
(0.048) 0.000 0.000 1.000
impact factor o f  
journal
the impact factor o f the medium where the 
estimate was published
0.856
(0.154) 0.100 0.000 2.907
number o f  
observations
the number o f observations in the study 
sample
9240
(2822) 1080 17.90 19251
study used 
aggregate data whether the data was at the aggregate level
0.534
(0.066) 1.000 0.000 1.000
age o f the study indicates the number o f  years since the study was published
11.29
(0.871) 9.000 4.600 22.00
coinsurance
regime
indicates whether the insurer charged a 
coinsurance rate for drugs
0.138
(0.046) 0.000 0.000 1.000
mixed cost 
sharing regime
indicates whether the insurer charged mix 
o f  cost sharing types for drugs
0.345
(0.063) 0.000 0.000 1.000
tax-based health 
system
indicates whether the health care system of  
interest was tax based
0.672
(0.062) 1.000 0.000 1.000
social health 
insurance system
indicates whether the health care system o f  
interest was social health insurance based
0.155
(0.048) 0.000 0.000 1.000
Standard deviations in parentheses
Additionally, we investigated homogeneity in the sample by calculating the ^-statistic. 
The calculated value of the (9-statistic was high at 50,540 (p=0.000). With a value of 
100 percent, the /-statistic further confirmed the result of the (9-statistic. Both of 
these measures indicated that there was significant heterogeneity in the sample, 
suggesting that regression analysis was merited.
4.4.2. Regression results: what are the estimation biases?
To obtain an adjusted price elasticity estimate, we followed two separate empirical 
specifications. First, we defined the elasticity estimate as the dependent variable, 
which is the common practice in MRA (Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). Second, we used 
the t-value as the dependent variable in an attempt to correct for heteroskedasticity.
The first set of models (Models 1 -  5) used the individual study estimates of the 
elasticity as the dependent variable, and these results are reported in Table 4. The 
models differ in terms of the included independent variables and corrections for 
various statistical issues. All of the models were corrected for potential
69
Chapter 4
heteroskedasticity and clustered observations3. Model 1 included only the standard 
error as the independent variable, while Models 2 through 5 each included subsequent 
variables that were considered potential predictors. We initially included a number of 
other variables, particularly whether the elasticity estimate was for the elderly 
population, for the low-income population, or for the population with a chronic 
condition. We also considered whether the estimate was from the United States, 
Canada, or another country, however, none of these variables were significant in the 
regression, and they were subsequently removed. We also considered a number of 
possible interaction terms, for example, an interaction between the number of 
observations and whether the data was aggregate, but only the interaction term 
between the standard error of the estimate and the number of observations was 
significant.
There were a few issues that required further examination, in particular, potential 
heteroskedasticity and the possibility of omitted variables. A residual plot of the 
standard errors appeared to exhibit heteroskedasticity, and this was confirmed with a 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity. Adding additional controls to the model did 
not correct for this problem, so we used the White (1980) estimator to make the 
standard errors of the corrected regressions (Models 1 - 5 )  robust.
From Table 4.4 we see that with the exception of Model 5, the coefficient on the 
standard error variable remained significant, even as more covariates were added to 
the model. The coefficient was typically between 0.91 and 1.55, indicating that as the 
standard error of the elasticity increased by one unit, the elasticity estimate also 
increased by a little more than one unit. However, the insignificance of the standard 
error variable in Model 5 was interesting because this appears to be caused by the 
addition of the interaction term between the standard error and the number of 
observations.
The adjusted elasticity value ranges from a significant -0.11 in Model 1 to an 
insignificant -0.16 in Model 5. In terms of the quality variables, the indicator for 
whether the elasticity estimate was published in an economic journal was significant 
in all of the models, although in Model 3, it was only significant at the 10 percent 
level. The coefficient ranged from 0.14 to about 0.18, signifying that elasticity 
estimates which were published in economic journals were larger than estimates that 
were published in non-economic journals, working papers, or books. The coefficient 
on the other quality indicator, the impact factor of the journal, was never significant in 
any of the models.
Most of the variables representing the characteristics of each specific study were not 
significant. The variable representing the number of observations was positive but 
only significant in Model 4. It appears that elasticity values derived from aggregate 
datasets are larger than those obtained from non-aggregate datasets, a result that is not 
surprising given the greater amount of noise in aggregate datasets. The coefficient on 
the variable indicating that the observation was obtained from a tax-based health care
3 There were certain studies that yielded more than one elasticity value, and we accounted for these 
clustered observations in the corrected regressions.
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system was also significant at the 10 percent level in Models 4 and 5 and signified 
that individuals in these systems were less sensitive to prices than individuals in 
private insurance or mixed systems. In addition, the variable representing the 
interaction between the standard error of the estimate and the number of observations 
in the study was significant and positive in Model 5.
Table 4.4. OLS regressions with the elasticity as the dependent variablea
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Publication biases
standard error 1.460§
(0.545)
1.546§
(0.541)
1.339§
(0.602)
1.229*
(0.631)
0.913
(0.621)
study published in economic 0.1595 0.140* 0.180§ 0.155§
journal (0.060) (0.068) (0.067) (0.062)
impact factor o f  journal -0.004
(0.023)
-0.002
(0.019)
0.004
(0.018)
0.003
(0.016)
Study characteristics
number o f observations 0.000(0.000)
0.000§
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
study used aggregate d£a 0.116*(0.057)
0.140§ 
(0.056)
0.222§
(0.056)
age of the study -0.002(0.005)
-0.004
(0.007)
-0.008
(0.006)
Institutional setting
tax-based health system -0.134*(0.077)
-0.156*
(0.084)
social health insurance system -0.073(0.130)
-0.051
(0.115)
Interaction terms, constant
standard error * number o f 0.000§
observations (0.000)
constant 0.106§ 0.078 0.051 0.156 0.156
(0.046) (0.047) (0.069) (0.111) (0.113)
N 58 58 58 58 58
Number o f  clusters 23 23 23 23 23
R2 0.245 0.324 0.368 0.423 0.483
a standard errors in parentheses
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
In addition to the models with the elasticity as the left-hand side variable, we 
conducted a weighted least squares regression by dividing the dependent and 
independent variables by the standard error of the elasticity. Thus, the dependent 
variable of this model was the conventional t-value (Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). Table 
4.5 reports the results of the regression with the t-value as the dependent variable.
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Table 4.5. OLS regression with t-value as left-hand side variable'a
Variable Model 6
Publication biases
standard error / standard error 1.591
(1.176)
study published in economic journal / 0.213*
standard error (0.111)
impact factor o f journal /  standard error 0.007
(0.028)
Study characteristics
number o f  observations /  standard error 0.000§
(0.000)
study used aggregate data / 0.372§
standard error (0.101)
age o f the study / standard error -0.026§
(0.010)
Institutional setting
tax-based health system /  standard error 0.078
(0.060)
social health insurance system / standard 0.417*
error (0.197)
Interaction terms, constant
standard error * number o f  observations / 0.001s
standard error (0.000)
constant / standard error -0.091*(0.038)
N 58
Number o f clusters 23
R2 0.213
a standard errors in parentheses
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
Model 6 did not perform as well as Model 5, but we still discuss the results briefly 
here. The results of Model 6 indicate that the adjusted elasticity of demand is -0.159 
(p=0.109), which is not significantly different from zero. The indicator of whether the 
study was published in an economic journal (divided by the standard error) was 
significant and positive at the 10 percent level. Meanwhile, all of the study 
characteristics (divided by the standard error) were significant. While the number of 
observations (divided by the standard error) and the indicator of whether the study 
used aggregate data (divided by the standard error) were positive, the age of the study 
(divided by the standard error) was negative. The indicator of whether the 
observations were drawn from a social health insurance system (divided by the 
standard error) was significant and positive, but only at the 10 percent level. Finally,
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the interaction between the standard error and the number of observations (divided by 
the standard error) was significant and positive at the 5 percent level.
4.5. Discussion
The predicted elasticity value indicates that the demand for prescription drugs is 
relatively inelastic at -0.16 (p=0.181). These estimates imply that across the 
developed world, consumers are not virtually unresponsive to changes in out-of- 
pocket prices for prescription drugs. This may be due to a perceived necessity of 
prescription medications and a lack of suitable substitutes. However, there may be an 
existing bias as most of these papers have calculated elasticities at the lower end of 
the demand curve, and these values may be considerably higher for greater levels of 
cost sharing. It is important to keep this possibility in mind when evaluating the 
“adjusted” price elasticity value.
The fact that many of the covariates were not significant predictors of the elasticity 
indicates that only a few variables exert an influence on the elasticity estimates for 
prescription drugs. As expected, publication and precision bias have some influence 
on this estimate, as the standard error of the elasticity was an important explanatory 
variable across some of the specifications. The significance of the economic journal 
indicator may reflect other underlying factors, for example, a preference for 
significant and relatively higher elasticity values among economic journal editors.
The indicator for whether the study employed aggregate or non-aggregate data was 
significant. The finding is not surprising as there is considerably more noise in 
aggregate datasets, suggesting that not only do the specific characteristics of the study 
matter, but the precision of the estimate is higher when individual-level data are 
employed. Another interesting result was that consumers in tax-based health 
insurance systems seem to be less sensitive to changes in out-of-pocket prices than 
consumers in other types of systems. Compared with those in private insurance 
systems, those who are under tax-based health care generally face lower cost sharing 
requirements for prescription drugs and less uncertainty as to whether their out-of- 
pocket burden will increase significantly in the future.
There were a few studies that published elasticity estimates or enough information for 
us to calculate the elasticity, but these papers did not offer enough information for us 
to calculate standard errors. The results from our meta-regression are generally lower 
than findings from other studies. An early study from Canada (Greenlick and Darsky, 
1968) reported enough information for us to calculate an unadjusted arc elasticity 
value of -0.38. A second study (Harris et al., 1990), this time from the US, also 
allowed us to calculate elasticities, and we determined that when the co-payment 
increased from $0 to $1.50, the unadjusted arc elasticity was -0.17, while the adjusted 
arc elasticity was -0.06. Meanwhile, we were able to calculate arc elasticities from a 
later American investigation (Johnson et al., 1997); the results were that when the co­
payment increased from $1 to $3, the elasticity of demand for prescription drugs was - 
0.02 and when the co-payment increased again from $3 to $5, the elasticity of demand 
was -0.24. The low elasticity values of -0.02, -0.06, and -0.17 may have been due to
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the relatively small co-payment values that beneficiaries in these studies faced. 
Finally, Mortimer (1997) used American data to calculate elasticities for 
antidepressants and beta-blockers and to compare generic and brand-name drugs. In 
general, the elasticity results from Mortimer (1997) were higher than our predicted 
values, although this was probably due to the analysis of the two specific product 
markets where a number of products in the market are interchangeable.
4.6. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to amalgamate the existing elasticity estimates of 
demand for prescription drugs into a dataset and use MRA to obtain a composite and 
presumably unbiased estimate of this elasticity. This involved identifying the effects 
which significantly influence individual study elasticity estimates and calculating how 
this elasticity estimate differed across individual studies due to the quality of the 
published papers, the institutional setting, and the characteristics of the study that 
might have affected estimation biases.
The chapter began with a brief overview of the literature on the price elasticity of 
demand, which highlighted the variation in estimates between studies. We then 
developed the meta-regression analysis methodology and discussed the collection of 
data and the calculation of price elasticity estimates and standard errors. The results of 
the MRA indicated that an “adjusted” price elasticity of demand across the developed 
world is around -0.16, although this value is not significantly different from zero. Not 
surprisingly, across various health care systems patients are relatively insensitive to 
price changes of prescription drugs. The important predictors of the price elasticity 
estimate were the indicator for whether the paper was published in an economic 
journal, the indicator for aggregate data, and the indicator for consumers living in tax- 
based health systems. When we do not include an interaction effect for the number of 
observations and publication bias, there appears to be an important effect of 
publication bias on the results.
The use of MRA has some caveats, for instance, this method is unavoidably subject to 
the limitations of the studies included in the analysis. For example, the publication of 
empirical evidence might be the result of a non-random process (Stanley and Jarrell,
2005). Some specific time patterns might be in place, for instance, certain topics are 
more in fashion during certain periods perhaps because of political factors, and this 
phenomenon might lead to meta-errors, however, including a time pattern can 
alleviate this. Another shortcoming of this approach is that MRA aggregates all of the 
data used in the elasticity calculations such that we lose information on specific 
subpopulations. We can somewhat control for this issue through dummy variables, 
although we are still limited by the sample size, which explains why the dummy 
variables are frequently insignificant. Policymakers should bear in mind the broad 
interpretation of the meta-elasticity result when considering the applicability of the 
elasticity estimate to policy. Finally, it is important to note that although MRA 
reduces some of the subjectivity related to classifying and weighting the existing 
empirical evidence, selection effects might still exist. However, MRA allows for 
replication, and the specific influence of any selection effect can easily be tested.
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Similarly, as with meta-analysis, we explicitly state the rules of inclusion and 
selection of estimates for the sample, so we can potentially capture systematic 
variation within the sample.
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Chapter 5: Description of the health and pharmaceutical systems in the United 
States and British Columbia
5.1. Introduction
As a precursor to the empirical analysis of demand-side cost sharing for prescription 
drugs in the United States and British Columbia, Canada, this chapter provides an 
overview of the health care and pharmaceutical systems in the US and Canada. The 
description of pharmaceutical policies in Canada focuses on British Columbia, though, 
because prescription drug coverage is defined at the provincial level in Canada. The 
purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, by describing the health care system in each 
country, we can flag any specific issues that may affect the empirical specification 
chosen for that country. Second, the health care description sets the scene for later 
interpretation of the empirical results (Chapters 6 and 7) and for policy conclusions 
specific to each health care system (Chapter 8).
As pointed out by Evans et al. (1991), Americans and Canadians share a multitude of 
similarities. The two countries share a common language, their economies and the 
media are closely linked, their cultural and historical experiences are related, and the 
geographic setting means that cross-border transfers are common. These underlying 
similarities have not played out in the health care sector as both countries have gone 
down divergent paths in funding and regulating health care since the late 1960s 
(Evans et al., 1991). The combination of these underlying similarities and the widely 
divergent health care systems has led a number of researchers to compare aspects 
such as the health of residents, the income distribution and health, the quality of care, 
and the costs of care versus the amount of care provided in each country (Evans and 
Roos, 1999). By considering the pharmaceutical market from the demand side, an 
aspect of Canadian and American health care that has not been considered in the 
context of a comparison, we contribute to this existing literature on health care 
comparisons between the two countries.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: the next section provides an overview 
of the US health care system and includes a description of pharmaceutical coverage in 
the country. Section 5.3 then covers the health care system in Canada, as the provision 
of core medical services are defined at the national level. Since the pharmaceutical 
system is defined at the provincial level, Section 5.3 also provides an overview of 
pharmaceutical coverage in British Columbia. Section 5.4 then discusses the 
differences between the US and Canadian health systems and the implications for 
price elasticity estimates, while Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.2. The US health care and pharmaceutical system
This section first provides a brief overview of the health insurance market in the US 
and then provides more detailed descriptions of the multiple sources of coverage, 
including trends in health insurance over time.
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5.2.1. General overview
Health insurance coverage in the United States is fragmented with individuals 
receiving coverage from various private and public third-party payers and a 
significant proportion of the population having no insurance coverage. With the 
exception of some public insurance programs, third-party payers heavily rely on 
demand-side cost sharing to limit moral hazard and constrain health care expenditures, 
particularly pharmaceutical expenditures. Although pharmaceutical expenditures 
comprised about 10 percent o f total national health spending in 2004, prescription 
drugs contributed 14.7 percent of total health care spending growth from 1994-2004 
(KFF, 2006g).
Around 46.6 million Americans had no health insurance in 2005 (US Census Bureau,
2006) up from approximately 41.6 million in 2001 (US Census Bureau, 2005). Public 
insurance is available to those who are above the age of 64, low-income individuals as 
defined at the state level, certain public employees, and military veterans. The main 
public insurance programs include Medicare, Medicaid, US Department of Veterans 
Affairs (USVA) health insurance, and TRICARE. The rest of the insured population, 
ineligible for public insurance, typically receives coverage from employer-sponsored 
health insurance, non-group health insurance, and medical savings accounts.
Figure 5.1. Sources o f health insurance coverage in the US (percentage o f the total 
population)0'13
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Source: US Census Bureau (2006)
a individuals receiving coverage from multiple sources are counted more than once such that the 
percents add up to more than 100, bMilitary insurance coverage includes CHAMPUS (Comprehensive 
Health and Medical Plan for Uniformed Services)/Tricare, Veterans Administration, and military health 
care
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Figure 5.1 indicates that employer-sponsored private coverage increased between 
1995 and 2000 and began to decline after 2000, while there has been a general decline 
in non-group coverage since 1995. The proportion of the population with Medicare 
and/or Medicaid has grown slightly since 1995, while the proportion of the population 
with military coverage has remained relatively steady.
There has been a slight increase in the uninsured population since 2000, and most of 
this change is related to fewer workers with employer-sponsored coverage (KFF, 
2005a). There are fewer families with two-full time workers, more families with only 
one full-time worker, and more families with no full-time workers. The decrease in 
employer-sponsored coverage is also due to a shift in employment from large 
companies to self-employment and firms with fewer than 25 employees (KFF, 2005a), 
which are less likely to offer employer-sponsored coverage because of smaller risk 
pools. It appears that a decrease in household incomes and an increase in the number 
of individuals in poverty (KFF, 2005a) contributed to fewer individuals picking up 
alternate forms of insurance. Although Medicaid and SCHIP (State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program) coverage increased significantly for children and Medicaid 
coverage increased slightly for adults (KFF, 2005a), these increases were not 
sufficient to offset declines in other types of health insurance.
Other facts related to the decline in insurance coverage point to certain demographic 
groups experiencing more difficulties. Among adults that became uninsured between 
2000 and 2004, 46 percent were poor and 22 percent were near-poor (KFF, 2005a).
Not surprisingly, while young adults (ages 19-34) make up approximately one-third of 
the non-elderly population, this segment of the population comprised almost half of 
the growth in the uninsured population (KFF, 2005a). Young adults are arguably more 
likely to change jobs, more likely to be self-employed, and may view health insurance 
as less of a necessity as they tend to be healthier. Interestingly, minorities and non­
citizens did not account for most of the growth in the uninsured population even 
though these groups are more likely to be uninsured overall (KFF, 2005a).
While Medicaid, USVA insurance, and TRICARE typically offer prescription drug 
coverage, not all private insurance contracts include this type of coverage, although 
nearly all individuals with employer-sponsored insurance had a prescription drug 
benefit in 2005 (KFF/FIRET, 2005). As a result, fewer individuals have prescription 
drug coverage than health insurance coverage, with 24 percent of adults between the 
ages of 19 and 64 having no prescription drug insurance and 40 percent of persons 
over 65 having no identifiable prescription drug coverage (KFF, 2006f). In 
comparison, 23 percent o f non-elderly adults had no prescription drug coverage and 
36 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had no prescription drug insurance in 1996 (KFF, 
2003).
The following sections offer more detail regarding each of the main insurance 
programs in the United States, with an emphasis on cost sharing requirements and 
trends over time.
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5.2.2. Medicare
Medicare is a national public insurance program for individuals over the age of 64, 
some non-elderly persons with specific disabilities, and persons of all ages with End 
Stage Renal Disease (CMS, 2006b). The program is funded through taxation, 
premiums, user fees, and other sources. All employed persons in the US pay a 1.45 
percent tax that is earmarked for Medicare and Medicaid, and employers match this 
amount. More information about Medicare premiums and user fees is provided below.
Under traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare, the program consists of three main 
parts: A, B, and D. Medicare Part A applies to all Medicare beneficiaries and 
comprises hospital stays, skilled nursing facilities, limited home health care, and 
hospice care for terminally ill persons. Although most beneficiaries do not face a 
premium for Part A, there is cost sharing that depends on the specific service 
consumed (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1. Various forms o f cost sharing under Medicare Part A
Deductibles Co-payments Coverage maximums
Inpatient hospital care Inpatient hospital care Inpatient hospital care
Skilled nursing facility care Skilled nursing facility care
Hospice care Home health agency
Source: CMS (2007a)
Table 5.2 lists some of the current and historical premiums and out-of-pocket 
requirements for Medicare Part A. For comparability over time, the values in Table 
5.2 are in 2005 dollars1.
The percents in parentheses represent the inflation-adjusted annual growth rates, 
where the value for the previous year is used as a basis for calculating the growth rate. 
There are a few trends that we can highlight based on the information in Table 5.2. 
The inflation-adjusted inpatient deductible and co-payments declined between 1998 
and 2000 but began to rise somewhat faster than the rate o f inflation after 2000. 
Meanwhile, median household income among elderly households generally increased 
faster than inflation up through 2000 and afterwards declined or remained relatively 
flat.
1 For this particular table and all subsequent tables in this section where the values are adjusted by 
inflation, the American Consumer Price Index (US-CPI) for all major expenditure classes (Council o f  
Economic Advisors, 2007) was used to deflate the nominal amounts. The deflation factors are available 
in Appendix C .l.
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Table 5.2. Selected information on out-of-pocket costs for Medicare Part A and 
median household income’b
Year a * m Co-payment (61“ -  90 Annual deductible , . .day in hospital)
1 Co-payment for lifetime 
reserve days' Median income*1
1990 $885(0.30%)
$221
(0.30%)
$442
(0.30%)
$44,743
(-1.72%)
1995 $1,027(0.04%)
$257
(0.04%)
$513
(0.04%)
$48,862
(2.71%)
1996 $1,025(-0.21%)
$256
(-0.21%)
$512
(-0.21%)
$49,405
(1.11%)
1997 $1,027(0.26%)
$257
(0.26%)
$514
(0.26%)
$50,014
(1.23%)
1998 $1,007(-1.98%)
$252
(-1.98%)
$503
(-1.98%)
$51,243
(2.46%)
1999 $984(-2.25%)
$246
(-2.25%)
$492
(-2.25%)
$52,152
(1.77%)
2000 $966(-1.86%)
$241
(-1.86%)
$483
(-1.86%)
$52,267
(0.22%)
2001
$964
(-0.23%)
$241
(-0.23%)
$482
(-0.23%)
$51,384
(-1.69%)
2002 $973(0.95%)
$243
(0.95%)
$486
(0.95%)
$50,813
(-1.11%)
2003 $985(1.21%)
$246
(1.21%)
$492
(1.21%)
$50,780
(-0.06%)
2004 $994
(0.89%)
$248
(0.89%)
$497
(0.89%)
$50,281
(-0.98%)
2005 $1,006(1.23%)
$251
(1.23%)
$503
(1.23%)
$51,087
(1.60%)
2006 $1,033(2.76%)
$258
(2.76%)
$517
(2.76%) NA
Sources: CMS (2006), Council o f  Economic Advisors (2007), US Census Bureau (2007a)
“all values in 2005 dollars, percentage increase from previous year in inflation-adjusted dollars in 
parentheses, clifetime reserve days are 60 days o f  inpatient hospital coverage that Medicare offers to
cover inpatient costs after a 90-day stay in the hospital, dwhere the head o f  the household is over 64 
years o f  age
In addition to Medicare Part A, Medicare Part B is a voluntary insurance program that 
covers outpatient and physician services for a monthly premium. Part B covers some 
medical services not covered under Medicare Part A such as some services offered by 
physical and occupational therapists and certain home health care services. In terms of 
prescription drugs, Medicare Part B reimburses beneficiaries for medicines that are 
injectable and infusible, not usually self-administered, and administered by a 
physician (Sharon et al., 2005). There is an annual deductible and coinsurance 
depending on the type of services received, although these are usually 20 percent of 
the maximum allowable charges (CMS, 2007a). There are also maximum-approved 
amounts for Medicare-approved physical, speech, or occupational therapy services 
performed in non-hospital settings. Many common medical services are not covered 
under Medicare Part B, including long-term care, routine eye care, dental services, 
and prescription drugs and biologies that can be self-administered. Most beneficiaries 
pay a monthly premium, but some beneficiaries with low incomes or assets are 
eligible for subsidies under the Medicare Savings Program (KFF, 2007c). Table 5.3
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lists historical premiums and annual deductibles for Medicare Part B in 2005 dollars. 
The table does not include information for 2007 as the premium structure changed in 
that year. An important note is that the percentage increase from previous year in 
inflation-adjusted dollars is in parentheses, and the parentheses listed for 1995 
represent the percentage increase in inflation-adjusted dollars from 1994 to 1995.
Even though the inflation-adjusted increases in Medicare Part A deductibles and 
premiums were relatively small, it appears that costs have been rising significantly for 
Medicare Part B, particularly since 2000. One note is that the significant decrease in 
the Medicare Part B premium in 1990 was an anomaly due to the Medicare 
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, most of the provisions of which were repealed in 
1989 (CMS, 2006). Until 2001 premiums generally fell in real terms, but after this 
point in time, premiums rose from 6 percent to 13 percent per year in real terms. 
However, it wasn’t until 2005 that the deductible for Medicare Part B was increased 
(previously it was $ 100 in nominal terms), and the increases in the 2005 and 2006 
deductibles were both greater than the inflation rate.
Table 5.3. Information on premiums and deductibles for Medicare Part B and median 
household incomea,b
Year Annual premium Annual deductible Median income0
1990 $513(-14.94%)
$ 1 1 2
(-5.13%)
$44,743
(-1.72%)
1995 $709(9.07%)
$128
(-2.76%)
$43,668
(2.71%)
1996 $635(-10.45%)
$124
(-2.87%)
$44,178
(1.17%)
1997 $640
(0.75%)
$122
(-2.24%)
$45,029
(1.92%)
1998 $630(-1.53%)
$120
(-1.53%)
$46,590
(3.47%)
1999 $640(1.64%)
$117
(-2.16%)
$47,707
(2.40%)
2000 $619(-3.25%)
$113
(-3.25%)
$47,623
(-0.18%)
2001 $662(6.85%)
$110
(-2.77%)
$46,568
(-2 .22%)
2002 $703(6.32%)
$109
(-1.56%)
$46,039
(-1.13%)
2003 $748(6.28%)
$106
(-2.23%)
$45,978
(-0.13%)
2004 $826
(10.52%)
$103
(-2.59%)
$45,836
(-0.31%)
2005 $938(13.57%)
$110
(6.40%)
$46,326
(1.07%)
2006 $1,029(9.63%)
$120
(9.20%) NA
Sources: CMS (2006), Council o f Economic Advisors (2007), US Census Bureau (2007a)
“all values in 2005 dollars, percentage increase from previous year in inflation-adjusted dollars in 
parentheses, °for households where the head o f household is older than 64
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Until 2000 median incomes generally rose, and thus Part B beneficiaries were better 
off as premiums and deductibles were declining in real terms while median incomes 
were rising. The situation reversed after 2000, and the trend has likely continued as 
recent increases in Part B premiums and deductibles have been substantial. If we view 
the premium information from another perspective, we see that annual premiums as a 
percentage of median income were 1.15 percent of income in 1990 and 2.03 percent 
of income in 2005.
In January 2007 the premiums for Medicare Part B changed significantly. While the 
standard monthly premium increased to a nominal value of $93.50 per month in 2007 
(up from a nominal value of $88.50 per month in 2006) (SSA, 2006), higher-income 
beneficiaries now pay larger premiums based on income. Table 5.4 lists the main 
premium amounts for Medicare beneficiaries with higher incomes who file joint tax 
returns2.
Table 5.4. Medicare premiums for higher income beneficiaries, 2007
Beneficiaries who file an 
individual tax return with 
income:
Beneficiaries who file a joint 
tax return with income:
Annual premium per 
beneficiary
less than or equal to $80,000 less than or equal to $160,000 $1,122
$80,000 to $100,000 $160,001 to $200,000 $1,272
$100,001 to $150,000 $200,001 to $300,000 $1,496
$150,001 to $200,000 $300,001 to $400,000 $1,721
greater than $200,000 greater than $400,000 $1,945
Source: SSA (2006)
Because data from the CPI for 2007 were not yet available at the time of writing, we 
only discuss premium increases in nominal terms. For the lowest-income beneficiaries 
listed in Table 5.4, premiums increased 5.7 percent in nominal terms between 2006 
and 2007. Meanwhile, nominal premiums for the highest-income beneficiaries in 
Table 5.4 increased 62.0 percent in nominal terms.
Medicare Part D, which was implemented in January 2006, offers supplementary 
prescription drug coverage where the monthly premium varies by the plan in which 
the beneficiary enrolls. Low-income beneficiaries may be partially or fully subsidized 
for premiums (CMS, 2007a). Although Medicare oversees the prescription drug 
program, other entities (such as private companies or public groups) actually provide 
the coverage. Beneficiaries can choose to receive coverage from any private 
companies offering Medicare Part D in their region, and the specific prescriptions, 
premiums, and cost sharing amounts available differ between companies. However,
2 Beneficiaries who are married but file a separate tax return from their spouse and lived with their 
spouse sometime during the taxable year pay slightly different amounts than those who file an 
individual tax return.
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all companies must provide at least a minimum level of coverage, defined by 
Medicare as the “basic coverage” plan. The average premium in 2007 was $27.35 (not 
weighted by enrollment), although premiums varied by plan and region: the lowest 
available premium was $9.50 for a standard benefit plan, and the highest premium 
was $135.70 for an enhanced benefit plan (KFF, 2007c).
The recommended prescription drug coinsurance rates for non-Medicaid beneficiaries 
for 2006 and 2007 are listed in Table 5.5, although these varied by insurance plan. As 
Part D was implemented in 2006, only two years of data are available.
Table 5.5. Recommended coinsurance rates for Medicare Part D, 2006-2007
Total prescription d rug  
spending, 2006
Total prescription drug 
spending, 2007
C oinsurance rate
$0 - $250 $0 - $265 100%
$250.01 -$2,250 $265.01 - $2,400 25%
$2,250.01 -$5,100 $2,400.01 -$5,451.25 100%
$5,100.01 and above $5,451.26 and above 5%
Source: KFF(2005b), KFF (2007c)
The new benefit recommended that insurance plans charge a $265 deductible with 25 
percent cost sharing up to total drug spending of $2,400 in 2007. Between total 
spending of $2400 and $5451.25, there was 100 percent coinsurance, what analysts 
have deemed the “donut hole”. Above $5,451.25 there was catastrophic coverage 
where beneficiaries only paid 5 percent of the cost.
Data from June 2006 indicate that the new Medicare prescription drug benefit had 
enrolled approximately 22.5 million beneficiaries at that point (CMS, 2007b). Of this 
total, 10.4 million beneficiaries had purchased stand-alone drug coverage through 
Medicare Part D, 6 million had purchased prescription drug coverage as part of a 
Medicare Advantage plan, and 6.1 million were automatically enrolled as dual 
eligibles (more information on dual eligibles is given in the section on Medicaid).
Outside of the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program, Medicare contracts with 
certain organizations to provide care for beneficiaries that choose Medicare 
Advantage (Medicare Part C). Medicare has divided the US into regions, and plans 
willing to participate in the program must serve an entire region. At a minimum these 
organizations are required to provide the current Medicare benefit package. 
Additional services can also be covered, and private plans are required to offer 
additional coverage if plan costs are lower than the Medicare payments received by 
the plan. Each of these Medicare Part C plans has its own cost sharing requirements, 
which are typically lower than the out-of-pocket requirements under traditional FFS 
Medicare.
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At a glance, average out-of-pocket spending across all health services for Medicare 
beneficiaries reveals a trend of increasing out-of-pocket payments. Per capita out-of- 
pocket spending for the elderly increased from $613 in 2000 to $1,005 in 2004 and 
$1,139 in 2005 (KFF, 2005c). This was increase of almost 86 percent over the period 
at an average rate of 17.2 percent per year. As a percentage of the median household 
income among the elderly, average out-of-pocket spending rose from 2.66 percent of 
income in 2000 to 4.1 percent of income in 2004.
5.2.3. Medicaid
Medicaid is another public insurance program that is overseen by the Federal 
government and administered by each of the 50 states (CMS, 2005b). The program is 
intended to cover low-income individuals and families, although each state establishes 
its own eligibility requirements. Each state also determines the type, duration, and 
scope of payments and sets the rate of payment for services. The program insured 
more than 55 million people in 2003 (KFF, 2007b). In terms of funding, the Federal 
government pays a share of each state’s Medicaid medical expenditures, which is 
known as the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FAMP). The FAMP is 
determined annually by comparing the state’s average per capita income level with 
the national income average and must be between 50 percent and 83 percent (CMS, 
2005b). States with a higher per capita income levels are reimbursed a smaller share 
of their costs.
States have considerable freedom to determine eligibility for coverage, although there 
are certain groups that states must cover in order to receive Federal funds (CMS, 
2005b). Examples of groups that states are required to cover include: persons that 
meet the requirements for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program, children under the age of six whose family income is at or below 133 
percent of the Federal Poverty Level3, and pregnant women whose family income is 
below 133 percent of the FPL. States also have considerable discretion in determining 
what services to cover, although as with eligibility, the Federal government requires 
that certain medical services be covered if the state receives Federal funds. Some of 
these services comprise: inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, 
prenatal care, vaccines for children, physician services, and laboratory and x-ray 
services. States can establish the duration and scope of services, again subject to 
Federal restrictions generally stating that coverage limits must result in a sufficient 
level of services to reasonably achieve the purpose of the benefits. Limits on benefits 
may be different between beneficiaries based on medical diagnosis or condition. More 
detailed information on Medicaid enrollment, payments per enrollee, and physician 
and inpatient co-payments is available in Appendix C.2.
Prior to 2006 states were not permitted to impose premiums on Medicaid beneficiaries, 
however, this changed when the president signed the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 
2005 into law in February 2006 (KFF, 2006c). The DRA allows states to charge 
unlimited premiums for beneficiaries with incomes at or above 150 percent of the
3 In 2007 the Federal Poverty Level was $10,488 for a single individual under 65 years of age and 
$9,669 for a single elderly individual (US Census Bureau, 2007b).
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Federal Poverty Level (FPL) (KFF, 2006c), although states are prohibited from 
charging premiums for protected groups that include certain children and pregnant 
women who are covered by Medicaid.
In terms of user fees, prior to 2006 states could only charge nominal cost sharing 
amounts (no more than $3) for certain services, and some low-income groups such as 
pregnant women and children could not be charged user fees. Beneficiaries generally 
could not be charged for services such as emergency room visits, family planning 
services, and hospice care (KFF, 2006c). Since the introduction of the DRA, states 
may also impose coinsurance rates up to 20 percent of the cost of medical care 
services for higher-income beneficiaries (incomes at or above 150 percent of the FPL). 
For families with incomes between 100 percent and 150 percent of the FPL, states can 
set coinsurance rates as high as 10 percent (KFF, 2006c). However, state Medicaid 
programs may not impose user fees on protected Medicaid recipients that include 
certain children and pregnant women. Specific medical services such as preventative 
services for children, pregnancy-related services, and emergency services are exempt 
from cost sharing requirements. An important note is that the sum of all cost sharing 
amounts may not exceed five percent of a family’s income over a one month or a 
quarterly time period (DPC, 2006). Kentucky and West Virginia have taken 
advantage of the cost sharing changes permitted by the DRA.
There are a number of Medicaid beneficiaries who are “dual eligibles”: individuals 
who are eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid (KFF, 2006d). There are 
approximately 7.5 million dual eligibles, and these beneficiaries receive premium and 
cost sharing assistance along with additional services not covered by Medicare Part B 
such as long-term care and prescription drugs. States spend around 40 percent of total 
Medicaid spending on dual eligibles, as this is generally an unhealthier population 
that often faces illnesses such as diabetes, heart disease, dementia, or severe mental 
illness (Jensen, 2005).
Medicaid eligibility varies significantly between states. In 2006 the median eligibility 
for working parents was 65 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (Cohen Ross et al.,
2007). In 14 states eligibility was less than 50 percent of the FPL, in 21 states 
eligibility was 50-99 percent of the FPL, and in 16 states eligibility was 100 percent 
or more of the FPL (Cohen Ross et al., 2007). Eligibility thresholds for children are 
generally higher with 17 states requiring children from a family of three to have 
income below 200 percent of the FPL, 24 states providing coverage at 200 percent of 
the FPL, and 10 states providing coverage above 200 percent of the FPL (Cohen Ross 
et al., 2007).
Coverage restrictions and cost sharing requirements differ by state for prescription 
drugs, and Table 5.6 offers a snapshot of prescription drug coverage in each state. 
Information on coverage is only available for 2003 and 2004.
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Table 5.6. State-specific information related to prescription drug coverage for 
Medicaid enrollees, 2003-2004
State Pharmaceutical co-payments 2003
Pharmaceutical co-payments 
2004
Medicaid drug 
spending per 
enrollee“'h
Median 
state income
Alabama $.50-$3/Rx depending on drug cost $.50-$3/Rx depending on drug cost $591.77 $34,135
Alaska $2/Rx $2/Rx $751.54 $51,571
Arizona None None $4.33 $40,558
Arkansas $.50-$3/Rx depending on drug cost $.50-$3/Rx depending on drug cost $482.67 $32,182
California $1/Rx $1/Rx $365.82 $47,493
Colorado $0.75/generic or multi-source Rx, $3/brand or single source Rx
$1 /generic or multi-source Rx, 
$3/brand or single source Rx $475.02 $47,203
Connecticut None None $745.22 $53,935
Delaware None None $548.57 $47,381
District o f 
Columbia $1/Rx $1/Rx $350.40 $40,127
Florida None None $649.05 $38,819
Georgia
$.50/preferred drug or generic Rx, 
$.50-$3/non-preferred or brand Rx 
depending on drug cost
$.50/preferred drug or generic Rx, 
$.50-$3/non-preferred or brand Rx 
depending on drug cost
$457.82 $42,433
Hawaii None None $407.57 $49,820
Idaho None None $690.09 $37,572
Illinois $1 /generic Rx, $3/brand Rx $3/brand Rx $706.31 $46,590
Indiana $.50-$3/brand or single source Rx, $ .50/generic Rx $3/Rx $749.21 $41,567
Iowa $1/Rx $ 1/generic Rx, $.50-$3/brand Rx depending on drug cost $787.22 $39,469
Kansas $3/Rx $3/Rx $763.09 $40,624
Kentucky $1/Rx $1/Rx $818.27 $33,672
Louisiana $.50-$3/Rx depending on drug cost $.50-$3/Rx depending on drug cost $757.10 $32,566
Maine $2/generic or single source brand Rx, $3/muIti-source brand Rx
$2.50/Rx, up to $25/month, $0 for 
mail order Rxs $907.46 $37,240
Maryland $2/Rx
$1/Rx for generic or preferred 
brand, $2/Rx for non-preferred 
brand
$665.38 $52,868
Massachusetts $2/Rx $ 1 /generic Rx or OTC product, $3/brand Rx $893.55 $50,502
Michigan $1/Rx $1/Rx $465.48 $44,667
Minnesota N/A $l-$3/generic Rx, $3/brand Rx, up to $20/month $474.98 $47,111
Mississippi $ 1/generic Rx, $3/brand Rx $ 1/generic Rx, $2/preferred brand Rx, $3/other brand Rx $797.38 $31,330
Missouri $.50-$2/Rx depending on drug cost $.50-$2/Rx depending on drug cost $771.99 $37,934
Montana $l-$5/R x depending on drug cost, up to $25 max per month
$l-$5/R x depending on drug cost, 
up to $25 max per month $750.84 $33,024
Nebraska $2/Rx $2/Rx $768.27 $39,250
Nevada None $1 /generic Rx, $2/brand Rx $445.36 $44,581
New
Hampshire
$.50/generic or single source brand 
Rx, $1/multi-source brand or 
compound Rx
$ 1/generic Rx, $2/brand or 
compound Rx $948.74 $49,467
New Jersey None None $718.60 $55,146
New Mexico $2/Rx with annual maximum across all services based on income
$5/Rx with annual maximum 
across all services based on income $87.90 $34,133
New York $.50/generic Rx and over the counter product, $2/brand Rx
$.50/generic Rx and over the 
counter product, $2/brand Rx $870.61 $43,393
86
Chapter 5
State Pharmaceutical co-payments 2003
Pharmaceutical co-payments 
2004
Medicaid drug 
spending per 
enrol lee‘ b
Median 
state income
North Carolina $ 1/generic Rx and covered OTC products, $3/brand Rx
$ 1/generic Rx and covered OTC 
products, $3/brand Rx $788.85 $39,184
North Dakota $3/brand Rx $3/brand Rx $737.18 $34,604
Ohio None $3/Rx if  not on Preferred Drug List $803.44 $40,956
Oklahoma $1 /generic Rx, $2/brand Rx $l-$2/Rx, depending on drug cost $422.80 $33,400
Oregon $2/generic Rx, $3/brand Rx $2/generic Rx, $3/brand Rx $434.30 $40,916
Pennsylvania $1/Rx $1/Rx $441.97 $40,106
Rhode Island None None $634.63 $42,090
South Carolina $3/Rx $3/Rx $562.08 $37,082
South Dakota $2/Rx $2/Rx $541.52 $35,282
Tennessee $5-$10/Rx $5-$10/Rx $167.34 $36,360
Texas None None $539.12 $39,927
Utah depends on beneficiary group depends on beneficiary group $511.45 $45,726
Vermont depends on beneficiary group $l-$3 depending on drug cost $751.96 $40,856
Virginia Sl/Rx $ 1/generic Rx, $3/brand Rx $682.05 $46,677
Washington None None $528.55 $45,776
West Virginia $.50-$2/Rx depending on drug cost $.50-$3/Rx depending on drug cost $758.50 $29,696
Wisconsin $1/Rx up to $5/month and $.50/over the counter drug
$ 1/generic Rx and $3/brand Rx up 
to $5/month $636.19 $43,791
Wyoming $2/Rx $ 1/generic Rx, $2/preferred brand Rx, $3/non-preferred brand Rx $643.29 $37,892
Sources: Statistical Abstract o f  the United States, KFF (2006a), KFF (2006e), US Census Bureau 
(2007a)
“for the year 2002 (the latest available year), brough calculation o f enrollment obtained by dividing 
state Medicaid pharmaceutical expenditures by the state Medicaid enrollment
Before 2006 states could not charge more than $3 per prescription, and pharmacists 
were required to fill Medicaid prescriptions even if the beneficiary was unable to pay 
the co-payment. According to the table, there were 38 states that had cost sharing 
requirements for prescription drugs in 2003, and this number had increased to 41 
states by 2004 (KFF, 2004). The states which made changes to their prescription 
charges in 2004 were: Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Vermont, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Although this is not listed in the table, in 2003 there were 32 states4 and the District of 
Columbia that required prior authorization for certain prescription drugs, and this 
number had increased to 33 states in 2004 (KFF, 2004). The state that added a prior
4 Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New  
Hampshire, New Jersey, N ew York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming
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authorization program in 2004 was Georgia. There were also 30 states5 in 2003 that 
had some sort of coverage restrictions for prescription drugs (KFF, 2004); for 
example, limits on the number of prescriptions per month or limits on the number of 
days supply that a beneficiary could receive. All of these 30 states continued to have 
coverage restrictions in 2004, and Texas also began imposing coverage restrictions in 
that year.
According to Table 5.6, there does not appear to be a correlation between median 
state spending on prescription drugs and median income. While 13 of the states with 
incomes below the median level spent more than the median level of prescription drug 
spending, 12 of the states with incomes above the median level spent more than the 
median level of prescription drug spending. It is important to bear in mind the effect 
of the FAMP when examining the relationship between median income and spending; 
those states with lower per capita incomes will receive a higher percentage of 
matching funds for Medicaid from the Federal government. This would lead to a 
tendency for a negative correlation between median income and prescription drug 
spending.
Table 5.7. Low-income individuals and Medicare Part D, 2007
Coinsurance/ co-navments
Category or income/asset limit Premium assistance Deductible Below out-of- pocket threshold
Above out-of- 
pocket threshold
Full subsidy groups
Full-benefit Medicaid or 
Medicare Savings Program 
beneficiary with income at or 
below 100% o f FPL
100% $0
$1 generic or 
preferred, $3.10 
other
$0
Full-benefit Medicaid or 
Medicare Savings Program 
beneficiary with income above 
100% o f  FPL
100% $0
$2.15 generic or 
preferred, $5.35 
other
$0
Other beneficiary with income 
below 135% o f  FPL assets at 
or below $6,000 (individual), 
$9,000 (couple)
100% $0
$2.15 generic or 
preferred, $5.35 
other
$0
Partial subsidy groups
Income below 135% o f  FPL, 
assets $6,001-11,710 
(individual), $9,001- 
$23,410 (couple)
100% $0 15%
$2.15 generic or 
preferred, $5.35 
other
Income 135%-150% o f  FPL, 
assets at or below $11,710 
(individual), $23,410 (couple)
Sliding scale, 100%- 
0%$ $50 15%
$2.15 generic or 
preferred, $5.35 
other
Source: Merlis (2007)
5 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin
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An important note is that since January 2006 all dual eligibles and certain other low- 
income individuals receive prescription drug coverage through Medicare Part D, 
although a clawback system is in operation to retrieve some of this cost from the 
states. This clawback is a monthly payment by states that is intended to approximate 
the amount the state would have paid if the Medicaid beneficiary was still covered 
under the state Medicaid program instead of Medicare Part D (Schneider, 2004). In 
2006 the sum of the state clawback payments was projected to be $6 billion 
(Schneider, 2004). Although prescription drug benefits for non-elderly beneficiaries 
vary by state, the premiums and out-of-pocket costs for the low-income elderly are set 
at the Federal level (see Table 5.7).
One difference for dual eligible beneficiaries is that some prescriptions may be more 
expensive. Specifically, co-payments for Medicaid beneficiaries were capped at $3 
prior to Medicare Part D (unless the state received a waver from CMS allowing it to 
charge higher amounts), and now beneficiaries can pay up to $5 per prescription for 
brand-name drugs.
Another important note is that in 2006 when the Deficit Reduction Act was 
implemented, Federal rules changed to allow states to charge coinsurance rates of up 
to 20 percent for prescription drugs (KFF, 2006c). There are certain qualifications, 
though. For instance, prescription drug coinsurance rates may not exceed 10 percent 
for beneficiaries with incomes between 100 percent and 150 percent of the FPL.
There are no provisions in the DRA for beneficiaries with incomes below 100 percent 
of the FPL (KFF, 2006c), but the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
Secretary has indicated that no state plans which allow prescription drug co-payments 
for this group to exceed nominal co-payments6 will be approved (DPC, 2006).
The DRA also allows states to impose differing user fees according to preferred and 
non-preferred drug status, but the maximum out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs 
still apply to non-preferred drugs. States are permitted to charge the preferred co­
payment amount for the non-preferred drug if a physician concludes that a preferred 
medication is not effective or causes adverse health effects (DPC, 2006).
An additional aspect of the Deficit Reduction Act is the enforceability provision. 
Previously, pharmacists were not permitted to deny medications for any Medicaid 
beneficiaries that could not pay the co-payment. According to the DRA, states can not 
allow pharmacists to deny medications for recipients who cannot pay (DPC, 2006).
5.2.4. Other public health insurance programs
As for other public programs, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (USVA) 
provides health care coverage for qualified veterans of the US military (USVA, 
2006)7. The USVA health care program is funded on a discretionary basis determined
6 Co-payments are capped at $3, although if the DHHS Secretary chooses, this can be increased with 
inflation according to the medical care component of the consumer price index.
7 TRICARE is another public program that provides coverage for members of the military, Public 
Health Service employees, the National Oceanic Administration employees, and the dependents of
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by Congress each fiscal year, and most medical services are covered. One unique 
aspect is that beneficiaries typically must obtain care from Veterans Administration 
centers. Some veterans, such as those who have received a Purple Heart Medal, 
former Prisoners of War, individuals with certain military service-connected 
disabilities, and low-income persons, are exempt from out-of-pocket payments 
(USVA, 2007). Otherwise, co-payments depend on the beneficiary’s income and the 
type of service received. A typical co-payment in 2007 was $15 for a physician visit 
(USVA, 2007). The annual co-payment for the first 90 days of care in an inpatient 
facility was $992 in 2007, and the co-payment for each additional 90 days of care was 
$496. Certain low-income veterans that live in high-cost areas can receive up to an 80 
percent reduction in these inpatient charges (USVA, 2007). There was also a $10 per- 
diem charge for inpatient care in 2007.
As for prescription drugs, the VA uses a national formulary and a competitive bidding 
process to select one or a limited number of contractors to supply drugs within 
specified therapeutic classes. One or two drugs within each category are admitted to 
the formulary based on negotiations with the manufacturers. There was no cost 
sharing for inpatient prescriptions in 2007, and non-exempt beneficiaries faced a co­
payment of $8 per outpatient prescription for a 30-day supply. Some veterans had an 
annual out-of-pocket limit of $960 (USVA, 2007).
5.2.5. Employer-sponsored private insurance
For Americans that are not eligible for public health coverage, a number of private 
companies offer health insurance. The main types of health insurance providers are 
commercial health insurers (indemnity plans), health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and point of service plans (POSs). 
Appendix C.3 provides a brief summary of these four types of health insurance 
providers.
Most residents obtain employer-sponsored insurance as opposed to non-group 
insurance because there are tax incentives for employers that offer health insurance. 
Employers typically bear a larger share of the premium, although this translates into 
lower wages for employees, a form of “in-kind” payment. Premiums vary by 
employer and the type of insurance coverage chosen. All employer-sponsored health 
plans have some form of cost sharing with 82 percent of individuals with employer- 
sponsored coverage facing co-payments only, 11 percent facing coinsurance only, and 
one percent facing a combination of co-payments and coinsurance for doctor visits in 
2006 (KFF/HRET, 2006). Among the workers facing coinsurance rates for physician 
visits, coinsurance rates generally ranged from 20 to 25 percent for in-network 
providers (KFF/HRET, 2006). Table 5.8 contains inflation-adjusted premium and 
deductible information for employer-sponsored health insurance. Premium and 
deductible information is only available from 1999, and deductible information is not 
available for 2006.
these beneficiaries. This program will not be discussed as it is relatively small compared to other forms 
of coverage. Public information on the number of TRICARE enrollees is not available.
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In general, monthly premiums for both single and family coverage policies grew 
faster than inflation and median incomes from 2000 to 2006. Average deductibles also 
increased significantly for single coverage during the entire period and for family 
coverage after 2001, perhaps indicating a greater willingness on the part of insurers to 
pass more out-of-pocket costs on to consumers. After 2002 the growth rate of 
deductibles for both types of coverage was significantly greater than inflation and the 
growth rate of median incomes.
Table 5.8. Average annual premiums and deductibles for employer-sponsored 
coveragea
Year
Annual
premium (single 
coverage)b
Annual
premium
(family
coverage)1
Average
deductible
(single
coverage)'
Average
deductible
(family
coverage)'
Median income 
(single person)
Median income 
(family)1
1999 $380 $1,815 $292 $710 $24,584 $69,816(NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (1.81%) (4.26%)
2000 $381 $1,837 $271 $618 $24,338 $70,713(0.33%) (1.25%) (-7.14%) (-12.99%) (-1.00%) (1.29%)
2001 $397 $1,972 $264 $659 $23,997 $69,028(4.18%) (7.32%) (-2.77%) (6.69%) (-1.40%) (-2.38%)
2002 $508 $2,319 $293 $722 $23,365 $67,814(27.98%) (17.60%) (11.21%) (9.47%) (-2.63%) (-1.76%)
2003 $535 $2,560 $408 $833 $23,277 $68,327(5.29%) (10.41%) (39.05%) (15.41%) (-0.38%) (0.76%)
2004 $583 $2,754 $428 $890 $23,325 $68,015(9.00%) (7.58%) (5.02%) (6.84%) (0.21% (-0.46%)
2005 $612 $2,712 $602 $1,192 $23,736 $69,605(4.95%) (-1.53%) (40.65%) (33.91%) (1.76%) (2.34%)
2006 $605(-1.23%)
$2,883
(6.31%) NA NA NA NA
Sources: KFF/HRET (2000), KFF/HRET (2002), KFF/HRET (2005), KFF/HRET (2006), US Census 
Bureau (2007a), Council o f  Economic Advisors (2007)
aall values in 2005 dollars, bworker’s portion, cfor conventional health insurance plan, dfor a household 
o f four people
Approximately 98 percent of covered workers in an employer-sponsored plan 
received prescription drug coverage in 2006 (KFF/HRET, 2006). However, insurance 
companies generally pass on part of the prescription costs and often employ various 
tools to guide usage. Formularies, where insurers steer consumers towards lower-cost 
therapeutic and generic alternatives, are common. Approximately 90 percent of 
covered workers face tiered co-payment systems, where the lowest co-payments are 
for generic drugs, preferred medications require higher co-payments, and the highest 
co-payments are for non-preferred medications (KFF/HRET, 2006). Table 5.9 lists 
historical co-payments for prescription drugs in 2005 dollars8.
8 This data was only available from 2000.
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Table 5.9. Average prescription drug co-payments for individuals in employer- 
sponsored plans that face prescription drug co-paymentsa,b
Year Generic drugs Preferred drugs Non-preferreddrugs
Fourth-tier drugs Median income0
2000 $7.94(NA)
$14.74
(NA)
$19.28
(NA) NA
$70,713
(1.29%)
2001 $8.82(11.12%)
$16.54
(12.19%)
$22.06
(14.39%) NA
$69,028
(-2.38%)
2002 $9.77(10.75%)
$18.46
(11.57%)
$27.14
(23.05%) NA
$67,814
(-1.76%)
2003 $9.55
(-2.23%)
$20.17
(9.27%)
$30.78
(13.42%) NA
$68,327
(0.76%)
2004 $10.34
(8.23%)
$21.71
(7.66%)
$34.12
(10.84%)
$49.63
(NA)
$68,015
(-0.46%)
2005 $10.00(-3.28%)
$22.00
(1.33%)
$35.00
(2.58%)
$74.00
(49.11%)
$69,605
(2.34%)
2006 $10.66(6.56%)
$23.25
(5.68%)
$36.81
(5.18%)
$61.03
(-17.53%) NA
Sources: KFF/HRET (2006), US Census Bureau (2007a), Council o f  Economic Advisors (2007) 
aall values in 2005 dollars, bpercentage increase from previous year in parentheses, cfor a household o f  
four people
Unfortunately, because the nominal co-payment values that we obtained did not 
include any decimal points, the inflation-adjusted growth rates of out-of-pocket prices 
are rough estimates. Nonetheless, it appears that all three co-payment tiers grew faster 
than the inflation rate and the rate of increase in median income. However, the 
average growth rates between the three classes of medications differed markedly. 
While the out-of-pocket price of generic drugs grew at an average of 5.70 percent 
annually (in inflation-adjusted terms) between 2000 and 2005, the corresponding 
average annual growth rates for preferred and non-preferred drug prices were 9.62 
percent and 15.16 percent, respectively. From 2004 to 2006 (the only years where 
data are available), the co-payments for fourth-tier drugs grew at an annual rate of 
11.49 percent (in real terms). Thus, it appears that insurers were attempting to steer 
beneficiaries towards generic drugs and preferred medications over time.
5.2.6. Direct purchase (non-group or individual) private health insurance
For individuals that are unable to obtain health insurance coverage through an 
employer, there is the option of purchasing non-group coverage. Individuals who 
obtain this type of insurance are more likely to be working part-time, self-employed, 
or working for a business with less than 25 employees. Most beneficiaries are white 
non-Hispanic and married (Ziller et al., 2004). Unlike premiums in employer- 
sponsored health insurance, premiums for non-group insurance usually vary by the 
age of the purchaser or the ages of the family members for family coverage, the 
geographic area of insurance purchase, and the type of coverage chosen. In 2003 
single person premiums averaged $148.80 per month, while family premiums 
averaged $277.62 per month (KFF and eHealthlnsurance, 2004). Cost sharing 
amounts vary widely between non-group plans, with 25 percent of plans having
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deductibles between $2,000 and $3,000 in 2003 (KFF and eHealthlnsurance, 2004). 
Although there are no national trend data available on average premiums for 
individual health insurance policies, data from California indicate that premiums rose 
45 percent (in constant dollars) between 1996 and 2003 (Buntin et al., 2004).
Private non-group health insurance may not cover prescription drugs, although there 
is a lack of research examining prescription drug benefits among this group of 
individuals. Lav and Friedman (2001) examined the types of insurance policies a 
family could obtain in the low price range ($2,000 - $2,500 premiums per year), and 
most of the policies available did not offer prescription drug coverage. Only 80 
percent of enrollees with non-group health insurance had prescription drug coverage 
in 2000 (Gabel et al., 2002). In contrast, 98 percent of enrollees with employer- 
sponsored insurance had prescription drug coverage in 2006 (KFF/HRET, 2006).
5.2.7. Health Savings Accounts
Another substitute for health coverage in the private market is a Health Savings 
Account (HSA), although uptake of these plans has been limited in the US. An HSA 
is a tax-sheltered account earmarked for medical expenses. In contrast to traditional 
insurance plans, HSAs spread the costs of medical care over time9 rather than over a 
pool of insured beneficiaries. The costs of prescription drugs along with all other non- 
catastrophic expenses are paid for out of the Health Savings Account. Because this 
type of coverage is not extensively used in America and because HSAs are different 
from traditional insurance, this type of coverage will not be discussed any further.
5.2.8. Recent development
A recent policy initiative in Massachusetts is intended to have the opposite effect on 
insurance coverage. In April 2006 the Massachusetts legislature passed a bill 
requiring all citizens of that state to purchase health insurance (KFF, 2007a), and the 
plan (called MassHealth) became operational on 1 July 2007. Under the policy some 
low-income residents are offered free or heavily subsidized health insurance, while 
higher-income individuals that refuse to obtain insurance face both financial 
incentives and tax penalties. For instance, residents who do not purchase insurance 
may face tax penalties of up to 50 percent of a health insurance premium (KFF, 
2007a). Businesses that fail to offer health insurance to their employees may be forced 
to pay a Free Rider surcharge. The reform also requires firms with more than 10 
employees to provide a fair and reasonable contribution to each employee’s health 
insurance premium; otherwise, the firm will be required to contribute up to $295 per 
employee to a common fund each year (KFF, 2007a).
9 When an individual does not use all of the funds in his HSA during a given year, the funds are carried 
over for subsequent years. Thus, it is expected that individuals will have lower risks of health problems 
when they are young and higher risks of health problems when they are old, such that they will spend 
less than the annual contribution at younger ages and use these reserves to cover health costs as they 
age.
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The centerpiece of MassHealth is the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector, 
which is intended to offer affordable, quality insurance products to residents (KFF, 
2007a). The Connector is meant for small business and individuals that can not obtain 
coverage through their employer. MassHealth also provides subsidies for low-income 
individuals on a sliding-scale basis (KFF, 2007a). Residents with incomes up to 300 
percent of the FPL can be partially subsidized for premiums10, while residents with 
incomes below 150 percent of the FPL pay no premiums. Affordability standards 
have also been approved for individuals with incomes above 300 percent of the FPL 
(KFF, 2007a).
Managed care programs that participate in Massachusetts Medicaid offer plans 
through the Commonwealth Care (KFF, 2007a). Although the Commonwealth Health 
Insurance Connector Board approved minimum creditable coverage in June 2007, 
concerns that some employers and beneficiaries would need to switch plans to comply 
with these standards have caused enforcement of the provisions to be delayed until 
January 2009 (KFF, 2007a).
Because the implementation of the plan is so recent, it is difficult to gauge the success 
of MassHealth. Researchers such as Holahan and Blumberg (2006) have raised 
concerns about the affordability provisions of the plan. There are also questions 
related to whether fines of $295 per employee for firms that do not offer coverage are 
sufficient to change firm behavior. Nonetheless, other states are closely watching the 
MassHealth plan, and the success of the program will likely have an impact on health 
insurance policies in other parts of the country (KFF, 2007a).
5.2.9. Summary of the US health care market
This description of the US health care market has highlighted the fragmented nature 
of insurance in the country. The main sources of coverage are public health insurance 
(Medicare, Medicaid, and other Federal programs), private employer-sponsored 
coverage, and private non-group health insurance. A significant proportion of the 
population does not have any coverage. Premiums vary between the programs, with 
Medicaid and USVA beneficiaries paying no premiums. Non-poor Medicare 
beneficiaries paid from $93.50 to $162.10 per month in premiums in 2007 for 
Medicare Part B and from $9.50 to $135.70 with an average of $27.35 (not weighted 
by enrollment) for Medicare Part D (KFF, 2007c). Medicaid subsidizes premiums for 
selected Medicare beneficiaries. In comparison, individuals with single-coverage 
employer-sponsored insurance paid approximately $52 per month in premiums in 
2006, while those with family-coverage employer-sponsored insurance11 paid 
approximately $248 per month (KFF/HRET, 2006). In contrast, those with non-group 
single-coverage paid $148.80 per month in 2003, and those with non-group family- 
coverage paid $277.62 per month (KFF and eHealthlnsurance, 2004). A comparison 
of these premiums indicates that Medicare subsidizes its beneficiaries, although 
coverage is not complete, and many beneficiaries obtain additional coverage from
10 For example, individuals with incomes between 151 and 200 percent of the FPL pay monthly 
premiums ranging from $35 to $40 per month.
11 Premium cost for a family of four
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other sources such as employer-sponsored insurance or Medigap. As employer- 
sponsored insurance premiums are lower than non-group insurance premiums, 
employers seem to pick up a significant portion of the insurance premium cost.
Cost sharing amounts also vary significantly insurance plans. In 2007 Medicare 
beneficiaries faced an annual deductible of $992 for inpatient services and $131 for 
covered Medicare Part B services (KFF, 2007c). On top of this, non-poor elderly 
individuals generally faced 20 percent co-payments for Part B services. Typically, 
there were lower out-of-pocket requirements for Medicaid beneficiaries (KFF, 2007b). 
Meanwhile, workers with employer-sponsored coverage faced even higher 
deductibles: among single-covered workers who faced deductibles, the average 
deductibles were $352 for health maintenance organization (HMO) plans, $473 for 
preferred provider organization (PPO) plans, $553 for point of service (POS) plans, 
and $1,715 for high-deductible health plans (HDHP) (KFF/HRET, 2006). Among 
family-covered workers who faced deductibles, the average deductibles were $751 for 
HMO plans, $1,034 for PPO plans, $1,127 for POS plans, and $3,511 for HDHP 
(KFF/HRET, 2006). Virtually all of these enrollees faced some sort of cost sharing for 
medical services. Those with non-group health insurance fared even worse, with a 
significant proportion of these individuals facing deductibles between $2,000 and 
$3,000 in 2003.
Thus, it appears that Medicare passes a large proportion of the medical costs on to 
beneficiaries, and this burden has been increasing significantly over time. While the 
out-of-pocket burden that Medicaid beneficiaries face differs between states, most 
states do not impose a significant burden. Similar to the trends that we observe with 
Medicare, those with employer-sponsored coverage are increasingly facing greater 
out-of-pocket burdens, and the burden becomes even more severe for those with non­
group insurance.
In terms of pharmaceutical cost sharing, there are thousands of different cost sharing 
regimes that individuals face. Within Medicare many of the elderly did not have 
prescription drug coverage until 2006, as Medicare did not offer outpatient 
prescription drug benefits before that year. All Medicaid programs cover prescription 
drugs, and many states employ a number of tools to limit prescription drug 
expenditures. Prior to 2006 co-payments could not exceed $3 for prescription drugs 
without a waver from CMS, but since the implementation of the DRA states can 
impose user fees of up to 20 percent (KFF, 2006c). Meanwhile, prescription drug 
benefits are becoming less generous with employer-sponsored insurance. While data 
are lacking on this subject for those with non-group insurance, some researchers have 
indicated that prescription drug benefits are often non-existent or less extensive 
among this group of individuals.
This description has highlighted the significant changes that have been occurring for 
prescription drug benefits and indicates that an analysis of the impact of these changes 
on consumption behavior may reveal some interesting findings. The description has 
also emphasized the disparity in coverage between various groups of the population 
and even within different forms of insurance coverage, indicating that comparisons
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across individuals might be useful. In addition, cost sharing requirements have risen 
substantially over from 1996 to 2003, allowing us to formulate elasticity estimates 
from out-of-pocket prices that are not always at the low end of the demand curve.
5.3. The Canadian health care system and prescription drug insurance in British 
Columbia
5.3.1. General overview of health insurance in Canada
This portion of the chapter offers a brief description of the Canadian health care 
system and more in-depth coverage of prescription drug coverage in British Columbia. 
The Canadian health care system is a mix of core public coverage and supplementary 
private coverage for certain goods and services. The public sector accounts for 
approximately 70 percent of total health care expenditures (Marchildon, 2005). The 
public portion, commonly known as Medicare, is publicly funded and administered on 
a provincial or territorial basis within guidelines set by the federal government. The 
federal government, however, directly finances and administers health care for certain 
groups, including services for First Nation individuals living on reserves, Inuit, 
members of the military and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, veterans, and 
individuals in federal prisons (Marchildon, 2005). One unique aspect of the Canadian 
system is that a group of socialized health insurance plans provides universal 
coverage for most health care services.
In terms of the health care system, there is universal coverage for most procedures.
The primary sources of funding are federal and provincial taxes, although British 
Columbia and Alberta mandate that residents pay premiums (Irvine et al., 2005). 
Nonetheless, these premiums account for a relatively small proportion of health care 
funding in both provinces (Marchildon, 2005). The health care system is governed by 
the 1984 Canada Health Act, which describes the conditions and criteria that 
provincial governments must abide by in order to receive full funding from the 
national government. The Canada Health Act also mandates that 100 percent of the 
population in each province have health insurance coverage. For example, provincial 
governments must ensure that health care administration is managed by a non-profit 
public authority. Other conditions of this Act relate to the health services covered, 
portability of coverage, accessibility, reporting of health service information, extra 
billing, and cost sharing. Residents are able to choose their own medical practitioners 
and hospitals, and most care is free at the point of delivery. Thus, although there is 
regulation at the national level, provincial governments have some discretion over 
what services are covered, how contracts with providers are negotiated, how to make 
up shortfalls in funding, and other aspects of funding and provision.
Medicare covers what the Canadian government deems essential services, but 
interestingly, outpatient pharmaceuticals are not part of the core Medicare package12.
In fact, while all provinces and territories provide coverage for vulnerable population 
groups, many individuals who do not fall into these classifications purchase drug 
coverage on the private market. The likely reason that pharmaceuticals were not
12 Prescription drugs administered in an inpatient setting are covered by Medicare.
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included in the core medical package is because spending on physician services 
outstripped spending on pharmaceuticals (Lewis et al., 2001) when the Health Canada 
Act was implemented. As a result of the growing out-of-pocket and private burden for 
prescription drugs in Canada, the Ministers of Health in each province and territory 
put together a document that, among other things, indicated the need for a National 
Pharmaceuticals Strategy (NPS) (Health Canada, 2004). The Ministers then put 
together a task force to develop and implement a National Pharmaceuticals Strategy, 
and the task force reported on its progress in June 2006 (Health Canada, 2006).
The National Pharmaceutical Strategy has nine elements to ensure equitable access to 
safe, effective, and appropriately prescribed prescription medications (Health Canada,
2006). Because only one of these elements is relevant to the discussion, we will not 
discuss the other eight components. One of the short-term goals of the NPS is to 
develop, assess, and cost alternatives for catastrophic prescription drug coverage. The 
task force recommended that income-based catastrophic coverage be considered as an 
option. Under income-based catastrophic coverage, the amount that the individual 
would be expected to pay before receiving catastrophic coverage would increase with 
income. The next phase of the program is for provincial and territorial governments to 
research the financial and policy aspects of catastrophic drug coverage to gain a better 
understanding of different options. The report did not list a timeline for this next 
phase of the program.
5.3.2. Public health insurance in British Columbia
The previous section has highlighted the general principles of health coverage in 
Canada, but the discussion in this section focuses on British Columbia because the 
empirical analysis in Chapter 7 is limited to British Columbia. In BC insurance 
coverage for medically necessary procedures is provided through the Medical 
Services Plan (MSP), which covered around 4.2 million people in 2005-2006 (MSP,
2007). All residents of BC are required to enroll with the MSP13. The dependents of 
MSP beneficiaries are also eligible for MSP coverage provided that they reside in 
British Columbia (MSP, 2007).
A number of medical services are publicly covered, including medically required 
services provided by a physician enrolled with the MSP, maternity services, medically 
required eye exams, diagnostic services, and medically required dental and oral 
surgery. Beneficiaries receive all of these covered services free of charge. Other 
services like prescription drugs, preventative services, and screening tests where there 
is little evidence of clinical effectiveness are not always covered by MSP, and many 
residents must buy supplementary coverage for these services. One interesting aspect 
of health insurance coverage in many Canadian provinces, including British Columbia, 
is that individuals are prohibited from entering into contracts that cover publicly 
insured services (Flood and Archibald, 2001). In addition, British Columbia explicitly
13 A resident must be a citizen of Canada or lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence, must 
claim British Columbia as a home, and must be physically present in the province at least six months 
during a calendar year.
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invalidates any part of an insurance contract that covers any goods or services already 
covered by the MSP (Flood and Archibald, 2001).
For individuals who do not receive premium assistance, premiums for the Medical 
Services Plan depend on family size. Table 5.10 lists historical premium information 
for primary insurance coverage in British Columbia. In order to compare inflation- 
adjusted growth rates, the values in Table 5.10 are in 2005 dollars14.
Table 5.10. Annual premiums for the Medical Services Plan in British Columbia13’b
Year Premium: single person
Premium: two- 
person family
Premium: family 
of three or more
British Columbia: 
median income
Canada: median 
income
1QQ9 $540 $957 $1,081 $44,900 $45,800177Z (-2.60%) (-2.60%) (-2.60%) (-0.44) (1-33)___________
1 QQT $526 $932 $1,053 $43,700 $44,9001 77 J (-3.38%) (-3.38%) (-3.38%) (-2.67) (-1.97)
1 0 0 4 $508 $901 $1,017 $44,400 $44,9001 77H (0.91%) (0.91%) (0.91%) (1.60) (0.00)
$513 $912 $1,026 $44,000 $45,3001 77 J (-2.22%) (-2.22%) (-2.22%) (-0.90) (0.89)
1 QOA $502 $892 $1,003 $43,500 $44,2001 770 (-0.92%) (-0.92%) (-0.92%) (-1 14)______________ (-2-43)
1 QQ7 $497 $884 $994 $43,300 $43,8001 77 / (-0.73%) (-0.73%) (-0.73%) (-0.46) (-0.90)
1 OOfi $493 $877 $987 $44,800 $44,4001 770 (-0.27%) (-0.27%) (-0.27%) (3.46) (1.37)
1 OOQ $492 $875 $984 $46,100 $44,6001777
(-1.08%) (-1.08%) (-1.08%) (2.90) (0.45)
$487 $865 $974 $46,700 $44,100zuuu (-1.85%) (-1.85%) (-1.85%) (130)_______________ (-1.12)
$478 $849 $956 $47,800 $44,500
ZUUI (-1.65%) (-1.65%) (-1.65%) (2-36) (0-91)
$470 $835 $940 $47,600 $45,000zuuz
(46.56%) (46.56%) (46.56%) (-0.42) (1.12)
$689 $1,224 $1,377 $47,500 $44,300
ZUUJ (-2.08%) (-2.08%) (-2.08%) (-0.21) (-1.56)
$674 $1,199 $1,349 $48,100 $46,400
ZUUH (-1.95%) (-1.95%) (-1.95%) (1.26) (4.74)
$661 $1,175 $1,322 $48,800 $47,200
ZUUJ (-2.00%) (-2.00%) (-2.00%) d-46) (172)
2006 $648(-1.73%)
$1,152
(-1.73%)
$17296
(-1.73%) N/A N/A
aall premium values in nominal 2005 Canadian dollars, bpercentage increase from previous year in real
dollars in parentheses (BC-CPI used for the adjustment)
Sources: Warburton (2003), Statistics Canada (2006b), personal correspondence with the British 
Columbia Medical Services Plan
14 For this particular table and all subsequent tables where the values are adjusted by inflation, the 
Canadian Consumer Price Index (CA-CPI) and the British Columbia Consumer Price Index (BC-CPI) 
for all major expenditure classes (Statistics Canada, 2007) were used to deflate the nominal amounts to 
2005 dollars. The deflation factors are available in Appendix C .l.
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In Table 5.10 the numbers in parentheses are the inflation-adjusted growth rates based 
on the Consumer Price Index from British Columbia (BC-CPI) where we use 2005 as 
the base year15. As the MSP only raises premiums every few years, premiums appear 
to fall in real terms over most of the examined period, with the exception of 1994 and 
2002 when the MSP raised premiums. Over the entire examined period, the MSP 
increased premiums 21 percent in real terms (on average around 1.5 percent annually), 
meaning that residents faced higher average premiums in real terms in 2006 than they 
did in 1996. Of course, this picture is slightly misleading given that premiums only 
increase every few years and our snapshot is only for 1992 to 2006.
Real median income in Canada grew slower than inflation from 1992 to 1993, from 
1995 to 1997, and from 2002 to 2003. The growth rates for median income in British 
Columbia were slightly different. From 1992 to 2005 median income in Canada grew 
8.69 percent in inflation-adjusted terms, while median income in British Columbia 
grew 3.06 percent in real terms. In comparison with the MSP premiums, real income 
in both Canada and British Columbia grew at much slower rates than premiums.
We can also examine the premium trends from another perspective by considering 
premiums as a percentage of the median income. In 1992 the (annual) premium for a 
single individual was around 1.17 percent of BC median income, the premium for a 
two-person family was around 2.08 percent of BC median income, and the premium 
for a family of three or more was around 2.34 percent of BC median income. These 
percentages continued to decrease somewhat until 2002, where there was an increase 
in premiums across the board. From 2002 onwards the premium for a single 
individual was around 1.5 percent of median income, the premium for a two-person 
family was around 2.6 percent of median income, and the premium for a family of 
three or more was around 2.8 percent of median income.
The provincial government provides premium assistance for low-income individuals 
who have been resident in British Columbia for at least 12 months (Warburton, 2005), 
and there were approximately 1.2 million people who received premium assistance in 
2005-2006 (MSP, 2007). There are two forms of assistance: temporary premium 
assistance and regular premium assistance. Temporary premium assistance is for 
residents who are unable to pay premiums because of temporary financial hardship. 
Regular premium assistance provides subsidies according to family-adjusted net 
income, although the threshold income levels are $3,000 lower for each person aged 
65 and older, disabled, or under the age of 19 (Warburton, 2005). Table 5.11 contains 
the nominal family income thresholds for subsidy eligibility in the province.
An interesting observation is that the inflation-adjusted growth of subsidy thresholds 
has varied by the subsidy level. The inflation-adjusted growth rate of the subsidy 
threshold has been the largest for those receiving 100 percent premium subsidies; for 
these families the subsidy threshold has increased 42.6 percent from 1992 to 2006 (an 
average of 3.1 percent per year in real terms). As the subsidy has decreased, the 
growth rate of the subsidy threshold has consistently decreased. The subsidy threshold
15 We use 2005 as the base year to compare the premium growth rates with the median income growth 
rates, as the median income data are only available in 2005 Canadian dollars.
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for those receiving 20 percent premium subsidies has only increased 15.6 percent 
from 1992 to 2006 in real terms (an average of 1.1 percent annually in real terms). 
Thus, it appears that British Columbia has been targeting more subsidies at the 
lowest-income groups over time.
Table 5.11. Premium subsidy family income thresholds for the MSP in British 
Columbia
Year 100% subsidy threshold 80% subsidy 60% subsidy 40% subsidy 20% subsidy
1992- 1998 $ 0-$11 ,000 $11,001 -$13,000 $13,001 -$15,000 $15,001 -$17,000 $17,001 -$19,000
1999-2001 $0 - $12,000 $12,001 -$14,000 $14,001 -$16,000 $16,001 -$18,000 $18,001 -$20,000
2002 - 2005 $ 0-$16 ,000 $16,001 -$18,000 $18,001 -$20,000 $20,001 - $22,000 $22,001 - $24,000
2006 - present $0 - $20,000 $20,001 - $22,000 $22,001 - $24,000 $24,001 - $26,000 $26,001 - $28,000
Sources: Warburton (2005)
In 2003 the BC health care system underwent restructuring, mainly through the 
reduction of covered services and increased privatization (Fuller et al., 2003). One of 
the major changes was the elimination of reimbursement for supplementary therapies 
such as chiropractic services, physiotherapy, massage therapy, and routine eye 
services. The province also closed a number of hospitals and long-term care facilities 
while reducing the number of services and beds in other institutions. Another change 
was the reduction in subsidies for prescription drugs for seniors, although this is 
discussed in more detail below. The reform paved the way for increased participation 
of the private sector through the opening of a private surgery center, the contracting 
out of certain services, and other initiatives.
Although most medically necessary health services are covered under the Medical 
Services Plan, public prescription drug insurance is part of a different program called 
PharmaCare. In general, residents who are ineligible for PharmaCare either have no 
prescription drug coverage or receive coverage from their employer as there are tax 
incentives for purchasing insurance through specific organizations.
PharmaCare is only available to certain population groups, mainly the elderly and 
low-income populations. To obtain assistance an individual must be a BC resident for 
at least three months, be registered with the MSP, and have filed the most recent tax 
return (PharmaCare, 2003). Currently, PharmaCare splits the eligible population into 
specific groups and assigns each group to a plan. Table 5.12 lists the specific 
PharmaCare plans for 2007.
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Table 5.12. PharmaCare plans in 2007
PharmaCare plan Information
Plan I (Fair PharmaCare) Offers financial assistance for prescription drug costs for eligible low-income families and elderly 
individuals (above the age o f 64). Cost sharing is based on income.
Plan B Residents o f  designated long-term care (LTC) facilities have no out-of-pocket requirements for 
PharmaCare. Pharmacies collect a monthly capitation rate from each LTC facility based on the 
number o f  occupied beds.
P lanC Individuals receiving income assistance from the Ministry o f Human Resources receive full 
funding for PharmaCare benefits
Plan D (Cystic Fibrosis) Individuals with cystic fibrosis who are registered with a provincial cystic fibrosis clinic receive 
digestive enzymes free o f charge when prescribed by a physician at the clinic, although the 
enzymes are dispensed through community pharmacies.
Plan F (At-home children Children under the age o f  19 who are eligible for benefits inder the At Home Program o f  the
program) Ministry o f  Children and Family Development receive certain prescription drugs free o f charge.
Plan G (no charge Clients o f  mental health service centers who qualify for MSP premum assistance receive
psychiatric medicine) designated psychiatric medicines free o f charge.
The BC Centre for HIV-positive individuals receive antiretroviral drugs free o f  charge when enroled in this program,
Excellence in HIV/AIDS which operates out o f  St. Paul’s hospital in Vancouver.
Sources: Working Group on Drug Prices (2000), PharmaCare (2004)
Table 5.12 indicates that low-income individuals who receive premium assistance 
from the MSP or who receive income assistance from the federal government are 
eligible for PharmaCare. Residents aged 65 and above also receive coverage through 
PharmaCare under Plan I. As Table 5.12 also indicates, other vulnerable groups, such 
as those in LTC facilities are eligible for PharmaCare.
Up until 2003 the elderly received generous prescription drug coverage from 
PharmaCare. Lower-income groups also received coverage from PharmaCare, but 
their coverage was less generous than that of the elderly. The cost sharing 
requirements for all recipients changed significantly in 2003 with the implementation 
of Fair PharmaCare, and more information regarding the new cost sharing 
requirements is available below. Table 5.13 lists cost sharing requirements for 
PharmaCare recipients until 2002, the year before Fair PharmaCare was implemented.
The cost sharing values in Table 5.13 are inflation-adjusted Canadian dollars based on 
the BC-CPI, and the values in parentheses are real growth rates. As PharmaCare tends 
only to raise deductibles and maximum contributions every few years, in most years 
the growth of cost sharing appears to be negative. Also because o f this, the increases 
in deductibles for low-income and social assistance recipients in 1993 and 1994 
appear to be rather large, although the table does indicate that these deductibles 
stabilized (in nominal terms) for a few years.
One important note is that although Table 5.13 does not list this, all non-senior social 
assistance recipients in BC received full prescription drug coverage. Coverage for 
other non-senior residents did not differ between low- and higher-income households 
until 1994 when PharmaCare reduced coinsurance rates for low-income groups to 0 
percent and increased coinsurance rates for higher-income groups to 30 percent. A 
beneficiary was considered low-income when he received MSP premium assistance 
(see Table 5.11 for MSP premium assistance income thresholds). Deductibles
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remained constant in nominal dollars for non-senior low-income households until 
2002 when these households experienced a CDN $200 increase in their deductibles. 
Non-senior higher-income households saw their deductibles rise faster with a CDN 
$200 increase in 1998 and another CDN $200 increase in 2002. Over the entire period, 
deductibles increased 402 percent in real terms (real annual growth of 33 percent on 
average) for non-senior low-income households and 527 percent in real terms (real 
annual growth of 44 percent on average) for non-senior higher-income households. 
However, for all non-senior households there was an annual maximum contribution 
by family of CDN $2,000 per year, and this maximum contribution was constant 
between 1990 and 2002. As a result, the annual out-of-pocket maximum decreased 22 
percent in real terms over the entire period (an annual decrease of 1.8 percent on 
average). The overall indication regarding user fees for prescription drugs is that the 
BC government shifted a significant amount of costs to both low-income and higher- 
income non-senior beneficiaries over the examined period.
Table 5.13. Cost sharing amounts for PharmaCare recipientsab
Seniors Non-seniors, low-income Non-seniors, higher-income
Year co­
payment
maximum
contribution deductible coinsurance
maximum
contribution0 deductible coinsurance
maximum
contribution0
1990 75% o f  
disp. fee
$170
(-5.09%)
$170
(-5.09%) 20%
$2,712
(-5.09%)
$170
(-5.09%) 20%
$2,712
(-5.09%)
1991 75% o f  
disp. fee
$161
(-5.13%)
$161
(-5.13%) 20%
$2,573
(-5.13%)
$161
(-5.13%) 20%
$2,573
(-5.13%)
1992 75% o f  
disp. fee
$157
(-2.60%)
$501
(211.68%) 20%
$2,506
(-2.60%)
$501
(211.68%) 20%
$2,506
(-2.60%)
1993 75% o f  disp. fee
$151
(-3.38%)
$605
(20.77%) 20%
$2,421
(-3.38%)
$605
(20.77%) 20%
$2,421
(-3.38%)
1994 100% of  disp. fee
$238
(56.97%)
$713
(17.73%) 0%
$2,375
(-1.90%)
$713
(17.73%) 30%
$2,375
(-1.90%)
1995 100% o f  disp. fee
$232
(-2.22%)
$697
(-2.22%) 0%
$2,323
(-2.22%)
$697
(-2.22%) 30%
$2,323
(-2.22%)
1996 100% o f  disp. fee
$230
(-0.92%)
$690
(-0.92%) 0%
$2,301
(-0.92%)
$690
(-0.92%) 30%
$2,301
(-0.92%)
1997 100% of  disp. fee
$228
(-0.73%)
$685
(-0.73%) 0%
$2,284
(-0.73%)
$685
(-0.73%) 30%
$2,284
(-0.73%)
1998 100% o f  disp. fee
$228
(-0.27%)
$683
(-0.27%) 0%
$2,278
(-0.27%)
$911
(32.97%) 30%
$2,278
(-0.27%)
1999 100% of  disp. fee
$225
(-1.08%)
$676
(-1.08%) 0%
$2,254
(-1.08%)
$901
(-1.08%) 30%
$2,254
(-1.08%)
2000 100% o f  disp. fee
$221
(-1.85%)
$664
(-1.85%) 0%
$2,212
(-1.85%)
$885
(-1.85%) 30%
$2,212
(-1.85%)
2001 100% o f  disp. fee
$218
(-1.65%)
$653
(-1.65%) 0%
$2,175
(-1.65%)
$870
(-1.65%) 30%
$2,175
(-1.65%)
2002 $ 2 5 /$ 1 0  
(N/A)
$292 /$ 2 1 3
(34.35% /
-2.29%)
$850
(30.28%) 0%
$2,126
(-2.29%)
$1,063
(22.14%) 30%
$2,126
(-2.29%)
aall figures are in nominal 2005 Canadian dollars, bpercentage increase from previous year in real
dollars in parentheses (BC-CPI used for the adjustment), cper family
Source: Grootendorst (2002), Grootendorst and Racine (2005), PharmaCare (2003)
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Meanwhile, coverage did not differ between low- and high-income seniors from 1992 
to 2002. Until 1994 seniors paid 75 percent of the pharmacist’s dispensing fee for 
each prescription up to a maximum yearly out-of-pocket contribution of CDN $125. 
For example, the average dispensing fee that pharmacists charged was CDN $5.74 in 
1992 (Working Group on Drug Prices, 2000), while the maximum dispensing fee was 
CDN $7.84 in 2002 (PharmaCare, 2003). The annual out-of-pocket maximum 
increased to CDN $200 in 1994, and another change was that seniors were then 
expected to pay 100 percent of the pharmacist’s dispensing fee.
In 2002 the program split seniors into two groups: those receiving MSP premium 
assistance and the rest of the elderly. The elderly receiving premium assistance faced 
maximum co-payments of $10 per prescription (including the dispensing fee) and an 
annual limit on out-of-pocket contributions of $200 (PharmaCare, 2003). Higher- 
income seniors faced maximum co-payments of $25 per prescription (including the 
dispensing fee) with an annual limit of $275 on out-of-pocket spending. Because the 
policy change in 2002 created two separate annual out-of-pocket maximums 
according to family income, the inflation-adjusted growth rate that low-income and 
higher-income beneficiaries faced over the period differed.
According to Table 5.13, from 1990 to 2002 the maximum out-of-pocket contribution 
increased around 72 percent in real terms (real annual growth of 6 percent on average) 
for higher-income elderly beneficiaries. For lower-income beneficiaries, the 
maximum contribution increased around 60 percent in real terms (an average real 
annual growth rate of 5 percent). The implication of this discussion is that from 1992 
to 2002, many seniors saw an increase in their out-of-pocket costs for prescription 
drugs.
As part of the BC health care reform, the PharmaCare program went through a major 
restructuring in 2003, effectively ending universal prescription drug coverage for 
seniors. The new program is deemed “Fair PharmaCare” and is intended to target 
most subsidies at low-income individuals (Fuller, 2003). To phase in the new program, 
beneficiaries bom before 1939 face lower deductibles and coinsurance rates than the 
rest of the population. The deductible for this group is progressive, depending on 
family income. Once the deductible is reached, the recipient is responsible for 25 
percent o f the prescription dmg cost up to an annual family out-of-pocket maximum 
that increases with family income. For individuals who turn 65 sifter 2005, the 
deductibles are higher although still related to income. Once the deductible is reached, 
there is a 30 percent coinsurance rate up to an annual family out-of-pocket maximum. 
These maximum family amounts are higher than the corresponding amounts for those 
bom before 1939. Table 5.14 provides a comparison of the previous out-of-pocket 
costs for individuals under PharmaCare and the new costs under Fair PharmaCare.
For non-seniors and those bom after 1938, Fair PharmaCare has lowered the out-of- 
pocket requirements for the poorest families as those with family incomes below 
$20,000 now pay no deductible and face a significantly lower annual out-of-pocket 
maximum. For seniors bom before 1939, the lowest income groups still do not face a 
deductible, and the income level at which the deductible applies is higher than for
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non-seniors and those bom after 1938. Additionally, the annual out-of-pocket 
maximum decreased for the lowest-income seniors bom before 1939. For both groups 
in the higher income brackets, the deductibles and annual out-of-pocket maximums 
have increased, although these are comparatively lower for seniors bom before 1939 
than for non-seniors and those bom in 1939 and thereafter.
Table 5.14. Comparison o f previous PharmaCare program and Fair PharmaCare
Family income Old deductible* New deductible Old maximum New family maximum
Non-seniors and those born in 1939 and thereafter
$10,000 $600 $0 $2,000 $200
$15,000 $600 $0 $2,000 $300
$20,000 $600 $400 $2,000 $600
$25,000 $800 $500 $2,000 $750
$30,000 $800 $600 $2,000 $900
$35,000 $800 $1,050 $2,000 $1,400
$40,000 $800 $1,200 $2,000 $1,600
$45,000 $800 $1,350 $2,000 $1,800
$50,000 $800 $1,500 $2,000 $2,000
$55,000 $800 $1,650 $2,000 $2,200
$60,000 $800 $1,800 $2,000 $2,400
$65,000 $800 $1,950 $2,000 $2,600
$70,000 $800 $2,100 $2,000 $2,800
Seniors born before 1939
$10,000 $0 $0 $200 $125
$15,000 $0 $0 $200 $188
$20,000 $0 $0 $200 $250
$25,000 $0 $0 $200 $313
$30,000 $0 $0 $200 $375
$35,000 $0 $350 $200 $700
$40,000 $0 $300 $200 $800
$45,000 $0 $450 $200 $900
$50,000 $0 $500 $200 $1,000
$55,000 $0 $1,100 $200 $1,650
$60,000 $0 $1,200 $200 $1,800
$65,000 $0 $1,300 $200 $1,950
$70,000 $0 $1,400 $200 $2,100
Source: Fuller (2003)
“under the old PharmaCare system, the income levels for the deductible were based on the individual 
qualifying for MSP premium assistance. This table uses the figures for a single individual, but families 
would have a higher income threshold for the same deductible
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In British Columbia pharmacists can only dispense medications that have been 
prescribed by a licensed Canadian practitioner, which includes physicians, dentists, 
midwives, and podiatrists (PharmaCare, 2003). PharmaCare does not reimburse the 
costs of all drugs on the market (British Columbia Ministry of Health, 2006). 
Specifically, a drug must first be approved for marketing in Canada by Health Canada 
(Anis, 2000). Then the medication undergoes an examination by the Common Drug 
Review, which is an independent, national review that provides recommendations to 
all provincial health programs regarding whether a drug should be included in the 
provincial formulary. British Columbia also requires that a medication undergo a 
review by the Therapeutics Initiative, another independent body at the University of 
British Columbia. The decision to include a drug in the BC formulary is based on 
safety, clinical effectiveness and health outcomes, value for money as compared to 
existing treatments, and impact on the budget. Based on these reviews PharmaCare 
determines whether the drug should be reimbursed as a regular benefit, whether the 
patient must meet clinical criteria to qualify for coverage, whether the drug will be 
partially reimbursed because an equivalent drug is available at a lower cost, or 
whether the drug will not be reimbursed at all (Anis, 2000).
For certain drugs there is a reference pricing (RP) system in place (Graham, 2002). 
These drugs include nitrates, ACE inhibitors, some calcium channel blockers, 
histamine-2 receptor antagonists (H2RAs), and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
(NSAIDs). In a RP system, certain drugs are clustered by therapeutic class and a 
maximum reimbursement price is established for each therapeutic cluster (Kanavos 
and Reinhardt, 2003). How this maximum reimbursement price is set is unique to 
every system, although the reference price for each therapeutic class is based on the 
cheapest drugs in the class in British Columbia (Graham, 2002). When a medication 
is priced above the reference price, the patient is responsible for the difference 
between that price and the reference price. This out-of-pocket cost is in addition to 
any user charges that the patient already faces. However, if  a physician determines 
that an individual must have a specific medication because of medical need, 
PharmaCare may agree to reimburse the medication as if it was under the regular 
reimbursement system. There are also automatic individual exemptions, for example, 
asthmatics and diabetics are automatically exempted from restrictions on calcium 
channel blockers and ACE inhibitors. Another feature of BC’s reference pricing 
system is that on-patent drugs are included in each therapeutic class. There are a 
number of arguments for and against reference pricing; however, it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to discuss these issues.
PharmaCare also employs a “Low Cost Alternative Program” (PharmaCare, 2003). 
When there is a generic version of a prescription drug, PharmaCare fully reimburses 
the cost of the lower-priced medications and partially reimburses the cost of the 
higher-priced medications. PharmaCare also defines some medications needing 
Special Authority approval because these medications are not typically considered 
first-line therapies for treatment due to the cost (PharmaCare, 2003). For these defined 
medications the program has established criteria under which the medication may be 
eligible for full reimbursement. The criteria are related to the patient’s illness, 
intolerance for alternative treatment, and other factors (PharmaCare, 2003). To
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receive coverage for one of these medications, the patient’s medical practitioner needs 
to apply for reimbursement through the Special Authority process and obtain approval.
The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) (2006) estimated drug 
expenditures of CDN $2,771 in 2005 or 15.1 percent of total health expenditures. 
PharmaCare was estimated to pay 42.1 percent of total drug expenditures in the 
province in 2005, a percentage that has steadily been declining since a high of 
approximately 60 percent in 1986.
5.3.3. Private health insurance in British Columbia
In addition to the public insurance system, there is a private insurance system where 
some residents purchase coverage for goods and services not covered by Medicare. 
BC residents are prohibited from purchasing private coverage that offers a private 
alternative or faster access to medically necessary inpatient and physician care 
(Marchildon, 2005). In general, employers, unions, professional organizations, and 
similar organizations sponsor group insurance as British Columbia residents receiving 
benefits through these plans are exempt from taxation on these benefits (Stabile, 
2002). In fact, around 95 percent of the market for health insurance has traditionally 
been provided by employers and unions (Deber et al., 1999).
5.3.4. Pharmaceutical expenditures in British Columbia
As a partial justification for the policy change that resulted in the Fair PharmaCare 
program, policymakers argued that the increase in public pharmaceutical expenditures 
was unsustainable (Morgan et al., 2006). To shed light on this argument, Figure 5.2 
lists information on pharmaceutical expenditures from different sources in the 
province. The top graph in Figure 5.2 shows the nominal values for public, private, 
and total pharmaceutical expenditures and suggests an upward trend in expenditures 
over time. The lower graph in Figure 5.2 plots the inflation-adjusted expenditure 
growth for each of these pharmaceutical expenditure categories.
Not surprisingly, given the arguments for the implementation of Fair PharmaCare, 
provincial expenditures for publicly-covered drugs have grown well in excess of 
inflation over the past decade. There was a brief period in 1994 and 1995 when public 
expenditures fell in real terms, although this change was likely due to one-off savings 
from the reference pricing system that was first implemented in 1994. Interestingly, 
private expenditures on prescription drugs have generally grown at a faster rate than 
public expenditures. From 1990 to 2005, public expenditures increased by 106 
percent in real terms, while private expenditures increased by 236 percent, implying 
either that the government has been exercising greater control than private insurance 
over costs (e.g. through the reference pricing system) and/or that the government has 
been shifting costs to individuals (e.g. through higher user fees).
Another interesting observation is that public expenditures decreased in 2003, the 
same year that Fair PharmaCare came into play, while private expenditures began to 
grow more rapidly beginning in 2002. This increase in private expenditures may have
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been due to the higher co-payments that PharmaCare imposed in 2002 and the 
purchase of private insurance by PharmaCare recipients in 2003 who no longer 
received such generous public coverage.
Figure 5.2. Pharmaceutical expenditures per capita and expenditure growth by public, 
private, and total pharmaceutical expenditures in British Columbia, 1990-2005a
2 0 0 0
“all expenditure values are in nominal Canadian dollars 
Source: CIHI (2006)
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5.3.5. Recent developments
In September of 2006, the BC government launched a “Conversation on Health”, a 
program intended to elicit public opinion on health care in the province (BC, 2007). 
The government hopes to obtain public input on methods of reducing and prioritizing 
spending in the health care system. Organizations such as the Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives (CCPA), however, have suggested that the motives of the BC 
government are misguided (CCPA, 2007). The argument is that the BC government is 
promoting this discourse as a means of making private insurance more attractive. That
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is, the CCPA claims that the BC government’s projections of health expenditures are 
biased upwards (CCPA, 2007), which causes the prospect of continuing to publicly 
fund health care appear unsustainable.
Moreover, the government of British Columbia indicated in 2006 that it was 
committed to a comprehensive review of the delivery of health services in the 
province (Skolrood, 2006). This public announcement came on the heels of the 
“Chaoulli Decision” in Quebec where the Supreme Court ruled that residents had the 
right to purchase private insurance to cover surgical procedures as there were 
excessive waiting times for surgery in Quebec (CCPA, 2007). One of the main issues 
related to the improvement of health care in BC is whether increasing private sector 
involvement will lead to better health outcomes or whether it will cause greater 
inequities and damage to the public system (Skolrood, 2006). The British Columbia 
Health Coalition (BCHC) claims that the BC government favors a health funding 
system similar to that in the United Kingdom (BCHC, 2006). Specifically, hospitals in 
BC would compete with each other and with for-profit medical clinics and US-owned 
hospital chains for publicly funded inpatient services.
As the consultation on health care is ongoing, it is unclear at this point whether the 
province will move forward in its desire to introduce more private competition into 
health care. Nonetheless, because BC residents can already purchase private 
prescription drug insurance, these potential changes should have little effect on the 
pharmaceutical market.
5.3.6. Summary of health care in Canada and BC
This description of the Canadian health care system and the BC PharmaCare program 
indicates that universal health insurance coverage exists in the country. The core 
medical services publicly covered are medically required services provided by a 
physician, maternity services, medically required eye exams, diagnostic services, and 
medically required dental and oral surgery. Notably, prescription drugs are not 
included in the core medical services benefit package. There is no cost sharing for the 
core medical services, but for services outside of the defined benefits package, 
residents sometimes buy supplementary insurance coverage. Private insurance 
coverage for benefits such as prescription drugs is often sponsored by employers, 
unions, professional organizations, and other similar organizations.
In terms of the cost of medical care, most provinces fund the core medical services 
through taxation, but British Columbia also requires residents to pay monthly 
premiums for the Medical Services Plan. These premiums varied from CDN $54 per 
month for a single person to CDN $108 per month for a family of three or more in 
2007. Depending on family income, premiums are subsidized at the 100 percent, 80 
percent, 60 percent, 40 percent, 20 percent, and 0 percent levels. The maximum 
family income level for the 100 percent subsidy was CDN $20,000 in 2007.
The pharmaceutical system consists of public and private insurance coverage. 
PharmaCare is the public insurance program for the elderly, certain low-income
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individuals, and other select groups. Cost sharing differs between these groups, with 
insurance coverage traditionally having been the most generous for the elderly. There 
are also other cost containment mechanisms in place, such as a reference pricing 
system and a Low Cost Alternative Program. The BC pharmaceutical reimbursement 
system has recently changed, and new cost sharing requirements were implemented in 
May 2003. Pharmaceutical subsidies are now tiered according to income, with higher- 
income groups facing greater levels of cost sharing.
Since the early 1990s the pharmaceutical system in British Columbia has gone 
through a few major changes. In addition to increases in co-payments and deductibles 
every few years, the province also implemented programs such as the reference 
pricing system and the Low Cost Alternative Program. Fair PharmaCare was a 
significant departure from the traditional model, as the program is meant to favor 
lower-income recipients. In general, coverage has been relatively predictable for the 
elderly, at least before 2002, and this may play a role in the price elasticity estimates. 
The relatively small out-of-pocket burden that elderly beneficiaries face also provides 
an interesting case for comparison with the US where the price elasticity estimates are 
measured on a higher portion of the demand curve.
5.4. Discussion
This section offers a broad comparison of the US and Canadian health care systems 
and the pharmaceutical system in the US and British Columbia. The purpose of this 
section is to highlight the main differences between the areas and to discuss the 
importance of these differences for price elasticity estimates.
While health care in the United States is fragmented between various third-party 
payers, all coverage for what the Canadian government defines as core medical 
services are publicly funded. Core medical services are also free at the point of use in 
Canada, while most Americans face significant user fees even for physician and 
inpatient visits. This disparity in the structure and out-of-pocket costs of health care 
has an important implication for pharmaceutical consumption. Alternative forms of 
care are likely to be more attractive in Canada than in the US because of the zero 
price for some services in Canada, which may increase the price elasticity of demand 
for pharmaceuticals in BC. Of course, waiting lists for care would dampen this effect. 
There is evidence of significant waiting lists for a number of procedures in Canada 
(Sanmartin et al., 2000). It is not clear which of these effects (free care or long 
waiting lists) is dominant, although evidence from British Columbia indicates the 
effect of free care may be greater. In an older sample of individuals, Li et al. (2006) 
determined that significant and positive cross-price elasticities between prescription 
drugs and physician services exist.
In terms of cost sharing for prescription drugs, we do not have data on average cost 
sharing amounts for residents of British Columbia ineligible for PharmaCare. For 
older people, though, individuals in the United States generally face much higher user 
fees for prescription drugs than their counterparts in British Columbia. Prior to 2006 
Medicare did not even have an outpatient prescription drug benefit, and many of the
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privately insured beneficiaries faced significant out-of-pocket requirements. In 
contrast, prior to 2002 elderly residents of British Columbia only faced dispensing 
fees and other potential out-of-pocket costs16 with maximum annual outlays. Even 
after the introduction of Fair PharmaCare, pharmaceutical coverage for older 
beneficiaries in the province was still more generous on average than pharmaceutical 
coverage in the United States. The implication is that an empirical analysis of 
prescription drug consumption among the elderly in the United States is likely to 
measure consumption at a higher point on the demand curve than an empirical 
analysis from British Columbia. According to this argument, we would thus expect 
American seniors to be more responsive to out-of-pocket price changes than seniors in 
British Columbia.
As for low-income beneficiaries, a comparison between this population in the United 
States and British Columbia is less straightforward than a comparison of the elderly in 
both countries. The reason is because health care and pharmaceutical coverage varies 
by state in the US, and there are large disparities in the generosity of Medicaid 
coverage between states. Prior to 2003 many low-income beneficiaries in British 
Columbia faced deductibles, and it is possible that some of them paid more out-of- 
pocket than some of their counterparts (for instance, in terms of income and health 
status) in the United States. Since the introduction of Fair PharmaCare, this is less 
likely to be the case. Now, the lowest-income beneficiaries face no or very low 
deductibles, and they also have annual out-of-pocket maximums, a feature that is not 
prevalent in the Medicaid program. Because of the difficulty in comparing the 
generosity of coverage among low-income beneficiaries before 2003, it is unclear 
whether price elasticity values would differ between low-income groups in the United 
States and British Columbia. After 2003 it is likely that low-income beneficiaries in 
British Columbia would be measured at a lower point on the demand curve than their 
American counterparts, potentially leading to a lower estimate for BC seniors.
The differences in the funding of pharmaceutical coverage in the United States and 
British Columbia leads to implications for each empirical model. Because private 
insurance makes up a large proportion of pharmaceutical coverage in the United 
States, there may be a potential endogeneity problem with the analysis. If we are 
unable to observe past consumption or expectations of consumption, this important 
predictor of the co-payment level may bias the estimates. Techniques such as 
instrumental variables regression may need to be used to correct for this bias. 
Endogeneity may also be a problem in British Columbia if  we analyze consumption 
among the non-elderly portion of the population, as a number of these individuals are 
likely to hold private insurance for prescription drugs. Among the elderly there is 
unlikely to be an endogeneity problem related to adverse selection or consumption 
expectations because user fees are partially set at the provincial level and partially set 
by pharmacies within small price bands. That is, the level of the co-payment that the 
elderly individual faces is based on factors such as his income, which are unrelated to 
unobservable variables such as past consumption. However, as we discuss in Chapter
16 For instance, PharmaCare beneficiaries that chose medications priced above the reference price paid 
the difference between the total price of the drug and the reference price.
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7, there may be endogeneity issues related to the non-linearity of the BC price 
variable.
5.5. Conclusion
This chapter has provided a background description of the health care and 
pharmaceutical systems in the United States and British Columbia. The intent has 
been to highlight the main aspects of each system, which bring up important 
considerations for the empirical specifications of the models. Another reason for 
providing the background description is to set the scene for the policy analysis of each 
health care system in Chapter 8.
The description of the American health care system highlighted the fragmented nature 
of coverage in the country. While around 70 percent of the population had private 
coverage, 25 percent were publicly insured, and around 15 percent were uninsured in 
2005. The population that was insured, however, still faced significant cost sharing 
for all types of medical care, including prescription drugs. Even public programs like 
Medicare passed a large proportion of the costs to beneficiaries. Furthermore, out-of- 
pocket costs have been rising faster than inflation, and the burden of co-payments has 
been increasing steadily as a percentage of median income.
In contrast, beneficiary costs have been rising at a much slower rate for residents of 
British Columbia. Premiums and co-payment levels have generally remained fixed for 
a few years at a time, although these less frequent increases can be quite substantial. 
The overall trend in cost sharing and premium increases throughout time has been 
lower in British Columbia than in the United States. This is likely due to the 
centralized nature of health care in Canada, as the central government keeps a tighter 
control on costs and typically has lower overheads than private insurance (Evans et al., 
1991).
The discussion pointed out that these differences in health care between the US and 
Canada will likely lead to different price elasticity results. On the one hand, the 
existence of free care for core medical services in British Columbia may lead to 
higher elasticity estimates, although the effect of longer waiting times is likely to have 
a dampening effect. On the other hand, the fact that an analysis of elderly individuals 
in the United States would measure these individuals at a higher point on the demand 
curve than their counterparts in British Columbia may lead to higher elasticity 
estimates in the United States. A comparison of low-income individuals in each 
country could lead to differing effects because of the difficulty in determining 
whether user fees for this group are higher in the United States or Canada.
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Chapter 6: Analysis of prescription drug cost sharing in the United States
6.1. Introduction
This chapter is a natural extension of Chapters 2, 3, and 5. Specifically, Chapter 2 
provided the theoretical foundation behind insurance and cost sharing and offered 
insight into other important predictors of demand. We use this theoretical foundation 
along with the previous results from the literature to motivate the empirical 
specification and choice of variables for the United States. Chapter 5 offered an 
overview of the US health care system - a description that provides some indication of 
what results we can expect from an empirical model.
As a number of questions regarding the impact of cost sharing on the demand for 
prescription drugs remain for the United States, this chapter aims to fill some of those 
gaps in the literature (discussed in Chapter 3). In particular, there are no existing 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs among the elderly 
American population or among the low-income population. Estimates for these 
populations are pertinent as a new Medicare prescription drug benefit with significant 
cost sharing requirements has recently been implemented for the elderly. Additionally, 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 will allow states to charge Medicaid (low-income) 
beneficiaries higher co-payments (KFF, 2006c), a change that could have a profound 
impact on prescription drug consumption in this population. Given that public 
insurance coverage is related to income and age, we would expect a distinct response 
to price after a certain age or in the event of low income. It is because of these 
characteristics of coverage for low-income groups and the elderly that we run separate 
estimations for these two groups.
While a number of studies using non-aggregate data have calculated the price 
elasticity of demand for prescription drugs (see Chapter 3), it is unclear whether this 
elasticity has changed over time as many of the previous estimates are outdated, 
relating to periods of substantially lower pharmaceutical prices, lower individual 
income, and different levels of insurance coverage. The seminal RAND study 
overcame many methodological problems that other studies addressing this issue 
often face, but it has been 25 years since this experiment was implemented (Manning 
et al., 1987). Recent US studies focused on specific subgroups rather than the general 
population or on specific therapeutic or disease categories. Recent elasticity estimates 
also exist for Canada and the Netherlands, but it is by no means certain that these 
results are transferable to the US health care system.
As important as the dated evidence, the methodologies adopted by the older studies 
were not always appropriate; in particular, no study of price elasticity in this area has 
simultaneously accounted for unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection, and an 
endogenous co-payment variable (where appropriate). Unobserved heterogeneity is 
important given that information is always lacking, and only three studies 
(Balkrishnan et al., 1997; Gibson et al., 2005; Grootendorst et al., 1997) have used 
panel data. The non-linearity of drug consumption means that linear regression 
techniques may not be appropriate. Finally, while panel data allows improved
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specification of a consumption pattern that is prone to longitudinal aspects, for 
example with a high obvious positive correlation with an individual’s state of chronic 
health, endogeneity must be considered. A failure to account for these factors in non- 
experimental settings may have led to biased estimates which subsequently misinform 
policy responses. Only recently have specific estimators which control for such 
elements within a single specification been developed for panel data.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer an updated estimate of the price elasticity of 
demand for prescription drugs using the 1996-2004 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS). Novel panel data techniques are employed to account for the 
problems of heterogeneity, sample selection, and endogeneity. The organization is as 
follows: Section 6.2 puts forward the research questions that will be addressed for the 
United States, while Section 6.3 then describes the dataset employed (MEPS) and 
provides a description of the variables that might be important predictors of the 
demand for prescription drugs. Section 6.4 goes over statistical considerations 
relevant to the unique design of the dataset that may need to be addressed and then 
presents the chosen econometric model that accounts for these statistical 
considerations. Section 6.5 presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Section 
6.6 discusses the results. Finally, Section 6.7 wraps up the chapter.
6.2. Research questions for the United States
The research questions for the US are based on the economic theory of moral hazard, 
the gaps in the literature highlighted in Chapter 3, and the description of insurance 
coverage in the US from Chapter 5. Specifically, the economic theory implies that 
price elasticity values differ between various population groups, and yet there is little 
literature that explicitly takes this into account. Chapter 5 further highlighted that 
insurance coverage differs between the elderly and low-income groups, additionally 
implying that price elasticities vary between the two groups. We are also interested in 
estimates for the general population as a basis for comparison. Because of our interest 
in the general population for a broad estimate and the elderly and low-income groups 
for separate estimates, we split the regression into three groups along these lines. 
Based on these considerations, the particular questions that this chapter addresses are:
Q l. What is the effect of cost sharing for prescription drugs on 
demand for the average individual in the population? What is the 
price elasticity of demand for this group?
Q2. What is the effect of cost sharing for prescription drugs on 
demand among the elderly? What is the price elasticity of demand 
for this group?
Q3. What is the effect of cost sharing for prescription drugs on 
demand among low-income individuals? What is the price elasticity 
of demand for this group?
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Q4. How does the price elasticity of demand compare across the 
general population, the elderly, and the low-income population?
Questions 1, 2, and 3 are covered in Section 6.5, while Question 4 is addressed in the 
discussion (Section 6.6).
6.3. The dataset and explanation of potential covariates
This section first gives an explanation of the dataset that is used to empirically answer 
the questions posed in Section 6.2. This section also provides information on the 
advantages and drawbacks of using this particular dataset and information on 
variables that are relevant to the analysis. We first discuss the co-payment variable 
and then cover other potential covariates, mainly demographic characteristics, 
socioeconomic characteristics, and health status.
6.3.1. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
To answer the research questions put forward in the previous section, statistical 
analyses are employed using the 1996-2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS)1, a study co-sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) (AHRQ, 2004). One of 
the main reasons we chose this time period is pragmatic: 1996 to 2004 are all of the 
years available in the MEPS database. Furthermore, around the middle of this chosen 
period in 2000, a US recession started and appears to have lasted until 2002 (Davis, 
2005). In relation to this recession, employer-sponsored coverage began to decline 
after 2000 (Gould, 2004). Meanwhile, because of the economic slowdown, Medicaid 
enrollment and spending growth declined between 2002 and 2003 (KFF, 2005b) after 
a period of significant enrollment and spending growth in the 1990s (KFF, 2001). 
Additionally, the discussion of the US health care system in Chapter 5 highlighted the 
changes that have occurred in out-of-pocket costs since 2000. Thus, 1996-2004 
appears to be a dynamic period where a number of changes in Medicaid and private 
insurance were occurring, allowing for a richer analysis.
In comparison to other national surveys that contain health care information such as 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the National Ambulatory Medical Care 
Survey (NAMCS), and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), there are a 
number of advantages to employing the MEPS database. While both the PSID and the 
NAMCS lack information on prescription drug utilization, the MCBS only includes 
information on individuals covered under the Medicare program, mainly those over 
65 and some of the disabled. As public policy can be informed by elasticity estimates
1 An advantage of this dataset, as evidenced by the literature review, is that no other studies have used 
MEPS to examine the impact of cost sharing on prescription drug utilization
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for individuals of all ages, we were interested in including the non-elderly in our 
sample.
Unfortunately, because the MEPS dataset is only available through 2004, we were 
unable to examine an important policy change: the introduction of Medicare Part D, 
which was implemented in January 2006. However, we can use the results of our 
analysis to discuss the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs among the 
elderly for 1996-2004 and use these results to make inferences related Medicare Part 
D (See Chapter 8 for this discussion).
The MEPS is a nationally representative sample of the US civilian, non­
institutionalized population with over sampling of Hispanics and blacks. The MEPS is 
an overlapping panel in which five in-person interviews are collected over a two-year 
calendar period using computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) technology. 
The survey collects data from a new sample of households each subsequent year, 
allowing for overlapping panels of survey data and longitudinal analysis. The raw 
data comprises N=272,277 individual-level observations.
The component of the MEPS most relevant to this thesis is the Household Component 
(HC). This portion of the survey contains information about demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, health status and conditions, utilization of medical care 
services, charges and payments for medical care, access to care, and health insurance 
coverage. The Medical Provider Component (MPC) of the MEPS is also appropriate 
as this portion of the survey contains information collected from medical providers 
and pharmacies identified by HC respondents. The MPC comprises information on 
the medical and financial characteristics of reported medical and pharmacy events.
The prescription drug portion of the MPC can be used to determine the number of 
prescription drugs obtained by an individual and the amount paid by the recipient for 
the drug.
6.3.2. Explanation of the dependent variable and potential covariates
Certain variables may be important predictors of the demand for prescription drugs, 
and the following section describes the dependent variable along with the explanatory 
variables that may be valuable in the model, such as price, income, and other controls. 
The choice of potential controls is based on findings from the literature on cost 
sharing for prescription drugs and the theoretical background on insurance. The 
description begins with an explanation of the dependent variable and then discusses 
the co-payment variable other potential covariates, including demand-side variables, 
particularly demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and health status. When 
special consideration regarding the calculation of a particular variable was needed, the 
method used to compute the variable is described.
The dependent variable is the number of prescription drugs purchased (including 
initial prescriptions and refills). And important point regarding the dependent variable 
is that it is made up of both brand and generic drugs. As we were unable to distinguish
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between brand and generic drugs in the MEPS dataset, we assumed perfect 
substitutability between brand and generic drugs.
As the impact of co-payments on the demand for prescription drugs is the central 
theme of this thesis, an explanation of why this variable may be an important 
predictor is necessary. The co-payment is a proxy for the generosity of insurance 
coverage as it provides an indication of an individual’s risk sharing arrangements with 
the insurance company. That is, individuals with 100% coinsurance either have no 
insurance or have insurance that does not cover prescription drugs. Individuals with 
low co-payments or coinsurance tend to have generous insurance. According to the 
neo-classical economic theory of insurance put forward in Chapter 2, the market will 
separate high- and low-risk consumers. High-risk consumers will obtain the most 
generous insurance at the appropriate price, while low-risk consumers will obtain the 
least generous insurance coverage (normally with co-payments) or may forego 
insurance altogether. However, in practice, there are a number of reasons why this 
outcome may not occur. One reason is that private insurance is typically offered 
through employers in the United States, and because unhealthy individuals may be 
unable to work, this type of insurance tends to cover a healthier population. 
Employment insurance does not always extend into retirement either. Also, high-risk 
persons are less likely to have private insurance because they are typically priced out 
of the market as insurers can partially identify their risk profiles. This situation has led 
the Federal government to establish some public coverage for the high-risk members 
of society: low-income persons and the elderly. In fact, research from the Kaiser 
Family Foundation indicates that in the absence of public insurance coverage, only 
about 9 percent of these enrollees would have access to some other source of 
insurance coverage (Long and Graves, 2006). There is also an ex-post moral hazard 
element of insurance as lower coinsurance rates lead to higher consumption of 
prescription drugs. Thus, health status, income, and other factors are likely to 
influence the level of the co-payment, and in turn, the level of the co-payment has an 
impact on the demand for prescription drugs.
The MEPS dataset does not contain an explicit variable for the co-payment, however, 
there is information regarding the individual’s total pharmaceutical consumption and 
out-of-pocket pharmaceutical expenditures. As a result, it is possible to compute an 
average co-payment at the individual level by weighting the individual’s annual out- 
of-pocket drug expenditures by the total number of prescriptions consumed (including 
initial purchases and refills). We recognize that this is a summary variable that proxies 
prescription drug cost sharing as some individuals may face additional deductibles, 
coverage limits, or out-of-pocket maximums. The computed co-payment variable is 
nonetheless an indicator of the average out-of-pocket burden that an individual faces 
and maps the generosity of his prescription drug coverage as it correlates with actual 
co-payment levels. Moreover, while the amount the individual pays out-of-pocket 
differs by the type of health insurance he possesses; the prices in the region where he 
obtains his medication; the amount that the pharmacy charges if he is uninsured; and 
the size of the pack, the dosage, and the number of units that he obtains may be 
important; the MEPS does not contain enough information to control for these 
differences. However, it is not clear whether better information would change the
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outcome of our analysis, particularly as we further control for unobserved 
heterogeneity (as detailed in Section 6.4).
Importantly, the co-payment is potentially endogenous as the number of prescriptions 
an individual consumes in the past and the number of prescriptions he expects to 
consume in a given year will affect the type of insurance contract that he chooses, and 
we are unable to measure consumption expectations. The potential for adverse 
selection in a private insurance market is also an important reason to test for 
endogeneity as the existence of different risk types may cause insurance companies to 
design benefit packages that induce different risk types to choose different insurance 
contracts. A third potential source of endogeneity is the non-linearity of the co­
payment variables. That is, because the co-payment is constructed as an average, and 
patients may face deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, and/or out-of-pocket limits 
simultaneously, the size of the constructed co-payment variable depends on 
consumption. Therefore, we are unable to assume independence between the 
covariates and the error term. An explanation of how we test for endogeneity and 
correct for the problem is covered in the econometric model description and the 
Appendix.
There are a number of variables in addition to the co-payment that may be important 
predictors of the demand for prescription drugs. Our predictions regarding the effects 
of these variables on prescription drug consumption are listed in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Predicted signs ofpossible variables measuring o f the demand for 
prescription drugs
Variable Number of drugs (Adult sample)
Number of drugs 
(Elderly sample)
Number of drugs 
(Low-income sample)
Drug co-payment - - -
Age - + -
Age squared + - +
Male - - -
Female + + +
White + + +
Black - - -
Hispanic - - -
Other race/ethnicity - - -
Income + + +
Married +/- +/- +/-
Not married +/- +/- +/-
Good health - - -
Poor health + + +
Diagnosed with a major disease + + +
Not diagnosed with a major 
disease - - -
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For each of the samples, we hypothesized that a negative relationship would exist 
between the co-payment and the demand for prescription drugs because of the 
downward sloping law of demand. In general, we predicted that consumption of 
prescription drugs would fall with age as individuals become more focused on work 
and their children’s health than on their own health, but we hypothesized that after a 
certain age, demand would begin to rise again. This is because around middle age 
adults begin to face more chronic problems such as diabetes and heart disease. 
However, as individuals consume more medicines, the likelihood of contraindications 
and adverse reactions increases, and doctors may actually prescribe fewer medications 
for the oldest of the elderly.
Sex is typically another significant predictor of demand intensity; men may have 
different preferences for medications than women, and evidence suggests that health 
care use differs between the sexes (Bertakis et al., 2000). Additionally, men and 
women often suffer from somewhat different diseases; for instance, men are more 
likely to have cardiovascular problems, while women are more likely to have 
osteoporosis. There is also evidence that women are more risk averse than men, which 
would imply greater use of prescription drugs among women (Zinkhan and Karande, 
1991).
Race/ethnicity is another characteristic that may be an important determinant of 
demand for prescription drugs; for instance, race may be an indicator of cultural 
differences. Hispanic or Asian persons may have different preferences for medical 
care, particularly prescription drugs, than white individuals. Race/ethnicity may also 
be an indicator of socioeconomic status, as white individuals frequently live in 
wealthier areas even if they have lower income themselves, and these areas might 
exhibit better quality of medical care than non-white areas. Race/ethnicity may also 
be related to health status as blacks are more likely to suffer from diabetes (American 
Diabetes Association, 2006) and coronary heart disease (National Heart, Lung, and 
Blood Institute, 1994).
Other factors such as income, household size, and marital status are also important in 
prescription drug consumption decisions. Higher-income persons are less likely to 
face tradeoffs between necessities such as food and shelter and other goods and 
services where consumption can sometimes be delayed such as doctor visits and 
prescription drugs. Thus, it is expected that the demand for prescription drugs will 
increase with income. Meanwhile, larger families are forced to spread the income 
over more family members and may forego pharmaceuticals to achieve savings2. The 
same may be true with married individuals, although spouses may also be more likely 
to push for medical treatment.
Health status, which is an indicator of need for medications, may be one of the most 
important predictors of prescription drug consumption. Not only are individuals in
2 An alternative to including both income and household size in the analysis is to divide total family 
income by household size (family income per person). The effect of this variable should be similar to 
that of income in a regression that also controls for family size.
118
Chapter 6
poorer health more likely to visit the physician, but they are also more likely to 
receive a prescription from the physician once they have visited the doctor.
6.4. Development of an econometric model specification
This section outlines the process of obtaining a prescription drug in the United States 
and the potential empirical issues that accompany this process. Based on this 
discussion, we then develop the preferred econometric specification for the analysis.
6.4.1. Basic framework of the model
There are a number of important aspects of the model that merit attention. The main 
variable of interest is the total number of prescriptions that the individual obtains in a 
given year including initial purchases and refills. The process of obtaining a 
prescription could be made quite complex, and Figure 6.1 depicts various stages in the 
process.
Figure 6.1. Process o f obtaining prescriptions in the United States
number purchased
patient
purchases
prescription
patient does 
not
purchase
prescription
There can be quite a few stages in the process leading up to the patient obtaining a 
prescription, and this diagram has simplified the process significantly3. Given that the 
object of interest is not the decision-making process and given the lack of
3 For example, the process could begin with the patient falling ill and deciding whether or not to visit 
the physician or the hospital. The pharmacist could also enter at a later stage o f  the process, perhaps by 
advising the patient to purchase an OTC medication instead o f  a prescription medication.
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observational variables in the MEPS for each stage of the decision process, it would 
be statistically infeasible and undesirable to model the entire process. For example, it 
is not possible to determine whether the doctor issued a prescription to the patient 
during a particular visit. Nonetheless, the important considerations for this dissertation 
are the cost/benefit comparisons regarding prescription drugs made by both patients 
and physicians. Specifically, once the patient has chosen to visit the doctor, the 
physician makes a marginal cost/marginal benefit comparison to determine whether or 
not to issue a prescription. The physician’s marginal cost may be affected by a 
capitated budget, the likelihood of credibility loss if the prescription does not work or 
causes severe side effects, or the time it takes to explain to the patient the need for a 
particular prescription. After the physician issues a prescription, the patient makes his 
own marginal cost/marginal benefit comparison and decides whether to purchase the 
medication. The patient’s marginal benefit evaluation may be based on his cultural 
views of medication, his faith in the doctor’s recommendation, his view of the 
severity of illness, and other factors. While we cannot observe the outcome of the 
physician’s cost/benefit comparison, we are able to establish whether a patient 
determined that his own net benefit outweighed the marginal cost; that is, the patient 
purchased medication.
One issue that we are unable to address is compliance. That is, we cannot ascertain 
whether the patient received a prescription from the physician but chose not to fill the 
prescription for economic, personal, or other reasons. We are also unable to ascertain 
whether the patient complied with the prescription instructions once he obtained the 
medication; for instance, we do not know whether the patient took half of the required 
dosage or skipped dosages because of economic reasons.
6.4.2. Econometric specification of the model
Based on the need to model the process that determines the consumption of 
prescription drugs and the nature of the dataset, there are a number of important 
considerations for developing an econometric specification.
Sample selection
The implication of this sequence of events is that we are unable to determine whether 
zero prescription drug consumption represents a true choice of zero consumption. For 
example, we cannot distinguish between the whether the physician issued a 
prescription and the patient chose not to fill the prescription (a true zero) and whether 
the physician never issued a prescription but the patient would have filled the 
prescription had he received one (not a true zero). An OLS regression on the selected 
sample would be inconsistent.
Alternative statistical techniques have been developed to account for the 
preponderance of zeros, and some of these methods include the two-part model, the 
double hurdle model, and the Heckman correction procedure. After consideration of 
different estimation techniques, the method that we employ in this dissertation is a 
Heckman (1979) sample selection model, and the description of this model is given in
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Appendix D. 1. The reasons for choosing the sample selection model over the 
alternatives are also discussed in Appendix D. 1. In brief, the model occurs over two 
stages where the individual chooses to consume any medications in the first stage, and 
in the second stage we model the number of drugs he consumes contingent upon 
consumption in the first stage.
Endogeneity
In addition to sample selection, there is also a potential endogeneity problem related 
to the co-payment variable. While we posit that the co-payment has an impact on the 
number of prescriptions consumed, the number of prescriptions consumed may also 
influence the insurance contract chosen by the individual and thus the co-payment. 
Because consumers do not always reveal these expectations regarding future drug 
consumption to insurers, issues of adverse selection influence the types of insurance 
contracts available on the market. Likely, individuals who perceive a greater need for 
prescriptions will purchase more generous insurance with a lower co-payment. A final 
potential source of endogeneity is the non-linearity of the co-payment variable. The 
problem is that we are unable to measure these insurance contracts, expectations 
regarding drug consumption, or specifics regarding the non-linearity, meaning that the 
error term in the regression is not independent of the co-payment variable. This can 
lead to biased estimates. Instrumental variable methods, which involve estimating the 
endogenous variable with at least one instrument that is not correlated with the 
dependent variable of interest and using this estimate for the endogenous variable in 
the main equation, have been developed for this purpose. Appendix D.3 provides an 
overview of the instrumental variables model.
Panel data techniques
While sample selection and endogeneity are problems that need to be addressed, 
having a panel dataset is an improvement over cross-sectional data as it allows us to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity. Econometric techniques have been developed 
to address panel data. The two main models for panel data are fixed effects and 
random effects, although there are a number of variations based on these two models. 
The fixed effects model introduces dummy variables to account for the impact of 
omitted variables that are specific to individual cross-sectional units but constant over 
time. This model can allow for the impact of time-specific omitted variables that are 
constant across individual cross-sectional units. Meanwhile, the random effects model 
assumes that there are a large number of factors which influence the dependent 
variable but have not been included in the model as explanatory variables (random 
disturbances). For our particular dataset and given question, a fixed effects approach 
is more appropriate as there are individual-specific factors that influence the choice of 
prescription drug consumption4. A more detailed explanation of the fixed effects 
model is given in Appendix D.4.
4 We test the assumption that fixed effects is more appropriate than random effects in the simple linear 
case. Appendix D.6 lists the results of this test in a footnote.
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Combining sample selection, endogeneity, and panel data techniques
The previous sections detailed various considerations that arise in empirical work, 
however, both the sample selection and endogeneity corrections were only described 
for cross-sectional cases. The purpose of this section is to bring together both the 
sample selection and endogeneity techniques into one model that simultaneously 
corrects for unobserved heterogeneity. An appropriate model to apply to this 
consumption decision was developed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) and 
consists of three main equations. Using sit as a selection indicator, these equations 
are:
= xi,P + S i+  for / = 1 , - . ,T . (6.1)
s„ = l[z„y + r|( + £„ > 0] for t = 1 . (6.2).
The variables from equation (6.1) represent the following: y it is the total number of 
prescriptions that the individual obtains in a given year including initial purchases and 
refills, which is censored according to sit. The xit are the explanatory variables that
determine y it (some of which can be endogenous; in our case we consider the 
potentially endogenous co-payment variable, demographic and socioeconomic 
variables, health variables, and time variables) and p is the coefficient on x it. In
addition, g t is the individual-specific term, and uit is the error term. In equation (6.2) 
slt is the indicator variable, z it are the instruments associated with the endogenous 
variable, y are the coefficients for z it, ri, is the individual-specific term, and s„ is 
the error term. We assume that 8//|z/ ,r |/ ~Normal(0,l), allowing sit to be estimated 
through an unobserved effects probit model.
The Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) estimator further allows for correlation 
between the individual-specific effect (r); ) and the instrumental variables (z,). The
chosen method is based on Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980) and models the 
unobserved effects from (6.1) and (6.2) as:
r|(. = z ^  + T + ai . (6.3)
Si = z iZ>i+ T 1+an . (6.4).
This assumes that the correlation between the unobserved effect and the z i occurs
only through the time means of z i , while at is independent of z t (Mundlak, 1978;
Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006). Incorporating (6.3) and (6.4) into equations (6.1) 
and (6.2) allows us to rewrite the main and selection equations as:
yu = Xufl  + z ,£  + rx + If/it for t = l , . . . , r . (6.5)
sit = l[zity + x + Zi5 + v„ > o] for t = 1 ,...,T . (6.6).
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While an additively combines with w„in equation (6.1) to form at combines 
additively with the e„ in the indicator function to form vjt, where 
vu\zi ~ Normal (0,l)5. To obtain an estimatable form of the model, two further 
assumptions are needed:
E {a n |z,,v„) = E(an |v„ ) = <)>„ v„ (6.7)
E {u „ K . v„) = E {u„ |v„ )=p,v„ (6.8).
Given that \yit = an + uit:
E ^Vu\z i<vi i ) -  E(aa\zt>vit)+ <hv« +P,v,, = K ,V „  (6.9),
and substituting (6.9) into (6.1) results in:
y« =x„fi + z l4i + r  + K,E{vu\zl,s,l \  +e„ (6.10),
where £(v„|zj , j„ ) = 0 .
The model is made robust to heteroskedasticity by using the White (1980) estimates 
of variance. When endogenous variables are included in the estimator, the model is 
labeled the “SS FE-2SLS” (fixed effects two stage least squares correcting for sample 
selection) model.
The procedure to obtain the estimates for y it is as follows: we first estimate a probit 
equation of zn and z, on st by estimating a separate probit equation for each year. 
Using these estimates, we construct the inverse Mills ratio. We then run a two-stage 
least squares regression with y it as the main variable of interest and the co-payment 
variable as the endogenous variable for the sample where sit = 1, including zf in both 
stages to account for the fixed effects.
To determine whether this procedure is merited for the given sample, Semykina and 
Wooldridge (2006) developed a test, which involves first estimating a probit model of 
this equation for each time period:
p (s„ = l|z,) = + Z&2 + r2) (6.11).
5 The assumption regarding v u |z ( ~  Normal (0,l) does not hold strictly. But following
v it |Zl ~  Normal (0,1 +  ), we simplify the true variation to specify a less restrictive form without
weakening the argument; this simplification is based on Semykina and Wooldridge (2006). This allows 
the coefficients in the individual-year selection equations to be entirely unrestricted. Full details of this 
assumption can be found in Section 4 of Semykina and Wooldridge (2006), pg. 15-16.
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Then, the results of each probit are used to calculate the inverse Mills ratios, Xit. For 
the sample where sjt = 1, a fixed effects two-stage least squares approach is used to 
estimate the equation:
y u = x„P + pXH + g, + u„ (6.12).
If the coefficient for Xit is significant, the null hypothesis of no selection bias is
rejected. Note that by interacting the inverse Mills ratio with the time dummies and 
using a robust variance matrix, a test of the joint significant of all of those terms can 
be undertaken with a Wald test.
In the analysis that follows in Section 6.5, the dependent variable (yjt) is the number 
of prescription drugs obtained per person per year, whereas the sample selection 
indicator (sit) equals one if the individual obtained any prescriptions in a given year 
and zero otherwise. As mentioned previously, we hypothesize that the co-payment is 
an endogenous variable (cit).
6.5. Results
This section discusses the results of the descriptive statistics and the econometric 
estimation. The creation of the dataset and subsequent analyses were carried out in 
STATA 9.2. For some of the panel data analyses, the STATA [xt\ commands, which 
account for unbalanced panels, were employed. We also used the [regress] command 
along with time averages for each explanatory variable for the SS FE-2SLS estimator; 
the variances for this model were also adjusted to account for sample selection and 
endogeneity according to Semykina and Wooldridge (2006). The STATA code for the 
estimator along with the variance correction code is available in Appendix D.5.
The raw data consisted of 272,277 observations, and after removing individuals under 
the age of 18 (83,123 observations) and excluding observations with missing data 
(2,554 observations), the final sample consisted of 186,600 observations6. The 
analysis extended to three different samples: an adult, an elderly, and a low-income 
sample7. We chose the adult sample to represent the general population, and we 
excluded individuals under the age of 18 because in the US, the child’s guardian 
typically has discretion over the child’s type of insurance coverage and consumption 
of medical care. The elderly sample consisted of individuals aged 65 and above as 65 
is the age at which Americans become eligible for Medicare and a typical retirement 
age. Inclusion in the low-income sample was based on family size, and we defined 
low-income individuals as those who belonged to a family with an income below 
200% of the Federal poverty level. The amount for a single filer is similar to the
6 All of these totals include both observations for individuals that appeared twice in MEPS.
7 We conducted a Chow test for the equality of coefficients between the three samples. Specifically, we 
rejected the null hypothesis of no structural difference between the general population and the elderly 
group, and we rejected the null hypothesis of no structural difference between the general population 
and the low-income group.
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amount that has been suggested as the lower threshold for the middle class (Kacapyr 
et al., 1996).
6.5.1. Descriptive results of the sample
Table 6.2 lists the explanatory variables that we considered for the model along with 
their means and standard deviations, although not all of these variables were included 
in the final model for reasons discussed below.
Table 6.2. Percent o f sample exhibiting specific characteristics, 1996-2004
Variable Adult sample (N =  186,600)
Elderly sample 
(N = 29,244)
Low-income sample 
(N = 51,112)
Drug co-payment, <=$6.84 51.12 26.25 55.91
Drug co-payment, $6.85 -  $12.81 ! 16.35 16.91 12.12
Drug co-payment, $12.82 -  $24.57 16.26 22.92 13.69
Drug co-payment, >$24.57 16.26 33.92 18.29
Age <=30 25.1 N/A 26.17
Age, 31 -45 31.15 N/A 29.94
Age, 45 - 65 | 28.08 N/A 21.47
Age, 65 -  74 8.58 54.76 10.49
Age >74 7.09 45.24 11.93
Male 46.14 40.96 40.01
Female 53.86 59.04 59.99
White 60.25 73.15 42.57
Black 13.65 12.17 20.00
Hispanic 21.62 11.76 33.56
Other race/ethnicity 4.48 2.92 3.87
Income, <=$7,955 25.57 26.43 85.62
Income, $7,966 -  $15,910 26.87 31.36 14.38
Income, $15,911 -$23 ,865 17.38 17.33 N/A
Income, $23 ,866-$31 ,820 10.5 9.57 N/A
Income, >$31,820 19.69 15.31 N/A
Married 56.53 52.28 46.06
Not married 43.47 47.72 53.94
Good health 85.35 72.7 75.13
Poor health 14.65 27.3 24.87
Diagnosed with a major disease 17.51 39.04 21.37
Not diagnosed with a major disease 82.49 60.96 78.63
Has a limitation to activities o f  daily 
living 2.16 8.28 3.99
Does not have a limitation to activities 
o f  daily living 97.84 91.72 96.01
Various trends appear when we examine the summary statistics, which were 
calculated using all 186,600 observations. The co-payment bands were chosen by
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taking the co-payment at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles for individuals with 
positive prescriptions, as the co-payment is not observed for those who do not 
consume any prescriptions in a given year. The descriptive statistics reveal that 
approximately half of the sample has a co-payment of less than $6.84, although this 
percent is relatively large because it includes the sample that did not consume any 
drugs. Note that we are unable to observe the actual co-payment for individuals that 
did not consume any prescriptions in a given year, and this calculation likely 
overestimates the proportion of the sample with a low co-payment. The percent of the 
sample was split relatively evenly between the other co-payment bands; thus, the 
number of people purchasing prescriptions with high out-of-pocket costs was 
comparatively large. The proportion of respondents in the various co-payment bands 
was relatively similar for the low-income group, although an alarming result was that 
over 18 percent of the low-income sample faced a co-payment greater than $24.57 per 
prescription. The distribution of elderly individuals between the co-payment bands 
was different though, with a smaller proportion facing a low co-payment (less than 
$6.84) and a much larger proportion facing higher co-payment (above $24.57).
The summary statistics for age reveal that most of the adult sample is between the 
ages of 18 and 65, while a slightly greater proportion of the elderly sample is between 
65 and 74. Compared with the adult sample, the low-income group had a greater 
proportion of respondents under the age of 30 and a slightly larger proportion over the 
age of 64. Meanwhile, the gender variables indicate that females make up a slightly 
larger proportion of the adult sample. This difference becomes even more pronounced 
in the elderly and low-income samples, likely because women have higher life 
expectancies than men. Slightly more than half of the sample is white, while blacks 
and Hispanics make up almost 40% of the sample. Because of the study design where 
blacks and Hispanics were over-sampled, this proportion is higher than the national 
average.
The income variable was created by dividing total family income by the number of 
persons in the household8. To calculate the income bands in Table 6.2, we used the 
Federal Poverty Level, where each band represents an increase in income to n percent 
of the FPL (where n = 100 percent, 200 percent, 300 percent, and 400 percent). The 
income variable indicates that a disproportionate part of the adult sample has very low 
income, and the elderly appear to have less income on average than the adult 
population. A little over half of the adult, elderly, and low-income samples were 
married.
In terms of the health status variables, most of the adult sample reported being in good 
health, although this proportion was lower for the elderly and low-income samples. 
Only about 18 percent of the adult sample had been diagnosed with one of the leading 
causes of death (asthma, coronary heart disease, stroke, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, malignant cancer, and diabetes (CDC, 2006)). This proportion 
was higher for the low-income group and more than twice as large for the elderly. 
Finally, only about 2 percent of the adult sample faced at least one limitation to an
8 This allowed us to implicitly account for family size, a variable that may not change significantly 
from one year to the next, in the fixed effects framework.
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activity of daily living, although this proportion was about 4 percent for the low- 
income group and four times as large for the elderly.
As described previously, we are primarily interested in the effect of co-payments on 
the number of prescription drugs consumed. As pointed out in the literature review, 
the decision to consume at least one prescription may be different than the choice of 
how much to consume. Because of this distinction, we examined descriptive statistics 
for the probability of consuming a prescription drug and the number of drugs 
purchased conditional upon positive consumption (Table 6.3).
In terms of the probability of obtaining a prescription drug, this likelihood increases 
with age in all of the samples. Females are more likely to obtain a prescription drug in 
all three samples, while the probability of an individual who is white obtaining a 
prescription drug is higher than for someone who is black, Hispanic, or of another 
race or ethnicity. As for income there doesn’t appear to be much of a difference 
between this likelihood among the different income bands, except for those at or 
below 100% of the FPL in the adult and low-income sample, as the poorest group was 
less likely to obtain a prescription. In all of the samples, the probability of a married 
respondent receiving a drug was about the same as for an unmarried respondent. In 
general, the likelihood of positive consumption was much higher for individuals who 
reported being in poor health than for their healthier counterparts. The trend was the 
same for those who had been diagnosed with at least one of the leading causes of 
death and those reporting at least one limitation to an activity of daily living.
There were interesting trends for total prescription drugs consumed, conditional upon 
the respondent having at least one prescription. As the co-payment increased the 
number of prescriptions obtained actually increased. This positive association may 
have been due to the other factors such as need, expected drug consumption, and the 
availability of insurance contracts on the market. This descriptive result implies the 
need to further investigate the relationship between the co-payment and consumption, 
for instance, by considering the possibility that the co-payment is endogenous to 
consumption.
Not surprisingly, there was a positive relationship between age and total drugs 
consumed, likely because health stock declines with age. Females also tended to have 
more prescriptions than men, except for in the low-income sample where men and 
women consumed similar amounts of prescriptions. The trends for the different racial 
and ethnic groups were somewhat different than with the probability of obtaining a 
prescription. Among the adult and low-income populations, whites and blacks 
consumed about the same number of drugs, while Hispanics and individuals of other 
races and ethnicities consumed fewer prescriptions. For the elderly population, 
consumption was similar across all racial and ethnic groups, with blacks consuming 
the most prescription drugs.
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Table 6.3. Statistical information about the possible predictors o f demand for 
prescription drugs, 1996-2004
Variable Adult sample fN = 186.6001
Elderly sample 
tN=29.244)
Low-income sample 
IN =51,1121
Prob. o f at 
least one Number of  drugs2
Prob. o f at 
least one
Number o f  
drugs2
Prob. o f at 
least one
Prob. o f at 
least one
prescription prescription prescription prescription
Drug co-payment, 
<=$6.84 N/A 13.18 N/A 26.00 N/A
19.74
Drug co-payment, 
$6.85-$12.81
N/A 14.51 N/A 26.21 N/A 18.79
Drug co-payment, 
$12 .82-$24.57 N/A 17.83
N/A 27.99 N/A 22.10
Drug co-payment, 
>$24.57 N/A 17.83 N/A
26.88 N/A 21.67
Age, <=30 0.488 5.87 N/A N/A 0.451 6.08
Age, 31 - 45 0.580 9.91 N/A N/A 0.529 12.27
Age, 45 - 65 0.738 19.43 N/A N/A 0.736 27.58
Age, 65 -  74 0.878 25.60 0.878 25.60 0.882 29.62
Age, >74 0.914 28.38 0.914 28.38 0.917 30.70
Male 0.551 14.32 0.872 24.26 0.520 19.37
Female 0.736 16.82 0.910 28.63 0.714 21.23
White 0.720 16.72 0.905 26.76 0.755 23.67
Black 0.616 17.00 0.884 29.01 0.638 21.47
Hispanic 0.500 11.98 0.856 25.89 0.489 14.13
Other race/ethnicity 0.553 13.32 0.820 25.00 0.592 19.64
Income, <=$7,955 0.598 18.53 0.892 30.24 0.608 19.16
Income, $7,966 -  $15,910 0.641 16.53 0.897 27.86 0.802 27.22
Income, $15,911 -$23 ,865 0.668 15.09 0.892 26.42 N/A N/A
Income, $23,866-$31 ,820 0.688 14.39 0.893 23.37 N/A N/A
Income, >$31,820 0.695 13.38 0.896 21.83 N/A N/A
Married 0.674 14.71 0.895 24.34 0.614 17.46
Not married 0.620 17.44 0.893 29.68 0.655 23.15
Good health 0.613 12.06 0.870 22.20 0.561 14.05
Poor health 0.871 31.32 0.959 38.20 0.864 33.50
Diagnosed with major 
disease 0.944 29.29 0.976 36.05
0.950 35.31
Not diagnosed with major 
disease 0.588 11.26
0.842 20.08 0.551 13.73
Limitation to activities o f  
daily living
0.947 43.38 0.957 44.40 0.952 45.68
No limitation to activities o f  
daily living
0.644 14.95 0.889 25.18 0.623 19.03
afor an individual with at least one prescription, the mean number o f prescriptions consumed
As income increased among the adult and elderly samples, the number of prescription 
drugs declined, possibly indicating that lower-income populations have greater need 
for prescription drug treatments. The results from the marital status variable indicated
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that although married respondents had a higher probability of consuming at least one 
prescription, unmarried respondents actually consumed more prescription drugs once 
we account for the probability of positive consumption. Not surprisingly, individuals 
who were in poor health, who had been diagnosed with at least one of the leading 
causes of death, or who faced at least one limitation to daily activities purchased 
significantly more prescriptions.
6.5.2. Results of the econometric analysis
The following section discusses the variables included in the models and the results of 
the models. We first go over general information about the model, including the 
transformations of some variables and information regarding which variables were 
included in the equations. Then, the section offers the regression results for the total 
number of prescription drugs obtained.
We transformed the dependent variable (total prescription drugs obtained) and two of 
the major explanatory variables (the prescription drug co-payment and income per 
person in each family) into logarithms as these variables were highly skewed to the 
right. Given the use of the fixed effects estimator, time-invariant variables, including 
gender and race/ethnicity, did not return coefficients. A number of variables that were 
hypothesized to significantly predict the demand for prescription drugs (such as 
education) had little effect in the fixed effects framework possibly because omitted 
variables, such as preferences for prescription drugs and access to pharmacies, were 
capturing much of the impact on the demand for prescription drugs. Interaction effects, 
for instance age and income, age and morbidity, and morbidity and self-reported 
health status were also defined, but none of these were significant.
The instrumental variables chosen for the adult sample were the main regressors, 
whether the individual had non-Medicare public insurance coverage9, and whether the 
individual reported being self-employed10. The public insurance variable was intended 
to control for the effect of different prescription drug prices as public insurance 
agencies tend to obtain the highest discounts for prescription drugs and can use these 
savings to keep the out-of-pocket burden for public insurance beneficiaries low11. As 
for the self-employed variable, we hypothesized that individuals who were self- 
employed would be less risk averse (Brown et al., 2006) and thus more likely to 
forego insurance coverage, particularly because evidence suggests that self- 
employment lowers income and failure rates are high (De Meza and Southey, 1996).
9 We did not include Medicare coverage as Medicare did not offer an outpatient prescription drug 
benefit during the study period.
10 We also tried the variable indicating whether the individual had changed insurance plans during the 
year; this variable was a suitable instrument, and the results were almost identical to the results using 
the self-employment variable as an instrument.
11 Co-payments for non-Medicare public programs are relatively low, and major coverage benefits arise 
through the negotiation of lower drug prices and Federal and state policies that mandate certain ceilings 
and rebates on drugs for government purchasers above those given to private purchasers (GAO, 2007). 
These policies help public insurers provide more generous coverage (for instance, coverage that does 
not have prescription limits) and keep co-payments lower, effectively reducing the out-of-pocket 
burden for beneficiaries.
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The validity of this instrument has been confirmed elsewhere for the MEPS dataset 
(Meer and Rosen, 2003).
Because the elderly and low-income populations are less likely to be self-employed, 
we chose different instruments for these samples; specifically, the instruments were 
the main regressors along with whether the individual had non-Medicare public 
insurance coverage and whether the individual switched insurance coverage at least 
once during the year12. We hypothesized that individuals who switch insurance plans 
are likely to experience a change in their out-of-pocket requirements as a result.
Another important point is related to identification of the annual probits that were 
used to predict the Mills lambda. While identification can theoretically be achieved 
through the functional form of the Mills lambda, it is preferable to have instruments 
that predict the probability of prescription drug consumption but do not predict the 
number of drugs consumed. We tried a variety of potential instruments, but none of 
these were feasible.
There are separate tables of the coefficient estimates for each of the population groups. 
We only report the results from the main variables of interest in this section; tables 
that include all time variables, X coefficients, and time averages from the main 
equation along with the results from the sample selection and endogenous variable 
equations are available in Appendix Sections D.7, D.8, and D.9. Furthermore, the 
results of the specification tests for the appropriateness of the SS FE-2SLS model and 
the chosen variable are available in Appendix D.6.
Number o f  prescription drugs obtained, adult sample 
In order to obtain a general price elasticity value for the broad population, we 
estimated the effect of a change in the co-payment on the annual number of 
prescription drugs obtained for the adult sample. We ran five different models on the 
restricted sample of individuals that consumed at least one prescription and appeared 
in the sample twice: a simple OLS model with an exogenous co-payment variable that 
did not account for the panel nature of the data13 (Pooled OLS), a 2SLS model that 
also did not account for the panel nature of the data (Pooled 2SLS), a fixed effects 
model with an exogenous co-payment variable (Fixed Effects), a fixed effects 2SLS 
(Fixed Effects 2SLS or FE-2SLS) model, and a fixed effects 2SLS model that 
accounted for sample selection (SS FE-2SLS). The intuition behind running these 
different specifications was to provide some indication of how the coefficients, 
particularly the elasticity values, change across specifications. Because the preferred 
specification is the SS FE-2SLS model, the discussion of Table 6.4 covers the results 
of the other specifications but focuses on the FE-2SLS model.
12 This variable indicated whether the individual changed between any o f these insurance types at least 
once in a given year: Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, other state insurance programs, other public 
insurance programs, employer union insurance, other group insurance, self-employment insurance, 
non-group insurance, or private insurance (source unknown).
13 In the pooled OLS and pooled 2SLS estimations, we controlled for repeated observations through 
clustering.
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The additional variables that we considered such as marital status, urban area, and 
potential interaction effects were not significant. We conducted an F-test on the set of 
instruments, as discussed in Staiger and Stock (1997), to examine the null hypothesis 
that the instrumental variables were not significantly correlated with the endogenous 
variable. A rule of thumb is that the F-test on all the instruments needs to exceed 10, 
and our F-value of 57.48 was sufficient to determine that we did not have weak 
instruments. We also performed a Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions to 
determine whether the instruments were independent of the error term in the main 
equation. A statistically significant test statistic indicates that the instrument set is not 
independent of the error term, but as the value of our statistic from this test was 0.032 
(p=0.859), we failed to reject the null hypothesis at %2(l). Furthermore, neither of the 
instruments was a significant predictor of the total number of prescription drugs 
consumed.
Table 6.4. Estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription drugs obtained 
equation (adult sample)a,b,c
Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(log) drug co-payment 0.058§
(0.004)
-0.284§
(0.014)
0.036§
(0.004)
-0.262§
(0.041)
-0.250S
(0.039)
age between 30 and 39 0.207§
(0.012)
0.226S
(0.013)
-0.030
(0.033)
-0.039
(0.034)
-0.052
(0.036)
age between 40 and 49 0.461§ 
(0.012)
0.503§
(0.013)
-0.010
(0.042)
0.007
(0.042)
-0.030
(0.046)
age between 50 and 64 0.749§
(0.012)
0 .812S 
(0.013)
0.079
(0.049)
0.102*
(0.049)
0.039
(0.053)
age between 65 and 74 0.878§
(0.014)
1.009§
(0.016)
0.113*
(0.056)
0.146*
(0.058)
0.051
(0.061)
age above 74 0.948§
(0.015)
1.094§
(0.016)
0.075
(0.064)
0.099
(0.072)
-0.029
(0.069)
(log) income per person in 0.023§ 0.028§ 0.003 0.003 0.002
family (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
individual reports poor 0.558§ 0.534§ 0.060§ 0.061§ 0.060s
health (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
individual diagnosed with at .  „ §  
least one o f  leading causes 0.534§ 0.204S 0.218S 0.194s
o f death (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017)
1.242§ 1.982§ 2.243s 2.919s 1.814Sconbiani
(0.016) (0.034) (0.041) (0.102) (0.000)
N 90,088 90,088 90,088 90,088 90,088
R2 0.298 0.207 0.229 0.027 0.117
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 30, individual reports
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the leading causes o f  death
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
The coefficients on all of the variables were generally larger in the pooled cross- 
sectional models, implying that the included variables in the cross-sectional models
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were capturing individual-specific effects that were not included in the regression.
The coefficient on the prescription drug co-payment variable was positive for the 
regressions where the endogeneity of the co-payment was not considered and negative 
in the models where we corrected for endogeneity. The positive coefficient on the co­
payment in some of the regressions could be explained by the existence of omitted 
variables (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). As a result, the residuals on the co-payment 
variable, which have essentially been removed in the endogeneity correction, were 
likely biasing the coefficient on the co-payment variable upwards. Interestingly, the 
coefficient on the co-payment variable was relatively stable between the FE-2SLS 
model and the FE-2SLS model accounting for sample selection, implying that the 
primary effect of the co-payment on the demand for prescription drugs was through 
the volume of drugs consumed and not the probability of consumption. In the fixed 
effects model that accounted for endogeneity and sample selection, the price elasticity 
of demand was -0.250 (p=0.000).
In general, the coefficients on the age variables were positive for higher ages, 
indicating that prescription drug consumption increases with age. The age coefficients 
were significant in the pooled regression setting and sometimes significant in the 
panel data models, potentially because the age variables were capturing unobserved 
effects in the pooled models. In fact, age appears to work partially through the initial 
decision to consume at least one prescription and partially through the determination 
of the co-payment, at least for higher age levels.
While the income variable was significant in the pooled models and never significant 
in the panel data models, the coefficient on this variable was positive across all 
specifications. Both of the included health variables were significant and positive, 
indicating that deteriorating health has an important effect on prescription drug 
consumption. Specifically, an individual that reports being in poor health consumes 
6.18 percent more prescriptions on average than an individual who reports being in 
good health. Also, an individual who has been diagnosed with at least one of the 
leading causes of death consumes 21.41 percent more prescriptions on average than 
an individual who has not been diagnosed with one of these conditions.
Number of prescription drugs obtained\ elderly sample 
While the price elasticity estimates for the general population are useful, 
policymakers are also interested in the elasticity of demand for the elderly as they are 
generally considered a more vulnerable group. There may be different factors that 
influence consumption among seniors, but for comparability we provide the results of 
the model using the regressors from the regression on the general population (see 
Table 6.5). We then provide the results of the estimation for a set of regressors that is 
specific to the elderly (see Table 6.6).
When we used the same variables for the regressions on elderly sample, the trends in 
the explanatory variables across the pooled and fixed effects settings were similar to 
the trends we observed in the adult sample. We included this table and report the price 
elasticity results for these specifications, though, in order to provide a consistent
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comparison with the results from the adult and low-income samples. The coefficient 
on prescription drug price elasticity variable was -0.096 (p=0.235) in the fixed effects 
two-stage least squares model, which was not significant.
Table 6.5. Estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription drugs obtained 
equation (elderly sample)a,b
Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(log) drug co-payment 0.031  ^
(0.008)
-0.186§
(0.023)
0.022S
(0.008)
-0.129*
(0.079)
-0.096
(0.080)
individual is above the age o f 0.080S 0.090s -0.064s -0.068* -0.098s
74 (0.015) (0.016) (0.029) (0.035) (0.030)
(log) income per person in 
family
0.021§ 
(0.003)
0.023S
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
individual reports poor health 0.418§
(0.015)
0.389s
(0.016)
0.044§
(0.015)
0.047s
(0.017)
0.039S
(0.015)
individual diagnosed with at 
least one o f leading causes o f  
death
0.495S
(0.015)
0.497S
(0.016)
0.135S
(0.022)
0.139§
(0.023)
0.105§
(0.027)
constant 2.210s 2.773s 2.798s 3.188S 2.567s
(0.035) (0.066) (0.046) (0.213) (0.231)
N 21,780 21,780 21,780 21,780 21,780
R2 0.148 0.103 0.094 0.023 0.084
“standard errors in parentheses, excluded dummy variables are age less than 75, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the leading causes o f  death 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
As mentioned earlier, there may be different factors that influence elderly 
consumption of prescription drugs. In particular, among the elderly there may not be 
much difference in drug consumption until the individual becomes very old; at that 
point, the elderly may actually take fewer medications as the risk of adverse events 
increases (Avom et al., 2001). Also, the magnitude of illness may be a more important 
predictor of consumption for this group of the population because most individuals 
are already consuming some medications. Whether or not the individual is retired may 
also be another key variable as this is a proxy for the amount of free time the 
individual has. By including these variables in the model, we obtain the results in 
Table 6.6.
The inclusion of other variables in the model did not create a multicollinearity 
problem as we obtained a variance inflation factor of 3.82 and a condition index of
13.3. To test for the performance of the instruments, we again used an F-test and 
obtained an acceptable value of 15.61. The Sargan test for the independence of the 
instruments from the main error terms had a value of 0.010 (p=0.922). In addition, 
neither of the instruments was a significant predictor of the total number of 
prescription drugs consumed among this sample.
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Table 6.6. Revised estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription drugs 
obtained equation (elderly sample)a,b
E xplanatory  variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(log) drug co-payment 0.029§
(0.008)
-0.150§
(0.022)
0.021s
(0.008)
-0.133*
(0.079)
-0.108
(0.079)
individual is above the age 0.017 0.033* -0.038 -0.038 -0.066s
o f  79 (0.017) (0.018) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032)
(log) income per person in 0.023S 0.024s 0.005 0.005 0.005
family (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
individual is retired -0.006(0.015)
0.003
(0.015)
-0.027
(0.018)
-0.030*
(0.016)
-0.034*
(0.018)
individual reports poor 0.407s 0.386s 0.041s 0.044S 0.037s
health (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
individual faces at least one 
limitation to an activity o f  
daily living
0.342§
(0.027)
0.321S
(0.027)
0.082s
(0.029)
0.098S
(0.034)
0.089S
(0.030)
individual has at least one 
pre-defined high-cost and/or 
high-prevalence diseases14
0.584s
(0.017)
0.592S
(0.017)
0.191S
(0.026)
0.198S
(0.026)
0.139S
(0.041)
constant 2.035s 2.490s 2.731s 3.127s 2.416s
(0.037) (0.066) (0.050) (0.203) (0.231)
N 21,780 21,780 21,780 21,780 21,780
R2 0.171 0.140 0.135 0.048 0.120
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 79, individual is not
retired, individual reports being in good health, individual does not have at least one limitation at
activities o f daily living, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the pre-defined diseases
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
The co-payment variable was only significant in the pooled cross-sectional 
regressions and the fixed effects OLS regression that did not account for sample 
selection or endogeneity. The co-payment was negative across all specifications that 
accounted for endogeneity. In the fixed effects 2SLS model accounting for sample 
selection, the calculated price elasticity was -0.108 (p=0.172). The age variable was 
significant in the pooled cross-sectional models and the SS FE-2SLS model, and 
according to the preferred model, older geriatrics consume less than their younger 
counterparts. In line with the result from the adult sample, income was only 
significant in the pooled models and appears to have a slightly positive impact on 
drug consumption. While the variable indicating whether the individual was perceived 
as being in poor health was significant in the pooled cross-sectional models, it was not 
significant at the conventional level in the fixed effects models. However, the 
coefficient on the variable indicating whether the individual faced an ADL suggested 
that having this health problem caused the individual to consume 9.31 percent more 
prescriptions. Similarly, individuals diagnosed with at least one high-cost, high-
14 The high-cost and/or high-prevalence diseases were defined as hypertension, diabetes, cancer, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, acute myocardial infarction, coronary heart disease, and stroke 
according to Joyce et al. (2005).
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prevalence disease consume 14.91 percent more prescriptions on average that 
individuals who are not diagnosed with one of these diseases.
Number o f prescription drugs obtained, low-income sample
Another group that is generally considered to be more vulnerable is those who are 
poor. They tend to have less disposable income to spend on prescriptions, and there is 
a positive association between poor health and low income (Macinko et al., 2003). 
Yet, the literature review of cost sharing for prescription drugs in Chapter 3 pointed 
out the lack of studies comparing price elasticity estimates for low-income and 
general population groups. To remedy this gap in the literature, the results of this 
analysis are available in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7. Estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription drugs obtained 
equation (low-income sample)0,b’c
Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(log) drug co-payment 0.002(0.007)
-0.261§
(0.016)
-0.261S
(0.012)
-0.239S
(0.054)
-0.199S
(0.046)
age between 30 and 39 0.256S
(0.031)
0.304S
(0.033)
0.304S
(0.026)
-0.148*
(0.081)
-0.151*
(0.082)
age between 40 and 49 0.6005
(0.034)
0.690s
(0.036)
0.690S
(0.027)
-0.168
(0.118)
-0.188*
(0.112)
age between 50 and 64 0.903§
(0.032)
1.016S
(0.034)
1.016 s 
(0.026)
-0.034
(0.136)
-0.087
(0.127)
age between 65 and 74 0.934§
(0.034)
1.085S
(0.037)
1.0858
(0.028)
0.002
(0.146)
-0.078
(0.142)
age above 74 0.951§
(0.033)
1.134s
(0.036)
1.134s
(0.028)
-0.073
(0.142)
-0.194
(0.157)
(log) income per person in 0.047S 0.0465 0.046s 0.003 0.003
family (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
individual reports poor 0.525s 0.494S 0.494S 0.070S 0.069s
health (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018)
individual diagnosed with at 
least one o f  leading causes 
o f death
0.532S
(0.019)
0.541S
(0.020)
0.541§
(0.015)
0.199S
(0.027)
0.138s
(0.035)
constant 1.296s 1.786S 1.786s 3.200S 1.691S
(0.034) (0.046) (0.039) (0.163) (0.125)
N 16,786 16,786 16,786 16,786 16,786
R2 0.355 0.112 0.173 0.040 0.099
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 30, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the leading causes o f death 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
The F-test on the set of instruments at 22.43 was high enough to merit the use of our 
chosen instruments. However, we experimented with numerous other potential 
instruments and combinations of potential instruments, and the instruments chosen for
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this analysis performed better than any other possibilities. As for the Sargan test to 
determine the relationship between the instruments and the error term in the main 
equation, our resulting value was 1.61 (p=0.205), and we failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of independence. Another finding was that both instruments were not 
significant predictors of the total number of prescription drugs consumed among the 
low-income group.
Similar to the analyses for the other samples, the coefficients on the explanatory 
variables were smaller in the fixed effects models, implying that there were 
unobserved variables that we could not account for in the pooled cross-sectional 
regression analysis. The co-payment variable exhibited the same pattern as observed 
in the previous regressions; it was positive for the models that did not account for 
endogeneity and negative for the models that did correct for this bias. The price 
elasticity of demand decreased as more biases were controlled for, and the final price 
elasticity value was -0.199 (p=0.000). The only other variables that were significant 
in the fixed effects framework were the health status variables, which indicated that 
an individual who reports being in poor health consumes 7.14 percent more 
prescriptions on average than an individual who reports being in good health. Also, a 
respondent who is diagnosed with one of the leading causes of death obtains 14.80 
percent more prescriptions on average than one who is not diagnosed with one of 
these conditions.
6.6. Discussion
This section of the chapter brings together the results from the various analyses that 
were conducted and discusses why we might have observed the specific outcomes. 
This chapter does not offer policy implications based on our analysis; instead, the 
policy relevance of our work is discussed in Chapter 8. One interesting phenomenon 
was the observed positive association between the out-of-pocket cost and the demand 
for prescription drugs in the raw data. As this is the opposite of what we would expect, 
we hypothesized that other factors which determine the co-payment, particularly the 
existence of both public and private insurance in the United States and the non- 
linearity of the co-payment variable, were influencing this result. Based on this 
hypothesis, we empirically examined whether the co-payment was endogenous and 
confirmed that we needed to correct for this bias.
Across all of the samples and dependent variables that we examined, the fixed effects 
framework was more efficient than pooled cross-sectional OLS. This implies that a 
number of individual-specific factors, such as preferences for prescription drugs, 
unobserved wealth, and access to health care, are important predictors of the demand 
for prescription drugs. As the coefficients on all of the explanatory variables 
decreased when the fixed effects framework was used, this implies that at least some 
coefficient estimates from the literature may be larger than if the authors had 
accounted for unobserved individual-specific effects.
Based on the results of the preferred specification (SS FE-2SLS), Table 6.8 lists the 
price elasticity values that we obtained from each specific population group.
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Table 6.8. Comparison o f elasticity results for different samplesa
Population group Price elasticity
Adults -0.250(p=0.000)
Elderly -0.108 
OH). 172)
-0.199Low-income (p=0.000)
astandard errors in parentheses
The price elasticities are significantly different from zero in the adult and low-income 
samples but not significantly different from zero in the elderly sample. One feature of 
our calculations is that the price elasticity value in the low-income sample is lower 
than the elasticity in the adult sample, but we would expect the opposite result as the 
low-income population has less disposable income. The income variable in the low- 
income regression may account for some of the greater sensitivity that we would 
expect. Another possibility is that we are unable to observe wealth, and some 
individuals classified as poor, such as elderly individuals, may be incorrectly 
classified as such because they are not working and can afford to live off of their 
wealth. Also, some of the poor are covered by Medicaid, which generally requires 
little or no cost sharing for prescription drugs, and as these individuals are clustered 
near the low-end of the demand curve, they may be less responsive to changes in the 
out-of-pocket price.
The lower price elasticity value (in absolute value) for the elderly was not surprising, 
although the value of the elasticity was interesting. As the marginal efficiency of 
investments in health is lower for the elderly, they must spend a greater amount on 
medical care to maintain their health. They may also perceive fewer substitutes for 
prescription drugs. For example, changes in diet and exercise may be insufficient to 
improve their health, and alternatives such as surgery are more dangerous for the 
elderly and thus less appealing. The result is that seniors are likely to be less sensitive 
to changes in the out-of-pocket prices of prescription drugs, and we observe this 
expected trend with the given analysis.
In comparison with the elasticity values from the literature, our calculated price 
elasticity estimate of -0.250 for the adult population is higher than the value of -0.156 
that we obtained in the meta-regression analysis in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, the 
estimate of -0.250 from the American sample is significantly different from -0.156 
(p=0.007). Our elasticity may be somewhat different because we only examined the 
adult American population in this chapter, while the meta-regression analysis 
considered the general population across a number of developed countries.
In terms of our estimates for the elderly, there were only a few papers that that 
calculated the price elasticity of demand among the elderly at the non-aggregate level 
(or offered enough information for us to calculate the price elasticity of demand) 
(Coulson and Stuart, 1995; Gardner et al., 1997; Grootendorst and Levine, 2001;
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Grootendorst et al., 1997; Klick and Stratmann, 2005; Li et al., 2006). The price 
elasticity values from these papers ranged from -0.56 to 0.04. With the exception of 
the Grootendorst and Levine (2001) Canadian calculation15, our price elasticity 
estimate of -0.108 for the elderly is smaller in absolute value than estimates from the 
literature.
A few papers have also examined low-income groups at the non-aggregate level 
(Coulson and Stuart, 1995; Grootendorst and Levine, 2001; Li et al., 2006), and our 
American estimate for the low-income group of -0.199 is at the high end of this range. 
Nonetheless, all estimates for the low-income group are relatively inelastic.
In general, there are a number of reasons why our estimates might differ from those 
found in the literature. Differences in estimation techniques is likely an important 
reason for the variation in estimates, and the differences in samples selected for the 
analyses may also be an important contributor to variation. Furthermore, authors that 
used datasets from outside the United States may have obtained different results as 
other developed countries have universal health insurance systems, and individuals in 
these countries may face less uncertainty related to changes in their out-of-pocket 
costs.
In terms of the other variables that we used to predict the demand for prescription 
drugs, age was always significant in the pooled cross-sectional models and sometimes 
significant in the fixed effects framework. Specifically, the variable representing 
whether the respondent was between the ages of 65 and 74 had a positive coefficient 
in the regression for total drugs consumed among the general population. The variable 
also tended to be positive as age increased and decreasing at very high ages, although 
this wasn’t necessarily true in the low-income population when we used the fixed 
effects two-stage least squares framework. This may have been because the 
endogenous co-payment variable was capturing most of the age effects. Interestingly, 
the negative result of age among the elderly is consistent with the findings from the 
literature review (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4). We pointed out that beginning at certain 
ages in the American elderly population, age is likely has a negative effect, but the 
same effect may not hold for other elderly populations in countries like Canada, 
where there is generous insurance coverage.
As for the income variable, this was never significant in the fixed effects models, 
likely because wealth is a better predictor of drug consumption. It may be that wealth 
is a better predictor of drug consumption, and the fixed effects may be capturing these 
wealth effects. Other variables such as health status may be picking up the income 
effects as there is generally a positive correlation between income and health 
(Macinko et a l , 2003). Alternatively, the primary effect of income may be through 
the determination of the co-payment variable.
15 While the Canadian elderly are shielded from most out-of-pocket prescription drug costs, they also 
face no out-of-pocket costs for essential medical services (as defined by the Canadian government). In 
the Grootendorst and Levine (2001) estimation, it appears that the effect of lower prescription drug cost 
sharing may have led to a lower price elasticity estimate as they were measuring elasticities at a lower 
point on the demand curve.
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Across all samples and dependent variables considered, the health status variables 
were significant and positive. It is not surprising that individuals who are perceived to 
be in poorer health and who suffer from the specific diseases that are the leading 
causes of death in the United States would be more likely to seek pharmaceutical 
treatment. These findings regarding health status are in line with the findings from the 
literature on cost sharing for medical services and prescription drugs.
6.7. Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the US health care system, highlighting the fragmented 
nature of funding in the country, and estimated the individual determinants of the 
demand for prescription drugs consumed in the United States. The analysis began 
with a description of the MEPS and the potential regressors and then developed a 
preferred econometric specification. The results of the econometric analysis indicated 
that the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs was relatively low across all 
of the samples that were considered. Moreover, in the fixed effects framework, age 
and income appeared to have little effect on the demand for prescription drugs, 
although health status was always a significant explanatory variable.
There are a number of limitations that should be kept in mind when considering the 
results of this analysis. Although the dependent variable representing the number of 
prescriptions obtained by the individual was a count variable, we were unable to use 
count variable techniques for this analysis because truncated panel data models are 
not yet available. Our analysis instead assumed that the individual could theoretically 
consume an infinite number of prescriptions. Future research could incorporate these 
techniques into the analysis to determine if the outcomes differ by population group.
A second issue is our inability to measure whether respondents complied with their 
therapies. For example, although the doctor may have written a prescription for two 
weeks of painkillers, the patient may not have filled his prescription, may have only 
filled one week of medicine, or may have cut his pills in half or skipped pills. In these 
situations we are unable to measure whether user fees changed the individual’s 
behavior.
Another question that remains after this analysis is whether cost sharing led to a 
decrease in the use of inappropriate medications, appropriate medications, or both in 
the studied population. If higher levels of cost sharing cause patients to decrease their 
consumption of inappropriate medications, then this is an improvement in the 
medication-related quality of care. However, if cost sharing leads to a decrease in 
both appropriate and inappropriate medications, the net effect on quality is unclear.
An analysis of the relationship between cost sharing and inappropriate medication use 
could be useful for policymakers and insurance companies if they were interested in 
charging higher prescription user fees for potentially inappropriate medications.
A fourth limitation is our inability to measure adverse selection because the MEPS 
does not contain information on premium payments. Economic theory indicates that
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adverse selection will occur in a private insurance market, and testing for the 
existence of this phenomenon would offer insights into arguments regarding universal 
insurance coverage and a national insurance program in the United States.
Furthermore, there is a possibility that past prescription drug consumption influences 
current drug consumption, perhaps through a learning effect. That is, an individual 
that uses a medication and sees improvement in his health or few side effects is more 
likely to continue consuming that medication in the future, particularly if he has a 
chronic condition. Because our data only measures two years maximum of 
consumption for each individual in the sample, we cannot account for the effect of 
past prescription drug consumption on current consumption.
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Chapter 7: Analysis of prescription drug cost sharing in British Columbia, 
Canada
7.1. Introduction
Although demand-side cost sharing for prescription drugs in developed countries 
outside of the United States is generally less burdensome for patients, debate still 
rages in countries like Canada about the suitability of user charges, the impact of co­
payments on the most vulnerable populations, and other aspects of cost sharing 
(Evans and Barer, 1995). Because PharmaCare, the provincial prescription drug 
program in British Columbia, covers the population subgroups that the government of 
BC considers to be the most vulnerable, policymakers are interested in how these 
residents fare under cost sharing. Balanced against this interest in protecting 
vulnerable groups is the persistent rise in pharmaceutical expenditures and 
consumption within the province, and an interesting question is whether the 
historically low levels of cost sharing for public beneficiaries have contributed to 
growth in the use of publicly funded medications.
Yet, as discussed in Chapter 3, there are still gaps in the literature related to the price 
elasticity of demand for prescription drugs in Canada. For example, there are only two 
published estimates of the price elasticity of demand for older people in Canada 
(Grootendorst and Levine, 2001; Li et al., 2006). While one estimate is for a specific 
population with rheumatoid arthritis, a group that may be less sensitive to price than 
the general elderly population, the other elasticity estimate is positive (Grootendorst 
and Levine, 2001)1. Given the usual negative relationship between price and quantity 
demanded, it is not clear whether this result is a true indicator of the price elasticity of 
demand among this population. The other existing price elasticity estimates are from 
the United States, but these results are unlikely to be applicable to Canada as the 
estimates were derived from specific groups within the American population, in 
particular, elderly individuals from Pennsylvania not enrolled in an HMO (Coulson 
and Stuart, 1995), publicly-employed seniors with state-funded insurance coverage 
(Gardner et al., 1997), and elderly individuals without Medicaid or employer- 
sponsored insurance (Klick and Stratmann, 2005). As important as the applicability of 
the evidence to Canada are the methodologies employed by the existing studies; 
specifically, few of these studies simultaneously accounted for non-negative values of 
the dependent variable and unobserved heterogeneity. An advantage of this research is 
that we are able to account for unobserved heterogeneity and a nonlinear dependent 
variable within a single specification.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer an updated estimate of the price elasticity of 
demand for prescription drugs, and the 1992-2002 British Columbia Linked Health 
Database (BCLHD) is used to achieve this purpose. Due to the nature of the data, 
which is discussed in detail below, we restrict the empirical analysis to the elderly.
1 It is also possible to calculate price elasticity values from the Grootendorst et al. (1997) study, but the 
elasticity is based on a change from an unknown prescription drug insurance status to full prescription 
drug coverage and thus does not account for specific price changes.
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The organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 7.2 addresses the relevant 
research questions for British Columbia. Section 7.3 gives an overview of the dataset 
and some unique aspects of the dataset that merit special consideration, and Section 
7.3 also offers a description of potential covariates that are considered for the analysis. 
Section 7.4 then explains the econometric techniques that are utilized, while Section
7.5 offers the main results of the analysis. We then provide a discussion of the 
econometric results in Section 7.6 and conclude the chapter in Section 7.7.
7.2. Research questions for British Columbia
The development of research questions is based on the economic theory of insurance, 
gaps in the literature highlighted by the literature review, and the description of the 
health care and pharmaceutical system in British Columbia. However, due to data 
constraints that are detailed in the next paragraph, the research questions are focused 
on the elderly population.
The selection of the sample for the estimation requires further explanation. As there is 
both private and public drug coverage in British Columbia, residents who are under 
the age of 65 may hold either type of drug coverage. Although we were able to obtain 
data on patients between the ages of 18 and 64 that received subsidized prescription 
drugs from PharmaCare, we were unable to determine if these individuals 
simultaneously held private drug coverage. However, seniors (those aged 65 and 
above) received comprehensive drug coverage from PharmaCare until 2003, and thus 
we assume that they were unlikely to hold private drug coverage before 20032. As 
drug coverage for seniors became less comprehensive when Fair PharmaCare was 
implemented in 2003, we could no longer assume that seniors did not hold private 
drug coverage after 2002. As a result, we restrict the sample to beneficiaries aged 65 
and above, and the time period studied ends in 2002.
The specific research questions that we address in this chapter are:
Ql: In terms of volume, what is the impact of cost sharing on the 
average elderly individual?
Q2: What is the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs 
among elderly individuals?
Both of these questions are addressed empirically in Section 7.5.
2 Although there are no data on private prescription drug coverage among the elderly in BC, the high 
likelihood that BC seniors do not have private coverage was confirmed via personal communication 
with Dr. Steve Morgan, an expert in Canadian pharmaceutical policy from the University of British 
Columbia Centre for Health Services and Policy Research.
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7.3. The dataset and explanation of potential covariates
This section is meant to provide an explanation of the dataset that is used to address 
the research questions. Another aim is to offer information on relevant variables for 
the analysis, with a focus on the co-payment variable. We also discuss other potential 
covariates, mainly demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and health status.
7.3.1. The British Columbia Linked Health Database
To explore the given research questions, the British Columbia Linked Health 
Database (BCLHD) is employed for the empirical analysis. The BCLHD is a 
longitudinal database of linkable files covering all beneficiaries of the Medical 
Service Plan in British Columbia (over four million residents). The database is 
developed and housed at the University of British Columbia’s Centre for Health 
Services and Policy Research. Most of the BCLHD files are available from 1985 to 
2004, and the files contain individual-level information regarding demographic 
characteristics and health care use.
Although data were available beginning in 1985, our sample period begins in 1992 
and ends in 2002. There were a couple of reasons for starting in 1992. One reason was 
that Canada came out of a recession around 1992 (Statistics Canada, 2006a), and thus 
it seemed interesting to examine the effect of cost sharing during a period of rising 
incomes. Another reason for starting in 1992 is that changes to user fees occurred in 
1994, allowing us to examine the time trend effects of major PharmaCare changes. 
Although data were available through 2004, the sample period ended in 2002 as Fair 
PharmaCare (a less generous prescription drug program than PharmaCare) began in 
2003, and some of the elderly may have purchased private drug coverage when this 
began. As mentioned in Section 7.2, we are unable to observe their consumption of 
privately funded drugs, and thus we exclude this segment of the sample.
Although there are a number of linkable files in the BCLHD, not all of these files are 
relevant to this investigation. The most useful files are the Registry, Medical Services 
Plan, and the PharmaCare files. The Registry file consists of demographic and 
socioeconomic information for beneficiaries, including sex, income decile, date of 
birth, post code, and number of days registered in the MSP. The Medical Services 
Plan component contains information regarding health care utilization linked to the 
Medical Services Plan. This component also contains some individual-specific 
information, such as area of residence and age. The other useful component is the 
PharmaCare file, which consists of data on drugs purchased through the provincial 
drug program.
Although the BCLHD allows researchers to track individuals over a number of years, 
there are still a few major limitations. One problem is that the database only contains 
limited information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. For example, 
the database does not list specific income levels; instead, it only provides information 
on the income decile into which the individual falls based on his postcode. There is 
also information on whether the resident qualifies for MSP premium assistance 
because of low income. Other relevant information that would be useful to the
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; analysis is education level and the employment status, but these variables are also 
! missing from the dataset.
7.3.2. Explanation of the dependent variable and potential covariates
The likely determinants of the demand for prescription drugs were discussed in both 
Chapters 2 and 3. Specifically, Chapter 2 discussed the traditional economic intuition 
behind the effect of higher prices and other potential covariates on consumption, 
while Chapter 3 covered the main determinants that have been considered in the 
empirical literature. This section describes both the dependent variable and these 
variables that are potentially important predictors for the model, such as the out-of- 
pocket price, the socioeconomic decile, and age. We first offer a discussion of the 
dependent variable and then cover the formation of the co-payment variable and the 
intuition behind the other explanatory variables.
The dependent variable is the number of prescription drugs purchased (including 
initial prescriptions and refills). And important point regarding the dependent variable 
is that it is made up of both brand and generic drugs. As we were unable to distinguish 
between brand and generic drugs in the BCLHD dataset, we assumed perfect 
substitutability between brand and generic drugs.
The main explanatory variable of interest in this thesis is the co-payment, as we are 
primarily concerned with estimating the price elasticity of demand for prescription 
drugs. Because of the unique cost sharing arrangements within the BC PharmaCare 
program and because of the way that cost information for prescription drugs is 
presented in the BCLHD, a description of how we created the co-payment variable is 
necessary. As highlighted previously in Chapter 5, PharmaCare subsidizes 
prescription drugs for eligible low-income and elderly residents. While most 
prescription drugs are covered under the program, there are certain measures in place, 
such as reference pricing and prior authorization, which sometimes require 
beneficiaries to pay an amount above any other cost-sharing requirements. The 
BCLHD reports the amount that the pharmacist received for the drug and the amount 
that PharmaCare paid for the drug. Thus, any difference between these two amounts 
was paid out-of-pocket by the individual. In addition, there is often a dispensing fee 
that the pharmacist collects from the beneficiary, and this also represents an out-of- 
pocket cost.
To obtain the average co-payment per prescription drug received, we first summed the 
difference between the amount the pharmacist received for a prescription drug (not 
including the dispensing fee) and the amount that PharmaCare reimbursed the 
pharmacist for the drug for each observation of pharmaceutical consumption. We then 
summed the dispensing fee that the patient paid for each prescription over all 
prescriptions that he obtained. The sum of these two totals represented the total annual 
out-of-pocket burden that each beneficiary faced, and we divided this annual burden 
by the annual number of prescriptions obtained to calculate the average co-payment.
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As with the calculation of the co-payment variable in the MEPS database, this 
variable is a proxy for prescription drug user fees because cost sharing requirements 
differ over individuals in PharmaCare. Nonetheless, the computed co-payment 
variable is an indicator of the average out-of-pocket burden that an individual faces 
and thus the generosity of his PharmaCare coverage. This variable is still a reflection 
of the marginal cost/marginal benefit comparisons of prescription drugs that each 
patient makes, and as put forward by the basic theoretical background, there should 
still be a negative relationship between the out-of-pocket price and consumption of 
prescription drugs.
In addition to the co-payment variable, there are other variables available in the 
BCLHD that may determine the demand for prescription drugs. Table 7.1 lists the 
expected effect of these predictors on the number of drugs consumed and prescription 
drug expenditures for the elderly sample.
Table 7.1. Predicted signs ofpossible variables measuring o f the demand for  
prescription drugs
V ariable E lderly  sample
Number o f drugs
Drug co-payment
Age +
Age squared +
Male
Female +
Socioeconomic level +
Diagnosed with a major disease +
Not diagnosed with a major disease
Because we expect the demand curve for prescription drugs to be downward sloping, 
there is likely to be a negative relationship between the prescription drug co-payment 
and the number of drugs consumed. In terms of age, there is likely to be a positive 
relationship between age and consumption. While the demand for prescription drugs 
might actually decline after a certain age in places like the United States where there 
is less generous insurance coverage and exclusions, we do not expect this to be the 
case in British Columbia. The reason is that prescription drug coverage in BC is 
public, there are no coverage restrictions based on illness, and there are out-of-pocket 
limits that protect heavy users.
As with females in the American samples, we expected that females in British 
Columbia would consume more prescription drugs than males. While evidence 
suggests that women use more health care services than men (Bertakis et al., 2000) 
both in the United States and Canada (Kandrack et al., 1991), men and women may 
also suffer from different diseases in Canada. Women typically face problems like
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osteoporosis and are more likely to die of cardiovascular disease in Canada than men 
(Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada, 1997). Moreover, the onset of disease may 
occur at different periods of the life cycle for women and men; for instance, in Canada 
the onset of stroke and heart disease generally occur a decade later for women (Heart 
and Stroke Foundation of Canada, 1997). Furthermore, evidence suggests that women 
are more risk averse than men (Zinkhan and Karande, 1991), implying that women 
may be more likely to seek care for medical problems and fill prescription drugs.
Income is likely to have a positive effect on the consumption of prescription drugs as 
higher-income individuals may be less likely to face tradeoffs between necessities 
such as food and shelter and other goods and services whose consumption can 
sometimes be delayed such as doctor visits and prescription drugs. Health status is 
another variable that is expected to positively affect the demand for prescription drugs. 
As a proxy for need, those who are in worse health are generally prescribed more 
medications and may be more likely to fill prescriptions due to personal perceptions 
of need.
7.4. Development of an econometric model specification
This section provides an overview of the considerations for the econometric 
specification and details the specific model chosen for the analysis.
7.4.1. Basic framework of the model
To model the demand for prescription drugs in British Columbia, there are various 
institutional and data characteristics that need to be considered. As with the United 
States, the main variable of interest in the analysis is the number of prescription drugs 
purchased including initial purchases and refills. A basic model of the process of 
obtaining prescription drugs is given in Figure 7.1, and further information regarding 
the conceptual and mathematical development of the model is provided below.
As with the American analysis, we do not have information from British Columbia on 
the number of prescriptions issued by physicians. However, it is not desirable to 
model this process as we are primarily interested in the effect of cost sharing at the 
patient level. We can only observe the point at which the patient actually fills a 
prescription and the number of prescriptions that he obtains in a given year. Yet, the 
inferences that we are interested in making are related to patient-level marginal 
benefit/marginal cost comparisons that occur for prescription drug consumption 
decisions.
Similar to the American analysis, we are unable to make inferences about compliance 
with prescribed medication regimes. The main issue is that it is impossible to 
determine if the physician wrote a prescription but the patient chose not to fill the 
prescription for economic, personal, or other reasons. We also cannot ascertain 
anything about compliance once the patient fills his prescription, for instance, whether 
he actually takes the pills or skips dosages.
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Figure 7.1. Process o f obtaining prescriptions in British Columbia, Canada
number purchased
patient
purchases
prescription
patient does 
not
purchase
prescription
doctoj>doesn’t
-issue
prescription^-^
7.4.2. Econometric specification of the model
In order to model the prescription process outlined above, there are a few important 
factors that should be considered for the econometric specification. Each of these 
factors is briefly discussed in this section, but more information is available in the 
appendix to Chapter 6 (Appendix D) and the appendix to this chapter3 (Appendix E).
Sample selection
One prominent aspect of the sequence of events that leads to prescription drug 
consumption is that whether the decision to consume represents a true choice by the 
patient. For instance, it is impossible to distinguish between whether the doctor wrote 
a prescription and the patient did not fill it (a true zero) and whether the physician did 
not issue a prescription but the patient would have filled a prescription had he 
received one (not a true zero). Thus, an OLS regression on the selected sample would 
be inconsistent. To reduce the bias from the nonnegative values, we employ a 
Heckman sample selection correction. As Section 6.4.1 in Chapter 6 and Appendix 
D. 1 provided a detailed explanation of the Heckman correction for sample selection, 
we do not provide any further information on the basic procedure here.
3 Because some o f the econometric considerations were already detailed in the appendix to Chapter 6 
(Appendix D), we refer the reader to these details rather than repeating them in the appendix to this 
Chapter (Appendix E).
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Endogeneity
In the American context the co-payment variable is endogenous to the model as 
individuals choose among various insurance contracts and the expected consumption 
of prescription drugs affects the level of co-payment chosen. The BCLHD only 
contains information on public consumption of prescription drugs, but it is likely that 
elderly respondents do not have supplementary private insurance coverage due to the 
generosity of PharmaCare. As a result, the estimation only includes consumption of 
publicly covered prescription drugs among the elderly. Given that eligibility for 
PharmaCare is automatic when the individual turns 65, there are no unobserved 
factors related to risk selection or consumption expectations that determine the level 
of the co-payment. However, it is possible that the co-payment is endogenous due to 
its construction. Specifically, because out-of-pocket prices are non-linear (based on 
co-payments and out-of-pocket limits) in BC, the constructed co-payment variable 
may depend on the number of prescription drugs consumed. To consider this 
possibility, we tested for the number of individuals that exceeded the out-of-pocket 
maximum during the year and determined that it was less than 5 percent of the sample. 
As a result, we assume that endogeneity is not a significant issue with the sample.
Panel data techniques
While one aspect of 1he data is the non-observability of consumption for some 
individuals, another aspect is the repetition of observations for most respondents. That 
is, we can observe more than one year of data for all elderly individuals in dataset 
who enter PharmaCare before 2002 and who do not die within one year of becoming 
eligible for PharmaCare. The panel is unbalanced as individuals only enter the dataset 
once they turn 65 and as some of the elderly die during the given time period. More 
detail on panel data techniques is also given in Appendix D.4.
We hypothesize that an approach which accounts for individual-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity is more appropriate for the analysis4. The reasoning is that we are 
unable to observe a number of individual-specific factors that affect the demand for 
prescription drugs; for example, preferences for drugs over different types of medical 
care, access to pharmacies, and wealth.
Combining sample selection and panel data techniques 
Given that the dependent variable is nonlinear and given the longitudinal nature of the 
dataset, the purpose of this section is to bring together both the sample selection and 
panel data techniques into one model5. In line with the American analysis, an 
appropriate model to apply to the consumption decision was developed by Semykina 
and Wooldridge (2006). The model detailed in this section is a slight variation of their 
specification given that the co-payment variable is not endogenous. Using sit as a 
selection indicator, these equations are:
4 We formally test and accept this assumption and present the results in Appendix E.2 in a footnote.
5 We also considered a dynamic fixed effects sample selection model, however, there was persistent 
autocorrelation that was possibly related to the dynamic aspect of the model. Nonetheless, we provide 
the results of this regression in Appendix E.5.
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y„ =x„P + g ,+  u„ for t = 1,..., T .  (7.1)
= l[z„r + n, + £„ > 0] for t = 1 . (7.2).
The variables from equation (7.1) represent the following: y it is the total number of 
prescriptions that the individual obtains in a given year including initial purchases and 
refills, which is censored according to sit . The xit are the explanatory variables that
determine y it (some of which can be endogenous; in our case we do not have any 
endogenous variables) and p is the coefficient on x it. In addition, g, is the 
individual-specific term, and uit is the error term. In equation (7.2) sit is the indicator 
variable, zit are the instruments associated with the endogenous variable, y are the 
coefficients for z it, r\t is the individual-specific term, and e/f is the error term. We 
assume that s it\ziir\i ~Normal(0,l), allowing sit to be estimated through an 
unobserved effects probit model.
The Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) estimator further allows for correlation 
between the individual-specific effect (q() and the instrumental variables (zt). The
chosen method is based on Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980) and models the 
unobserved effects from (7.1) and (7.2) as:
T|x =Z/£ + T + tf,.. (7.3)
g, +T, +an . (7.4).
This assumes that the correlation between the unobserved effect and the z i occurs
only through the time means of z ,, while at is independent of z, (Mundlak, 1978;
Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006). Incorporating (7.3) and (7.4) into equations (7.1) 
and (7.2) allows us to rewrite the main and selection equations as:
y„ = x„p + z<£ + r, + 1//„ for t = 1 . (7.5)
■*,, = 1[z«r + T + z '4 + v„ > o] for t = . (7.6).
While an additively combines with ult in equation (7.1) to form vj/lY, at combines 
additively with the e;, in the indicator function to form vit, where 
v„ |z(. ~ Normal (0,l)6. To obtain an estimatable form of the model, two further 
assumptions are needed:
6 The assumption regarding v jt |z f ~  Normal (0 ,l) does not hold strictly. But following
v it |z. ~  Normal (o,l +  ), we simplify the true variation to specify a less restrictive form without
weakening the argument; this simplification is based on Semykina and Wooldridge (2006). This allows
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E \a n K  v« )  = E ( a lt |v„ ) = <]>„ v„ 
E{utl\zl,vu)= E(ull\vtt)= p ,v il
(7.7)
(7.8).
Given that ij/„ = an + uit:
^(V/,K>'’a )=  E(an |z(, vj()+ £(«„ |z,, v(, ) = <|>, va + p,v* = k , v„ (7.9),„ ,
and substituting (7.9) into (7.1) results in:
y» =XuP + z£ i +r  + K,E(yu\zi,s it\  +e„ 
where E(vil\zi,s i, ) = 0 .
(7.10),
The model is made robust to heteroskedasticity by using the White (1980) estimates 
of variance. When there are no endogenous variables included in the estimator, the 
model is labeled the “SS FE” (fixed effects correcting for sample selection) model.
The procedure to obtain the estimates for y it is as follows: we first estimate a probit 
equation of z it and z i on si by estimating a separate probit equation for each year. 
Using these estimates, we construct the inverse Mills ratio. We then run an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression with y it as the main variable of interest and the co­
payment variable as the endogenous variable for the sample where sit = 1, including 
z i in both stages to account for the fixed effects.
To determine whether this procedure is merited for the given sample, Semykina and 
Wooldridge (2006) developed a test, which involves first estimating a probit model of 
this equation for each time period:
Then, the results of each probit are used to calculate the inverse Mills ratios, Xit. For 
the sample where sit = 1, a fixed effects OLS approach is used to estimate the 
equation:
If the coefficient for Xit is significant, the null hypothesis of no selection bias is 
rejected. Note that by interacting the inverse Mills ratio with the time dummies and
(7.11).
y  i< = x„ P + p K  + g, + (7.12).
the coefficients in the individual-year selection equations to be entirely unrestricted. Full details of this 
assumption can be found in Section 4 of Semykina and Wooldridge (2006), pg. 15-16.
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using a robust variance matrix, a test of the joint significant of all of those terms can 
be undertaken with a Wald test.
In the analysis that follows in Section 7.5, the dependent variable (y it) is the number 
of prescription drugs including initial prescription and refills obtained per person per 
year. Meanwhile, the sample selection indicator (sit) equals one if the individual 
purchased any prescriptions in the observed year and zero otherwise.
7.5. Results
In this section of the chapter, we present the results of the descriptive statistics and the 
econometric estimation. As the dataset was extremely large, we cleaned the dataset 
using 64-bit STATA version 9.2, and the subsequent analysis was also carried out 
using 64-bit STATA version 9.2. Again, we used the STATA [xt] commands, which 
account for unbalanced panels, for some of the panel data analysis. For the SS FE 
analysis we used the [regress] command along with time averages for each 
explanatory variable. The specific STATA code for this model along with the 
variance correction code is given in Appendix E.l.
There were 5,785,2017 observations of those aged 65 and above in the raw BCLHD 
file, although we removed 118,693 individuals who had not died in the given year and 
who had been registered for the MSP less than 365 days8. Additionally, we removed 
294,987 individuals whose socioeconomic decile was not reported. According to 
Statistics Canada, some residents could not be assigned a socioeconomic 
classification because of missing postcodes or because there were postal codes that 
straddled more than one geographic region (Statistics Canada, 2006c)9. We also 
dropped individuals that were 65 years of age as we did not have a lull year of data 
for these residents (301,571 observations). The resulting sample consisted of 
5,069,950 individuals.
7.5.1. Descriptive results of the sample
Table 7.2 lists the main variables that are likely to be important predictors of the 
demand for prescription drugs.
There are a number of trends that we observe based on the descriptive statistics. To be 
consistent with the MEPS analysis, the average co-payment bands were chosen by 
taking the co-payment at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles for individuals with 
positive prescriptions, since the co-payment is not observed for those who do not
7 All of these totals include all observations for beneficiaries that appeared more than once in the 
BCLHD.
8 The reasons for this may have been that the beneficiary moved into or out of BC during the given 
year or the beneficiary may not have resided in the province for at least six months, perhaps due to 
business in another country or province.
9 For each postcode, Statistics Canada assigns a socioeconomic decile based on the average income in 
the postcode. Thus, the BCLHD does not report income but instead reports this socioeconomic decile 
information.
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consume any prescriptions in a given year. While around 38% of the entire sample 
faced a co-payment of less than CDN $4.48, the sample was evenly divided between 
the higher co-payment bands.
Table 7.2. Percent o f sample exhibiting specific characteristics, 1992-2002
V ariable Elderly(N = 5,069,950)
RX co-payment <= $4.48 38.06
RX co-payment, $4.48 - $6.60 i  21.01
RX co-payment, $6.60 - $8.00 20.66
RX co-payment > $8.00 1 20.28
Age, 65 -  74 1 51.31
Age, 75 -  84 36.36
Age > 84 12.33
Male 1 43.37
Female 56.63
Socioeconomic decile = 1 24.09
Socioeconomic decile = 2 20.66
Socioeconomic decile = 3 18.67
Socioeconomic decile = 4 17.96
Socioeconomic decile = 5 18.62
Diagnosed with a major disease 48.55
Not diagnosed with a major disease 51.45
In terms of the age variables, slightly more than half of the sample is comprised of 
individuals less than the age of 75, while 36% are between 75 and 84, and a little 
more than 12% is older than 84. Not surprisingly, given that females have greater life 
expectancies, more than half of the sample is made up of women. The socioeconomic 
variables indicate that around a quarter of elderly PharmaCare recipients fall in the 
lowest socioeconomic quintile, and about a fifth of the sample falls in the second 
lowest socioeconomic quintile. The sample is divided relatively evenly between the 
higher socioeconomic quintiles.
An interesting finding is that 49% of the sample has been diagnosed with a major 
disease (hypertension, diabetes malignant cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, acute myocardial infarction, coronary heart disease, and stroke10). Thus, a 
relatively large proportion of the sample appears to suffer from a chronic condition, 
although this may be a reflection of the greater age of the sample.
10 These prevalent, high cost diseases are identical to the ones used in the revised regression for the 
American elderly in Chapter 6.
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In addition to examining the distribution of individuals with specific characteristics, 
we can also examine the relationship between the main variables of interest and the 
number of prescription drugs consumed. Since the decision to consume at least one 
prescription may be somewhat different than the choice of how much to consume, one 
important dependent variable to examine is the probability of obtaining a prescription. 
Conditional upon the individual having at least one prescription, we also looked at the 
number of drugs consumed. Table 7.3 provides descriptive information related to drug 
consumption.
The probability of obtaining a prescription drug increases somewhat when the 
individual is between the ages of 75 and 84 as opposed to being between the ages of 
65 and 74. However, beyond the age of 84 the probability of obtaining a prescription 
actually decreases. Females exhibit a higher probability of obtaining at least one 
prescription drug. Interestingly, the likelihood of obtaining at least one prescription is 
relatively constant across socioeconomic groups. Another result that was not 
surprising was that individuals who have been diagnosed with at least one major 
disease have a much higher probability of acquiring a prescription medication than 
their healthier counterparts.
Table 7.3. Statistical information about the possible predictors o f demand for  
prescription drugs, 1992-2002
V ariable Elderly sample£N = 5,069,950)
Prob. o f at least one VI . c , a . . Number o f drugs prescription 6
RX co-payment <= $4.48 i N/A 20.84
RX co-payment, $4.48 - $6.60 ; n /a 14.56
RX co-payment, $6.60 - $8.00 N/A 15.43
RX co-payment > $8.00 N/A 17.97
Age, 65 -  74 i  82.10 14.21
Age, 7 5 - 8 4 I 82.76 18.58
Age > 84 77.82 25.18
Male 78.49 15.22
Female 84.36 18.45
Socioeconomic decile =  1 81.28 18.85
Socioeconomic decile =  2 81.84 17.05
Socioeconomic decile = 3 81.80 16.91
Socioeconomic decile =  4 81.86 16.30
Socioeconomic decile =  5 82.45 15.91
Diagnosed with a major disease 92.52 19.80
Not diagnosed with a major disease 71.71 13.83
Tor an individual with at least one prescription and the defined characteristic, the mean number o f  
prescriptions consumed
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In terms of the descriptive results related to the number of prescription drugs 
purchased, a finding that was not surprising was that individuals with co-payments 
that were in the lowest 25th percentile had the highest consumption of medications. 
Another noteworthy finding was that individuals with the highest co-payments (above 
CDN $8.00) consumed more prescription drugs than individuals with co-payments 
between CDN $4.48 and $8.00.
As age increased the number of prescriptions obtained simultaneously increased even 
though the probability of obtaining a prescription decreased beyond the age of 84. In 
terms of gender, men consumed fewer prescriptions than women. Consumption of 
drugs decreased with socioeconomic quintile. Finally, those who Were diagnosed with 
a major disease consumed more prescription medications than their healthier 
counterparts.
7.5.2. Results of the econometric analysis
This section includes information regarding the variables that were included in the 
models and the results of the estimation. Two of the variables were transformed into 
logarithms because they were highly skewed to the right: total prescription drugs 
obtained and the prescription drug co-payment. Because the fixed effects estimator 
performed better than pooled OLS, we did not include variables that were time 
invariant in the estimation, and subsequently the coefficient on gender is not reported. 
We also examined a number of interaction effects, for instance age and 
socioeconomic level and age and morbidity. As many of these interaction effects were 
significant, we provide an additional table in this section detailing changes to the 
elasticity value when interaction effects are added to the preferred specification.
A mentioned in Chapter 6, it is preferable to have instruments that predict the 
probability of prescription drug consumption but do not predict the number of drugs 
consumed for identification purposes. Given the restricted number of variables 
available in the BCHLD dataset, we were unable to find a suitable instrument for the 
first stage probits.
The results table includes the coefficient estimates from the main econometric 
specification as well as other potential model specifications. Only the results from the 
main variables of interest are reported in the table, and information related to the time 
variables, X coefficients, and time averages from the main equation along with the 
results from the sample selection (first stage) equations is provided in Appendix 
Sections E.3 to E.4. Additionally, we provide information on the appropriateness of 
the model and the chosen variables in Appendix E.2.
To calculate the price elasticity of demand for the elderly population, we estimated 
the effect of a change in the co-payment on the number of prescription drugs obtained 
annually, holding all other factors constant. Table 7.4 lists the results of the fixed 
effects model that corrected for sample selection (SS FE or SS Fixed Effects), 
although we also ran a simple OLS model that did not account for the panel nature of
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the data or sample selection11 (Pooled OLS) and a fixed effects model that did not 
account for sample selection (FE or Fixed Effects).
Table 7.4. Estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription drugs obtained 
equation (elderly sample)a,b,c
E xplanatory variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects SS Fixed Effects
(log) drug co-payment -0.306§
(0.002)
-0.167®
(0.001)
-0.295®
(0.002)
age between 65 and 74 0.188§ 
(0.002)
-0.017®
(0.001)
0.074®
(0.002)
age between 75 and 84 0.358§
(0.003)
0.010®
(0.002)
0.141®
(0.003)
second socioeconomic quintile -0.041§ 
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
third socioeconomic quintile -0.041§ 
(0.002)
0.003®
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
fourth socioeconomic quintile -0.053§
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.010®
(0.002)
fifth socioeconomic quintile -0.065®
(0.003)
0.0051
(0.002)
-0.007®
(0.002)
individual diagnosed with at least 
one o f pre-defined high-cost 
and/or high-prevalence disease
0.458®
(0.001)
0.165®
(0.001)
0.188®
(0.003)
individual died this year -0.079®
(0.003)
-0.418®
(0.002)
-0.429®
(0.003)
constant 2.696®
(0.004)
2.427®
(0.002)
2.095®
(0.010)
N 4,071,186 4,071,186 4,071,186
R2 0.122 0.043 0.060
“standard errors in parentheses; Excluded dummy variables are age greater than 84, individual lives in 
a postcode that is in the lowest socioeconomic quintile in British Columbia, individual has not been 
diagnosed with at least one o f  the pre-defined high-cost and/or high-prevalence diseases 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
In the cross-sectional model the coefficients on most of the variables, with the 
exception of the variable indicating that the individual died in the given year, were 
larger than in the panel data models. This suggests that the independent variables in 
the cross-sectional model were capturing individual-specific effects that were not 
included in the regression. An interesting result with regards to the co-payment 
variable was that the coefficient in the fixed effects model accounting for sample 
selection was similar to the coefficient in the cross-sectional model, while the 
coefficient in the fixed effects model that did not correct for sample selection was 
smaller in absolute value. In the preferred model (SS FE) the elasticity of demand for 
prescription drugs was -0.295 (p=0.000).
11 In the cross-sectional model we controlled for repeated observations through clustering.
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In terms of the other covariates in the model, in all of the specifications the age 
variables were negative and significant. The proxy for income, socioeconomic 
deprivation, was significant in the pooled OLS model and significant some of the time 
in the two fixed effects models. In the SS FE model, the effect of socioeconomic 
quintile was negative and significant for the highest two socioeconomic quintiles. 
Across all of the specifications, the variable indicating whether the patient had been 
diagnosed with one of the leading causes of death was positive and significant. In the 
preferred specification, the coefficient on this variable indicated that an ill individual 
consumes 20.68 percent more prescriptions on average than an individual who has not 
been diagnosed with one of these conditions. Finally, the variable indicating whether 
the individual had died in the studied year was negative across all of the specifications, 
indicating that the effect of an individual dying in the early months o f the year and 
thus consuming less on an annual basis outweighed any increases in consumption 
observed immediately before death.
Although the time trends are not shown in the table (see Appendix Section E.4), there 
are some interesting findings related to time. Specifically, drug consumption 
decreased in 1994 and 1995 but increased in 1993 and in every year after 1995. All of 
the coefficients on the time variables were significant.
We also ran the preferred specification (SS FE) with a number of interaction effects as 
covariates. Table 7.5 provides the price elasticity results when different interaction 
effects are included.
Table 7.5. Price elasticity values when different interaction effects are added to the 
model
In teraction  effect P rice elasticity
co-payment and morbidity -0.298(p=0.000)
socioeconomic deprivation and 
morbidity
-0.295
(p=0.000)
age and morbidity -0.286(p=0.000)
Table 7.5 indicates that with the exception of the interaction effect between age and 
morbidity, the interaction effects have a minimal impact on the price elasticity of 
demand. Even the age and morbidity interaction only decreases the price elasticity by 
about 3%.
7.6. Discussion
This final portion of chapter goes over the results from the empirical analysis. The 
purpose of this section is not to offer the policy implications of the analysis as these 
are discussed in Chapter 8. Instead, this section discusses the meaning of the results.
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While there appeared to be a positive association between the co-payment and 
consumption in the raw American data, we observed the opposite relationship in the 
raw data from British Columbia. The likely reason is that prescription drug insurance 
among the elderly in the province is not endogenous as all individuals receive 
relatively generous public coverage when they turn 65.
An exploration of different possible models for the demand for prescription drugs 
indicated that the fixed effects model correcting for sample selection (SS FE) was the 
most appropriate. As a panel data specification was utilized, this implies that other 
unobserved individual-specific factors such as the wealth and preferences for care are 
important predictors of the demand for prescription drugs. In comparison with the 
cross-sectional model, nearly all of the coefficients on the independent variables 
decreased in the fixed effects models.
We determined that the elasticity of demand among the elderly is -0.295 (p=0.000). 
Thus, the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs is relatively low for older 
people in BC, indicating that older persons in the province are not particularly 
sensitive to changes in the out-of-pocket prices of their medications. This is likely 
related to the fact that we measured consumption along the low end of the demand 
curve as total out-of-pocket payments were relatively low during the study period.
Nonetheless, the elasticity is somewhat higher than what we might expect for the 
elderly population. The marginal efficiency of investments in health is lower for the 
elderly than for younger population groups, which means that they must spend more 
on medical care to maintain their health. As discussed in Section 5.8 of the previous 
chapter, older people may also perceive fewer substitutes for prescription drugs. As a 
result, older people are likely to be less sensitive to changes in the out-of-pocket 
prices of prescription drugs than the general population.
There are only a few studies that calculated price elasticity values for the elderly at 
the microeconomic level (or included enough information for us to calculate 
elasticities), and all of these studies were confined to the US (Coulson and Stuart, 
1995; Gardner et al., 1997; Klick and Stratmann, 2005) and Canada (Grootendorst 
and Levine, 2001; Grootendorst et al., 1997; Li et al., 2006). The price elasticity 
values ranged from -0.56 to 0.04, and our price elasticity value is in the range of those 
found in the literature, with the exception of the value of 0.04 calculated by 
Grootendorst and Levine (2001). The result from Grootendorst and Levine (2001) 
may have differed from ours because they could only examine the number of 
prescription drugs taken within the past two days. Thus, their sample of consumed 
medications may have been skewed towards those for chronic conditions, which 
might have biased the elasticity value.
In terms of the other variables that we used to predict the demand for prescription 
drugs, age, socioeconomic deprivation, and morbidity were important predictors of 
demand. The increasing effect of age on demand is interesting because it is in line 
with the results from the literature review in Chapter 3, Section 3.4. In that chapter we 
indicated that although age is likely to have a negative effect on consumption among
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the elderly in the US, in other countries like Canada, the effect is likely to be in the 
opposite direction. In the United States, where unmeasured conditions in the 
insurance market (like pre-existing condition exclusions and limited lists) make 
insurance coverage less generous for seniors, the age variable may pick up these 
effects. In British Columbia, where before 2003 coverage was generous for all of the 
elderly regardless of income or health, there are unlikely to be unmeasured factors 
such as those in the United States that dampen the demand for prescription drugs.
The result for the socioeconomic deprivation variable was also interesting. In 
comparison to those living in postcodes in the lowest income quintile, those living 
postcodes with higher incomes consumed fewer prescription drugs, although this was 
only significant for those living in the top two quintiles. It is important to keep in 
mind that socioeconomic deprivation is an aggregate variable, and thus it may also be 
picking up regional effects that we cannot account for with the fixed effects 
regression. For example, individuals that live in the wealthiest postcodes may be less 
ill on average, and thus, there may be fewer pharmacies in the wealthiest areas.
Not surprisingly, there was a positive relationship between morbidity and the number 
of prescription drugs consumed, with ill individuals consuming about 20 percent more 
prescriptions than their healthier counterparts. Morbidity is a proxy for need, and thus 
we would expect that those who are sicker would have to consume more prescription 
drugs to maintain their health.
7.7. Conclusion
This chapter has presented an analysis of the demand for prescription drugs among 
older people in British Columbia. After covering the research questions for the 
analysis, we provided a description of the BCLHD and the variables that might be 
important predictors of prescription drug demand. We then developed an econometric 
specification to model the effect of the co-payment on the number of prescription 
drugs consumed.
The results of the SS FE model indicated that the co-payment variable was negative 
and significant at -0.295 (p=0.000). Elderly individuals are relatively insensitive to 
out-of-pocket prices for prescription drugs in the province. Another significant 
predictor of demand was age, which was positive, suggesting that individuals must 
consume more medical care as they age to maintain their health. Meanwhile, the 
socioeconomic decile variable was negative and significant, perhaps because of 
unmeasured variables related to less deprived socioeconomic areas. Morbidity, as a 
proxy for need, was also an important positive predictor of the demand for 
prescription drugs.
As with any analysis, there are limitations that need to be kept in mind. One limitation 
that also existed with the MEPS analysis was our inability to use count variable 
techniques for the number of prescription drugs obtained. We instead assumed that 
the individual could theoretically consume an infinite number of prescriptions. To
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determine if the outcome differs, future research could employ count variable 
techniques for the dependent variable when these become available.
Another limitation that we also faced in the MEPS analysis is that we could not 
determine whether PharmaCare recipients complied with their drug therapies. Non­
adherence to medication regimes can have significant consequences for the health of 
the elderly and measurement of this problem is important for policymakers. However, 
measuring adherence can be difficult and costly, and as a result, the major datasets 
that include prescription drug consumption do not include information on adherence.
There is also a question of whether cost sharing decreased the use of inappropriate 
medications, appropriate medications, or both among older people. There can be an 
improvement in the medication-related quality of care if higher cost sharing decreases 
consumption of inappropriate medications. If cost sharing has the opposite effect, 
though, there may be a decrease in quality. Information regarding the relationship 
between cost sharing and inappropriate medication use could be useful for 
policymakers if they wanted to tailor prescription charges according to the 
appropriateness of pharmaceutical treatments.
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Chapter 8: Comparison of results and policy implications
8.1. Introduction
Beyond the research results it is important to discuss the implications of these results 
in a policy context. The results from the meta regression and the American and 
Canadian analyses are particularly interesting in light of the literature review, which 
highlighted the significant range of price elasticity values that exists there, because 
our results are within a smaller range. Our work implies a relatively inelastic demand 
for prescription drugs, which has a number of policy implications for health systems 
in general in addition to the specific implications for the United States and British 
Columbia.
As pointed out in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the price elasticity of demand has 
traditionally been evaluated from a neo-classical economic perspective that assumes 
that consumption greater than the equilibrium quantity in a free market is over­
consumption. This perspective is useful for quantifying the relationship between price 
and quantity demanded while controlling for other covariates. It is also valuable if we 
assume that health care has the same value to society as other consumer goods and 
services. But health policymakers generally employ a different definition of efficiency 
(what we deem as “health care efficiency” or “health policy efficiency”1) than neo­
classical economists (who often use Pareto e ffic ien cy^  to mean efficiency). Moreover, 
the two definitions are not always compatible. Thus, it is important to provide a 
distinction between both types of efficiency and to discuss the implications of both 
within the economic and policy realms.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to bring together the results from each of the 
estimations and to offer a cohesive policy analysis of the results. In Section 8.2 we 
discuss why the results differ across specifications. Then we consider the findings in 
terms of the insurance and moral hazard literature in Section 8.3. As highlighted in the 
previous paragraph, there is a disconnection between the economic and health care 
definitions of efficiency, and this distinction is discussed in Section 8.4. As equity is 
also an important policy goal (Le Grand, 1991; Lindbladh et al., 1998), we provide a 
comparison of Pareto and health care efficiency and equity in Section 8.4. In Section
8.5 this general discussion of the issues surrounding equity and efficiency allows us to 
then cover the policy implications of our price elasticity estimates, not only in broad 
terms but also with specific reference to the United States and British Columbia. 
Finally, Section 8.6 wraps up the economic and policy discussions.
1 Although a detailed definition of “health care efficiency” / “health policy efficiency” is given in 
Section 8.4, briefly, it is an allocation of resources that maximizes health gain (Williams, 1997).
2 As defined earlier in Chapter 2, Pareto efficiency is an allocation of resources that cannot be changed 
to make one individual better off without simultaneously making another feel worse off (Reinhardt, 
1992). Some argue that the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle is a more useful principle of 
efficiency as Pareto efficiency can be difficult to achieve in practice. However, within the moral hazard 
literature, efficiency has explicitly or implicitly been defined as Pareto efficiency (see for instance, 
Pauly, 1974). Thus, we employ Pareto efficiency as the working definition for this thesis as this 
concept has influenced cost sharing policies in the medical care sector, particularly in the United States.
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8.2. Comparison of results from the meta-regression, the United States, and 
British Columbia
While it is difficult to directly compare the results from the meta-regression analysis 
and the American and Canadian analyses because the context of each sample (e.g. 
policy environment) is disparate, it is still interesting to offer a general discussion 
related to the various findings. Table 8.1 lists the price elasticity values that we 
obtained from each model. For comparison purposes we provide the meta-regression 
elasticity estimate based on non-aggregate data as both the American and Canadian 
estimations were run on non-aggregate datasets.
Table 8.1. Price elasticity values obtainedfrom Chapters 4, 6, and 7°
C ountry/Region Population Elasticity value
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, United Kingdom, United States
different population groups are 
represented in different 
samples from each country
-0.156
(p=0.181)
United States all individuals above the age o f  17
-0.250
(p=0.000)
United States all individuals 65 and older -0.108 (p=0.172)
United States
all individuals with income 
below 200% o f  the Federal 
Poverty level
-0.199
(p=0.000)
British Columbia, Canada all individuals 65 and older -0.295(p=0.000)
ap-values in parentheses
To shed further light on the differences between elasticity values in Table 8.1, Table
8.2 provides the results from pairwise comparisons of the differences in elasticities 
(based on the student’s t-test).
Table 8.2. T-test comparisons o f price elasticity values obtainedfrom Chapters 4, 6, 
and 7°
MRA U S -g e n e ra l population US -  elderly BC - elderly
U S -g e n e ra l 
population
-3.96
(p=0.079) - - -
U S -e ld e rly 2.02(p=0.146)
-257.8
(p=0.001) - -
US -  low-income -1.81(p=0.161)
134.9
(p=0.002)
-141.7
(p=0.002) -
BC - elderly -5.85(p=0.0544)
-346.3
(p=0.001)
-349.3
(p=0.001)
-270.4
(p=0.001)
‘The t-values are listed in the table along with the associated p-values in parentheses
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The white cells in Table 8.2 each represent the result of a student’s t-test for the 
comparison of two price elasticity values. For instance, the cell that is the intersection 
of the second row and second column of the table indicates the t-value from 
comparing the price elasticity value from the meta-regression analysis and the price 
elasticity value from the US analysis on the general population. Interestingly, Table
8.2 indicates that most of the estimated price elasticity values are different from each 
other with the exception of the meta-regression elasticity value and the US elderly and 
low-income estimates.
The differences between the elasticity values for the three main sub-populations in the 
United States were already discussed in Chapter 6, so the nuances of the US findings 
will not be discussed again here.
8.2.1. Comparison of meta-regression and US results
The price elasticity value for the US general population is twice as high as and 
significantly different from the meta-regression estimate. In comparison with 
populations in other developed countries, adults in the United States generally face 
higher cost sharing for prescription drugs, and thus elasticity values among the 
American population are probably measured at higher points on the demand curve.
The fact that the US estimate is higher is interesting, not the least because Americans 
face substantially higher cost sharing for prescription drugs than individuals in most 
other developed countries. Thus, we might have expected an even higher elasticity 
value for the American general population. Other cultural and institutional factors in 
the United States may contribute to a lower estimate. For example, since a substantial 
portion of health care financing in the country is private, Americans may take more of 
a role in health care decision-making because inappropriate decisions are more 
financially costly. That is, most Americans face substantial cost sharing for physician 
and inpatient visits in addition to prescription drugs. As a result, Americans may 
actually be less sensitive to price than we would expect given their high out-of-pocket 
burden; they may place a higher value on the medications they have already chosen to 
consume in comparison with patients in other countries where the self-care movement 
is less developed.
As part of consumer-driven health care, direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) 
might also be an important influence because DTCA may help patients feel that they 
have more of a stake in their prescription decisions, may positively influence 
perceptions of advertised medications, and may increase the population that seeks 
treatment for advertised conditions. The movement towards tiered formularies also 
could be an important contributor to this low elasticity estimate. Although the 
evidence has indicated that tiered formularies do still lower overall drug consumption, 
patients appear to switch to generic and preferred drugs within the formularies 
(Gleason et al., 2005), implying that volume reductions may be less severe than under 
other cost sharing designs.
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A final reason for the US general population estimate that seems to be lower than we 
might expect is the changes in the structure of health care management and delivery in 
the United States. That is, the rise of managed care as a major force in the American 
health care system may have had a dampening effect on the demand for prescription 
drugs. This is because managed care controls the supply of medicines more tightly 
now through pharmacy benefit managers and formularies.
The price elasticity estimate for elderly Americans is slightly lower than the meta­
regression price elasticity, although this difference is not significant. This is an 
expected result given that older patients have less time in which to implement lifestyle 
changes to improve their health. Other options, such as surgery, may be less appealing 
because of the costs and the associated risks. Indeed, with the exception of one value 
of -0.559 (Klick and Stratmann, 2005), all of the price elasticity values used in the 
meta-regression sample were less than -0.20. The Klick and Stratmann (2005) value 
was likely higher than the true value for the elderly population because they restricted 
their sample to Medicare recipients without employer-sponsored insurance or 
Medicaid, and the resulting sample was likely more price-sensitive because they faced 
the highest co-payments. Additionally, Klick and Stratmann (2005) did not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, and omitted variable bias may have influenced the 
magnitude of their elasticity estimate.
Meanwhile, the price elasticity value for low-income Americans was higher than the 
meta-regression result, but it was not significantly different from the MRA value. 
Interestingly, all of the values for low-income populations from the meta-regression 
were less than -0.20, with the exception of one elasticity estimate (-0.40) from Van 
Doorslaer (1984). We might expect the low-income population to be more sensitive to 
changes in out-of-pocket prices for medications than the general population because 
low-income groups have less disposable income available for medical and 
pharmaceutical treatment. However, in most developed countries, including the 
United States, there are substantial subsidies and even exemptions related to 
prescription drugs for low-income groups. This measurement of cost sharing at the 
low end of the demand curve is a likely reason for the lower elasticity estimates 
among the poor, both in the meta-regression sample and the US sample. Yet, the US 
price elasticity estimate for the low-income group is still slightly higher than almost 
all of the estimates from the meta-regression sample. Our elasticity estimate is also 
higher than the two American estimates from the meta-regression, which were -0.05 
(Soumerai, 1987) and -0.14 (Martin and McMillan, 1996)3. The likely reasons for our 
larger US estimate are that (i) Medicaid coverage varies widely between states as 
highlighted in Chapter 5 such that coverage may be insubstantial or non-existent for a 
number of low-income individuals, (ii) the calculated estimates from Soumerai (1987) 
and Martin and McMillan (1996) were for chronically ill patients or high users of 
prescription drugs who are likely more insensitive to out-of-pocket prices out of 
necessity, and (iii) the Soumerai (1987) estimate was for the low-income elderly who 
we expect to be more price insensitive for reasons previously discussed.
3 Both of these elasticity values were calculated by the author of this dissertation because the original 
authors did not provide elasticity estimates.
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8.2.2. Comparison of meta-regression and BC results
The difference between the meta-regression result and the price elasticity value for the 
older population in British Columbia is also worth discussion. The BC estimate is 
higher than the MRA result, and the difference is significant at the 10 percent level, 
which is somewhat surprising given that we expect the elderly to be more insensitive 
to price. Furthermore, out-of-pocket prices for the elderly in BC were low during the 
period studied (1992-2002), and the populations from which the MRA results were 
drawn generally faced higher cost sharing than elderly British Columbians. However, 
another aspect of the Canadian health care system may be having an important 
influence on the elasticity estimate. In particular, as discussed in Chapter 5, all core 
medical services in British Columbia are free of charge for MSP beneficiaries, 
although there are significant waiting times for some services. Given the higher price 
elasticity value, it is likely that the effect of free care outweighs the effect of waiting 
times. Thus, it could be that elderly British Columbia residents are substituting 
physician and inpatient care for prescription drugs when faced with higher cost 
sharing amounts. In fact, Li et al. (2006) found positive cross-price elasticities 
between prescription drugs and physician visits in British Columbia during the 2002 
policy change which increased patient co-payments for prescription drugs.
8.2.3. Comparison of US and BC results
If we also compare the price elasticity values from the elderly populations in the US 
and BC, there are interesting inferences. An important point to make is that the 
American and British Columbian samples may have consisted of different types of 
respondents. Specifically, the US sample excluded institutionalized elderly 
individuals, while the British Columbia sample did not exclude any residents. 
However, institutionalized individuals in the British Columbia sample would likely 
have purchased medications from their institution rather than a pharmacy, and thus 
these medications would not be included in the PharmaCare database (as the 
PharmaCare database covers prescriptions dispensed from pharmacies in BC).
The price elasticity value from British Columbia is larger than the American (elderly) 
estimate, and statistically there is a significant difference between the two values. This 
is surprising because we would expect the US estimate to be higher than the BC 
estimate as Medicare did not offer an outpatient prescription drug benefit during the 
study time period of the American analysis (1996-2004). This means that older 
Americans sometimes faced substantial out-of-pocket costs for their medications. 
However, there may be other cultural factors at play, including greater patient 
involvement in health care decision-making in the United States and DTCA. The 
influence of these two factors has been discussed in Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 and will 
not be repeated here. In addition, the ability of elderly residents in British Columbia to 
substitute free inpatient, outpatient, and physician care for prescription drugs may also 
have been an important factor in the higher BC estimate.
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8.2.4. Comparison of US results, BC results, and results from the literature 
review
Another interesting exercise is to put the results of the analyses from this dissertation 
into the context of the literature. Table 8.3 lists the elasticity values from this 
dissertation and the ranges of elasticity values that we obtained in the literature review.
Table 8.3. Non-aggregate price elasticity values from the literature review and this 
dissertation
Source Population Outcom e variable Price elasticity
All groups Medical care -0.20 t o -0.10
All groups Inpatient care (admissions) -0.85 to -0.04
Literature review
All groups Physician and outpatient care -0.51 t o -0.01
General population Prescription drugs -0.58 to -0.02
Elderly and chronically ill Prescription drugs -0.56 to 0.14
Low-income population Prescription drugs -0.20 to -0.05
General population Prescription drugs -0.25 t o -0.16
This dissertation Elderly Prescription drugs -0.30 t o -0.11
Low-income population Prescription drugs -0.20
In comparison with the elasticity values found for medical care, inpatient services 
(note that we only include elasticity values for inpatient admissions), and physician 
and outpatient services, the price elasticity values that we obtained seem to fall at the 
lower end of these ranges. Our estimates are also close to those obtained from the 
RAND experiment, which ranged from -0.20 to -0.10 (Manning et al., 1987). Thus, it 
may be that patients are not any more sensitive to changes in the prices of prescription 
drugs than to changes in the prices of other types of core medical services. This is in 
contrast to Pauly (1968) as he hypothesized that elasticity values should differ 
between various forms of medical care. The contrasting results may be due to 
advances in medicine that have occurred over the last 30 years: prescription drugs can 
now improve health for patients suffering from a number of different chronic 
conditions, such as hypertension, migraines, and osteoporosis, among others. 
Previously, inpatient and physician care may have been more important than 
prescription drugs.
Our estimates also fall within the ranges from the literature for the general population 
and the elderly, although given the wide range of estimates from the literature, this is 
not unlikely. There were only a few estimates at the microeconomic level for the low- 
income population from the literature. Our price elasticity estimate was in range of 
these estimates, although it was at the high end of this range.
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8.3. Neoclassical economic theory and the results
Given the insurance-related problem of moral hazard and its relationship to the 
elasticity of demand, it is important to place all of the price elasticity results in an 
economic context. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, neo-classical economists 
see moral hazard as a Pareto efficiency problem; that is, because patients with 
insurance coverage obtain prescription drugs that have a negative net marginal benefit, 
there is a welfare loss. Yet, the other extreme where there is no insurance is also not 
Pareto efficient given that consumer welfare can be improved by purchasing health 
insurance. Although there is no first-best outcome in this situation, economists have 
posited that an outcome somewhere in between these two extremes is ideal (Cutler 
and Zeckhauser, 2000).
Thus, two questions arise from this discussion: (i) do consumers reduce their 
consumption when faced with higher user fees, and (ii) if so, to what extent do they 
reduce their consumption?
8.3.1. The relationship between cost sharing for prescription drugs and
consumption
The relationship between prescription charges and the volume of medications 
purchased has been extensively addressed in the literature on cost sharing for 
prescription drugs, and there is clear evidence of a downward-sloping demand curve 
for prescription medications. Furthermore, with the exception of the finding for 
elderly Americans, the results from Chapters 4, 6, and 7 also confirm what has been 
found in the literature: individuals reduce their consumption of prescription 
medications when faced with higher user fees. The finding of no relationship between 
cost sharing for prescription drugs and volume among older Americans has already 
been discussed in Chapter 6 and Section 8.2 of this chapter.
8.3.2. The extent to which prescription charges reduce consumption
A number of authors have attempted to address the second question, but the findings 
have varied widely. One reason for the variance in the literature, though, is that the 
extent to which consumers reduce their consumption is crucially dependent on the 
context. For example, the sensitivity of older individuals to price changes is different 
than the sensitivity of younger individuals to price changes. The price elasticity of 
demand is also likely to differ substantially between different types of medications, 
depending on consumer perceptions of medication necessity, the availability of other 
substitutes, side effects, and other related aspects. Another reason for this variance 
may be the robustness of estimates; that is, few studies accounted for important 
factors such as unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection, and endogeneity (where 
appropriate). Because of this variance in price elasticity estimates and because many 
of the robust estimates (for instance, from the RAND study) are outdated or for 
specific populations, there was a need for more recent and robust estimates for the 
general population that could elucidate the moral hazard problem. There were also 
few comparisons of estimates between different age and income groups within a 
country and across countries.
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The resulting estimates from this analysis were between -0.25 and -0.20 for the 
general population, between -0.30 and -0.11 for the older population (although as the 
estimate of -0.11 was not significant, the upper range of elderly estimates was 
essentially 0), and -0.20 for the low-income population. The reasons for these varying 
estimates have already been covered in Section 8.2 of this chapter, but the fact that all 
of the values were less than -0.31 is interesting from an economic standpoint. The 
average person from each of these samples is not particularly sensitive to changes in 
out-of-pocket prices, implying that the perceived marginal benefits of most of the 
medications that these patients were taking outweighed the marginal costs (from the 
perspective of the individual). This result is relatively consistent across the different 
population groups.
In terms of Pareto efficiency, all of these results, with the exception of the American 
estimate for the elderly, indicate that moral hazard does exist, although it is not very 
extensive for prescription drugs. Our findings therefore imply that there is a relatively 
small welfare loss (by neo-classical economic standards) for prescription drug 
coverage. Therefore, moral hazard is unlikely to be a driving force behind 
pharmaceutical expenditure increases in developed countries. Because we do not have 
corresponding information on premiums for these populations, it is not possible to 
determine the optimal premium and coinsurance rates according to the neoclassical 
economic theory, but this would be an interesting exercise for the future.
As pointed out in Chapter 2, there are alternative theories of moral hazard within the 
health care arena. Rice (1992) argues that the demand curve does not accurately 
reflect willingness to pay, but for reasons discussed in Chapter 2, we believe that the 
demand curve can still be used as a tool to measure preferences. Nyman (1999), 
however, presents an alternative framework for measuring the welfare effect of moral 
hazard. His main point is that the traditional economic theory may overestimate the 
welfare loss of insurance because it does not consider the income transfer that insured 
individuals receive when ill. In particular, because we are unable to fully account for 
this income transfer, our analysis likely overstates the true elasticity value. The degree 
of this bias, however, depends on the income elasticity of demand and the percentage 
of the individual’s budget that out-of-pocket health care spending comprises and thus 
will differ across subgroups within a population. Nonetheless, Nyman’s (1999) 
framework does not change our interpretation that all of the groups that we considered 
in this dissertation were relatively insensitive to price.
A more interesting implication of Nyman’s (1999) framework is that the welfare loss 
of prescription drug insurance is likely relatively small (or even positive) given our 
price elasticity estimates. This is because Nyman accounts for improvements in access 
to prescription drugs and other goods brought about by insurance. Moreover, Nyman 
does not consider the effect that insurance companies have on prescription drug prices. 
That is, insurance companies have substantial negotiating power such that they pay
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significantly lower prices for medications than uninsured patients (Frank, 2001)4. This 
likely offsets some of the moral hazard effect of insurance. Although it is impossible 
for us to calculate the net welfare effect of insurance under Nyman’s framework, it 
does appear that the welfare loss of insurance would be relatively small. There may 
even be a welfare gain for the elderly population in the United States given the 
insignificant elasticity estimate for this group.
8.4. Health care efficiency, equity, and the results
The economic perspective is useful for quantifying the relationship between cost 
sharing for prescription drugs and demand, and it also provides insight into the 
covariates that determine this relationship. The problem is that some policymakers 
have different objectives for the health system that may actually contradict the goals 
of economic theory, where health systems are primarily concerned with issues such as 
improving the overall health of the population, containing costs, and improving equity 
(Le Grand et al., 1998; Lindbladh et al., 1998)5. As these differing objectives 
determine the interpretation and relevance of the elasticity values for health systems, 
it is important to provide definitions and a discussion of efficiency and equity. In this 
section we also discuss the elasticity results from this dissertation in light of 
efficiency and equity.
8.4.1. Background on efficiency and equity
A useful exercise is to provide a discussion of how efficiency and equity are defined 
in this dissertation and the meaning of efficiency within neo-classical economics and 
policy evaluation. Specifically, we are interested in examining the conflict between 
neo-classical economists’ perceptions of efficiency and health policymakers’ 
perceptions of efficiency. This highlights the importance of providing clear 
definitions for a cohesive policy discussion.
Although there are different types of efficiency (for instance technical and productive), 
the definition often implied by economists for efficiency and the one most useful to 
our discussion is one of Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency was defined in Chapter 2 
and discussed in Section 8.3 of this chapter. As a corollary to Pareto efficiency, 
economists sometimes assume that increasing the production of one commodity while 
holding the production of another commodity constant or even increasing production 
of both commodities will be a welfare improvement for society (Reinhardt, 1992). Yet, 
this definition of welfare depends on resources being allocated to those who are 
willing and able to pay, a concept that may be unrelated to health. The implication is 
that the neo-classical concept of efficiency may be unrelated to social welfare from an 
ethical standpoint and of limited use to policymakers who want to enhance population 
health given a fixed budget. Because we want to consider our price elasticity results 
from a policy stance, we employ the use of “health care efficiency”, a concept that is
4 For instance, pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) can steer patients towards specific brands through 
the use of formularies, giving the manufacturer an incentive to be included in the formulary. This gives 
the PBM more power to negotiate a lower price.
5 Improving quality and expanding choice are additional objectives that policymakers may consider.
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different from efficiency in a neo-classical sense. We define health care efficiency as 
an allocation of resources that maximizes health gain, where health gain is measured 
in a standardized manner (for instance, through years of life lost or quality-adjusted 
life years) (Williams, 1997).
Another important objective in some health systems is equity as many policymakers 
view health differences as unfair or unjust (Macinko and Starfield, 2002). Three 
common principles of equity are (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004):
• Equal access to health care for those in equal need of health care,
• Equal utilization of health care for those in equal need of health care, and
• Equitable health outcomes (for example, measured by quality adjusted life years, 
morbidity, or mortality), also known as equity in health.
Equal access to health care for those in need of medical care requires circumstances in 
which individuals with equal needs have equal opportunities to access health care 
(horizontal equity), and as a corollary, individuals with unequal needs have 
appropriately unequal opportunities to access health care (vertical equity) (Oliver and 
Mossialos, 2004). This is not to imply that given an equal playing field, all individuals 
will make equal use of health care resources; there are acceptable reasons such as 
preferences for care or risk aversion for not making use of available resources.
Equal utilization of health care for those in equal need requires circumstances in 
which those who are in equal need of health care actually make equal use of health 
care (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004). This principle requires policymakers to take an 
even stronger stance than the first definition of equity because policymakers would 
need to override the potentially acceptable reasons for not making use of health care.
The third definition of equity, equal health outcomes, requires the most proactive 
efforts from policymakers as they would have to provide conditions for all patients to 
achieve the same health outcomes (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004)6. In fact, the third 
definition of equity is undesirable in that policymakers would have to severely restrict 
the ways in which people choose to live.
Given that the equal access for equal need definition is the least restrictive to 
individual choice, this would at first blush seem to be the most useful definition to 
adopt in this dissertation. The problem is that measuring access is not straightforward 
as it encompasses the opportunities open to people to obtain care. Yet, the literature 
and policymakers have often taken equal access for equal need as the working 
definition of equity, the implication being that utilization is a proxy for access 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000). While access to treatment and receipt of 
treatment are argued to be different (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000), for policy 
analysis it makes sense to use a definition of equity that is generally more accepted by
6 A similar but less restrictive definition of equity is equitable health outcomes, which would allow for 
some inequity, for instance because of free choice.
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policymakers. Thus, we employ “equal access for equal need” as the definition of 
equity in this dissertation7.
Within the characterization of equity, there is also a need to define the terms “access” 
and “need”. At a general level access to care can be defined as involving the capacity 
to acquire a specified set of health care goods and services at a defined level of quality 
that is conditional on a specified maximum out-of-pocket cost and personal 
inconvenience and a specified level of information (Goddard and Smith, 2001). The 
word “specified” in the definition allows policymakers to tailor access to their own 
country- or region-specific circumstances as the feasibility of access levels may differ 
between areas. The importance of this definition is that it elucidates some of the 
important factors that need to be considered for the improvement of access, for 
instance, the necessary minimum level of information inconvenience, disutility, time 
and financial costs of obtaining services, and the appropriate range and quality of 
health care services available (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004).
Meanwhile, there is less agreement on the definition of need, although two 
components of need stand out as being important: (i) the state of the patient’s pre­
treatment health where poorer health implies greater need (generally the clinical 
definition), and (ii) the patient’s capacity to benefit from treatment where the amount 
of health care resources needed to exhaust the individual’s capacity to benefit governs 
the extent of their need (generally the health economics definition) (Oliver and 
Mossialos, 2004). Unfortunately, these two aspects of need may be conflicting in that 
treatments for patients who have the most debilitating illnesses are not always 
available, and there is a need for a more cohesive definition of need. For the purposes 
of this dissertation where we are taking an aggregate view of the sample when 
running regressions, the first component of need is more relevant.
On both the supply and demand sides of the health care market, there are important 
factors that influence equal access for equal need. On the supply side, the availability 
of health care resources within a given area determines the ease with which patients 
can access necessary health care. More relevant to this dissertation is the demand side, 
particularly the patient’s ability to pay for health care. Other important demand-side 
factors are cultural beliefs, knowledge, information, and preferences, some of which 
we could control through covariates and some of which we could control through a 
fixed effects approach.
As highlighted by others such as Williams (1997) and Le Grand (1990), researchers 
often speak of a trade-off between efficiency (whether it is Pareto efficiency, health 
care efficiency, or an alternative definition of efficiency) and equity8. Specifically, the
7 Our intent is not to argue or imply that equal access for equal need is the most appropriate definition 
of equity. Others such as Le Grand (1991) and Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000) have offered 
detailed discussions of equity and related concepts, and we refer the reader to these publications.
8 Le Grand (1990) argues that there are two types of equity and efficiency trade-offs. One trade-off 
concerns values and the other concerns production. We refer the reader to Le Grand (1990) for a 
distinction between the two, but in this dissertation we are concerned with discussing the equity and 
efficiency trade-off as it relates to production. That is, we are more interested in the feasibility of 
different policy alternatives in terms of equity and efficiency.
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achievement of Pareto or health care efficiency may exacerbate inequities9, mainly 
depending on how the gains from efficiency are distributed. That is, economists may 
deem an insurance policy with coinsurance for medical services as more efficient 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000)10, but this policy may not enhance social welfare from 
a policymaker’s standpoint. The reason is that the chronically ill and the poor may be 
unable to pay for their medications under a coinsurance regime, although their 
medications may be necessary from a medical standpoint. This could potentially 
create social tensions between the rich and the poor and the healthy and the unhealthy. 
In a similar vein, allowing individuals to purchase private supplementary insurance 
may be efficient from a health care efficiency standpoint, but this policy will 
exacerbate existing inequities as private insurance coverage is related to health and 
wealth. Acknowledging the trade-offs between these three definitions is important 
because if we only assess the effect of prescription charges from one of these angles, 
the applicability of the analysis to policy will be limited.
8.4.2. Relevance of price elasticity estimates for efficiency and equity
The neo-classical economic implications of our price elasticity estimates have already 
been discussed in Section 8.3, but the implications of the estimates in terms of health 
care efficiency and equity are considered in this section. For the relationship between 
prescription charges and health care efficiency, we inevitably need to determine 
whether implementing or raising user fees has any effect on population health. We 
can measure the effect of user fees for prescription drugs on health through different 
routes. The direct method is to simply measure the relationship between prescription 
charges and defined measurements of health, such as mortality, morbidity, or other 
specific outcomes like blood pressure levels. A second indirect method to proxy 
health is to investigate whether patients stop purchasing medications that are 
unnecessary for their well-being, and a third method is to analyze whether patients 
reduce their consumption of inappropriate medications. However, the aggregate effect 
of these two possibilities depends on whether there is a simultaneous reduction in 
appropriate medications that is of equal or greater magnitude. A fourth option is to 
measure the relationship between prescription charges and adherence. Empirically 
investigating all of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and 
some of these considerations have already been addressed in the literature (see 
Appendix B).
In addition, there is another indirect method for measuring the effect of cost sharing 
on health care efficiency. Specifically, we can consider whether cost sharing has a 
differential impact on consumption for various population groups and hypothesize
9 There is debate in the literature regarding the existence of an equity-efficiency trade-off, but the 
arguments often hinge upon the specific definition of efficiency employed. For instance, it would be 
more difficult to make the case for an equity and efficiency trade-off if our working definition of 
efficiency was the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle, which posits that a reallocation of resources 
is a social improvement if the gainers from the move can compensate the losers from the move and still 
remain gainers (Kaldor, 1939). For more discussion of these matters, see Le Grand (1990; 1991).
10 Economists such as Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) argue that an insurance contract with cost sharing 
is second-best as there is a trade-off between the welfare loss of insurance (due to moral hazard) and 
the benefits of greater risk sharing across beneficiaries.
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whether reductions in prescription consumption would be more detrimental among 
certain groups. Our finding related to the low-income subgroup does shed some light 
on the health care efficiency issue. We found that the price elasticity of demand 
among the low-income population was actually less than the price elasticity of 
demand for the general population. Given that the low-income population tends to be 
unhealthier than the general population and thus may be more in need of 
pharmaceutical treatment, it is somewhat alarming that these individuals are still 
sensitive to changes in out-of-pocket prices, even if some of them are partially 
protected from user fees by Medicaid. The implication is that imposing prescription 
charges on this subgroup may lead to a decline in their overall health, a hypothesis 
that was partially confirmed by the RAND experiment for general medical services 
(Rice and Morrison, 1994).
At the other extreme, the price elasticity of demand for the older population was not 
significantly different from zero in the US analysis but around -0.30 in the British 
Columbia analysis. Older people may be at least as medically needy as the poor, and 
at least in BC they appear to be sensitive to changes in prescription drug prices. Given 
that pharmaceutical treatment increases in importance with age, there may be negative 
health care efficiency implications related to user fees, at least in British Columbia11. 
In contrast, the insignificant estimate in the United States implies that demand-side 
cost sharing may have little effect on health among US seniors.
The relationship between user fees and equity is also something that we can partially 
discuss in the context of our results. The finding that the price elasticity of demand is 
relatively small implies that a cost sharing policy shifts expenditures from the third- 
party payer to the patient, as the decline in consumption is less than proportionate (in 
absolute value) to the increase in price. Indeed, evidence regarding the relationship 
between cost sharing for prescription drugs and out-of-pocket expenditures confirms 
that user fees increase individual expenditures (Alan et al., 2005). The fact that the 
price elasticity of demand among low-income Americans was even lower than among 
the general population implies that, at least to some degree, prescription charges 
among this group reflect expenditure shifting from the government and private 
insurers to patients. Although it is true that the poorest Americans generally receive 
prescription medications at little cost from Medicaid, the magnitude of this elasticity 
value implies that Medicaid cost sharing is not significantly reducing what 
policymakers deem “unnecessary consumption”; instead it is shifting the burden of 
payment to beneficiaries.
This raises important equity issues if the cost sharing policy does not protect the poor 
and heavy users of prescription drugs as they will bear the largest burden of this 
revenue transfer. Although there are no empirical studies of inequities in access to 
prescription drugs, there is research on inequities in access to medical care (Van 
Doorslaer et al., 2006; Van Doorslaer et al., 2000). Van Doorslaer et al. (2006) found
11 Of course, if cost sharing led patients to decrease their use of inappropriate medications, there could 
potentially be an improvement in health care efficiency. Evidence suggests otherwise, though, as 
patients are generally unable to distinguish between necessary and unnecessary treatments and reduce 
consumption of both when faced with user fees (Foxman et al., 1987; McManus et al., 1996).
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that the highest pro-rich inequities for GP visits are typically in the United States and 
Mexico, the only two countries without universal health insurance that they surveyed. 
There also appears to be a significant pro-rich bias for specialist services, but the 
evidence regarding inpatient care is mixed (Van Doorslaer et al., 2000). Based on this 
evidence regarding other medical services, it is likely that significant inequities in 
access to prescription drugs exist as cost sharing for prescription drugs is generally 
more prevalent than for other medical services. Nonetheless, there is a clear need for 
more research to quantify the inequities.
8.5. Policy implications
The previous two sections discussed cost sharing for prescription drugs in terms of 
economic efficiency, health care efficiency, and equity without offering guidance for 
policymakers. The perspective that policymakers take, whether it is one focused on 
economic efficiency, health care efficiency, and/or equity, determines the intrinsic 
value of the price elasticity estimate for that specific health system. Based on these 
different perspectives, we raise a number of policy issues related to our findings from 
the literature review and from the empirical analysis. We begin with an overall 
developed health systems perspective and then take a narrower view and discuss the 
policy issues relevant to the United States and British Columbia.
8.5.1. General policy implications
Since the original premise of cost sharing for medical services is based on economics, 
one place to start with the analysis is the policy implications from an economic 
perspective. While it is likely that the welfare loss of prescription drug insurance is 
relatively low due to the relatively small price elasticity values (see Section 8.3), other 
aspects of insurance such as the reduction in uncertainty regarding future income and 
the ability of insurers to negotiate deep discounts for prescription drugs are welfare 
gains to consumers. The extent to which the welfare loss of increased consumption is 
reduced by the gain from guaranteed future income and lower drug prices is unclear 
and a question that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, if  we assume 
that there is a welfare loss of insurance based on estimates of the price elasticity, the 
implication is that at least among the general and low-income populations, third-party 
payers need to impose some form of cost sharing to reduce the negative effects of this 
welfare loss.
As discussed in Chapter 2 and Section 8.3 of this chapter, if  we instead take Nyman’s 
(1999) point of view, there may be little or no welfare loss associated with insurance, 
particularly if we add in the gain from lower drug prices to his model. Hence, other 
demand- and supply-side measures to contain expenditures may be preferable to cost 
sharing. Nyman (1999) also points out that the traditional economic theory predicts 
that patients will reduce their consumption of both effective and ineffective 
prescription drugs when out-of-pocket prices rise. This implies that even according to 
the economic theory, cost sharing is a blunt instrument. Thus, from this perspective 
third-party payers may consider offering full insurance coverage for prescription
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drugs and using other mechanisms to influence potentially inappropriate or 
unnecessary consumption.
Shifting away from the traditional economic perspective, perhaps the most important 
question to consider when evaluating user fees from a policy perspective is whether 
patients are the appropriate target for reductions in demand. Given that patients 
delegate prescription decisions to medical practitioners, there is little reason to believe 
that the patient is more knowledgeable than the physician regarding the 
appropriateness of prescriptions. The fact that inappropriate medications are still 
prescribed even after multiple articles in the literature have highlighted these 
problems (see for instance, Beers et al., 1991 and Zhan et al., 2001) is alarming and 
indicates that more should be done to target inappropriate prescribing by physicians. 
Perhaps the smartest strategy would be to target those who research, manufacture, 
prescribe, and dispense drugs. Clinical guidelines from third-party payers or other 
professional organizations, whether mandatory or recommended, are an important 
start. Other mechanisms such as drug utilization reviews and electronic prescribing 
systems to alert pharmacists to potentially inappropriate medications are additional 
possibilities.
In addition, it is important to ask whether physician and pharmacist incentives are 
appropriately aligned. For instance, pharmacists may have an incentive to dispense 
more expensive medications if their revenue is based on a percentage of the 
prescription cost. The political economy of health systems does not make these 
suggestions attractive options for policymakers, but in the light of our analysis, it 
appears that these other measures should at least be considered in lieu of demand-side 
cost sharing. It is important that these possibilities are openly debated within the 
health care system.
Furthermore, improvements in medical technologies (including drugs) leading to 
wider use are generally acknowledged to be the main drivers of health expenditures 
(Newhouse, 1992). New prescription drugs can increase expenditures by expanding 
the population that can receive treatment (for instance, when drugs for previously 
untreatable conditions become available) and allowing treatment for secondary 
diseases within a disease (for instance, erythropoietin can treat anaemia in dialysis 
patients) (Rettig, 1994). The recent increase in the use of cost-effectiveness analysis 
for pricing and reimbursement decisions in Europe indicates that policymakers are 
beginning to consider the value of new technologies to the health care system. The 
valuation of these technologies is a first step in determining whether the use of these 
new medications should be promoted or hindered. For new medications that are 
deemed cost-effective, there are significant equity considerations, as groups that are 
privately insured or wealthier are more likely to receive these technologies (Goldman 
and Smith, 2005). Cost sharing is likely to exacerbate these inequities, although there 
is a need for more research on the relationship between cost sharing for prescription 
drugs and the diffusion of new technologies as little has been done on this area. The 
point is that it is important to question the value of new medications, to determine 
whether the health system is willing to bear the cost of these new technologies given 
their value, and to assess the distributional effects of their use.
174
Chapter 8
Another important consideration is the disparity between cost sharing for prescription 
drugs and cost sharing for other medical services. As mentioned earlier, this disparity 
may exist because of previous beliefs regarding the necessity and usefulness of 
prescription drugs when user fees were first implemented. Advances in medical 
technology mean that prescription drugs are now a vital aspect of medical care, and 
the similar ranges of elasticity values for the various types of medical care indicate 
that for consumers, there is little distinction between the necessity of prescription 
drugs and other forms of medical care. Trends in prescription charges in some 
countries perhaps reflect a growing awareness of this fact. In the United States, for 
example, health maintenance organizations offer lower user fees for prescription 
drugs than other insurance types such as fee-for-service, and the implementation of 
the Medicare prescription drug benefit has lowered out-of-pocket costs for a number 
of beneficiaries. In France the government increased subsidies for prescription drug 
consumption among low-income groups.
However, given that prescription charges are already built into most health systems, 
third-party payers may be reluctant to lose this valuable source of revenue. Taking 
this political reality into account, we consider other recommendations for prescription 
charges that are meant to protect the most vulnerable groups of the population. 
Policymakers have two main options to contain pharmaceutical budgets, minimize 
negative effects on equity, and/or maximize health care efficiency: first, to introduce 
mechanisms that protect poorer people and heavy users of prescription drugs (for 
example, older people and those with chronic conditions) and second, to differentiate 
prescription charges based on generic vs. brand-name status or cost-effectiveness. 
Although research in these areas is limited, we suggest that smarter cost-sharing 
systems would be carefully designed to ensure that any protection mechanisms 
available reflect need, are consistently applied, and do not conflict with other health 
policy goals. Correlations between income, age, and health (Macinko et al., 2003) 
combined with evidence from our analysis and the literature showing that low-income 
groups are sensitive to price, suggest that policymakers should focus on protecting 
poorer groups and heavy users of prescription drugs from the financial burden of cost 
sharing. In some countries protection mechanisms in the form of exemptions or 
reduced rates cover groups not considered to be particularly vulnerable, such as high- 
income older people. This may be motivated by dislike of the administrative costs and 
stigma associated with means testing, forcing policymakers to balance concerns for 
equity with concerns for administrative efficiency and political fall-out. In other 
countries voluntary insurance may be the predominant protection mechanism, but as it 
only protects those who are able to pay for it, its impact may be limited, and it may 
even exacerbate inequalities in access. Ideally, policymakers would target prescription 
drug subsidies at the most needy in the population: low-income groups and heavy 
users of medications, but at minimum, decisions about cost sharing should reflect an 
open debate about values and goals.
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8.5.2. Policy implications for the United States
Sections 8.5.2 and 8.5.3 provide specific policy implications for the two main regions 
considered in this dissertation: the United States and British Columbia. The policy 
implications for the United States can be broken down into four main groups: 
individuals with Medicaid, Medicare beneficiaries, privately insured individuals, and 
the uninsured.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 permits states to charge 
premiums and higher co-payments to selected Medicaid beneficiaries, although few 
states have taken advantage of this option. Given our relatively low elasticity estimate 
for low-income groups and the discussion regarding economic and health care 
efficiency, higher user fees for Medicaid beneficiaries do not appear to be the most 
efficient and equitable policy option. Even if we take an economic perspective, the 
welfare loss from Medicaid appears to be relatively low. From a health care efficiency 
standpoint, Medicaid recipients are a vulnerable group because of the correlation 
between income and health (Macinko et al., 2003), and co-payment increases may 
adversely affect the health of this population. In a setting where significant inequities 
in access to prescription drugs likely exist, policy changes that increase the out-of- 
pocket burden for the poor will only exacerbate these inequities. However, at the 
national level equity does not appear to be a prominent policy objective within the 
United States given that Medicaid is state-run, which automatically leads to horizontal 
inequities.
In light of these comments, the DRA conflicts with the policy objective of 
maximizing health care efficiency within a given budget. We recommend that 
Medicaid policymakers instead maintain low cost sharing amounts for Medicaid 
recipients and focus on other tools such as medical guidelines, drug utilization 
reviews, and formularies to maximize the appropriateness of prescriptions and contain 
costs.
We can also draw parallels to the new outpatient Medicare prescription drug benefit. 
The details of Medicare Part D were previously provided in Chapter 5, but the benefit 
basically entails significant out-of-pocket requirements, particularly for beneficiaries 
that fall into the “donut hole” (total drug spending between $2400 and $5451.25)12. 
Before analyzing the efficiency and equity implications of this benefit, though, it is 
useful to point out that Medicare Part D is a significant improvement in coverage for a 
number of elderly beneficiaries, particularly those that were previously uninsured. 
However, some dual-eligible beneficiaries face higher co-payments for brand-name 
prescription drugs and more restrictive formularies depending on the previous 
Medicaid coverage in their state of residence. In addition, the generosity of coverage 
is likely to decline over time as the market matures (KFF, 2006d). With these 
considerations in mind, it is important for the Federal government to carefully 
monitor the experience of low-income beneficiaries and institute more protections for 
dual-eligibles if the generosity of their coverage begins to decline.
12 It is worth noting that not all Part D prescription drug plans include the donut hole as part of the 
contract. Instead, around one-third of plans offer generic drug coverage for spending that falls within 
the donut hole, however, these plans simultaneously charge higher premiums (KFF, 2006b).
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As Avom (2006) points out, the construction of the Part D benefit was based on a 
moral hazard assumption, so that by including such extensive out-of-pocket sharing 
for beneficiaries, prescription drug plans could limit over-consumption. Yet, the 
evidence from the analysis in this dissertation points to the opposite conclusion, that 
moral hazard is very low for the average Medicare beneficiary. This implies that in 
general insurers may be able to shift expenditures to patients, allowing the insurance 
industry to retain higher revenues. Although competition does seem to be driving 
down out-of-pocket costs below those recommended by Medicare in some regions, 
which limits revenue shifting, beneficiary cost sharing is still substantial (Merlis, 
2007). Among beneficiaries that are low-income but not eligible for additional 
subsidies from Medicare, the effects of cost sharing can be detrimental; this was not 
picked up by the price elasticity estimate among the elderly because it was an average 
estimate. The fact that these beneficiaries still face a substantial out-of-pocket burden 
creates significant inequities. Further horizontal inequities are created by the fact that 
the generosity of prescription drug coverage differs between Medicaid beneficiaries in 
the same state depending on whether they are under or over 65 years of age. A more 
equitable policy option (but a politically less feasible policy option) would be to target 
the Part D benefits at the lowest income beneficiaries, as higher-income beneficiaries 
are already likely to have prescription drug coverage through private sources (Saffan 
et al., 2002).
For those who are privately insured, we can obtain a rough approximation of the 
elasticity value13. The relatively inelastic value of -0.26 indicates that insurers are able 
to shift expenditures to beneficiaries. In fact, recent evidence suggests that the 
insurance industry has consolidated, increasing the market power of individual firms 
(Davis et al., 2007). Subsequently, despite persistent increases in cost sharing among 
privately insured beneficiaries, insurance profit margins have risen over the past few 
years (Davis et al., 2007). The implication is that until consumers become more price 
sensitive (which might happen as co-payments continue to rise) or until the insurance 
market becomes more competitive, insurers are likely to continue passing these costs 
along to patients. There is no question that private insurance is highly inequitable, but 
whether the current state of private insurance in the US contributes to greater health 
care efficiency is not clear. Since privately insured patients do not significantly reduce 
their consumption of prescription drugs when faced with higher co-payments, there 
may be little effect on health. However, it might be that patients are switching to less 
effective or less appropriate medications with lower co-payments to lower their out- 
of-pocket burden, and this could adversely influence health.
13 We obtained elasticity estimates for those who had private insurance, public insurance, and no 
insurance using the same method. Using the formula ed = (A£?/ AP%P/Q), we calculated
(AQ f AP) using the elasticity estimate (ed ) from the regression on the general population and the
means of the co-payment and consumption variables (PjQ). Then we made the assumption that
(A Qf AP) was constant across different populations and used the mean co-payment and consumption 
values for those with private insurance, public insurance, and no insurance to calculate elasticity values 
for each of these groups.
177
Chapter 8
There is also interesting research regarding the offer and uptake of employer- 
sponsored insurance. Although employer-sponsored coverage has been steadily 
declining since 2000, evidence suggests that the decline has mainly been due to take- 
up rates by employees rather than offer rates by employers (Cutler, 2002a; 
Reschovsky et al., 2006). That is, employers are still offering insurance at roughly the 
same rate, but employees are choosing not to purchase the insurance. This decline in 
insurance coverage is consistent with increases in price caused by increases in both 
premiums and user fees (Reschovsky et al., 2006). The implication is that not only are 
higher user fees for medical services (including prescription drugs) reducing the 
demand for care, but they are also contributing to a decline in employer-sponsored 
coverage. This is alarming given that most of these individuals are unlikely to be 
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, indicating that they are either purchasing non­
group insurance or going without insurance. Both of these possibilities are disturbing 
if a catastrophic event occurs; even if the individual has non-group insurance during a 
catastrophic event, he may be unable to renew his insurance coverage at an affordable 
price afterwards and may even face difficulty in obtaining coverage. Thus, it is crucial 
that more discussion regarding the adverse effects of costly illnesses for the insured 
be held at the Federal and state level in the US.
As there are around 46.6 million uninsured Americans, it is also important to discuss 
the implications of the price elasticity estimate for the uninsured population. Our 
rough approximation of the price elasticity value for uninsured Americans was -0.64, 
which, not surprisingly, is larger than the price elasticity values for the general 
population and for individuals with private health insurance. Not only do the 
uninsured face the full price of prescription drugs, but pharmacies often charge 
uninsured consumers higher prices than institutional payers because consumers have 
the least negotiating power. Foregoing insurance is likely to have significant health 
care efficiency implications as there is evidence of a positive relationship between 
insurance coverage and overall health (Baker et al., 2001) and a negative relationship 
between insurance coverage and mortality (McDavid et al., 2003; McWilliams et al., 
2004; Roetzheim et al., 2000). Moreover, the uninsured population faces substantial 
barriers in access to prescription drugs, not only because of the higher prescription 
prices but also because of higher physician prices, leading to large inequities in the 
US population. From a health care efficiency and equity standpoint, extending 
insurance coverage to this population, whether through greater regulation of private 
insurance or extended public insurance coverage, could improve equity and the health 
of this currently uninsured group.
8.5.3. Policy implications for British Columbia, Canada
As we were only able to estimate the price elasticity of demand for older people in 
British Columbia, our policy implications are more relevant to PharmaCare recipients 
over the age of 64. The new Fair PharmaCare program that tiers deductibles and out- 
of-pocket maximums according to family income has led to lower out-of-pocket costs 
for the poorest beneficiaries, especially seniors with family incomes below CDN 
$15,000 per year. Beneficiaries with family incomes around CDN $20,000-$30,000 
per year may face slightly higher out-of-pocket maximums, and beneficiaries with
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family incomes above CDN $35,000 begin to face significantly higher out-of-pocket 
drug costs. The price elasticity estimate of -0.30 indicates that elderly British 
Columbians are to some degree sensitive to price. An interesting exercise would be to 
look at price elasticity values among different income groups within the elderly 
PharmaCare population, but due to data limitations, we were unable to do so in this 
dissertation.
Along these lines, Fair PharmaCare may only cause a small increase in consumption 
among the lowest income group of beneficiaries (who now receive more generous 
coverage under the program). In fact, Caetano et al. (2006) found that Fair 
PharmaCare had no effect on access to prescription treatments for the poorest of 
PharmaCare beneficiaries after its implementation. The elasticity estimate also 
indicates that Fair PharmaCare may have a small dampening effect on consumption 
for beneficiaries that now face higher deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums under 
the program. However, given that these beneficiaries have higher incomes, they may 
purchase supplementary insurance to cover some of the out-of-pocket costs that 
PharmaCare no longer covers. Thus, the effect of PharmaCare prior to 2003 may have 
simply been to crowd out private insurance purchase among this group. Whether the 
crowd-out of private insurance contributes to or hinders the goals of health 
policymakers in British Columbia is a question that is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Nonetheless, more research on this question is clearly needed.
Given the relatively inelastic price elasticity value, it is unclear whether there will be 
any adverse effects on the health of the average elderly beneficiary in BC. Essentially, 
Fair PharmaCare shifts expenditures from the government to beneficiaries, creating 
savings for the government. Yet, if there are negative effects on health, the policy is 
inefficient. Moreover, the problem with Fair PharmaCare is that it does not address 
the root of expenditure growth. As technology is a more important driver of health 
expenditures (Newhouse, 1992), pharmaceutical expenditures are likely to continue 
growing at the same rate as in the past. In fact, Morgan et al. (2006) indicate that after 
the implementation of Fair PharmaCare, there was a 17% decrease in public drug 
expenditures and an 18% increase in private drug expenditures compared with the 
situation that would have resulted in the absence of the new policy. Thus, according to 
their analysis, Fair PharmaCare actually had no influence on expenditure growth.
Overall, while the reduction in the out-of-pocket burden for low-income beneficiaries 
under Fair PharmaCare is an improvement in equity, there is potential for 
improvement in health care efficiency. One suggestion is for the PharmaCare program 
to implement additional mechanisms to promote generic drug use such as lower 
dispensing fees for generic drugs, generic substitution laws, and pharmacist payments 
that encourage generic dispensing. The government could also consider using tiered 
co-payments to steer patients toward lower-priced or more cost-effective medications. 
This would also allow the government to negotiate with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers for inclusion in the formularies. These additional measures are more 
likely to reduce pharmaceutical expenditures and could allow the province to provide 
more generous drug coverage for middle-income elderly beneficiaries.
179
Chapter 8
8.6. Conclusion
This chapter has summarized and discussed the results and placed our findings in the 
context of economic and policy analysis. This section provides a brief summary of the 
main points.
Section 8.2 compared the price elasticity values that we obtained in Chapters 4, 6, and 
7. The estimate from the US general population was slightly higher than the MRA 
estimate, likely because the American elasticity values were measured higher on the 
demand curve. The estimate for the low-income group in the US was almost identical 
to that from the MRA, although we might expect the elasticity among the poor to be 
higher. The reason for this discrepancy may be due to cultural factors in the United 
States and the fact that low-income beneficiaries generally face low user fees for 
prescription drugs under Medicaid. The price elasticity estimate for seniors from the 
US was more in line with our predictions. A more interesting result was that US 
seniors were less sensitive to prices than BC seniors, although this may have been due 
to cultural factors and the existence of generous insurance for core medical services in 
BC.
Section 8.3 then discussed the elasticity results in the context of the neo-classical and 
extended economic theories. We found that moral hazard exists in the prescription 
drug insurance market, although it does not appear to be a driving force of greater 
consumption due to its low value. We also considered Nyman’s (1999) extended 
theory of moral hazard and postulated that based on our elasticity values, the net 
welfare loss of insurance under Nyman’s framework was probably small. Under 
Nyman’s (1999) framework, there may have been a welfare gain for the elderly 
population in the US.
Section 8.4 brought in the policy interpretation of the elasticity estimate, paying 
particular attention to the conceptual differences between economic efficiency, health 
care efficiency, and equity. We then considered the relevance of the elasticity value 
from the perspective of health care efficiency and equity. Overall, it appears that user 
fees for prescription drugs may be detrimental to the health of certain population 
groups, particularly those who are low-income and unhealthy. In terms of equity, 
unless designed properly user fees have adverse effects on equity given that low- 
income individuals tend to be in poorer health, although more research is needed on 
this area.
The fifth section then provided the implications of the results for health care 
policymakers in developed countries, the United States, and British Columbia. From a 
neo-classical economic point of view, it appears that there is a welfare loss from 
prescription drug insurance, and the effect of moral hazard may be to discourage some 
individuals from purchasing insurance. The implication is that third-party payers need 
to impose some form of cost sharing to discourage excess consumption. Meanwhile, 
Nyman’s (1999) analysis leads us to the opposite conclusion; we determined that 
third-party payers should focus on other mechanisms of reducing demand. Shifting 
away from the traditional economic perspective, we point out that it is important for
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policymakers to openly debate the value of imposing cost sharing on consumers when 
physicians are making the primary decisions regarding prescriptions.
Section 8.5 also offered a policy discussion for the United States. While public health 
care policy seems to be moving in different directions depending on the form of 
coverage (e.g. Medicare or Medicaid), we indicated that other options for curbing 
expenditures that are less detrimental to equity and efficiency should be considered by 
public insurers. In the private insurance market US health care policy is significantly 
lacking, and more needs to be done to protect this group of the population. The same 
could be said for the uninsured group where more regulation of private insurance or 
an extension of public coverage could significantly improve equity and health 
outcomes among this group.
In British Columbia the new Fair PharmaCare policy appears to have maintained 
access to prescription drugs for all income groups within the elderly population. The 
overall effect is that the government transferred a proportion of expenditures to 
private payers. However, Fair PharmaCare is unlikely to constrain pharmaceutical 
expenditures in the long run, and the BC government should consider other measures 
to address pharmaceutical growth such as generic drug policies and tiered co­
payments.
181
Chapter 9
Chapter 9: Concluding remarks
9.1. Introduction
The main research question addressed in this thesis was the extent to which 
prescription user fees influence the number of prescription drugs consumed. As the 
initial motivation for exploring this question was based on the neo-classical economic 
perspective, we empirically estimated the price elasticity using three main datasets: 
the first was a collection of price elasticity estimates from the literature, the second 
was a sample of individuals from the United States, and the third was a sample of 
older people from British Columbia, Canada. These different specifications allowed 
us to compare and contrast the results and to hypothesize why the findings might 
differ between the three datasets. Based on the empirical results, we further explored 
the relationship between user charges for prescription drugs and demand by 
considering the policy implications from economic efficiency, health care efficiency, 
and equity perspectives.
Not only is cost sharing for prescription drugs widely applied across insurance types 
in the US, but the level of cost sharing faced by insured individuals is dynamic over 
time. British Columbia has undergone a recent policy change with the launch of Fair 
PharmaCare, which targets funding at the lower income groups. Many of the price 
elasticity estimates from the literature are outdated, particularly because the RAND 
experiment was conducted over 25 years ago. Other price elasticity estimates are 
based on less robust estimations, as the authors did not always explore issues such as 
sample selection, unobserved heterogeneity, or endogeneity. These issues implied the 
need for current, robust research that would explore the price elasticity of demand for 
prescription drugs, particularly among older people.
This thesis has addressed some of these existing gaps within the literature, and the 
purpose of this chapter is to summarize the discussion and findings from this 
dissertation and to offer suggestions for future research than naturally extends from 
our work. Specifically, Section 9.2 covers the main points from each of the other 
seven chapters within this thesis. In addition, we offer avenues for further research 
that extend beyond the scope of this thesis. Section 9.3 covers these areas that we 
suggest for further research.
9.2. A brief summary of the dissertation
Chapter 1 introduced the need for updated elasticity estimates for prescription drug 
consumption. The chapter outlined the various types of cost sharing that exist for 
prescription drugs and briefly discussed why policymakers implement user fees. 
While a negative relationship between prescription charges and drug consumption has 
generally been found across the literature, the first chapter highlighted a number of 
empirical gaps related to the price elasticity of demand that currently exist. In 
particular, an updated and more robust analysis would be useful. A study that 
summarizes the existing literature into one estimate or a few estimates based on the 
context could better inform policymakers, and analyses and comparisons of particular
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populations would be a valuable addition to the traditional analysis of the general 
population. The need for further research in the area of cost sharing and the usefulness 
of the price elasticity measure in shedding light on prescription drug consumption in 
the population were the primary motivations for this dissertation.
Given that our intention was to examine the extent of moral hazard by estimating the 
elasticity of demand for prescription drugs, Chapter 2 provided the framework of 
insurance theory as a means of motivating the empirical model. The chapter began 
with a discussion of insurance in a world of symmetric information and then 
proceeded to outline insurance under conditions of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
The main theoretical finding related to moral hazard was that patients increase their 
consumption of medical care when faced with lower out-of-pocket prices. This causes 
a welfare loss because of increased premiums and the fact that consumption is 
diverted away from other goods and services that may have higher net marginal 
benefits. We then discussed extensions to the traditional model of moral hazard, 
focusing on the work of Nyman (1999) who postulated that the welfare loss of 
insurance was not as large as theorized in the traditional model due to the income 
effect of insurance. Based on these neo-classical and extended theories, we discussed 
how the economic theories would likely translate into an empirical analysis of the 
demand for prescription drugs.
Chapter 3 included a literature review of studies that examined the link between cost 
sharing for medical services in general, physician visits, and hospital visits and the 
demand for these particular services. The chapter also provided a more 
comprehensive literature review of the effect of prescription charges on the volume of 
drugs purchased, the covariates that are important predictors of prescription demand, 
and the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs. While there was a consensus 
that prescription charges reduced the demand for prescription drugs, there was a large 
range of price elasticity estimates in the literature, perhaps due to the varying quality 
of studies and the different research settings. Not only did the literature review 
highlight the need for more research in the area, but in some cases it allowed us to see 
what results we might expect from our own analysis in terms of the dependent and 
independent variables.
Chapter 4 extended the literature review by statistically summarizing the widely 
varying elasticity estimates from the literature. The intent was to provide a benchmark 
price elasticity value for comparison against the estimates from the United States and 
British Columbia. We used a meta-regression analysis, which involved collating the 
existing price elasticity estimates into a dataset and running a regression on this 
constructed dataset. The analysis provided a “composite” or “adjusted” elasticity 
estimate that accounted for the heterogeneity that exists between elasticity values. The 
resulting “adjusted” estimate of-0.16 (not significant) indicated that across most 
populations and institutional settings, the demand for prescription drugs is highly 
inelastic. The analysis also revealed that other factors, such as the quality of the 
medium in which the estimate was published, characteristics of the dataset from 
which the estimate was pulled, and the institutional setting associated with the 
estimate were all important predictors of the price elasticity value.
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The intent of Chapter 5 was to set the scene for the empirical analyses of prescription 
drug cost sharing in the US and BC and the subsequent policy discussion in Chapter 8 
The overview of the American health care system revealed the fragmented nature of 
health care and the high levels of cost sharing faced by individuals across most types 
of insurance coverage. In contrast, core health services in British Columbia can only 
be funded by the public insurance system, but a large proportion of prescription drug 
funding for the non-elderly is private. The implication was that price elasticity values 
would likely differ between the US and Canada.
Chapter 6 highlighted the need for more robust price elasticity estimates among 
different age and income groups within the American population. The chapter 
employed data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and provided 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs among the adult, 
elderly, and low-income populations in the United States. An empirical model 
developed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) that accounted for sample selection, 
endogeneity, and unobserved heterogeneity was used to obtain these estimates. The 
price elasticity estimate was highest among adults (-0.26), followed by low-income 
individuals (-0.20), and older people (-0.11). Even though the elasticity value of -0.11 
for the elderly was not significantly different from zero at conventional levels, it was 
well within the range of elasticity values given in the literature review and our meta 
analysis and was part of a trend of decreasing elasticity values for this less price 
sensitive group.
Chapter 7 offered another analysis of the price elasticity of demand using a relatively 
similar population from British Columbia that faced more generous drug insurance 
coverage than individuals in the United States. The dataset was the British Columbia 
Linked Health Database. The sample was limited to individuals over the age of 65 in 
British Columbia, Canada because of our inability to observe private insurance 
purchases among PharmaCare recipients younger than 65. The empirical model was a 
variation of the Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) model that accounted for 
individual-specific effects and sample selection. We obtained a significant and 
inelastic price elasticity of demand of -0.30. While this indicates that the elderly are 
relatively insensitive to out-of-pocket price changes, perhaps because of their 
perceived need for medications and the historically low user fees for the elderly in the 
province, the value is somewhat higher than we might expect among this population.
Chapter 8 brought together the results from the three analysis chapters and offered a 
comparison of the different price elasticity results. The meta-regression estimate 
provided a useful benchmark against which to assess the other price elasticity values. 
Surprisingly, seniors in British Columbia were the most sensitive to user fees for 
prescription drugs followed by the general population in the United States. US seniors 
were the least sensitive to demand-side cost sharing. We also extended the analysis 
and discussed the policy implications, focusing on the effects of cost sharing on 
economic efficiency (Pareto efficiency), health care efficiency, and equity. We 
determined that demand-side cost sharing may lead to greater economic efficiency, 
but cost sharing may have a detrimental effect on health care efficiency and equity.
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The implication is that policymakers in both the United States and Canada should set 
clear policy goals and openly discuss whether any detrimental effects of cost sharing 
are considered acceptable from a policy standpoint.
9.3. Further research
There are a number of areas for further research that naturally follow upon the work 
of this thesis: one area of study relates to research that extends the work of this thesis, 
and the second type of research correlates with work that is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.
In terms of research that extends what has been done in this thesis, this involves work 
on the differences between generic and brand-name drug consumption and research 
that further explores the welfare loss of moral hazard in prescription drug 
consumption.
Beyond the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs, further research could 
determine whether the price elasticity differs between multi-source and single-source 
medications. For drugs where generic competitors exist, it would also be informative 
to investigate whether the elasticity differs between the generic and brand-name 
versions. In essence, this research would explore the “generic competition paradox”1 
(Frank and Salkever, 1992; Scherer, 1993) from the consumer side of the market. This 
work could have important implications for third-party payers that are interested in 
the potential for reducing drug expenditures through generic drug use. For instance, if 
research indicated that consumers were more sensitive to prices of brand-name drugs 
when more competitors existed in the market2, this would indicate that a supply-side 
policy of encouraging more generic competition could help reduce overall drug 
expenditures.
Analysts often expect consumers to behave rationally, foregoing the health services of 
least benefit to them, but this begs the question of how people decide which drugs 
they value least when faced with a price barrier. Studies that examined changes in the 
use of essential drugs as a proxy for poor health outcomes found that individuals were 
unable to distinguish ‘necessary’ from ‘unnecessary’ prescription drugs (Foxman et 
al., 1987; Soumerai et al., 1991). Other studies found that higher cost sharing 
increased the risk of adverse events such as being hospitalized or admitted to a 
nursing home (Soumerai et al., 1991; Tamblyn et al., 2001), and prescription charges
1 According to economic theory, as more firms enter a competitive market, the market price should fall. 
Interestingly, in the pharmaceutical off-patent market, researchers have observed that the prices of 
brand-name medications do not always fall when more generic firms enter the market. In fact, some 
researchers have found that brand-name prices have risen (Frank and Salkever, 1992). The argument 
for this paradox is that physicians are generally risk averse, insensitive to the costs o f treatment, and 
habitual creatures. From die consumer side, patients are insufficiently informed about their treatments 
and averse to switching away from medications (Scherer, 1993). Research on the price elasticity of 
demand for brand-name and generic drugs would thus explore whether patients indeed are averse to 
switching away from brand-name medications, even in the face o f higher prices.
2 More specifically, when there are more generic competitors in the market, this should drive overall 
generic prices and thus out-of-pocket prices for generics down. Consumers are thus more sensitive to 
the prices of brand-name drugs when there is a greater differential between the brand and generic price.
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also lowered adherence to treatment, which may have health implications. More 
comprehensive analyses that consider the implications of cost sharing on the 
appropriate use of medications, on the use of substitutes and complements, and on 
adherence and long-term health are still needed and would shed further light on this 
issue.
As for further research that is beyond the scope of this thesis, a major area that is 
virtually unexplored is the effect of prescription charges on access to drugs. Most 
research has instead focused on utilization as a proxy for access. Cost sharing does 
not have the same effect across all population groups. Surprisingly, elasticity 
estimates from our work and other did not show that low-income groups are more 
sensitive to price, but the findings still indicate that poorer people reduced their use of 
prescription drugs even when co-payment levels were very low. Furthermore, little 
work has been done on horizontal inequities brought about by regional variations in 
prescription charges. In countries like Canada and the United States, where 
prescription charges for low-income populations and older people differ from region 
to region, access to prescription drugs may vary significantly across regions. Spatial 
analyses might provide insight into this area, and further research may contribute to 
lowering inequalities in access to care.
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Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 2
The purpose of this appendix is to expand upon certain points made in Chapter 2. In 
some cases this translates into more detailed mathematical derivations of a specific 
concept. In other cases the appendix covers points that were not central to the 
objectives of Chapter 2 but may be interesting for the reader. Specifically, the 
appendix offers an explanation and mathematical derivation of adverse selection 
along with an expansion of aspects related to ex post moral hazard. The presentation 
of both adverse selection and moral hazard is intended to aid the reader in 
differentiating between the two types of asymmetric information. In line with Chapter 
2, this appendix draws heavily upon other work by Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), and Zweifel and Breyer (1997).
A.l. Equilibrium in an insurance market with no asymmetric information
The insured individual’s expected utility is represented by (Zweifel and Breyer,
1997):
EU*. = k *u(w6 -o t + ^ 2) + (1-^)*«(iv0 -/? ,) (A.l).
We also know that the individual’s premium p, is related to size of a claim if he falls 
ill: pj = acp where a  represents the percentage of the loss that the individual’s 
premium covers. Assuming that the consumer purchases insurance, if he doesn’t fall 
ill his wealth is wx = w0 -  p j. If he falls ill his wealth is w2 = w0 -  m + p 2, where
P2 =  cp -  acp.
To solve for the optimal insurance policy, we substitute for Pi and p2 and differentiate 
(A. 1) with respect to the claim (p in the event of illness:
^ n r  r
 — = n  * (1 -  7i) * u'(w0 - m  + <p- acp) + - ;r  * (1 -  ;r) * u'(w0 -  acp) = 0
d (p
(A.2).
Solving for (p we find that (p = m, indicating that if insurance is actuarially fair, the 
optimal policy for a risk averse individual is full insurance. The consumer does have 
the option of foregoing insurance altogether, so he will only purchase a contract if
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A.2. Adverse selection: illustration of why the high-risk indifference curve is 
steeper than the low-risk indifference curve
Adverse selection can be represented both mathematically and diagrammatically 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1980), and this 
section of the appendix derives models of adverse selection and insurance purchase.
A.2.1. Model assumptions
We assume that asymmetry exists in that individuals are aware of their own risk but 
are not willing to reveal this information to firms. A distinguishing feature of this 
model is that companies force individuals to choose from particular insurance 
packages instead of permitting consumers to purchase as much insurance as they 
would like at a particular price. Let there be two kinds of consumers: low-risk 
individuals with illness probability n L0 and high-risk individuals with illness 
probability n HI > n LO •
Each consumer begins with income W and faces an exogenous loss m in the event of 
illness. Net income is y j , where i represents the individual’s risk group (/ = LO, H i) 
and j  indicates the state of the world ( j  = s,h), i.e. sickness or health. The consumer’s 
utility is given by u\y{ J such that his expected utility is:
EU, = n l *u\y’,\+ § .-7 i,)*u \y ';\ (A.3).
A.2.2. Equilibrium with two classes of consumers
When there are different risk types, a pooling equilibrium will not occur, which can 
be illustrated through Appendix Figure A. 1.
Because there are two risk types in the market, each risk group has its own 
indifference curve: uHI for the high-risk group and uL0 for the low-risk group. The
slope of the high-risk indifference curve is less steep than the slope of the low-risk 
indifference curve (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976)1. The high-risk indifference curve is 
represented by uHI, and the low-risk indifference curve is represented by uL0. For
high-risk persons the marginal rate of substitution between wealth in the healthy state 
and wealth in the sick state is:
dw2 f t 'K - / ? , ) ♦ ( ! - * „ )
dwx u'(wQ - m  + p 2)* n HI
MRS,HIW\,W2
1 Intuitively, since the probability o f loss for a low-risk individual is lower, the low-risk person must 
receive more income than the high-risk person in the unhealthy state to compensate for income taken 
from the healthy state.
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Appendix Figure A. 1. Equilibrium with two types o f consumers
wealth in sick 
state (W2)
wealth in healthy
state (Wj)
Similarly, for low risk individuals the marginal rate of substitution between wealth in 
the healthy and the sick state is:
MRS’w’w = (A.5).
dw, u’(w0 - m  + /32) * x w
Given the assumption that high-risk and low-risk individuals are otherwise identical, 
we know that the utility of wealth at a given level of wealth is the same for both types 
of consumers: uHI (w) = uLO (w). Thus, the ratio of the slope of the high-risk 
indifference curve to the slope of the low-risk indifference curve is:
M R S 1" u '{ w 0- / ? , ) * (l - n HI)u'{w„ -  + )*  jcw
MRS1 ° u'(w0 -  m + P2)* '(w0 -  /S,)* (l -  )
_  n LO *   ^ U HI
n H] 1~ n Lo
(A.6 ).
7 iLO 1 — 71HI MRS
Because both —— a n d  7 7 7  are less than one, it follows th a t  — < 1,
tthi 1 - n L0 MRSlo
indicating that the slope of the high-risk indifference curve is less steep than the slope
of the low-risk indifference curve.
In Appendix Figure A. 1 the point E is the initial endowment, and the line EF is the 
aggregate fair-odds line. The pooling contract Q, which must lie on the fair-odds line 
because of the zero-profit constraint, involves a cross-subsidy from low-risk to high- 
risk individuals. This is because both groups pay the same premium, but high-risk 
persons make more claims. A contract like 0, however, would be strictly preferred by
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low-risk individuals and not preferred by high-risk individuals. Yet, when low-risk 
consumers switch to 0, Q becomes unprofitable. This process can continue infinitely 
for various “pooling” contracts on the market, and thus no pooling equilibrium can 
exist in a market with two types of customers (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).
In fact, if there is an equilibrium, each risk type will purchase a separate contract 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). This is called a separating equilibrium (see Appendix 
Figure A.2).
Appendix Figure A.2. Separating equilibrium
wealth in sick 
state (IV?)
y l D
H
' u
wealth in healthy
state {Wp
In Appendix Figure A.2 the two contracts offered are: the low risk contract Q LO, 
which lies on the line EL, and the high-risk contract Q w , which lies on the line EH. 
The high-risk contract Q HI is associated with full insurance , while the low-risk 
contract is partial insurance. Suppose that insurers offer the set of contracts ( t,Q w/ ) 
instead of ( 0 ^ , 0 ^ ) .  The full insurance contract x would be preferred to both ClLO 
and QH1 by both low-risk and high-risk individuals. The problem is that insurance 
companies would not be able to distinguish between high- and low-risk customers if x 
were offered, and there would be negative profits as x lies above the fair-odds line for 
all customers in the market. In order for an equilibrium to exist, all low-risk contracts 
must lie to the southeast of the high-risk indifference curve uHI; in fact, ClLO is the
best policy than an insurance company could offer to the low-risk types that would 
not attract the high-risk types.
2 This is because the high-risk contract lies on the intersection o f  the fair-odds line and the 45°-line.
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Nonetheless, whether (Qlo,Q hi ) always constitutes an equilibrium set of contracts
depends on X, the proportion of high-risk individuals in the market. Appendix Figure
A.3. demonstrates the importance of X.
Appendix Figure A. 3. Separating equilibrium and the proportion o f high-risk 
individuals
wealth in sick 
state < I/U2 >
H
wealth in healthy
state {Wq)
Both low- and high-risk customers would prefer the contract § because it lies above 
the indifference curves that correspond to Q L0 and Q HJ for low-risk and high-risk 
individuals, respectively. If a greater proportion of the population was high-risk, 
corresponding to the pooling fair-odds line EX+, then offering a contract like £, would 
be unprofitable because it lies above the pooling fair-odds line. However, if the 
opposite were true, then the pooling policy £, that would break the separating 
equilibrium is profitable and would be offered. When a pooling policy is offered, a 
sepaiating policy that attracts the low-risk types will break the equilibrium. Thus, for 
a separating equilibrium to occur, the low-risk indifference curve running through the 
initial endowment must lie completely above the fair-odds line. The lower the share of 
high-risk individuals in the market, the greater the chance that this requirement will be 
fulfilled (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).
Had the market only consisted of one risk type, the equilibrium contract would be full 
insurance. This indicates that according to the neo-classical theory, the presence of 
high-risk customers in a heterogeneous market exerts a negative externality on the 
low-dsk individuals.
A number of studies have investigated adverse selection in health insurance markets, 
and i summary of the results can be found in the Handbook o f Health Economics 
(Cut er and Zeckhauser, 2000). Nearly all of the studies have found that adverse 
selection is a significant force in insurance markets. There is adverse selection in the
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choice between having insurance or no insurance, between having a generous or less 
generous insurance plan, and between joining a fee-for-service or managed care plan.
A.3. Mathematical derivation of ex post moral hazard
Because medical services are assumed to be useless to a healthy individual in the most 
basic model, a consumer faces two possible utilities depending on the state of the 
world: us [m,ys J and uh m ,y h J . Certain assumptions can be made about these two 
utility functions (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997):
ASSUMPTION 2A.1
The healthy person’s utility only depends on other consumption, meaning that 
medical care m has no effect on his utility.
o
T tl adm
ASSUMPTION 2 A.2
Both utility functions for each state of the world are strictly increasing and 
strictly concave with respect to the consumption good. Mathematically:
=  s ^ > a ^ ^ < 0 a n d
y dy w dy2
uieu^ „;;=aVk]<0
y dy ™ dy2
ASSUMPTION 2A.3
For the individual who is sick, utility is a strictly concave function of medical 
care m when we hold consumption constant:„L:=^%z]<0
dm
The “satiation quantity” is the quantity of treatment m* at which the marginal 
utility of consumption is zero.
<[m*,y]=0
ASSUMPTION 2A.4
Holding consumption constant, the marginal utility of consumption is always 
lower in the sick state than in the healthy state: 
usy [m,y] < uhy [0,y\  for all values of m.
ASSUMPTION 2A.5
Consumption and medical care are weakly complementary goods in the sick 
state. This means that the marginal utility of consumption does not fall with 
increasing utilization of medical care provided that the amount of medical care 
is below the satiation level.
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dV[m,.y]:= ------ -—— > 0  if  m < m*.
my dmdy
These assumptions are useful for developing models of the demand for medical 
services and the optimal amount of insurance coverage in the presence of ex post 
moral hazard.
We assume that the insurer is unable to observe the individual’s health status and can 
only observe medical expenditures (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997). To combat moral 
hazard the insurer uses a constant coinsurance rate (c). The insurance payout can be 
expressed as:
l(m)  = (l -  c) * m (A.7),
and
r{m) = \ - c  (A. 8).
-J
The optimization problem occurs in two stages . Before the individual falls ill, the 
first stage is for him to determine the utility-maximizing consumption of medical care 
and other goods in the event of illness, assuming that the coinsurance rate is 
exogenous. In the second stage, the individual chooses the rate of coinsurance that 
maximizes his expected utility, taking this established behaviour into account (the 
existence of ex post moral hazard).
In the first stage the consumer optimizes his demand for medical care in the event that 
he becomes ill. His income in the ill state is given by:
y s = W +  c)* m (A. 9).
He then chooses the quantity of medical care that satisfies the necessary first-order 
condition:
du: = usm[m,ys] - c * u y [m,ys] = 0 (A.10).
dm
Based on this condition, we can derive the demand function for medical care4:
m = m(c) with m(o) = m* (A. 11).
3 This is in line with the model presented in Zweifel and Breyer (1997).
4 This follows from assumption 2A.3.
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To find the relationship between medical expenditures and the coinsurance rate, we
totally differentiate with respect to m and c and solve for , yielding: 
dm dc
r dus '  
y dm j
d2us d 2us —dm +  dc - 0  (A. 12).
dm dmdc
Solving for —  results in: 
dc
,  d 2u s/  
dm / dmdc
dc d 2u /
/ d m 2
The numerator can be written as:
d2u s
(A. 13).
dmdc
= - u smy*m + c * u syy- u y <0 (A. 14).
d 2ns dm
The negative value o f  (the numerator of — ) follows from assumptions 2A.5
dmdc dc
(usmy > o) and 2A.2: (w^ < 0 and uy > o).
The denominator can be written as:
aV
dm
2 = “L - 2 * c * K y +c1*u ,y),< 0  (A. 15).
d2 us dmThe negative sign o f  — (the denominator of — ) follows from assumptions 2A. 3
dm dc
(<„ < o), 2A.5 f a  > o), and 2A.2 f a  < o).
Overall, based on the signs of the numerator and the denominator, < 0. In other
dc
words, decreasing the coinsurance rate increases the utility-maximizing individual’s 
demand for medical care in the event of illness (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997).
Once the consumer has determined his optimal choice of medical care based on an 
exogenous coinsurance rate, he enters the second stage of optimization where he finds 
the value of c that maximizes his expected utility. This optimization problem occurs 
ex ante, so that his expected utility is based on the possibilities of being healthy or ill:
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EU(c)  =  n * us\m(c\W - p ( c ) - c  *m(c)]+ (l - n ) * u h[09W — p (c ) ]
(A. 16).
Given that l(m)  =  ( l  - c ) * m  the premium depends on the coinsurance rate. The next 
step in the process is for the individual to maximize his expected utility subject to the 
coinsurance rate:
dEU
dc
= n * u sm * m ' (c ) -n * u y *[jpl( c ) + c * / w ,( c ) + 7 w ( c ) ] - ( l - 7 t ) * « *  *P'(c)
(A. 17).
Solving for u sm yields: 
dm
S  ale Ju„ = c u , (A. 18).
This can be substituted into the consumer’s utility maximization problem and 
collecting terms results in:
P'(c)* + ( \-7r)*uhy }= -7 t*usy * m{c)
Substituting for fi'(c)5 and solving for c, the final equation is:
(A. 19).
m'(c)
1 - + 1
-  m(c)
(A.20).
The expression — ^ m u s t  be positive because m(c) is positive and because the 
m\c)
earlier analysis demonstrated that < 0. Additionally, since
dc
0 < < 1 we conclude that the optimal rate of coinsurance is
5 Assuming that there is no loading, the expression for the premium is: 
p (c ) = 71 * (l -  c) * m(c), where 
p '(c )  =  n * {(l - c ) * m ' ( c ) -  m (c)} .
Note that m'(c) is from equation (A. 13).
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positive6.
Based on equation (A.20), we observe that an increase in the health risk (71) translates 
into an increase in the optimal coinsurance rate. This causes n  * uy + (l -7 t )* u hy to
increase. In tu rn ,-----------— r— -  increases, and thus the optimal coinsurance rate
7r*usy +(l-7r)*uhy
must rise (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997).
6 The proof is as follows:
u y =  ( t t  + 1  — t t )  * Uy = n * u y + { i - n ) * u sy
if U sy <  Uy (assumption 2A.4), then u y <  7T * u sy +  (l — 7 t ) *  u y
Ksince u s >  0 (assumption 2A.2), 0 < ------------7---- r—r- <  1 .msy+\l-7ryy
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Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 3
This appendix provides supplementary information to Chapter 3. The first section of 
the appendix covers the main study classifications, for instance experimental/non- 
experimental and cross-sectional/time-series/panel data. The subsequent sections 
provide details of the literature that has covered the relationship between cost sharing 
and other outcome variables besides the use of prescription drugs. Total expenditures 
and health are two examples of other outcome variables. This description gives the 
reader an idea of what type of research has been previously performed in the area. The 
final portion of the appendix provides more detailed information the specific papers 
that were considered in the literature review.
B .l. The importance of different study classifications
The studies that have investigated cost sharing for a range of medical services can be 
classified into different types: experimental versus non-experimental, cross-sectional 
versus time series versus panel, and regression versus non-regression. There are 
advantages and disadvantages to each classification, and this section discusses these 
considerations.
In terms of experimental and non-experimental studies, experimental research first 
attempts decontextualize a single question from a "real world" scenario, studies it 
under controlled conditions, and then tries to recontextualize the results back on the 
"real world" scenario. One of the main advantages of this type of research is that it 
helps overcome problems with self selection, where certain individuals have a greater 
tendency to enter into specific groups. For instance, within the health insurance 
market, individuals that are older and sicker are more likely to seek health insurance.
A major disadvantage with experimental research is that these experiments are costly 
and require careful design as poorly designed experiments may have few advantages 
over non-experimental data. Moreover, because the cost of gathering experimental 
data is so high, these experiments may be limited to certain regions or subpopulations, 
and the results may not be generalizable to other populations.
Perhaps because of the prohibitive cost, most available datasets are non-experimental. 
The main problem with non-experimental methods is the lack of control over the 
situation, particularly in regards to self selection. Within this classification of methods, 
some studies are natural and some are observational. A natural study is one where the 
researcher has data for a group of individuals when a specific event has occurred. For 
instance, the researcher may have data on individuals in the UK from before and after 
an increase in prescription charges. The advantage of this design is that the researcher 
can quantify the impact of a specific policy change, although difficulties with natural 
datasets often occur if more than one policy or insurance change occurred 
simultaneously and if there were no individuals unaffected by the change. 
Observational studies track respondents in the absence of a specific event. In this case, 
the researcher might examine how insurance influences consumption over a given 
period of time. While this type of data allows the researcher to examine general
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changes in out-of-pocket prices or a snapshot of consumption, the difficulty with 
observational studies is that unobserved heterogeneity may affect the results, and the 
researcher may be unable to ascertain how specific changes in the price or level of 
insurance would affect the sample.
The collection of data can occur at one period in time (cross-sectional data) or over a 
period of time (panel and time-series data). The difference between panel and time- 
series data is that panel datasets follow the same individual over a number of time 
periods, while time-series data are typically at the aggregate level. There are a number 
of problems with cross-sectional datasets, one of these being omitted variable bias, 
which can lead to biased coefficients and standard errors (Hsiao, 2003). Omitted 
variable bias occurs when there are one or more variables that the researcher cannot 
obtain, and these variables influence the dependent variable. These factors might 
differ between various individuals but are constant over time. Additionally, these 
variables might be constant over various individuals but differ over time. The 
advantage of time-series data is that researchers can track changes over time, but the 
problem is that individual information is lost at the aggregate level.
Panel data allow the researcher to control for unobserved heterogeneity by examining 
changes in the left-hand side variable over time. Another advantage is the ability to 
better assess the dynamics of change (Hsiao, 2003); for instance, the probability of 
participation in an event may fluctuate over time. A cross-sectional snapshot of 
participation may imply that involvement is static as some individuals always 
participate in the event and others never participate. Meanwhile, a time-series analysis 
of participation may indicate that an individual has a probability of participation at 
any given moment in time and turnover may be frequent. A panel data approach 
allows the researcher to discriminate between these two possibilities and assess 
involvement using participation history and the probability of participation during 
certain periods of the life cycle, the business cycle, or other spans of time.
Another main distinction in the literature occurs between papers that use regression 
techniques and papers that only use descriptive analysis. Descriptive analysis allows 
the researcher to investigate whether certain groups differ significantly according to 
some criteria. For example, the researcher can test whether some groups obtain more 
prescription drugs than others. However, there are advantages to using regression 
analysis over simpler statistical modeling. Regression analyses can sometimes handle 
a large number of predictive factors simultaneously. Regression analysis also allows 
the researcher to investigate the influence of one specific variable, while holding the 
influence of all other variables constant. For instance, low-income respondents tend to 
be less healthy than wealthy individuals, and regression analysis allows the researcher 
to control for health and wealth.
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B.2. Literature covering cost sharing for medical care
B.2.1. Medical care: the effect of cost sharing on total expenditures
Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3 provided an overview of the literature on the effect of cost 
sharing for medical care on the number of goods and services purchased. While there 
is a general consensus among researchers that this relationship is negative, an 
extension to this question is whether this reduction in volume is accompanied by a 
reduction in overall medical expenditures. Expenditures are determined by both a 
price effect and the volume effect where the price effect can be manifested in a 
number of ways. One issue is that under coinsurance regimes, lower-priced treatments 
will be less expensive for consumers. However, under certain systems such as co­
payments and deductibles (if the consumer is near the deductible level), consumers 
may have no interest in being price conscious as all treatments may cost the same. 
Moreover, over a period of time, individuals tend to trade up to newer and more 
expensive treatments, causing expenditures to rise despite the existence of co­
payments. Thus, the hypothesis is that cost sharing will decrease expenditure growth 
through the volume effect and potentially through the price effect, but in the long run, 
cost sharing may not quell the rise in medical expenditures.
There were a number of papers which used individual-level data from the United 
States and the Netherlands and household-level data from Canada to study the impact 
of user fees or insurance on medical expenditures. The results of these papers are 
listed in Appendix Table B. 1.
Across Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States, user fees for medical care had 
the same effect. Whether the user fees were in the form of co-payment, coinsurance 
rates, deductibles, or some other form, higher out-of-pocket costs reduced medical 
expenditures.
Appendix Table B. 1. Medical care: cost sharing and total health care expenditures
Variable Expenditures Studies
Co-payment - Fahs (1992) [US, NS, CD, R]
Coinsurance -
Duan et al. (1983) [US, ES, CD, R]; Manning et al. (1981) [US, ES, CD,
R]; Manning et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, R]; Newhouse (1981) [US, ES, CD, 
R]; Newhouse (1993) [US, ES, CD, R]
Deductible - Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R]; Van Vliet (2004) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Mixed system -
Eichner (1998) [US, OS, CD, R]; Smart and Stabile (2005) [CA, NS, CD, 
R]
Insurance coverage 
Primary (vs. none) + Christensen et al. (1987) [US, OS, CD, R]
Public primary (vs. none) + Cartwright et al. (1992) [US, OS, CD, R]
Country: CA = Canada; NE = The Netherlands; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques
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B.2.2. Medical care: the expenditure elasticity of demand
As our primary interest in this thesis is the price elasticity of demand for prescription 
drugs, we reported the price elasticity of demand for medical care in Section 3.3.2 of 
Chapter 3 to provide a broad comparator. Other researchers have been concerned with 
the expenditure elasticity of demand given that policymakers are interested in 
containing medical care budgets, and cost sharing is one tool for achieving this 
outcome. Appendix Table B.2 lists the main expenditure elasticities that have been 
found in the literature.
All of the analyses found the expenditure elasticity of demand for medical care to be 
less than -0.30. With the exception of the estimate from Smart and Stabile (2005), the 
other estimates were within a relatively small range (-0.14 to -0.04), implying that at 
least in these settings and using the given statistical techniques, patients appear to be 
relatively insensitive to changes in the price of medical care.
Appendix Table B. 2. Medical care: the expenditure elasticity o f demand
Study Type of cost sharing Expenditure elasticity
Phelps and Newhouse (1974) [US, OS, CD, NR] Coinsurance -0 .12a to -0 .04a
Smart and Stabile (2005) [CA, NS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.28
Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R] Deductible -0.08
Van Vliet (2004) [NE, OS, CD, R] Deductible -0.14
“unadjusted elasticity estimate (no regression used)
Country: CA = Canada; NE = The Netherlands; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel
data model
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
B.2.3. Medical care: the effect of cost sharing on health
The literature has established that cost sharing reduces both volume and expenditures, 
at least in the short-run, but another important consideration is how user fees shape 
health outcomes. If cost sharing leads to worse health outcomes, there may be an 
increase in long-run costs if patients delay care and eventually need more expensive 
care, such as emergency room visits and inpatient stays.
A number of studies using individual-level data from the United States have 
investigated the relationship between these two variables. The different 
subpopulations investigated include: children, adults, the non-elderly, non-elderly 
adults, the elderly, the near elderly, and women. These samples also included 
individuals with various health problems, including hypertension, colectoral cancer, 
lung cancer, breast cancer, and prostate cancer. Although there are papers that have 
investigated other specific health outcomes, most of the literature in this area has
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considered mortality as the main outcome. A summary of the main results is available 
in Appendix Table B.3.
Appendix Table B. 3. Medical care: cost sharing and health outcomes
Variable Health Outcome Effect Studies
Coinsurance mortality + Brook et al. (1983) [US, ES, CD, R]
Insurance coverage 
Primary (vs. none) mortality -
Franks et al. (1993) [US, OS, SA, R]; McDavid et al.
(2003) [US, OS, CD/SA, R]; McWilliams et al. (2004) 
[US, OS, CD/SA, R]
Public primary (vs. private) mortality + McDavid et al. (2003) [US, OS, CD/SA, R]
Co-payment overall health - Lurie et al. (1984) [US, NS, CD, NR]
Coinsurance overall health 0 Valdez (1986) [US, ES, CD, R]
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) overall health + Baker et al. (2001) [US, OS, CD, R]
Co-payment blood pressure + Lurie et al. (1984) [US, NS, CD, NR]
Coinsurance blood pressure +
Brook et al. (1983) [US, ES, CD, R]; Keeler et al. (1985) 
[US, ES, CD, NR); Manning et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, 
R]; Newhouse (1993) [US, ES, CD, R]
Coinsurance hemoglobin
levels
+ Keeler et al. (1985) [US, ES, CD, NR]
Coinsurance vision -
Brook et al. (1983) [US, ES, CD, R]; Lurie et al. (1989) 
[US, ES, CD, NR]; Newhouse (1993) [US, ES, CD, R]
Country: US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; OS = observational study
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model; SA = survival analysis model 
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
Only one study (Brook et al., 1983) considered how a specific form of cost sharing 
influences mortality, and the authors determined that individuals with no coinsurance 
in the RAND experiment had a lower risk of dying, although the authors mainly 
attributed this fact to the lower blood pressure that the free plan group achieved. Not 
surprisingly, the existence of primary insurance coverage as opposed to no insurance 
improved mortality outcomes, but a more interesting finding was that beneficiaries of 
public insurance coverage had worse mortality outcomes than those with private 
insurance. If this is the case, it is perhaps indicative of access and quality problems 
within public insurance. Both studies that found this result regarding public insurance 
examined a sample of cancer patients. Yet, neither controlled for the possible scenario 
where individuals with less severe forms of cancer are unable to obtain private health 
insurance and must obtain public coverage if possible or go without health coverage.
Of the few papers that considered the relationship between cost sharing and overall 
health, all except for Valdez (1986) found that higher user fees led to a decline in 
overall health and insurance coverage had the opposite effect. Valdez (1986) found no
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significant relationship between coinsurance and overall health, although his sample 
consisted of children. Given that child health is often considered of utmost importance 
(Sundelin and Hakansson, 2000) and that guardians are typically making decisions on 
behalf of children, this may be a reason for the Valdez (1986) result.
Otherwise, there were only a few specific health outcomes where researchers found 
that cost sharing had an influence. Specifically, higher levels of cost sharing often led 
to higher blood pressure, higher hemoglobin levels, and worsening vision.
B.2.4. Inpatient care: the effect of cost sharing on expenditures
In contrast to other forms of medical care, consumers of inpatient services may have 
less control over the types of care they receive. Inpatient procedures are generally 
more complex than physician services, and patients may not be conscious enough to 
choose the type of care they are receiving. Although many inpatient procedures are set 
before the patient enters the hospital, and in these situations patients may have more 
discretion over the cost of services they receive. Furthermore, there is a question of 
whether cost sharing can dampen long-run expenditures given advances in medical 
technology, which are often expensive. It is for these reasons that a number of 
researchers have considered the relationship between user fees and inpatient 
expenditures. Appendix Table B.4 lists the results from the literature that has 
examined this area1.
Scheffler (1984) determined that increased levels of cost sharing decreased hospital 
expenditures, while Van Vliet (2001) found that higher deductibles reduced inpatient 
expenditures among privately insured beneficiaries in the Netherlands. Phelps (1975) 
considered the quality adjusted out-of-pocket price (based on coinsurance rates) and 
reached the same conclusion regarding hospital expenses per admission. However, all 
of these papers used cross-sectional data techniques, and there is a question of 
whether individuals adjust to changes in the out-of-pocket price over time and 
whether they shift to newer, more expensive treatments.
Appendix Table B.4. Inpatient care: cost sharing and inpatient expenditures
Variable Expenditures Studies
Coinsurance - Phelps (1975) [US, OS, CD, R]
Deductible - Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Mixed system - Scheffler (1984) [US, NS, CD, R]
Country: NE = the Netherlands; US = United States 
Type o f  study: NS = natural study; OS = observational study 
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model 
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques
1 While Phelps (1975) considered hospital expenses per admission, Scheffler (1984) and Van Vliet 
(2001) considered overall hospital expenditures
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B.2.5. Inpatient care: the expenditure elasticity of demand
Although the price elasticity of demand is the primary variable of interest in this 
dissertation, researchers have also been concerned with the expenditure elasticity of 
demand for inpatient services. Appendix Table B.5 lists some of the expenditure 
elasticity estimates from the literature.
Appendix Table B. 5. Inpatient care: the expenditure elasticity o f demand
Study Type o f cost sharing Expenditure elasticity
Newhouse and Phelps (1976) [US, OS, 
CD, R] Mixed system -0.30
Phelps and Newhouse (1974) [US, NS, 
CD, R] Coinsurance
-0.08 to -0 .04
Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R] Deductibles -0.01
Country: US = United States
Type o f  study: NS = natural study; OS = observational study 
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model 
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques
The expenditure elasticity values for inpatient care (-0.30 to -0.01) appear to be in the 
same range as the expenditure elasticity values for medical care, indicating that 
patients are relatively insensitive to changes in the out-of-pocket prices of hospital 
care.
B.2.6. Inpatient care: the effect of cost sharing on health
In addition to examining the relationship between cost sharing and inpatient use, a 
few papers have considered the association between inpatient user fees and health 
outcomes. Health is of particular interest as policymakers aim to maximize population 
health given a budget constraint, and a policy that decreases health outcomes may not 
contribute to this goal. There are a few studies that have examined mortality among 
patients that received hospital care, and all of these studies found that uninsured 
individuals had higher rates of total mortality (Yergan et al., 1988; Young and Cohen, 
1991) and inpatient mortality (Haas and Goldman, 1994; Hadley et al., 1991; Young 
and Cohen, 1991) than individuals with some form of insurance, whether that 
insurance was Medicare only, fee-for-service, HMO, or any form of insurance. Thus, 
it appears that insurance does lead to better health outcomes.
B.2.7. Physician and outpatient care: the effect of cost sharing on expenditures
The literature on physician and outpatient expenditures is less extensive than the 
literature on the volume of services purchased. Van Vliet (2001) and Van Vliet (2004) 
used individual-level data aggregated to the policy level to investigate the impact of 
differing deductible levels on physician visits in the Netherlands. Both papers found
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that higher deductibles, particularly deductibles above 100 Dfl, led to fewer physician 
visits.
B.2.8. Physician and outpatient care: the expenditure elasticity of demand
In addition to the price elasticity of demand, another variable of interest in the 
literature has been the expenditure elasticity of demand as this provides information 
on the combined effect of volume and price. A number of papers have considered this 
outcome variable, and Appendix Table B.6 provides an overview of the literature on 
the expenditure elasticity of demand.
Appendix Table B.6. Physician and outpatient care: the expenditure elasticity o f  
demand
Study Type of cost sharing Expenditure elasticity (doctor visits)
Phelps and Newhouse (1974) [US, 
NS, CD, R] Coinsurance -0.14
Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R] Deductible -0.09 to -0.07
Van Vliet (2004) [NE, OS, CD, R] Deductible -0.40
“calculated by this author using the arc elasticity formula:
e ,  = ((e 2- a  ) / ( & + a  M r ,
Country: NE = The Netherlands; US = United States
Type o f  study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study 
Type o f  model used for analysis: CD = cross-sectional model 
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques
The results from the literature indicate that the expenditure elasticity of demand varies 
according to the context of the study. The reason for the large elasticity estimate from 
Van Vliet (2004) is likely due to health care in the Netherlands, which operates on a 
system of referrals. The patient has the largest and most direct effect on the number of 
visits to his chosen GP, and thus he is likely to be more sensitive to changes in the 
prices of physician services. In an earlier paper Van Vliet (2001) found a much lower 
value for GP elasticity, but the author indicates in Van Vliet (2004) that this was 
likely due to his inability to distinguish specific deductible levels in the 2001 paper.
B.2.9. Physician and outpatient care: the effect of cost sharing on health
We did not identify any studies that examined the impact of cost sharing for physician 
or outpatient services on health outcomes.
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B.3. Literature covering cost sharing for prescription drugs
B.3.1. Prescription drugs: the effect of cost sharing on the probability of
prescription drug use
The factors which induce an individual to purchase at least one prescription in a given 
time period may be different from the factors which determine the number of 
prescriptions he consumes. Additionally, there is a question of whether the primary 
effect of cost sharing is to deter the probability of any use or to reduce the 
consumption of prescriptions. This possibility has led some studies to consider sample 
selection issues and estimate the volume of prescription drugs obtained conditioned 
upon an individual having consumed at least one prescription. Other studies have 
attempted to determine whether cost sharing deters the individual from consumption 
altogether. The results of these papers are listed in Appendix Table B.7.
Appendix Table B. 7. Prescription drugs: the effect o f cost sharing on the probability 
o f obtaining a prescription drug
Variable Probability of drug use Studies
Co-payment -
Esposito (2002)1 [[US, OS, CD, R]; Gardner et al. (1996) [NZ, OS, 
CD, NR]; Hillman et al. (1999) [US, OS, CD, R]; Stuart and Zacker
(1999) [US, OS, CD, R]; W att et al. (1992) [NZ, OS, CD, NR]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 
2-tiers) - Huskamp et al. (2005a) [US, NS, CD, R];
Coinsurance - Lohr et al. (1986) [US, ES, CD, NR]
Deductible - Blais et al. (1999) [CA, NS, TD, R]
Mixed system -
Goldman et al. (2004) [US, OS, CD, R]; Ozminkowski et al. (2004) 
[US, OS, CD, R]; Smart and Stabile (2005) [CA, NS, CD, R]
Change from:
deductible and coinsurance to 
income-based deductible - Kozyrskyj et al. (2001) [CA, NS, CD, R]
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) + Smith and Garner (1974) [US, NS, CD, NR]
Supplementary (vs. none) +
Adams et al. (2001) [US, OS, CD, R]; Blustein (2000) [US, OS, CD, 
R]; Caussat and Glaude (1993) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Coulson and Stuart 
(1995) [US, OS, CD, R]; Genier et al. (1997) [FR, OS, CD, R]; 
Grignon and Perronin (2003) [FR, NS, CD, R]; Raynaud (2002) [FR, 
OS, CD, R]; Raynaud (2005) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Stuart and Grana 
(1995) [US, OS, CD, R]
Supplementary (vs. none) 0 Christiansen et al. (2002) [DK, OS, CD, R]
Supplementary public (vs. 
private)
+ Raynaud (2002) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Raynaud (2005) [FR, OS, CD, R]
This study examined the probability o f  using a specific statin compared to the probability o f using 
other statins when there were differing co-payments for each statin
Country: CA = Canada; DK = Denmark; FR = France; NZ = New Zealand; US = United States 
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study 
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model 
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
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Every paper found either that individuals who faced user fees were less likely to use 
prescription drugs or that those with health insurance were more likely to use them. 
The co-payments studied ranged in price from $0-$3 to about $10, and co-insurance 
rates ranged from 0 percent to 95 percent. Esposito (2002) also found that when there 
were differential co-payments for different statins, which ranged in price from $0 to 
$52.51, patients in the US were more likely to choose the least expensive option.
Two studies compared prescription drug consumption among individuals facing a 
change in their cost sharing regime (Huskamp et al., 2005a; Kozyrskyj et al., 2001). 
Kozyrskyj et al.(2001) found that when the Canadian province of Manitoba changed 
from a CDN $237 deductible and a 40 percent coinsurance rate to an income-based 
deductible (families with income below CDN $15,000 faced a lower deductible) with 
0 percent coinsurance above the deductible, there was no adjustment in consumption 
among low-income children, but consumption decreased for higher-income children. 
This result was not surprising in that the income-based deductible probably increased 
the out-of-pocket burden for higher-income respondents, but it appears that the 
existence of a deductible was still a deterrent for low-income groups, even if the 
deductible was lower than before. Additionally, Huskamp et al. (2005a) considered a 
group of children with attention-deficit disorder that faced a simultaneous change 
from a one-tier to a three-tier formulary and an across-the-board co-payment increase. 
Not surprisingly, the authors found that the probability of consumption decreased 
after the co-payment change.
B.3.2. Prescription drugs: the effect of cost sharing on prescription drug
expenditures
Although volume is clearly influenced by higher cost sharing requirements, 
policymakers are also interested in the impact of user fees on the drug budget. One 
issue is that under coinsurance regimes, generics are cheaper than brand-name drugs 
for consumers, and patients may switch to generic alternatives. Another consideration 
is that co-payments can be tiered so that generics and other preferred drugs (generally 
based on negotiations with manufacturers) are cheaper than non-preferred brand-name 
drugs. Although both of these policy options may decrease volume, it is likely that 
some consumers will switch to cheaper alternatives instead of foregoing prescriptions. 
Moreover, over a period of time, patients often trade up to newer and more expensive 
treatments (and new medicines widen the treatment population), causing expenditures 
to rise despite the existence of co-payments. The overall message from this discussion 
is that cost sharing will likely lead to lower expenditures in the short-run, but the 
long-run effect is unclear. See Appendix Table B.8 for the literature that has 
examined expenditures for prescription drugs.
Most studies found that higher cost sharing lowered prescription drug expenditures, 
although Grootendorst (1997) determined that the provision of enhanced drug 
coverage for older people in British Columbia, Canada had no effect on prescription 
drug expenditures. However, this result may have been related to the construction of 
the data as the author could only control for the sickest respondents in the earliest year 
of the sample (Grootendorst, 1997). Individuals who faced a three-tier formulary
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instead of a two-tier formulary also had lower expenditures, likely because these 
respondents switched to the lower-priced therapeutic alternatives in the first tier.
Appendix Table B.8. Prescription drugs: the effect o f cost sharing on prescription 
drug expenditures
Variable Expenditures Studies
Co-payment -
Atella (2000) [IT, OS, CD, R]; Hanau and Rizzi (1986) [IT, NS, TD, R]; 
Joyce et al. (2002) [US, OS, CD, R]; Lurk et al. (2004) [US, NS, CD, R]; 
Reeder and Nelson (1985) [US, NS, TD, R]; Smith (1993) [US, OS, CD, 
R]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- 
or 2-tiers) -
Fairman et al. (2003) [US, NS, CD, R]; Gibson et al. (2005) [US, NS, PD, 
R]; Huskamp et al. (2003) [US, NS, CD, R]; Huskamp et al. (2005a) [US, 
NS, CD, R]; Motheral and Fairman (2001) [US, NS, CD, R]; Kamal- 
Bahl and Briesacher (2004) [US, OS, CD, R]; Motheral and Henderson
(1999) [US, NS, CD, R]; Thomas et al. (2002) [US, OS, CD, NR]
Coinsurance -
Alignon and Grignon (1997) [FR, OS, CD, NR]; Almarsd6ttir et al.
(2000) [IC, NS, TD, R]; Klaukka et al. (1993) [FI, NS, CD, R]; Liebowitz 
et al. (1985) [US, ES, CD, R]; Newhouse (1993) [US, ES, CD, R]
Deductible - Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R]; Van Vliet (2004) [NE, OS, CD, R]
Mixed system -
Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, R]; Smart and Stabile (2005) 
[CA, NS, CD, R]; Thomas et al. (2002) [US, OS, CD, NR]
Mixed system 0 Grootendorst (1997) [CA, NS, PD, R]
Change from
co-payment to 
coinsurance - Contayannis et al. (2005) [CA, NS, CD, R]
coinsurance to deductible 
and coinsurance - Contayannis et al. (2005) [CA, NS, CD, R]
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) +
Artz et al. (2002) [US, OS, CD, R]; Danzon and Pauly (2002) [US, OS, 
CD, NR]; Gianfrancesco et al. (1994) [US, NS, CD, NR]; Smith and 
Garner (1974) [US, NS, CD, NR]
Supplementary (vs. none) +
Davis et al. (1999) [US, OS, CD, NR]; Dourgnon and Semet (2002) [FR, 
OS, CD, R]; Federman eta l. (2001) [US, OS, CD, R]; Lillard et al. (1999) 
[US, OS, CD, R]; Long (1994) [US, OS, CD, R]; Poisal and Murray 
(2001) [US, OS, CD, NR]; Raynaud (2003) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Raynaud 
(2005) [FR, OS, CD, R]; Stuart et al. (2000) [US, OS, CD, R]; W eeks 
(1973) [US, NS, CD, NR]
Supplementary (vs. none) + Yang et al. (2004) [US, OS, CD, R]
Supplementary (vs. none) 0 Grignon and Perronin (2003) [FR, NS, CD, R]
Public supplementary (vs. 
private)
+ Raynaud (2003) [FR, OS, CD, R]
Prescription limit - Soumerai et al. (1994) [US, NS, TD, R]
Country: CA = Canada; FI = Finland; FR = France; IC = Iceland; IT = Italy; NE = The Netherlands; 
US = United States
Type o f study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model
Type o f  statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
Contayannis et al. (2005) considered the effect of changing from one cost sharing 
regime to another based on two separate policy changes in Quebec, Canada; the first 
was a change from a CDN $2 co-payment to 25 percent co-insurance up to CDN $25
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maximum per prescription and the second was the addition of a deductible. After both 
policy changes, the authors observed a decrease in prescription drug expenditures.
Although having any form of insurance coverage (as opposed to none) had the 
expected effect on expenditures, there were other interesting findings related to 
specific types of insurance coverage. For example, we might expect Medicaid 
beneficiaries to have higher prescription drug expenditures than others because 
income and health tend to be correlated (Macinko et al., 2003). However, Medicaid 
recipients were found to have lower prescription drug expenditures than individuals 
wi|th Medicare only (Yang et al., 2004), perhaps due to cost containment measures 
imposed by Medicaid, such as prescription restrictions and the use of formularies.
B.3.3. Prescription drugs: the effect of cost sharing on out-of-pocket drug
expenditures
Another dependent variable that the literature considered was out-of-pocket 
prescription drug expenditures. We would expect higher levels of cost sharing to 
place a greater economic burden on individuals by increasing their out-of-pocket 
expenditures. However, rising out-of-pocket expenditures may in turn cause patients 
to lower their use of prescription drugs, so the net effect of cost sharing on out-of- 
pocket prescription drug expenditures could be positive or negative (see Appendix 
Table B.9).
Appendix Table B. 9. Prescription drugs: the effect o f cost sharing on out-of-pocket 
drug expenditures
Variable Out-of-pocket expenses Studies
Co-payment + Lurk et al. (2004) [US, NS, CD, R], Stuart and Zacker (1999) [US, OS, CD, R]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) +
Huskamp et al. (2005a) [US, NS, CD, R]; 
Huskamp et al. (2005b) [US, NS, CD, R]; Kamal- 
Bahl and Briesacher (2004) [US, OS, CD, R]
Insurance coverage
Supplementary (vs. none) -
Alan et al. (2002) [CS, OS, CD, R]; Alan et al.
(2003) [CS, OS, CD, R); Alan et al. (2005) [CS, 
OS, CD, R]; Blustein (2000) [US, OS, CD, R]; 
Federman et al. (2001) [US, OS, CD, R]
Reimbursement limit + Tseng et al. (2003) [US, OS, CD, NR]
Country: CA = Canada; US = United States
Type o f study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study 
Type o f data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
Stuart and Zacker (1999) found that Medicaid recipients living in states where 
Medicaid required co-payments ($0.50 to $3) had lower overall out-of-pocket costs 
for prescription drugs. However, the study was not able to control for restrictions that
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Medicaid might place on recipients, such as limits on the number of prescriptions per 
month, which might explain lower out-of-pocket spending in states with co-payments. 
Other researchers (Blustein, 2000; Federman et al., 2001) showed that individuals 
with insurance coverage in addition to Medicare had lower levels of out-of-pocket 
spending. In addition, Alan et al. (2003) found that the introduction of additional 
insurance coverage lowered the proportion of an individual’s budget spent on 
prescription drugs for older Canadian households with low and high levels of out-of- 
pocket spending on prescription drugs. The same authors confirmed this result in a 
later study (Alan et al., 2005) but also found that among non-elderly households, the 
introduction of drug benefit programs lowered out-of-pocket spending on prescription 
drugs more for low-income households than for high-income households.
B.3.4. Prescription drugs: the expenditure elasticity of demand
The expenditure elasticity of demand is another variable of interest from the literature, 
and Appendix Table B. 10 provides information on the limited number of studies that 
have considered this outcome variable.
Appendix Table B.10. Prescription drugs: the expenditure elasticity o f demand
Study Type of cost sharing Expenditure elasticity
Contayannis et al. (2005) [CA, NS, CD, R] Change from co-payment to coinsurance -0.16 t o -0.12
Klick and Stratmann (2005) [US, OS, CD, 
R]
Mixed system -1.07
Phelps and Newhouse (1972) [CA/UK, OS, 
CD, NR] Coinsurance -0.07
Smart and Stabile (2005) [CA, NS, CD, R] Mixed system -0.29 to -0.28
Van Vliet (2001) [NE, OS, CD, R] Deductible -0.06
Van Vliet (2004) [NE, OS, CD, R] Deductible -0.08
Country: CA = Canada; NE = The Netherlands; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States 
Type o f study: NS = natural study; OS = observational study 
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
The expenditure elasticity results range from an elastic -1.07 to an inelastic -0.06. 
The elastic estimate from Klick and Stratmann (2005) was unusually high, although 
this may have been due to the fact that their sample was restricted to the most price 
sensitive group of the elderly (those without Medicaid or employer-sponsored health 
insurance). In general, it appears that the expenditure elasticity is relatively low and 
close to the range of expenditure elasticity values found for medical care, physician 
visits, and inpatient visits.
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B.3.5. Prescription drugs: the effect of cost sharing on the use of substitutes and 
complements
As discussed in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3, the literature has established that cost 
sharing for prescription drugs reduces consumption of prescription drugs. Yet, another 
question that remains to be discussed is whether user fees influence the use of other 
goods or services related to prescription drugs. There may be health implications if 
patients substitute less effective forms of care such as over-the-counter drugs for 
prescription drugs, and there may be expenditure implications if consumers opt for 
more expensive forms of care such as inpatient stays. A number of articles focused on 
the relationship between cost sharing for prescription drugs and the demand for 
substitutes or complements (over-the-counter drugs, physician visits, inpatient visits, 
emergency mental health services, and nursing homes). Appendix Table B.l 1 outlines 
the literature in this area.
Appendix Table B.l 1. Prescription drugs: the effect o f cost sharing on the use o f  
substitutes and complements
Good/service
affected Variable Effect Study
Coinsurance - Liebowitz (1989) [US, ES, CD, R]
Insurance coverage
OTC drugs Supplementary (vs. none) + Caussat and Glaude (1993) [FR, OS, CD, R]
Supplementary (vs. none) - Stuart and Grana (1995) [US, OS, CD, R]
Prescription limit + Cox et al. (2001) [US, OS, CD, R]
Co-payment -
Anis et al. (2005) [CA, OS, PD, R]; Balkrishnan et al.
(2001) [US, NS, PD, R]; Lauterbach et al. (2000) [DE, 
OS, CD, R]; Winkelmann (2004a) [DE, NS, PD, R]; 
Winkelmann (2004b) [DE, NS, CD, R]
Co-payment 0 Gardner et al. (1997) [US, NS, TD, R]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 
2-tiers) 0 Motheral and Fairman (2001) [US, NS, CD, R]
physician services Mixed system + Li et al. (2006) [CA, NS, PD, R]
Change from 
coinsurance to deductible 
and coinsurance 0 Pilote et al. (2002) [CA, NS, CD, R]
Insurance coverage 
Public Supplementary (vs. 
private)
+ Raynaud (2005) [FR, OS, CD, R]
Reimbursement limit - Hsu et al. (2006) [US, OS, PD, R]
Co-payment + Balkrishnan et al. (2001) [US, NS, PD, R]
outpatient
services
Insurance coverage 
Public supplementary (vs. 
none)
+ Raynaud (2005) [FR, OS, CD, R]
inpatient services Co-payment +
Anis et al. (2005) [CA, OS, PD, R]; Atella et al. (2005) 
[IT, NS, CD, R], Balkrishnan et al. (2001) [US, NS, PD, 
R]
Co-payment 0 Gardner et al. (1997) [US, NS, TD, R]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 
2-tiers) 0
Motheral and Fairman (2001) [US, NS, CD, R]
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Good/service
affected Variable Effect Study
Insurance coverage 
Supplementary (vs. none) . Schoen et al. (2001) [US, NS, CD, NR]
Public supplementary 
drug (vs. private) - Lingle et al. (1987) [US, OS, CD, R]
Prescription limit + Soumerai et al. (1994) [US, NS, TD, R]
Prescription limit 0 Soumerai et al. (1991) [US, NS, TD, R]
Reimbursement limit + Hsu et al. (2006) [US, OS, PD, R]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1-or 
2-tiers) 0 Motheral and Fairman (2001) [US, NS, CD, R]
Mixed system + Tamblyn et al. (2001) [CA, NS, TD, R]
ER visits
Change from 
co-payment to deductible 
and coinsurance
+ Tamblyn et al. (2001) [CA, NS, TD, R]
coinsurance to deductible 
and coinsurance 0 Pilote et al. (2002) [CA, NS, CD, R]
Reimbursement limit + Hsu et al. (2006) [US, OS, PD, R]
emergency mental 
health services Prescription limit
+ Soumerai et al. (1994) [US, NS, TD, R]
nursing home 
admissions
Prescription limit + Soumerai et al. (1991) [US, NS, TD, R]
Country: CA = Canada; DE = Germany; FR = France; IT = Italy; US = United States
Type o f study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
As the use of prescription drugs requires a doctor’s prescription, in most cases we 
would expect prescription drug charges to decrease the use of doctors. One study 
found that a reimbursement limit did indeed lead to a reduction in doctor visits, three 
papers found that prescription drug charges had no effect on doctor visits, and one 
study found that they had a positive effect. However, two of the three studies finding 
no relationship between prescription drug charges and doctor visits examined 
situations in which user charges were designed to encourage the use o f lower-cost 
drugs through multi-tier formularies (Motheral and Fairman, 2001) or differential 
charges for generics and brand-name medications (Gardner et al., 1997). In the third 
of the three studies finding no relationship, the insignificant effect result may be 
explained by the fact that all of the study participants had experienced a heart attack, 
while those with lower incomes were afforded greater protection from prescription 
drug charges (Pilote et al., 2002). Consequently, this group was less likely to be 
sensitive to changes in price and, perhaps more likely to see the doctor for reasons 
other than to obtain a prescription. The positive result came from a sample of older 
people with rheumatoid arthritis (Li et al., 2006). As health insurance in Canada fully 
covers doctor visits, it is not surprising that some patients would substitute physician 
care for prescription drugs.
Researchers have obtained mixed results for OTC drugs. In the RAND experiment 
higher co-insurance rates lowered the probability of purchasing an OTC drug but after
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controlling for this, cost sharing had no effect on OTC expenditures (Liebowitz, 1989). 
Additional insurance coverage led to higher use of prescription drugs compared to 
OTC drugs in another US study (Stuart and Grana, 1995) but had the opposite effect 
in a French study (Caussat and Glaude, 1993). The French result probably differed 
because additional health insurance in France covers more than just prescription drugs, 
and as doctors often recommend the use of OTC drugs, increased OTC drug use may 
have been prompted by increased doctor visits. Having a limit on the number of free 
prescriptions an individual is allowed per month (a policy most often associated with 
Medicaid in the United States) positively influenced the quantity of OTC drugs used 
(Cox et al., 2001).
The results for outpatient, inpatient, and emergency care are more consistent. User 
charges designed to encourage the use of lower-cost drugs had no significant effect on 
the use of inpatient or emergency care. All except two studies found that prescription 
drug charges increased the use of outpatient, inpatient, and emergency care. Studies 
also found that prescription limits increased the frequency of partial hospitalisation 
(Soumerai et al., 1994), nursing home admissions (Soumerai et al., 1991), and 
emergency mental health services (Soumerai et al., 1994). The first study to find no 
effect was the one based on patients who had experienced a heart attack (outlined 
above) (Pilote et al., 2002). The authors of the second study suggested that their 
insignificant result for inpatient admissions might be due to the fact that the outcome 
variable they used (time to first hospital admission) would not highlight repeat 
hospital visits (Soumerai et al., 1991).
B.3.6. Prescription drugs: the effect of cost sharing on adherence to medications
The financial burden imposed by cost sharing may induce patients to adopt strategies 
that affect adherence to a particular treatment regime; for example, patients may cut 
pills in half or skip doses of medication. Appendix Table B.l 2 lists the results from 
the literature that focused on adherence to medication regimes.
Respondents were less likely to adhere to a treatment when faced with a co-payment 
even if the co-payment was relatively small (Poirier et al., 1998). Additionally, 
adherence was more of a problem for patients with a multi-tier formulary (vs. a two- 
tier formulary) (Landsman et al., 2005) or when patients purchased non-preferred 
drugs in a multi-tier formulary (Taira et al., 2006) as opposed to generic or preferred 
drugs. Dor and Encinosa (2004) also found that individuals who faced co-payments 
were more likely to comply with treatment regimes for diabetes than individuals who 
faced co-insurance rates. This difference may be due to patients’ uncertainty about 
how changes in the prices of drugs will affect their out-of-pocket spending under co- 
insurance (Dor and Encinosa, 2004). Individuals facing co-payments may also be able 
to obtain larger prescriptions to avoid higher out-of-pocket costs, an option 
unavailable under coinsurance regimes. Having primary or supplementary insurance 
increased adherence to treatment, while the existence of a limit on the number of 
reimbursable prescriptions had the opposite effect (Cox et al., 2001; Shulz et al.,
1995).
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Appendix Table B. 12. Prescription drugs: the effect o f cost sharing on adherence
Variable Compliance Study
Co-payment -
Atella et al. (2005) [IT, NS, CD, R]; Gibson et al. (2006) 
[US, OS, CD, R]; Poirier et al. (1998) [CA, NS, TD, NR]
Co-payment 0 Poirier et al. (1998) [CA, NS, TD, NR]
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) -
Landsman et al. (2005) [US, NS, TD, R]; Taira et al. (2006) 
[US, OS, CD, R]
Coinsurance - Reuveni et al. (2002) [IS, OS, CD, R]
Mixed system +
Ellis et al. (2004) [US, OS, CD, R]; Goldman et al. (2006) 
[US, OS, CD, R]; Mojtabai and Olfson (2003) [US, OS, CD, 
R]; Piette et al. (2004) [US, OS, CD, R]
Change from
coinsurance to deductible and coinsurance 0 Pilote et al. (2002) [CA, NS, CD, R]
Has coinsurance (vs. has co-payment) - Dor and Encinosa (2004) [US, OS, CD, R]
Insurance coverage 
Primary (vs. none) +
Kennedy and Erb (2002) [US, OS, CD, NR]; Piette et al.
(2004) [US, OS, CD, R]; Thomas et al. (1996) [US, OS, CD, 
R]
Primary public (vs. private) - Dodrill et al. (1987) [US, OS, CD, NR]
Supplementary (vs. none) + Col et al. (1990) [US, OS, CD, R]; Safran et al. (2002) [US, OS, CD, R]; Schoen et al. (2001) [US, NS, CD, NR]
Prescription limit -
Cox et al. (2001) [US, OS, CD, R]; Schulz et al. (1995) [US, 
NS, CD, NR]
Country: CA = Canada; IS =  Israel; IT = Italy; US = United States
Type o f study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
B.3.7. Prescription drugs: the effect of cost sharing on health
Another pressing question related to prescription charges is whether there is any effect 
on health. If user fees worsen health outcomes, long-run health care costs may 
increase, particularly if patients make more doctor visits, have more inpatient stays, 
and ultimately end up needing more prescription drugs.
Datasets of sufficient longitude to assess the impact of cost sharing on health are 
scarce. Although researchers using data from the RAND experiment estimated the 
impact of cost sharing on health outcomes, the length of time allowed for follow up of 
participants may not have been adequate to fully assess any effect on health, and few 
of these studies specifically linked cost sharing for prescription drugs to health 
outcomes. As a result, many studies use changes in essential drug use as a proxy for 
poor health outcomes on the grounds that decreases in the use o f necessary 
medications may negatively affect health in the long term (see Appendix Table B .l3). 
The definition of essential drug use varied by study, but essential drugs were 
generally considered to be those primarily used in the management of chronic medical 
conditions where the cessation of drug therapy would have potentially serious 
consequences or drugs that prevent deterioration in health or prolong life.
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Appendix Table B. 13. Prescription drugs: the effect o f cost sharing on the use o f 
essential and discretionary medications
Variable Use of essential 
medicines
Use of discretionary 
medicines
Studies
Co-payment - - McManus et al. (1996) [AU, NS, TD, R]
Co-payment negligible N/A Brian and Gibbens (1974) [US, ES, CD, NR]
Coinsurance - - Foxman et al. (1987) [US, ES, CD, R]
Mixed system negligible - Gardner et al. (1996) [NZ, OS, CD, NR]
Mixed system - N/A Tamblyn et al. (2001) [CA, NS, TD, R]
Change from
co-payment to deductible and 
coinsurance
- N/A Tamblyn et al. (2001) [CA, NS, TD, R]
Prescription limit - N/A
Fortress et al. (2001) [US, NS, PD, R]; 
Martin and McMillan (1996) [US, NS, TD, 
RJ; Soumerai et al. (1987) [US, NS, TD, R]; 
Soumerai et al. (1991) [US, NS, TD, R]
Prescription limit N/A - Soumerai et al. (1987) [US, NS, TD, R]
Country: AU = Australia; CA = Canada; US = United States
Type o f study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type o f data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional model; TD = time-series model; PD = panel data model
Type o f statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
Research has indicated that higher out-of-pocket costs lowered the use of essential 
drugs, implying that individuals are unable to distinguish between necessary and 
unnecessary prescriptions. For example, Soumerai et al. (1987) determined that 
Medicaid beneficiaries decreased their use of both types of prescriptions when faced 
with a prescription limit. However, Brian and Gibbens (1974) and Gardner et al. 
(1996) found that cost sharing had little impact on drugs that were judged to be 
important for the treatment of serious illnesses or drugs that were classified as critical 
or necessary, although both sets of authors only reported descriptive statistics.
A few papers directly or indirectly linked cost sharing and health outcomes in other 
ways. A Canadian study (Tamblyn et al., 2001) looked at essential drug use and 
serious adverse events (hospitalizations, nursing home admissions, and mortality) 
after a change from no co-payment for those receiving social assistance and a CDN $2 
co-payment for older people to co-insurance and annual maximum charges of CDN 
$200-$925. The authors found that higher prescription charges increased adverse 
events associated with reductions in the use of essential drugs, and greater cost 
sharing increased hospitalizations and emergency department visits, particularly 
among mentally ill patients. Another Canadian study examined a sample of older 
people who had experienced a myocardial infarction (Pilote et al., 2002) and found 
that a switch from a CDN $2 co-payment to co-insurance with annual maximums 
based on income (CDN $200, $500, or $750) had no effect on mortality or 
readmissions for complications. However, this particular group may have been less 
sensitive to changes in price due to their life-threatening chronic condition.
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Schoen et al. (2001) considered a natural experiment where indigent patients with 
cardiovascular disease that did not have prescription drug coverage received 
medications free of charge. The authors found that mean blood pressure declined 
among patients with hypertension, and mean LDL decreased for patients receiving 
free lipid-lowering drugs. Finally, Atella et al. (2005) looked at the correlation 
between a co-payment, level of adherence to treatment, and health in a sample of 
Italian hypertension patients. They found that the abolition of the co-payment lowered 
the mortality rate for low-compliant patients by 0.7 percentage points but had no 
effect on the mortality rate for high-compliant patients.
Overall, most articles found that prescription charges lowered the use of essential and 
non-essential drugs, although reductions in the use of non-essential drugs were 
usually slightly larger. This suggests that patients may attempt to discriminate on the 
basis of the usefulness of the prescription drug in question but are not always able to 
judge appropriately.
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B.4. Summaries of cost sharing studies
Appendix Table B. 14. Summaries o f studies o f cost sharing for medical care, inpatient services, physician services, and prescription 
drugs
Author (Year)
Outcome
variable (Region) Country
Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Adams et al. 
(2001)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1995 4,439 elderly (65+) 
beneficiaries with self- 
reported hypertension 
not enrolled in VA 
care or Medicare 
HMO
Employer-sponsored 
versus state- 
sponsored versus 
private supplemental 
insurance
Seniors with some form o f stie -  
sponsored drug coverage were 
more likely to use antihypertensive 
medications (odds ratio 1.5) than 
their counterparts with Medicare 
only;
Among seniors with private 
supplemental insurance, those with 
employer-sponsored insurance 
were more likely to use 
antihypertensive medic&ions 
(odds ratio 1.3) than their 
counterparts with private insurance 
that does not cover medications
No information on the extent o f 
drug coverage;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase prescription drug 
utilization
Ahlamaa- 
Tuompo et al. 
(1998a)
Inpatient
services
(Helsinki) Finland 1989-1994 40,000 injuries o f  
children (<16)
Introduction o f FIM 
60 co-payment for 
inpatient visits; then 
increased to FIM 100
The introduction o f the co­
payment decreased the annual 
inpatient visit rates for injuries by 
about 27% in the 7-15 age group 
and by about 18% in the 0-6 age 
group
May not be general izable because 
limited to one city in Finland; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and education of parents
Ahlamaa- 
Tuompo et al. 
(1998b)
Emergency
room
services
(Helsinki) Finland 1989-1994 37,861 injuries for 
children (<16)
Introduction o f FIM 
60 co-payment for 
inpatient visits; then 
increased to FIM 100
The incidence o f visits due to 
home and leisure injuries 
decreased after co-payment was 
introduced, but the incidence o f  
school injuries was unchanged
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one city in Finland; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and education o f parents
Alignon and 
Grignon (1998)
Prescription
drugs
France 1991 Individuals o f all ages 
(sample size not 
specified)
Individuals faced 
different levels o f  
cost sharing
Out-of-pocket payments were 
below average for poor households 
due to foregoing treatment;
When rich households chose to 
forego treatments, it was when 
they had already made high OOP 
payments
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase prescription drug 
utilization
Author (Year)
Outcome
variable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Alan et al. (2002) Prescription
drugs
(All 10 provinces) 
Canada
1969, 1974, 
1984, 1986, 
1990, 1992, 
1996
6,322 elderly (65+) 
urban respondents
Changes in provincial 
cost sharing 
requirements and 
subsidies over time
The incidence o f a prescription 
drug subsidy for seniors was 
mildly less progressive than a 
percentage-of-income cash 
transfer;
The reduction in prescription drug 
budget share upon implementation 
o f  a subsidy was only slightly 
larger for low-income than for 
high-income households
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in numbers o f physicians 
or pharmacists, restrictiveness o f  
drug programs, and preferences for 
different drugs over time may have 
influenced results
Alan et al. (2003) Prescription
drugs
Canada 1969, 1986, 
1996
Senior- and nonsenior- 
led households
Changes in provincial 
cost sharing 
requirements and 
subsidies over time
The introduction o f  drug benefits 
programs reduced out-of-pocket 
prescription drug expenditures by 
a larger amount for high-outlay 
households than for low-outlay 
households;
Among elderly households, these 
programs reduced prescription 
drug budget shares about the same 
amount for high- and low-outlay 
households, while the differences 
are less clear cut for non-elderly 
households
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in numbers o f  physicians 
or pharmacists, restrictiveness o f 
drug programs, and preferences for 
different drugs over time may have 
influenced results
Alan et al. (2005) Prescription
drugs
(British Columbia, 
Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, and 
Ontario) Canada
1974, 1984, 
1990
Non-elderly 
households not 
receiving social 
assistance (598 and 
516 for BC, 704 for 
Alberta, 440 for 
Saskatchewan, 327 for 
Manitoba, and 1403 
for Ontario)
Drug programs were 
introduced during the 
study time period in 
each o f  the studied 
provinces
The introduction o f drug benefits 
programs reduced prescription 
drug budget shares for households; 
The budget share reductions for 
low-income households were 
larger than for high-income 
households, suggesting that 
programs were progressive
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in numbers o f physicians 
or pharmacists, restrictiveness o f  
drug programs, and preferences for 
different drugs over time may have 
influenced results
Almarsd6ttir et 
al. (2000)
Prescription
drugs
Iceland 1993-1998 6 years o f data 
(number of 
observations not 
given)
Increase in cost- 
sharing requirement
Regulation to increase patients' 
share o f drug costs had a weak 
effect
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in supply o f pharmacists 
and GPs could be important
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Anderson et al. 
(2006)
Prescription
drugs
Sweden 1986-2002 17 years o f  quarterly 
data on prescription 
drug volume
Co-payment changes 
or reforms over time
The introduction o f  a new 
reimbursement schedule decreased 
levels o f  costs and volume in all 
indicator groups except for insulin; 
Subsequent increases in co­
payments had almost no effect on 
volume
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Anessi Pessina 
(1997)
Prescription
drugs
(Emilia-Romagna)
Italy
1989-1993 18 Districts and 60 
months o f data
Changes in co­
payments for 
prescription drugs 
over time and 
different co-payments 
for drugs based on 
their classification
The elasticity o f demand was 
generally larger than estimates 
from other studies;
Estimates ranged from -0.75 for 
vasoprotectives to -0.07 for 
diuretics
The demographic variables were 
aggregated and not all could be 
included in the regression because 
o f  correlation
Anis et al. (2005) Prescription
drugs
(British
Columbia) Canada
1997-2000 2,968 elderly patients 
(65+) with iheumatoid 
arthritis who had paid 
the maximum amount 
o f  dispensing fees in a 
calendar year
Individuals paid 
100% o f  dispensing 
fees up to an annual 
maximum o f $200
No difference in the probability o f  
being admitted to the hospital 
between the cost sharing and free 
period, but patients with cost 
sharing had a slightly higher 
number o f admissions conditioned 
on one admission;
During the cost sharing period, 
more patients had physician visits 
and fewer patients filled 
prescriptions
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and working status may 
have influenced the results
Artz et al. (2002) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1992-1995 Individuals that were 
enrolled in Medicare 
Part A and Part B but 
not Medicaid
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(none, good, fair, 
poor)
As prescription generosity 
increased, per capita prescription 
fill ratios increased consistently for 
all insurance groups; however, the 
ratios peaked at the fair generosity 
level and declined as generosity 
became good;
As prescription generosity 
increased, expenditure ratios rose 
for all insurance groups
There may be a problem with 
using individuals with no 
supplementary insurance for the 
reference group;
No information regarding the 
restrictiveness o f die prescription 
drug formulary
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Atella (2000) Prescription
drugs
Italy 1963-1994 34 years o f annual 
expenditure data
Changes in 
institutional structure 
over time and 
introduction o f  co­
payments in 1978, 
which changed 
several times over the 
course o f the study 
period
In the long run, increasing the co­
payment rate by 1% for public 
drugs only decreased expenditires
by 0.40%;
In the long run, an increase in the 
co-payment rate for private 
expenditures actually led to an 
increase in private expenditures
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in prices o f substitutes for 
prescription drugs
Atella et al.
(2005)
Prescription
drugs
(Treviso) Italy 1993-2004,
1995-2004
36,453 patients with 
hypertension being 
treated with ACE- 
inhibitors
Co-payment 
abolished in Jan 2001 
(was previously 1.5 
Euros); co-payment 
o f  1 Euro
reintroduced in March 
2002
Changes in cost sharing had a 
larger impact on low compliant 
patients than on high compliant 
patients;
For low compliant patients, the 
abolition o f  the co-payment 
decreased the hospitalization rate 
by 1 percentage point and the 
mortality rate by 0.7 percentage 
points
The databases contained no 
information on income and 
education;
Sample limited to individuals in 
one small region ofltaly and may 
not be generalizable to a larger 
population
Babazono et al. 
(1991)
Inpatient
services,
outpatient
services
Japan 1983-1985 12,385,925 individuals Introduction o f  10% 
coinsurance with an 
OOP limit o f 54,000 
yen
Coinsurance decreased the number 
o f individuals that used inpatient 
and outpatient care in a month;
The average age o f the individual 
was the most important 
determinant o f  the demand for 
medical services
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
preferences for medical care or 
cultural factors
Baker et al. 
(2001)
Medical
services
The United States 1992, 1994, 
1996
7,577 adults who were 
not elderly (51-61) in 
1992
Insurance coverage 
(continuously insured, 
intermittently insured, 
continuously 
uninsured)
Continuously uninsured 
participants were 63% more likely 
than privately insured participants 
to have an overall decline h their 
health
No information on the extent o f 
insurance coverage
Balkrishnan et al. 
(2001)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1997-1999 2,411 elderly (65+) 
continuously enrolled 
in Medicare HMO 
since 1998;
259 enrolled since 
1997 were eligible for 
the first part o f  the 
study
1997: $500 annual 
coverage limit, 
$6/generic, $ 12/brand 
1998: $200 quarterly 
deductible, $7/ 
generic, $ 15/brand; 
1999: unlimited 
coverage o f generic 
drugs at $5 per item,
$ 15/brand drug up to 
$25 per month
Policy change in 1998 caused 
25.2% increase in annual inpatient 
admissions, 29% increase in 
prescriptions costs, and 38% 
increase in total costs for HMO; 
Policy change in 1999 caused 27% 
increase in prescription costs,
4.4% drop in physician visits, no 
significant changes in inpatient 
visits, and 6.2% drop in annual 
total health care costs
May not be generalizable because 
limited to a single HMO;
Small sample for initial policy 
change
Author (Year) Outcomevariable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Barnett et al. 
(2000)
Physician
services
(Christchurch) 
New Zealand
1995, 1996 202 patients from the 
Kingdom Free Clinic 
and 148 patients using 
traditional fee-for- 
service providers
Some eligible 
individuals were able 
to use the free clinic
The mean GP consultation rates 
were 2.82 and 2.03 for the 
Kingdom Clinic and Phillipstown 
samples, respectively;
Despite having free care, a higher 
percentage o f individuals in the 
Kingdom Clinic sample reported 
delaying seeking care because o f 
cost than in the Phillipstown 
sample
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and employment 
information;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that influence physician and clinic 
utilization rates
Beck (1974) Physician
services
(Saskatchewan)
Canada
1963-1968 Approximately 40,000
low-income
individuals
Introduction o f CDN 
$1.50 co-payment for 
physician visits
Co-payment resulted in 
approximate 18% decline in 
physician visits
Income was self reported - also 
reported income often differs from 
actual income because o f the 
Canadian tax structure
Beck and Home 
(1980)
Inpatient
services,
physician
services
(Saskatchewan)
Canada
1963-1973 Approximately 40,000
low-income
individuals
Introduction o f  CDN 
$1.50 co-payment for 
physician visits and 
CDN $2.50 charge 
per day for first thirty 
days o f
hospitalization and 
CDN $1.50 per day 
thereafter up to 90 
day maximum
User fees resulted in 5.66% 
reduction in use o f  physicians' 
services over entire period;
No evidence that co-payments 
shortened lengths o f  stay in the 
hospital
Income was self reported - also 
reported income often differs from 
actual income because o f die 
Canadian tax structure;
Couldn't account for simultaneous 
changes such as billing changes
B e g g (1984) Prescription
drugs
The United 
Kingdom
1984 1,508 prescriptions for 
low income and 
elderly individuals
Co-payment 
exemption status o f  
patients
3.1% o f prescriptions for exempt 
patients were not filled compared 
to 9.1% o f  prescriptions for non­
exempt patients that were not 
filled
May not be general izable because 
limited to one group practice;
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
Bhattacharya et 
al. (1996)
Outpatient
services
Japan 1990 Approximately 
440,000 individuals; 
patients visiting 
physicians for certain 
reasons were excluded
Individuals enrolled 
in different health 
plans had different 
cost sharing 
requirements
Increasing expected OOP 
expenditures resulted in a 
decreased probability o f  seeing the 
doctor on any particular day; 
Disease type played an important 
role in the utilization interval 
between outpatient visits
Unmeasured variables such as 
preferences for medical care or 
cultural factors;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase use o f outpatient 
services
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Billings and 
Tiecholz (1990)
Inpatient
services
Washington, DC -  
the United States
1988 955 individuals 
admitted to DC 
hospitals
Insurance coverage 
(coverage, none)
Almost 20% o f the uninsured 
patients reported delaying an 
inpatient admission;
Almost 1/4 o f  the uninsured 
admissions were potentially 
preventable or avoidable
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
May not be general izable because 
limited to hospitals in one city
Birch (1986) Prescription
drugs
The United 
Kingdom
1979-1983 NHS beneficiaries not 
exempt from co­
payments
Change in co­
payment from £0.20 
to £1.60
Consumption o f  charge 
prescriptions fell by 35% over the 
period compared with a 23% 
increase in the consumption o f  
prescriptions by exempt groups
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Blais etal. 
(1999)
Prescription
drugs
(Quebec) Canada 1994-1997 5,182 individuals with 
asthma receiving 
social assistance
Change from no co­
payment to quarterly 
deductible o f $50
In the 18-34 age group there was 
40% non-renewable o f  medication 
vs. 13% in controls in use o f  any 
o f  the 4 classes in first 11 months 
after change;
In the 35-64 age group, the non­
renewable rates were 23% and 9%, 
respectively in use o f  any o f  die 4 
classes in first 11 months after 
change
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase use o f prescription 
drugs
Blais et al. 
(2001)
Prescription
drugs
(Quebec) Canada 1992-1997 Elderly individuals: 
49,333 persons on 
nitrates, 121,298 
persons on 
antihypertens i ves, 
41,118 persons on 
anticoagulants, 24,112 
persons on 
benzodiazepines
Change in co­
payment from CDN 
$2 to 25% of cost and 
deductible with 
maximum 
contribution
No significant decrease in drug 
consumption following the 
implementation o f  a cost-sharing 
drug plan for nitrates, 
antihypertensive agents, 
anticoagulants, and 
benzodiazepines
The observation window o f  one 
month may have been too short to 
detect an effect;
Unmeasured variables such as 
family income or the price o f  
medications
Blais et al. 
(2003)
Prescription
drugs
Canada 1991-1997 Non-elderly persons 
receiving social 
assistance: 55,890 
persons on inhaled 
corticosteroids, 29,461 
persons on 
neoroleptics, 44,916 
persons on 
anticonvulsants
Change from no co­
payment to quarterly 
deductible o f $50
Age group 18-34: 40% non­
renewable o f  medication vs. 13% 
in controls in use o f  any o f  the 4 
classes in first 11 months after 
change;
Age group 35-64: non-renewable 
rates were 23% and 9%, 
respectively in use o f  any o f the 4 
classes in first 11 months after 
change
No out-of-province control group; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Blendon etal. 
(1992)
Medical
services
Massachusetts, the 
United States
1989 1,066 households Insurance coverage 
(insurance, none)
10% o f the uninsured population 
reported being unable to receive 
medical care for financial reasons 
compared to 1% o f  the insured 
population experiencing this 
problem;
Insured individuals were more 
likely than uninsured individuals 
to receive physician or hospital 
care for one o f twelve serious or 
chronic health conditions
Didn't control for confounding 
factors through regression;
May not be general izable because 
limited to one state; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Blustein (2000) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1995 4,334 elderly (65+) 
individuals with 
hypertension
Supplemental diug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, employer- 
sponsored, individual- 
purchased, Medicare 
HMOs, Medicare 
only)
Lack o f  drug coverage increased 
the odds o f  failing to purchase any 
antihypertensives by 40%
Drug coverage increased the 
number o f  tablets purchased (37 
more tablets)
Self-reported information on drug 
coverage;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Brenna et al. 
(1984)
Prescription
drugs
Italy 1975-1981 7 years o f monthly 
aggregated data
In 1978
pharmaceuticals were 
divided into two 
classes (A and B) and 
user fee imposed on 
class B drugs
The introduction o f  co-payments 
had no effect on total 
consumption;
But consumption shifted from 
class B products (with co­
payment) to class A products
Only had dummy variable for 
indication o f co-payment change; 
There was a simultaneous 
introduction o f national health 
insurance around the introduction 
o f co-payments
Brian and 
Gibbens (1974)
Medical
services;
Prescription
drugs
(San Francisco, 
Ventura, and 
Tulare, California) 
The United States
1971-1972 10,662 low-income 
Medicaid individuals
Introduction o f $1 co­
payment for each o f  
first two office visits 
in month, $0.50 co­
payment for first two 
prescriptions in 
month
Increased use or small reductions 
in the use of'critical' or 'needed' 
drugs;
Individuals with co-payments and 
those without co-payments were 
equally likely to have seen a 
physician for 'significant' illnesses, 
but co-payers were less likely to 
seek care for 'intermediate' and 
'insignificant' illnesses
Unmeasured variables such as the 
diagnosis;
There could be underlying 
differences between the use o f  
medical care between the cortrol 
group and the study group, even if  
both had no co-payments;
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
Author (Year) Outcomevariable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Brook et al. 
(1983)
Medical
services
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1974-1977 3,958 non-elderly 
individuals without 
disabilities
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
Free care had significant positive 
effect on vision, and almost 
significant effect on diastolic 
blood pressure;
No other health measure showed a 
significant difference between the 
free and the cost-sharing plans; 
Lower risk o f dying for those in 
free plan, mainly attributable to the 
improved control o f  high blood 
pressure
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education
Buchmueller et
al. (2002)
Physician
services
France 1998 8,161 adults (25+) Supplemental 
insurance coverage 
(coverage, none)
Supplemental insurance increased 
the probability o f having at least 
one physician visit by almost 13 
percentage points;
The impact o f employer-provided 
insurance was actually slightly 
larger than the impact o f  
individually-purchased insurance 
on physician visits
The survey only asked individuals 
to recall visits in the past month; 
there may have been a seasonal 
impact on visits;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase physician visits
Buchmueller et 
al. (2004)
Physician
services
France 1998 8,161 adults (25+) Supplemental 
insurance coverage 
(coverage, none)
Supplemental insurance increased 
the probability o f  having at least 
one physician visit by almost 13 
percentage points;
Individuals without supplementary 
coverage were more likely to 
report having foregone care than 
those with coverage
Unmeasured variables such as 
preferences for medical care; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase physician visits
Cameron etal. 
(1988)
Inpatient
services,
physician
services,
prescription
drugs
Australia 1977-1978 5,190 adults (18+) Most individuals 
received free 
prescriptions, others 
received medicines 
for (AUS) $2.00 
which increased to 
(AUS) $2.50 in 1978, 
and others paid the 
full price
Prescription drug and other health 
care utilization relatively 
responsive to sex and age but 
changes less with income;
Health status measures typically 
had a significant impact on 
prescription drug and other health 
care utilization
The prescription drug utilization 
variable only captured use o f  
prescription drugs in the previous
2 days;
Unmeasured variables such as 
employment and use o f  substitutes 
or complements
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Carrin and Van 
Dael (1991)
Inpatient
services,
physician
and
outpatient
services,
prescription
drugs
Belgium 1966-1980 15 annual 
observations, 
individuals who were 
employed and their 
dependents
The out-of-pocket 
prices o f medical care 
services increased 
over time
Negative relationship between 
price and quantity o f  prescription 
drugs;
The number o f  GP visits, specialist 
visits, and hospital bed days all 
positively influenced the demand 
for prescription drugs
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level; 
Small sample size
Cartwright etal. 
(1992)
Medical
services
The United States 1977 4,409 elderly (65+) Supplementary 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, Medigap, 
Medicare only) with 
differing levels of 
generosity
The Medicaid elderly had the 
highest levels o f medical 
expenditures;
Insurance coverage increased 
expected medical expenditures
Still contained limited information 
on specifics o f drug coverage; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
medical care utilization
Caussat and 
G laude(1993)
Prescription
drugs
France 1980 16,766 individuals, 
excluding those with 
full public coverage or 
no public coverage, 
those with high 
mortality risk, and 
those with severe 
handicap
Supplementary health 
insurance coverage 
(coverage, none)
Having supplementary coverags 
increased the probability o f  
consuming prescription drugs and 
OTC drugs, and it increased the 
number o f  prescription and OTC 
drugs consumed
Possibility that supplementary 
coverage attracts individuals with 
higher consumption needs; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase prescription drug 
utilization
Cherkin et al. 
(1989)
Physician
and
outpatient
care
(Washington) The 
United States
1984-1986 30,414 non-elderly 
(<65) state employees
Introduction o f  $5 co­
payment for 
outpatient and 
ambulatory visits
10.9% decrease in primary care 
visits and 8.2% decrease in total 
visits per year for state employees; 
The decrease in medical visits 
persisted for the 12 months o f  the 
study
Did not control for other factors 
through regression;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one region in 
Washington;
Employees likely to be healthier 
and have higher income
Chiappori et al. 
(1998)
Physician
services
France 1993-1994 4,578 individuals with 
supplementary health 
insurance (bank and 
insurance employees 
and their dependents)
Introduction o f 10% 
coinsurance rate for 
all ambulatory care 
expenses
No apparent changes in 
consumption o f GP office visits or 
specialist visits;
Decrease in GP home visits 
occurred for cost sharing group
Sample population is likely to be 
wealthier and healthier than the 
general French population; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
income, health status, and 
education level
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Christensen et al. 
(1987)
Medical
services,
inpatient
services,
physician
services
The United States 1980, 1984, 
1985
7,799 elderly (65+) 
individuals
Insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, private, 
none)
Medicaid and Medigap recipients 
were 1.24 and 1.06, respectively 
time as likely to use some health 
care services as individuals 
without supplementary coverage; 
Out-of-pocket costs were highest 
for Medigap enrollees and those 
with no supplemental insurance, 
and Medicaid beneficiaries had the 
lowest OOP costs
No information on the extent o f 
insurance coverage 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase medical care 
utilization
Christensen and 
Shinogle (1997)
Inpatient
services,
outpatient
services
(New York City, 
Philadelphia, 
Chicago, 
Cleveland, Los 
Angeles, San 
Francisco, 
Phoenix, Seattle) 
The United States
1994 2,363 adults (19+) Supplemental 
insurance coverage 
(HMO, Medigap, 
employer-sponsored)
Those with Medigap and 
employer-sponsored insurance 
used about 20% more inpatient 
and outpatient services than those 
with no supplemental insurance; 
Although HMO enrollees used 
more outpatient services than those 
with no supplemental insurance, 
they used fewer inpatient days
No information on the extent o f  
insurance coverage; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
inpatient and outpatient utilization
Christiansen et 
al. (2002)
Prescription
drugs
Denmark 1994 4,668 adults (16+) 
with private insurance 
coverage
'Danmark': Private 
insurance coverage 
(coverage for co­
payments, no 
coverage for co­
payments)
Membership in 'Danmark' had no 
significant effect on the likelihood 
o f  prescription drug consumption; 
Gender, education, age, and health 
were important predictors o f use
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase prescription drug 
utilization;
Prescription drug usage indicator 
only covered two-week period
Cockx and 
Brasseur (2003)
Physician
services
Belgium 1993-1994 Groups o f individuals 
in a Belgian sickness 
fund
Co-payment increases 
o f 48% for GP office- 
based visits, 35% for 
GP home visits, 60% 
for specialist visits (in 
real terms)
For both men and women, GP 
office visits were necessities, 
while GP home visits were 
luxuries;
Specialist visits were luxuries for 
men and necessities for women
Unmeasured variables such as 
health status;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
physician utilization
Col etal. (1990) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1987 315 elderly (65+) 
patients in a single 
hospital
Supplemental 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, other 
health insurance, or 
Medicare only)
Non-compliance for those with 
insurance was 31% vs. 52% for 
those with no insurance
Usual non-compliance 
questionnaire problems;
Small sample;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to data from one hospital
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Colle and 
Grossman (1978)
Physician
services
The United States 1971 839 children (1-5) Childrens' parents 
faced different 
quality-adjusted OOP 
prices for pediatric 
care
Main determinants o f childrens’ 
medical use were mother's 
schooling and number o f  children 
in the family;
No evidence o f  a negative time 
cost coefficient in the demand for 
visits
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and age o f parents; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
use o f physician services
Contayannis et 
al. (2005)
Prescription
drugs
(Quebec) Canada 1993-1997 48,027; 60,909; and 
64,490 elderly in three 
pre- and post-policy 
comparisons
Change from CDN $2 
co-payment for 
middle- and high- 
income persons to 
25% coinsurance up 
to maximum; changed 
to CDN $25 
deductible and 25% 
co-payment up to 
maximum
Price elasticity o f  expenditure 
estimates from -0.164 to -0.124; 
Age and being female led to higher 
rates o f increases in levels o f  
prescription drug consumption
Individual information may have 
been lost when using 
neighborhood income and 
education values rather than 
individual values
Coulson and 
Stuart (1995)
Prescription
drugs
(Pennsylvania) 
The United States
1990 4,066 elderly (65+) 
individuals not 
enrolled in an HMO
Introduction o f $4 co­
payment in 
supplemental state 
drug subsidy program 
for low income
Individuals who are aged 85 and 
older or in better health fill fewer 
prescriptions;
Persons with more health problems 
or a higher income fill more 
prescriptions
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one state; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Coulson etal. 
(1995)
Prescription
drugs
(Pennsylvania) 
The United States
1990 4,509 elderly (65+) 
individuals not 
enrolled in an HMO
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, PACE, 
employer-sponsored, 
prescription coverage, 
physician coverage, 
other insurance, 
Medicare only)
Those with supplemental drug and 
doctor insurance refilled 1.42 more 
prescriptions over two-week 
period than those with no 
coverage;
Those with just supplemental drug 
insurance refilled 1.05 more 
prescriptions
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one state; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Cox et al. (2001) Prescription
drugs
(Arizona) The 
United States
Not given 387 elderly (65+), 
enrolled in a Medicare 
HMO plan who had 
reached >=60% o f  
their yearly 
prescription cap
Some individuals had 
capped prescription 
benefits o f$ l,500  per 
year, others had caps 
o f $3,000 per year, 
and others had caps o f  
$750 per year
15% o f  respondents went without 
necessities and 12% borrowed 
money to pay for their 
prescriptions;
Those who reached their 
prescription cap were more likely 
to take less medication than 
prescribed and discontinue 
medication compared to those who 
had not reached their prescription 
cap
Small sample;
Does not account for individuals 
that chose not to consume more 
60% o f their yearly prescription 
cap;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Danzon and 
Pauly (2002)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1987, 1996 Adults (25+) that did 
not have Medicaid or 
other public insurance
Insurance coverage 
(prescription and 
health insurance 
coverage, health 
insurance coverage 
only, none)
The population with drug coverage 
increased prescriptions per capita 
from 10.2 in 1987 to 12.6 in 1996, 
while volume decreased from 55  
to 4.6 over the same period for 
those without drug coverage; 
Estimated that approximately 1/4 
to 1/5 o f  drug spending growth due 
to increased insurance coverage
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Imperfect measure o f drug 
insurance coverage as Ihe 
insurance coverage for those with 
no drug spending could not be 
determined
Davis and 
Russell (1972)
Outpatient
services
The United States 1969 48 states' not-for-profit 
hospitals (aggregate 
data)
Patients faced 
different out-of- 
pocket costs o f  
hospital care
Significant cross-price elasticities 
between prices o f inpatient and 
outpatient care;
Demand for outpatient care was 
sensitive to occupancy rate o f  
inpatient care
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Davis et al. 
(1999)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1995 Approximately 12,000 
elderly (65+) 
individuals
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, employer- 
sponsored, 
individually- 
purchased, Medicare 
HMO, Medicare 
only)
Those with supplementary 
coverage filled 33% more 
prescriptions and had 66% higher 
prescription drug expenditures 
than those without;
Supplemental insurance increased 
utilization rates for and access to 
most types o f health services
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Delnoij et al. 
(2000)
Prescription
drugs
The Netherlands 1995-1997 Individuals who were 
referred to medical 
specialists
Increase in co­
payment rates for 
people covered by the 
public health 
insurance
Individuals who were covered by 
public health insurance did not 
significantly reduce the use o f  
drugs compared to those who were 
covered by private insurance
Only used data from three general 
practitioners;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Dodrill et al. 
(1987)
Prescription
drugs
(Washington) The 
United States
Not given 282 nonelderly (<67) 
patients o f  an epilepsy 
center
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, private 
insurance, no 
insurance)
Non-compliance is more related to 
general self-reported financial 
distress than to whether or not 
patients have drug insurance
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one epilepsy center; 
Small sample
Dor and
Encinosa (2004)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1999-2000 27,057 adults (18+) 
receiving anti-diabetic 
medicines and covered 
for prescription drugs 
by employer- 
sponsored health plans
Individuals with co­
payment requirements 
vs. individuals with 
coinsurance 
requirements
By the end of90 days, about 58% 
o f individuals with co-payments 
were compliant;
By the end of90 days, about 48% 
o f  individuals with coinsurance 
were compliant
Unmeasured variables; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Dourgnon and 
Sermet (2002)
Prescription
drugs
France 1998 15,191 individuals Supplementary health 
insurance coverage 
(mutual, private, 
employer, none)
Individuals without supplementary 
coverage spent 15% less than the 
population average;
When individuals without 
supplementary coverage consumed 
drugs, their expenditures were 
10% higher than individuals with 
supplementary coverage
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase prescription drug 
utilization
Duan et al. 
(1983)
Medical
services
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1974-1977 8,765 non-elderly 
(<62) individuals
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%) and 
the individual 
deductible plan
Under all model specifications, 
individuals with no coinsurance 
had higher medical expenses than 
individuals with cost sharing; 
Individuals with free care spent 
$414 on average compared with 
the $285.73 on average that 
individuals spent on the 95% plan
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education
Eichner(1998) Medical
services
The United States 1990-1992 16,989 employees (25- 
55) with employer- 
sponsored insurance, 
restricted to injury and 
poisoning claims
Different employer- 
sponsored plans with 
differences in 
deductibles, co­
payments, and stop­
loss limits
Increasing out-of-pocket costs 
decreased medical care 
expenditures
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one firm;
Employees likely to be healthier 
than general populttion
Ellis et al. (2004) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1998-2001 4,802 adult (18+) 
patients from a 
managed care 
organization receiving 
statin therapy
Individuals faced 
different levels o f  
cost sharing 
depending on the 
generosity o f their 
prescription drug 
insurance coverage
76.2% o f patients with a co­
payment >=$20 were non-adherent 
compared with 49.4% o f patients 
with a co-payment <=$10;
Patients facing co-payments 
>=$20 were four times more likely 
to discontinue statin therapy than 
patients with co-payments <=$10
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Elofsson et al. 
(1998)
Medical
services
Sweden 1995 7,983 adults (18+) Individuals in 
different county 
councils faced 
different user fees for 
health care
Individuals that classified their 
financial situation as poor were 
almost ten times as likely to forego 
care an individuals that assessed 
their financial situation as good
May not be generalizable because 
limited to two healthcare regions 
in Sweden;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates
Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Esposito (2002) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1997-1998 35,224 patients with 
coronary heart disease 
diagnosis, statin use, 
and continuous 
enrollment
Individuals faced 
different co-payment 
levels based on their 
health plan
The patient's co-payment level 
relative to the co-payment levels 
o f alternative statins was a highly 
significant predictor o f  statin use; 
There were significant cross-price 
effects between statins
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and race;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
F ahs(1992) Medical
services
(New Kensington, 
Pennsylvania) The 
United States
1976-1979 1,089 individuals 
enrolled in the United 
Mine Workers Health 
and Retirement Funds 
with visit for diabetes, 
urinary tract infection 
or sore throat
Introduction o f $7.50 
co-payment for 
physician visits
Evidence to support physician- 
induced demand such as an 
increase in total fees per illness 
episode;
The source o f price increase came 
from physician-initiated 
characteristics such as ambulatory 
fees, inpatient fees and increased 
length o f stay
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one region in 
Pennsylvania;
Unmeasured variables such as 
income
Fairman et al. 
(2003)
Prescription
drugs
(Midwest region) 
The United States
1998-2000 4,132 adults (18+) 
with private insurance 
(3,577 in the control 
group)
Individuals in the 
intervention group 
faced a 3-tier co­
payment ($8, $15, 
$25) while 
individuals in the 
comparison group 
faced a 2-tier co­
payment ($7, $12)
No significant differences in office 
visits, emergency department 
visits, or hospitalizations between 
the intervention and control 
groups;
The 3-tier structure significantly 
reduced the use o f  third-tier 
medications over the long term
The effects on other types o f  visits 
may be different for other 
populations;
The mix o f drugs within each tier 
may also affect utilization o f  other 
health services
Federman et al. 
(2001)
Prescription
drugs
(New Hampshire) 
The United States
1997-1999 1,908 elderly (66+), 
individuals who 
reported a history o f  
myocardial infarction 
or coronary heart 
disease, enrolled in 
Medicare Part B
Supplemental drug 
coverage (Medicaid, 
other public program, 
employer-sponsored 
coverage, self­
purchased plans with 
drug coverage, HMO 
plans, none)
Patients with Medicare only were 
less likely to use statins;
Patients with Medicare only or 
Medigap without drug coverage 
were less likely to use nitrates; 
Patients with Medicaid were the 
only group less likely to use B- 
blockers than those with employer- 
sponsored coverage
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one state; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Feldstein (1970) Physician
services
The United States 1948-1966 Aggregates o f private 
physician services
Patients faced 
different average and 
net OOP costs o f  
physician care
Doctors seemed to use their 
discretionary pricing power to 
maintain permanent excess 
demand
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Feldstein (1971) Inpatient
services
The United States 1958-1967 Annual state 
aggregates o f all 
hospitals (aggregated 
by state) and patients
Patients faced 
different out-of- 
pocket costs o f  
hospital care
Rising demand was induced by 
increases in insurance coverage, 
personal income, availability o f  
hospital oriented specialists, and 
other factors
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country
Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Feldstein (1977) Inpatient
services
The United States 1958-1973 All individuals 
admitted to hospitals
Patients faced 
different out-of- 
pocket costs o f  
hospital care
An increase in the quality o f care 
increased the demand for hospital 
admissions but decreased mean 
bed stay per care;
Higher out-of-pocket prices for 
hospital care decreased inpatient 
admissions
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
preferences for care
Fillenbaum et al. 
(1993)
Prescription
drugs
(North Carolina) 
The United States
1986-1987 4,163 elderly (65+) 
individuals
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, other drug 
insurance, or 
Medicare only)
Medicaid recipients had 25% 
higher drug use than those with 
other drug insurance or Medicare 
only;
Total 3rd-party payments rose 
more rapidly than co-payments 
only, suggesting that insurers were 
reluctant to increase co-payments 
at the same rate for beneficiaries
Not generalizable because only the 
Piedmont area o f North Carolina; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Fleishman and 
Mor (1993)
Outpatient
services,
inpatient
services,
emergency
room
services
(Northeast and 
South regions, 
Florida,
Washington) The 
United States
1988-1989,
1990
937 adults (>18) with 
AIDS
Insurance coverage 
(public, private, none)
The uninsured had significantly 
fewer inpatient admissions per 
month, inpatient nights per month 
and outpatient visits per month 
than the privately insured;
No significant differences in 
medical care use between publicly 
and privately insured except 
publicly insured individuals had 
more emergency room visits
The sample may under represent 
individuals without insurance 
because they are less likely to 
contact a medical provider; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
medical care utilization
Fortress et al. 
(2001)
Prescription
drugs
(New Hampshire) 
The United States
1980-1983 343 elderly (60+), 
low-income 
individuals on 
Medicaid and under 
treatment for specific 
chronic illnesses
Introduction o f a cap 
o f 3 reimbursable 
prescriptions per 
month
34.4% decrease in standard doses 
o f  essential medications;
The comorbidities associated with 
largest relative reduction were 
psychoses/bipolar disorders, 
anxiety/sleep problems, and 
chronic pain
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one state;
Small sample;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Foxman et al. 
(1987)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1974-1982 5,765 non-elderly (14- 
61) individuals
Insurance for health 
services and 
prescription drugs 
with different cost 
sharing (0%, 25%, 
50%, 95%)
Use o f prescription drugs 
increased by 85% in free plans 
relative to cost sharing plans; 
Antibiotic use was greater on the 
free than on the cost-sharing plans 
across all diagnoses;
Cost sharing decreased both 
inappropriate and appropriate use 
o f  antibiotics
Unmeasured variables such as 
income may influence demand for 
prescriptions;
Cross-sectional study, Ihus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Franks et al. 
(1993)
Medical
services
The United States 1975-1987 4,694 adults (25-74) 
who were uninsured or 
privately insured
Insurance coverage 
(insurance, none)
The risk o f dying for uninsured 
individuals was 1.25 times the risk 
o f dying for insured individuals; 
The adverse association between 
lacking insurance and mortality 
was observed in all subgroups
No information on the extent o f  
insurance coverage; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
medical care utilization
Freeman et al. 
(1990)
Medical
services,
physician
services
The United States 1986 10,130 individuals Insurance coverage 
(insurance, none)
Uninsured individuals had 1.2 
fewer ambulatory visits in a year 
than insured individuals 
Uninsured individuals were more 
than twice as likely as insured 
individuals to report foregoing 
needed medical care
Didn't control for confounding 
factors through regression;
Little information on the extent o f  
insurance coverage
Freiberg and
Scutchfield
(1976)
Inpatient
services
(Kentucky) The 
United States
1972 Individuals in 13 
group-family 
insurance plans
Because o f differing 
coinsurance rates 
between plans, 
individuals faced 
different out-of- 
pocket costs for 
inpatient care
A decrease in the out-of-pocket 
price o f  care led to a small but 
significant increase in hospital 
admissions and an increase in 
average lengths o f hospital stays; 
No support for the hypothesis that 
as the out-of-pocket cost o f 
inpatient services decreases, more 
patients substitute inpatient for 
outpatient care
Chose not to control for covariies 
such as income and sex, possibly 
causing omitted variable bias; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
hospital utilization
Friis et al. (1993) Prescription
drugs
(Zealand)
Denmark
1987, 1990 5,765 patients 
prescribed antibiotics 
by 553 general 
practitioners
Change from 25% 
coinsurance rate to 
patient paying full 
price up to 800 DKr 
for most commonly 
used antibiotics
The cost sharing change decreased 
the total number o f  patients treated 
for diagnoses where antbiotics are 
typically used;
Also a shift from more expensive 
to less expensive antibiotics
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
Fuchs and 
Kramer (1972)
Physician
services
The United States 1948-1956,
1956-1966
Aggregates o f  
physician services 
(aggregates o f 33 
states)
Patients faced 
different average and 
net OOP costs o f  
physician care
The demand for physicians' 
services appeared to be 
significantly influenced by the 
number o f physicians available; 
But, the demand for physicians' 
services did not appear very 
sensitive to differences in income
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Author (Year)
Outcome
variable (Region) Country Study dates
Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Gardner et al. 
(1996)
Prescription
drugs
New Zealand 1992 19,299 patients Different levels o f  
government drug 
subsidies depending 
on income status 
(these were not 
stated)
10.5% o f  prescriptions were for 
those with highest subsidy rate 
(lowest income) and 15.4% were 
for those with no subsidy (highest 
income);
For essential drug categories, no 
difference in non-dispensing rates; 
For discretionary drug categories, 
lower non-dispensing rates for 
those with highest subsidy rate
Did not control for other factors 
through regression
Gardner et al. 
(1997)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1988-1994 18,000 elderly (65+) 
public employees with 
state-funded Medicare 
supplemental benefit 
program
Initial co-payment o f 
$5 and increased to 
$8 (generics), $10 
(brand), second 
increase to $10 and 
$15 respectively, 
third increase to 
coinsurance o f 50% 
to a max o f  $50
Generic share o f  total days drug 
therapy per month unchanged after 
first two price increases;
Increased 20% after third price 
increase
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Genier et al. 
(1997)
Prescription
drugs
France 1991-1992 11,500 households 
with adjustment to be 
representative o f  
French population
Generosity o f  
supplementary health 
insurance coverage
Pharmaceutical consumption 
varied according to number o f  
illness episodes and insurance 
coverage;
Difference between insurance 
coverage with social security alone 
or with social security and 
supplementary coverage was 
significant
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Gianfrancesco et 
al. (1994)
Prescription
drugs
(Pennsylvania) 
The United States
1990-1992 1,818 retired mine 
workers and 
dependents
Extension o f  
prescription drug 
benefits to previously 
uninsured 
beneficiaries
Drug use and expenditures o f  the 
newly insured converged to that o f  
the previously insured
Unmeasured variables such as 
income;
Not generalizable because spedfic 
population o f  retired mine workers
Gibson et al. 
(2005)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1995-1998 Non-elderly adults 
between 18 and 64 
with employer- 
sponsored health 
insurance; 16,783 in 
intervention and 1,984 
in control group
The intervention 
employer increased 
the co-payment from 
$2 for all drugs to $7 
for brand-name drugs 
in 1996
An increase in the co-payment led 
to a drop in prescription drug 
utilization;
An increase in the brand-name co­
payment led to an increase in 
generic drug expenditures
May not be generalizable because 
limited to population of employees 
for one firm;
Unmeasured variables such as 
health status and income
Author (Year)
Outcome
variable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Goldman and 
Grossman (1978)
Physician
services
(Mott Haven and 
Westchester, New  
York) The United 
States
1956-1966 568 infants and 
children
Children’s' parents 
faced different 
quality-adjusted OOP 
prices for pediatric 
care
Pediatric visits more sensitive to 
income than quality o f visits;
The number o f  visits and the 
quality o f visits were sensitive to 
fixed travel cost
May not be generalizable because 
limited to parts o f New York; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
health status o f the child
Goldman et al. 
(2004)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1997-2000 960,791 beneficiaries 
continuously enrolled 
for up to 4 years
Private drug 
insurance coverage 
differed among 
individuals
Significant changes in utilization 
for NSAIDs and antihistamines 
when co-payment was predicted to 
change;
Lower responsiveness among 
chronically ill patierts to predicted 
change in co-payments
Sample consisted o f primary 
beneficiaries who may be healthier 
because they are employed; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Goldman et al. 
(2006)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1997-2002 62,274 adults (2(H) 
from 88 health plans 
who initiated 
cholesterol-lowering 
therapy between 1997 
and 2001
Different individual 
faced different co­
payments for 
cholesterol drugs
For each $10 increase in co­
payments, average compliance in a 
given year fell by 5 percentage 
points;
There would be a projected 
increase in hospitalizations if co­
payments increased for individuals 
at high risk
Study only examined patients who 
initiated therapy, and co-payments 
may have deterred some from 
initiating therapy in the first place; 
The co-payment may be 
endogenous as unmeasured 
variables may influence co­
payment and compliance
Grana and Stuart 
(1996)
Physician
services
The United States 1992 5,543 elderly (65+) 
individuals with 
arthritis
Supplemental 
insurance coverage 
(individual 
supplement, group 
supplement,
Medicaid, supplement 
o f  unknown origin, 
none)
Individuals with supplementary 
insurance were more likely to 
receive arthritis treatment from 
physicians than those with none; 
Those with individual 
supplementary insurance were 
more likely to have treatment than 
those with group coverage
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Greene and 
Gunselman 
(1986)
Inpatient
services
North Carolina, 
the United States
1981-1982 40 large (200+) 
employer groups for a 
total sample size o f  
33,882 individuals
Different levels o f  
insurance coverage 
(full inpatient 
coverage, medical 
coverage with cost 
sharing); deductibles 
ranging from $100- 
$200; coinsurance 
ranging from 15-20%
The groups that switched to the 
medical plans with cost sharing 
experienced an 11.3% decline in 
hospital admission rates, 14.4% 
decline in days/1000 in the 
hospital, and a decrease in the 
average length o f stay o f 0.3 days
Did not control for other factors 
through regression;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one state;
Employed individuals are likely to 
be healthier on average than 
general population and may be 
differences between individuals in 
small and large employer groups
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country
Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Greenlick and 
Darsky (1968)
Prescription
drugs
(Windsor, 
Ontario) Canada
1962-1963 Approximately 3,400
prescriptions
dispensed
Prescriptions 
dispensed under 
Prescription Services, 
Incorporated plan 
compared wilh 
prescription 
dispensed to people 
paying out-of-pocket
4.20 prescriptions per person 
dispensed to individuals with PSI, 
while 2.19 prescriptions dispensed 
to those without PSI;
Annual expenditures per person in 
the PSI plan were $16.64 and 
$8.29 for those not in PSE plan
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Analysis limited to small area and 
results may not be applicable to 
wider population
Gribben (1998) Physician
services
(Dargaville, 
Pukekohe, 
Matamama, 
Kawerau, Piopio, 
Taumaranui, and 
Featherston) New  
Zealand
1993-1994 5,367 patient records Some individuals 
received subsidies 
from the government 
for medical care
The GP consultation rate for 
subsidized individuals was 4.00 
visits per year, while the visit rae 
was 3.46 for non-subsidized 
individuals
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and marital status 
If the patient did not visit the 
doctor, the authors had to estimate 
whether the person was a subsidy 
cardholder
Grignon and 
Perronin (2003)
Prescription
drugs
France 1998-2000 Individuals benefiting 
from CMU out o f  
permanent sample o f 
social Insured 
(absolute numbers not 
specified)
Introduction of 
supplementary 
(CMU; Couverture 
Maladie Universelle) 
coverage on 1 Jan 
2000
CMU coverage increased 
probability o f  prescription by 5.2 
percentage points;
CMU increased expenditures (non­
significant) 6.3 percentage points 
for individuals with at least one 
prescription and 12 percentage 
points for the whole population
The covariates that the authors 
considered are unclear, and there 
may have been unmeasured and 
omitted variables
Grootendorst
(1997)
Prescription
drugs
(British
Columbia) Canada
1985-1992 18,000 individuals 
who turned 65 during 
the study time period
Provision o f enhanced 
public drug insurance 
coverage at 65
Availability of prescription drug 
coverage from the state for elderly 
contributed relatively little to 
overall increase in drug 
expenditures;
Prescription drug claims by low- 
income males seemed to increase 
substantially after provision o f  
insurance
May not be generalizable to 
individuals not living in single 
person households;
No out-of-province control group
Grootendorst and 
Levine (2001)
Prescription
drugs
(All 10 provinces) 
Canada
1994-1995,
1995-1996
3 categories o f non­
institutionalized 
persons: 3,195 elderly 
(65-85), social 
assistance recipients 
(unknown sample 
size), and non-elderly 
(<65) (unknown 
sample size)
Different deductibles, 
co-payments, and 
coinsurance rates, 
depending on the 
individual's province, 
age, income, and type 
o f drug coverage
Seniors' drug use was relatively 
insensitive to price and a small 
positive correlation between price 
and volume;
Social assistance recipients 
somewhat more sensitive to price; 
Among the general population, 
insurance had a small positive 
impact on the volume o f drugs 
consumed
Problems with measuring drug 
coverage forced the authors to 
reduce the sample size; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase prescription drug use
Author (Year) Outcomevariable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Grootendorst, 
O’Brien, and 
Anderson (1997)
Prescription
drugs
(Ontario) Canada 1990 9,370 near elderly (55- 
64) and elderly (65- 
75)
When individual 
turned 65, the 
province offered full 
drug coverage 
(equivalent to 
comparing those with 
and without 
supplemental 
insurance)
Increased use o f  prescription drugs 
upon eligibility, primarily among 
persons with lower health status; 
Increases in drug use were 
concentrated primarily among 
individuals with lower health 
status
Unmeasured variables such as the 
value o f time becaise individuals 
may retire upon turning 65; 
Consumption is self-reported
Haas and 
Goldman (1994)
Inpatient
services
(Massachusetts) 
The United States
1990 Non-elderly (15-64) 
individuals 
hospitalized for an 
emergency
Insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, private, 
none)
Individuals who were uninsured or 
had Medicaid were more likely to 
receive care in an urban hospital or 
level 1 trauma center;
Patients who were uninsured 
received fewer resources and had 
higher in-hospital mortality rates
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and sex;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to part o f one state; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Hadley et al. 
(1991)
Inpatient
services
The United States 1987 592,598 non-elderly 
(1-64) patients 
admitted to hospital
Insurance coverage 
(private insurance, 
none)
The length o f  stay for unhsured 
individuals was significantly 
shorter than that o f  the privately 
insured patients by 12% - 38%; 
The uninsured faced a higher 
relative probability o f  in-hospital 
mortality than the insured
Unmeasured variables such as 
health status and income; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that influence hospital admissions, 
procedures, and outcomes
Hahn (1994) Medical
services
The United States 1987 16,430 non-elderly 
adults (18-64)
Insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, private, 
none)
Individuals with Medicaid had 
significantly more hospital stays 
and physician visits than the 
uninsured, although there were not 
significant differences for visits 
between uninsured individuals and 
those with private insurance
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and region; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Hanau and Rizzi 
(1986)
Prescription
drugs
(Emilia-Romagna)
Italy
1980-1984 5 years o f monthly 
aggregated data
Various changes in 
co-payment regime 
over the period
Each new co-payment regime 
reduced total prescription drug 
expenditures and expenditures per 
prescription;
The effect o f each regime 
decreased over time as 
consumption shifted to fully 
reimbursed drugs, exemptions 
were granted, and co-payment 
evasion became widespread
Regression only had dummy 
variable for indication o f  co­
payment change;
A number o f other policy changes 
were also introduced with co­
payment changes
Author (Year) Outcomevariable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Harmon and 
Nolan (2001)
Living in
Ireland
Survey
Ireland 1994 4,048 households Insurance coverage 
(insurance, none)
The presence o f  insurance 
increased the probability o f having 
at least one hospital stay by about 
3% (not correcting for 
endogeneity) and about 6% 
(correcting for endogeneity)
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase inpatient services
Harris et al. 
(1990)
Prescription
drugs
(Washington) The 
United States
1982-1986 19,982 non-elderly 
state o f Washington 
employees enrolled in 
an HMO
Co-payments 
increased from $0- 
$1.50 and again from 
$1.50 to $3
Greater decline in use o f  
discretionary compared to use o f  
nondiscretionary drugs;
The effect o f  co-payments on 
reducing drug costs was smaller 
than the effect o f co-payments on 
reducing drug utilization
May not be generalizable because 
only one state and one HMO;
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
Helms et al. 
(1978)
Inpatient
services,
physician
services
(California) The 
United States
1971-1972 10,687 Medicaid 
individuals with the 
co-payment; 29,975 
Medicaid individuals 
without the co­
payment
Introduction o f  $1 co­
payment for each o f 
first two office visits 
in month, $0.50 co­
payment for first two 
prescriptions in 
month
8% decline in physician office 
visits and 17% increase in hospital 
days among co-payment group; 
Total program costs actually 
increased 3-8%
Unmeasured variables such as the 
diagnosis;
There could be underlying 
differences between the use o f 
medical care between the cortrol 
group and the study group, even if  
both had no co-payments
Hill and Veney 
(1970)
Inpatient
services
Sedgwick County, 
Kansas, the 
United States
1968 5,000 contracts for 
groups o f employees 
that were enrolled in 
Blue Cross / Blue 
Shield o f  Kansas
Certain outpatient and 
ambulatory services 
were offered for fiee 
in the experiment
No significant reductions in 
inpatient utilization rates for those 
with free care;
Inpatient short stays were reduced 
in experimental group;
Evidence that free out-of-hospital 
care created admissions which 
resulted in stays longer than 10 
days
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one region in Kansas; 
Employees and dependents likely 
to be healthier and have higher 
income;
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
Hillman et al. 
(1999)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1990-1992 134,937 non-elderly 
members o f nine US 
managed care plans
Variation in co­
payment from $1 to 
$20 between different 
between employer 
health plans
Higher co-payments associated 
with lower drug spending in 
insurance models where 
physicians not at risk for drug 
costs, but have little effect in 
insurance models where 
physicians bear financial risk for 
prescribing
Unmeasured variables such as 
education, marital status, and race 
may influence drug spending; 
Individuals in private health 
insurance plans likely to be 
healthier
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country
Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Holly et al. 
(1998)
Inpatient
services
Switzerland 1992-1993 15,288 individuals 
aged 15 and older 
living in private 
households
Supplemental 
insurance coverage 
(coverage, none)
Given that an individual has used 
some medical service, tie 
existence o f  supplemental 
insurance coverage increases fie 
probability that he will have at 
least one inpatient stay
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase inpatient services
Hsu et al. (2006) Prescription
drugs
The United States 2002-2003 199,179 elderly (65+) 
Medicare+Choice 
beneficiaries who 
were enrolled in a 2- 
tier drug plan
All individuals faced 
2-tier co-payments for 
drugs, but individuals 
in one group faced a 
$1000 maximum for 
drug coverage
Subjects with capped benefits had 
higher LDL cholesterol and more 
emergency department visits, non­
elective hospitalizations, and 
deaths than subjects without 
capped benefits;
They also had relatively fewer 
office visits
Differences between insurance 
coverage groups may be non­
random
Hughes and 
McGuire (1995)
Prescription
drugs
(England and 
Wales) The 
United Kingdom
1969-1992 24 annual 
observations, NHS 
beneficiaries not 
exempt from co­
payments
Change in co­
payment from £0.125 
to £3.75
The price elasticity o f demand 
increased over time;
Raising the charge from £3.75 in 
1992 to £4.25 in 1993 increased 
revenue by approximately £17.3 
million
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in supply o f  pharmacists 
and GPs could be important
Hurd and 
McGarry (1997)
Inpatient
services,
physician
services
The United States 1993-1994 7,327 elderly 
individuals (70+)
Insurance coverage 
(private, Medicare 
A&B only, Medicare 
A only, no insurance)
Individuals without Medicare Part 
B and individuals with no 
insurance coverage were 3.7% and 
15%, respectively, less likely to 
have at least one doctor visit than 
individuals with Medicare Parts 
A&B
Respondents may have had 
difficulty recalling health 
utilization and out-of-pocket 
payments for the past year; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase physician visits and 
inpatient stays
Huskamp et al. 
(2003)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1999-2001 134,937 non-elderly 
members o f nine US 
managed care plans
Employer 1: change 
from a 1-tier to a 2- 
tier formulary and 
increased levels o f  
co-payments for all 
tiers,
Employer 2: change 
from a 2-tier to a 3- 
tier formulary and 
increased levels o f  
co-payments for tier 3
Enrollees covered by Employer 1 
were twice as likely as the 
comparison group to discontinue 
the use o f  drugs in a given class 
altogether;
But enrollees covered by 
Employer 2 were not as likely as 
the comparison group to 
discontinue the use o f drugs in a 
given class altogether
May not be generalizable because 
limited to two employers; 
Individuals in employer health 
insurance plans likely to be 
healthier
Author (Year) Outcomevariable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Huskamp et al. 
(2005)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1999-2001 11,653 non-elderly 
(<65) individuals with 
employer-based 
managed care 
insurance
Change from 2-tier 
formulary with $6 co­
pay for generics and 
$12 co-pay for brand- 
name to $6 co-pay for 
generics, $12 co-pay 
for preferred, and $24 
for no-preferred
For ACE inhibitors, there was a 
22.7% decline in the use o f non- 
preferred tier 3 drugs;
Increase in the use o f preferred tier 
2 drugs but no change in the use o f  
tier 1 generic drugs
Unmeasured variables such as 
health status and income;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to population o f employees 
for one firm
Hux et al. (1997) Prescription
drugs
(Ontario) Canada 1996-1997 Elderly individuals
(65+)
Introduction of 
income-graded cost 
sharing: CDN $2 co­
payment for low- 
income persons and 
CDN $100 deductible 
and CDN $6.11 co­
payment for higher- 
income persons
Drop in prescription drug use in 
the few months after the user fee 
introduction;
In the first few months, the 
number o f essential prescriptions, 
discretionary prescriptions, and 
preventative prescriptions fell, 
although the volume per 
prescription rose
Unmeasured socioeconomic and 
demographic variables; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Johnson et al. 
(1997a)
Prescription
drugs
(Oregon) The 
United States
1987-1991 Between 3,352 and 
3,981 elderly (65+) 
Medicare HMO 
enrollees
In one group, increase 
in co-payment from 
$1 to $3 (1987-1988) 
and $3 to $5 (1988- 
1989);
In other group, 50% 
coinsurance with $25 
max per prescription 
(1987-1989) and rose 
to 70% with a $30 
max in 1990
Inconsistent results, although when 
the largest increase in co-payment 
occurred, beneficiaries were less 
likely to get exposure to 3 essenial 
classes o f  medication and 2 
nonessential classes o f  medication 
and the total days o f  use declined 
in 5 o f  the 7 essential classes and 1 
nonessential class
May not be generalizable because 
limited to HMO elderly population 
in one state;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Johnson et al. 
(1997b)
Prescription
drugs
(Oregon) The 
United States
1987-1991 Between 6,704 and 
7,962 elderly (65+) 
Medicare HMO 
enrollees
In one group, increase 
in co-payment from 
$1 to $3 (1987-1988) 
and $3 to $5 (1988- 
1989),
In other group, 50% 
coinsurance with $25 
max per prescription 
(1987-1989) and rose 
to 70% with a $30 
max in 1990
Little evidence that exposure to, 
costs and annual days o f  drug use 
for discretionary and essential drug 
use was affected;
Increased co-payments reduced 
total number o f  days of use for 
cardiac agents and diuretics in 
1988-1990, 1989-1990
May not be generalizable because 
limited to HMO elderly population 
in one state;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Joyce et al. 
(2002)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1997-1999 420,786 non-elderly 
employees (18-64) at 
large firms with heallh 
insurance benefits that 
included outpatient 
drugs
Plan A: change from 
$5 to $7 co-payment 
Plan B: change from 
$4 to $5 brand co­
payment
Control group: $10 
brand co-payment and 
$5 generic co­
payment
Doubling the co-payment in a 1- 
tier plan for all drugs reduced 
average annual spending from 
$725 to $563 per member; 
Adding an additional co-payment 
o f  $30 for non-preferred brand 
drugs lowered overall drug 
spending by 4%
Unmeasured variables such as 
income may influence spending; 
Individuals in employer health 
insurance plans likely to be 
healthier
Kamal-Bahl and
Briesacher
(2004)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1999 149,243 adults (18+) 
with a diagnosis o f  
hypertension with 
prescription drug 
benefits
18 single-tier 
prescription drug 
plans, 20 2-tier plans, 
and 4 3-tier plans
As the co-payment increased in the 
all plans, the probability o f  getting 
a more expensive medication (like 
ACE inhibitor) declined; 
Regardless o f  the co-payment 
amount, no differences in the types 
o f antihypertensives that enrollees 
obtained in single-tier plans
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
income may influence demand for 
prescriptions
Keeler et al. 
(1985)
Medical
services
The United States 1974-1982 3,495 non-elderly (14- 
61) individuals with 
hypertension
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
For the average adult, diastolic 
blood pressure was significantly 
lower with free care than with cost 
sharing;
Hypertensives with free care 
received a better quality o f  care 
than their counterparts on the cost- 
sharing plans, although for many 
measures o f quality, no difference
Unmeasured variables such as 
income which may influence 
medical service use
Kennedy and Erb 
(2002)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1994-1995 11,272 individuals 
with disabilities
Insurance coverage 
(private only, public 
only, mix o f private 
and public, no 
insurance)
2% o f adults 65-74 and 1% of  
adults 75+ reported non- 
compliance because o f  cost (these 
rates were much lower than those 
o f  younger age groups);
More than 50% o f  individuals who 
reported non-compliance due to 
costs reported adverse health 
outcomes
Did not control for other factors 
through regression;
Some o f the reasons they included 
for non-compliance may not be 
related to cost (may be related to 
side effects, doctor-patient 
relationship, etc)
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Klaukka et al. 
(93)
Prescription
drugs
Finland 1992 399 individuals 
receiving treatmert for 
high blood pressure
Reimbursement for 
the special
compensation class o f  
drugs was lowered 
from 90% to 80% in 
1992
Every tenth individual who took 
part in the survey said that they 
had decreased the consumption o f  
blood pressure medication due to 
the increased costs;
Expenditures for drugs in the 80% 
class were 2.3% below the 
previous year
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization;
Only examined individuals from 
one pharmacy, so there may have 
been sample selection issues
Klick and 
Stratmann (2005)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1996-1998 Elderly individuals 
(65+) that had not 
spent at least 1/2 o f  
the year in a nursing 
home, excluded those 
with Medicaid and 
employer-sponsored 
insurance
Individuals with 
different types o f  
supplemental 
insurance coverage 
face different out-of- 
pocket expenses
A $1 increase in the out-of-pocket 
price o f  a prescription led to a 66% 
decline in expenditures for 
prescription drugs and a 43% 
decline in the number of 
prescriptions
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Kozyrskyj et al. 
(2001)
Prescription
drugs
(Manitoba)
Canada
1995-1998 10,703 low-income 
children (5-15) with 
asthma
Change from a fixed 
deductible o f CDN 
$237 per family and 
40% co-payment 
system to income- 
based deductible 
system
Decrease in use o f corticosteroids 
by higher-income group with 
severe asthma compared to control 
group;
No change in use by low-income 
children compared to control 
group
Some children may have a higher 
probability o f  being diagnosed 
with asthma because o f access to 
physicians;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Kupor et al.
(1995)
Inpatient
services,
outpatient
services
Japan 1984, 1989 Subscribers to the 
Kukoho insurance 
fund
Main subscribers and 
dependents had 30% 
coinsurance and 
retirees had 20% for 
all medical services; 
retiree dependents 
had 20% coinsurance 
for inpatient and 30% 
coinsurance for 
outpatient care
Cost sharing had small but 
negative and significant effect on 
medical services utilization; 
Inpatient utilization was most 
sensitive to co-payments in the 
lowest income group, while it was 
least sensitive to co-payments in 
the higher income group
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
preferences for medical care
Landsman et al. 
(2005)
Prescription
drugs
(Northeast, South, 
and Southeast 
regions) The 
United States
1999-2001 Approximately 
630,000 cases and 1 
million controls 
enrolled in managed 
care plans
Co-payments ranged 
from $5 to $20 in 2- 
tiers for generic and 
brand-name drug in 
the pre-period and 
from $5 to $20 in 3- 
tiers in the post­
period
A larger proportion o f cases than 
controls switched to a product with 
a lower co-payment for statins, 
ACE inhibitors, and triptans;
For most medications considered, 
discontinuation rates increased 
significantly in the 6 months 
following the benefit change
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Information may have been lost at 
the aggregate level
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country
Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Lauterbach et al. 
(2000)
Prescription
drugs
(Cologne)
Germany
1998 Approximately 700 
adults (18+) that 
visited the chosen 
pharmacies who were 
not exempted from the 
co-payment
In 1997 the 
government increased 
co-payments by 6 
DM (co-payments 
still differed by pack 
size, thou^i)
The co-payment increase reduced 
physician visits by 4.5% and drugs 
by one pack on average;
Most people covered by public 
health insurance slightly changed 
their consumption o f drugs due to 
an increase in co-payments
Sampling issue because there was 
a probability o f being included in 
the sample as the individual had to 
visit the pharmacy;
Retrospective selfassessment may 
have been biased
Lavers (1989) Prescription
drugs
(England and 
Wales) The 
United Kingdom
1971-1982 12 annual 
observations, NHS 
beneficiaries not 
exempt from co­
payments
Change in co­
payment from £0.20 
to £1.30
No significant change in 
prescription size with the increase 
in co-payment;
No significant change in morbidity 
with the increase in co-payment
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in supply o f  pharmacists 
and GPs could be important
Lewis and 
Keaimes (1970)
Inpatient
services,
physician
services
(Sedgwick 
County, Kansas) 
The United States
1968 5,000 contracts for 
groups o f  employees 
that were enrolled in 
Blue Cross /  Blue 
Shield o f Kansas
Certain outpatient and 
ambulatory services 
were offered for free 
in the experiment
No significant differences in 
hospital admission rates between 
experimental and control groups; 
38.8% o f individuals in the 
experimental group and 34.4% o f  
individuals in the control group 
visited a physician at some time 
during the five two-week periods
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one region ri Kansas; 
Employees and dependents likely 
to be healthier and have higher 
income;
Employee groups, not individuals, 
had to be selected for the study
Li et al. (2006) Prescription
drugs
British Columbia, 
Canada
2001-2002 8,017 elderly 
individuals with 
rheumatoid arthritis
In 2002 co-payments 
increased to max o f  
CDN $25 for higher 
income groups and 
CDN $10 for lower 
income groups. 
Annual maximums 
also increased from 
CDN $200 to CDN 
$275 for higher- 
income groups
The co-payment increase 
decreased prescription drug 
consumption among both groups, 
although the lower-income group 
was more sensitive to the price 
change;
Both groups also substituted more 
physician visits for prescription 
drugs
Little demographic information 
was included as additional 
controls;
Restricted to one disease and the 
reaction to the price change among 
the general population o f the 
elderly may be different
Liebowitz etal. 
(1985)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1974-1982 3,680 non-elderly (14- 
61) individuals
Insurance plans for 
prescription drugs 
varying by level o f  
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
No change in drug quantities per 
prescription;
No change in use o f  generic drugs
Unmeasured variables such as 
income may influence demand for 
prescriptions
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population
Price variation Main results Limitations
Liebowitz (1989) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1974-1982 3,057 non-elderly (14- 
61) individuals
Insurance plans for 
prescription drugs 
varying by level o f  
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
Decreased probability o f  OTC use 
(31% used OTCs in free plan vs. 
22% in plan with 95% co­
payment);
No evidence o f substitution o f  
OTC for prescription drugs by 
consumers with less generous 
insurance for prescription drugs
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and prices o f  OTC 
medications may influence 
demand for prescriptions
Lillard et al. 
(1999)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1990 1,082 elderly (65+) 
individuals not 
enrolled in an HMO
Supplemental 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, private 
drug coverage, 
private physician 
coverage, Medicare 
only)
Privately insured individuals had 
44% higher odds o f drug use; 
Privately insured individuals had 
$83 more in drug expenditures; 
Medicaid insurance had similar but 
smaller effects
Some variables se lf  reported (such 
as total and OOP drug 
expenditures and prescription drug 
coverage);
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Lingle et al. 
(1987)
Prescription
drugs
(New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania) The 
United States
1975, 1979 9,966 elderly (65+) 
individuals not eligible 
for Medicaid
Introduction in 1977 
o f state drug subsidies 
for low-income 
elderly
Decrease o f $238.50 in inpatient 
expenses (likely due to less 
intensive care per hospital 
admission)
Unmeasured variables such as 
income may influence demand for 
prescriptions;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Link et al. (1980) Inpatient
services,
physician
services
The United States 1976 8,239 elderly (65+) Supplementary 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, private 
insurance, no 
insurance)
Those with chronic conditions and 
private supplementary insurance or 
Medicaid had 42% and 50%, 
respectively, more physician visits 
than those with Medicaid only; 
Those with private supplementary 
insurance or Medicaid had 33% 
and 47%, respectively, more 
hospital days than those with 
Medicaid only
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
use o f  inpatient and physician 
services
Lohr et al. (1986) Medical
services,
prescription
drugs
The United States 1974-1977 5,554 non-elderly 
individuals
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
Cost sharing lowered use for both 
effective and non-effective drugs; 
Cost sharing decreased the 
probability o f  any use o f medical 
care and prescription drugs among 
adults for almost all drugs studied
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
Author (Year)
Outcome
variable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Long (1994) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1990 5,300 elderly (65+) 
individuals
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(employer-sponsored, 
Medigap, or Medicare 
only)
Those with supplemental drug 
coverage had 26% higher spending 
than those without;
Evidence o f  adverse selection into 
the prescription drug insurance 
market
Unmeasured demographic 
information such as sex and age 
which may influence prescriptions; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Lundberg et al. 
(1998)
Prescription
drugs
(Uppsala County) 
Sweden
1995 2,008 individuals (20- 
84)
Hypothetical 
increases o f 9%, 25%, 
56%, 88%, and 150% 
in cost sharing 
requirements
Price sensitivity greatest for 
antitussives (40%) and least for 
climacteric drugs (11%);
Price sensitivity decreased with 
more education, age, and income
Study based on hypothetical rather 
than observed changes in user 
charges
Lurie et al. 
(1984)
Medical
services
(Los Angeles, 
California) The 
United States
1984 186 medically indigent 
adults who were not 
eligible for federal 
assistance programs
Termination of  
medical care that was 
free o f charge 
(patients could pay a 
fee of $20 or $30 or 
choose to undergo a 
screening to 
determine their 
eligibility for free 
care
There was a deterioration in the 
health status o f  medically indigert 
individuals at the six month 
follow-up;
There was a mean increase in 
diastolic blood pressure o f  10 mm 
Hg from base line to the six month 
follow-up
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one region in California; 
Did not control for confounding 
factors through regression
Lurie et al. Medical The United States 1974-1982 3,958 non-elderly Insurance for health Of the individuals that had Did not control for other factors
(1989) services (<62) individuals services with different 
cost sharing (0%,
25%, 50%, 95%)
perceived vision problems at 
enrollment in the experiment, 90% 
on the free plan and 76% on cost 
sharing plans received an eye 
examination;
Once individuals received an eye 
examination, enrollees on all plans 
obtained lenses with similar 
frequency
with regression;
Examined only vision services, 
while co-payments could affect 
use o f other services differently
Lurk et al. (2004) Prescription
drugs
(Kansas City, 
Missouri) The 
United States
1999-2002 Approximately 42,000 
patient visits for low- 
income patients
Co-payments 
increased from $5 for 
generic and $10 for 
brand-name drugs to 
$7.50 for generic and 
$15 for brand-name 
drugs
A $1 increase in the co-payment 
led to a $26.07 drop in prescription 
drug expenditures and a drop in 
the number o f  prescriptions o f  
0.42;
No significant change in the 
number o f  clinic visits after the co­
payment increase
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level; 
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one clinic in Kansas 
City
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Manning and 
Marquis (1996)
Medical
services
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1977-1982 2,138 non-elderly 
(<62) individuals
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (200%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
Increasing out-of-pocket costs 
decreased medical care use;
As the anticipated expenditures for 
medical care increased, the 
demand for health care increased
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education
Manning et al. 
(1981)
Medical
services
(Dayton, Ohio) 
The United States
1974-1977 2,202 non-elderly 
(<62) individuals
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%,
25%, 50%, 95%)
Higher coinsurance reduced both 
the probability o f seeking medical 
care and the amount o f care 
consumed;
The largest coinsurance response 
occurred in the free and 25% 
coinsurance plans
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education
Manning et al. 
(1987)
Medical
services
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1974-1977 5,809 non-elderly 
(<63) individuals
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
The likelihood o f any use was 
86.7% on the free plan, 78.8% on 
the 25% plan, 74.3% on the 50% 
plan, and 68% on the 95% plan; 
The mean predicted expenditure in 
the ffee plan was 46% higher than 
in the 95% plan
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education
Martin and 
McMillan (1996)
Prescription
drugs
(Georgia) The 
United States
1991-1992 1,884 non-elderly and 
elderly low income 
individuals who filled 
at least six 
prescriptions per 
month before policy 
change
Reduction in monthly 
limit from six to five 
reimbursable 
prescriptions
Decrease o f  6.6% in total 
prescription use, decrease o f  9.9% 
in prescriptions reimbursed by 
Medicaid, increase o f 9.7% in 
prescriptions paid OOP;
Decrease in use o f some essential 
therapeutic groups but not others
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one state;
Does not account for individuals 
that chose not to consume more 
than six prescriptions
McAvinchey and
Yannopoulos
(1993)
Inpatient
services
The United 
Kingdom
1955-1987 Individuals in the UK Price difference 
between public and 
private care
The demand for public sector care 
was less elastic in the short term, 
but the opposite was true in the 
longer term;
Cross elasticities indicated that 
private and public acute care could 
be substitutes or complements with 
substitutability dominant in long 
run
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in the supply o f doctors or 
changes in benefits for private 
insurance
Author (Year) Outcomevariable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
McCall et al. 
(1991)
Inpatient
services,
outpatient
and
physician
services
(California, 
Florida, Michigan, 
New Jersey, 
Washington, 
Wisconsin) The 
United States
1982 2,335 elderly (65+) 
individuals
Supplemental 
insurance coverage 
(basic coverage, first- 
dollar coverage, 
none)
Those who characterized their 
health as fair or poor and had 
supplemental insurance had 31% 
more hospital days;
Those who characterized their 
health as fair or poor and had 
supplemental insurance used 42% 
more Medicare Part B services
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to six states
McDavid et al. 
(2003)
Medical
Services
(Kentucky) The 
United States
1995-1999 Adults (15+): 7,661 
with colectoral cancer; 
12,477 with lung 
cancer; 8,758 with 
breast cancer; and 
6,959 with prostate 
cancer
Insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, Medicare, 
Medicare + 
supplementary, other 
federally funded, 
private, unknown, 
none)
Individuals with private insurance 
had higher rates o f  colectoral 
cancer survival than individuals 
with no or unknown insurance; 
Individuals with private insurance 
also had higher rates o f lung 
cancer survival than individuals 
with all other insurance types
Unmeasured variables such as 
income, number o f children, 
education, quality o f cancer 
treatment;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one state
McDonald etal. 
(1974)
Physician
services
Montreal, Quebec 
- Canada
1969-1972 Approximately 22,500 
individuals
Introduction o f health 
insurance
After the introduction of  
insurance, physician consultations 
for 13 o f 14 selected symptoms 
increased;
Little change in physician 
consultations for trivial complaints
Did not control for confounding 
factors through regression
McManus etal. 
(1996)
Prescription
drugs
Australia 1989-1994 Beneficiaries o f  
Australian National 
Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme, 
subgroup o f elderly 
(retired servicemen 
and women -  
Repatriation group)
Increase in co­
payment from $11 to 
$15 for general 
population; 
Introduction o f  $2.50 
co-payment for 
seniors and low 
income
For Repatriation group, smaller 
decrease in use o f both classes o f  
drugs and more rapid return to pre­
co-payment levels
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in supply o f  pharmacists 
and GPs could be important
McWilliams et 
al. (2004)
Medical
services
The United States 1992,2000 8,736 adults who were 
near elderly (55-64) in 
1992 and did not have 
public insurance 
coverage
Insurance coverage
(continuously insured,
intermittently
uninsured,
continuously
uninsured)
Mortality was significantly greater 
for uninsured adults;
Uninsured individuals with low 
incomes or with diabetes or 
cardiovascular disease were at 
higher risk o f  mortality
No information on the extent o f  
insurance coverage;
Did not account for gains or losses 
in insurance over the study period
Mojtabai and Prescription The United States 2000 10,413 elderly (65+) Individuals faced While only 7% o f  all Medicare Cross-sectional study, thus
Olfson (2003) drugs different levels o f  beneficiaries reported cost-related difficult to control for other
cost sharing non-adherence, more than 20% o f  unmeasured factors that influence
depending on the low-income beneficiaries with prescription drug utilization
generosity o f their OOP drug spending greater than
insurance coverage $ 1000 reported this
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Monheit et al. 
(1985)
Physician
services,
inpatient
services
The United States 1977, 1980 Non-elderly (16-64) 
individuals (sample 
size not given)
Insurance coverage 
(private, public, none)
About 62% o f uninsured 
individuals visited the physician 
compared to almost 77% o f the 
insured
Fewer than 5% o f the uninsured 
were hospitalized compared to 
more than 11% o f the insured
Didn't control for confounding 
factors through regression
Mortimer (1997) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1991-1993 3,397 individuals 
receiving
antidepressants and 
1,426 receiving beta 
blockers
Insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, HMO, 
commercial 
insurance, uninsured)
For both antidepressants and beta 
blockers, price and quantity were 
negatively related;
The most negative coefficiert was 
for Medicaid patients, followed by 
HMO patients, commercial plan 
patients, and self-pay patients in 
both groups
Unmeasured variables such as 
income;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Motheral and 
Fairman (2001)
Prescription
drugs
(Midwest region) 
The United States
1997-1998,
1998-1999
6,811 enrollees with 
employer-sponsored 
insurance as group 
with change, 13,279 
enrollees in 
comparison group 
with no change
Change from 2-tier 
system with $7 co­
payment for generic 
and $12 for brand 
drug to 3-tier system 
with $15 co-payment 
for formulary brand 
drug and $25 for non­
formulary drug
The group with a 2-tier co­
payment had larger increases in 
total prescription claims and tier 2 
and 3 claims than the group with a 
3-tier co-payment;
No differences in office visit rates, 
emergency room visits, or 
inpatient visits between groups
Analysis was limited to enrollees 
with employer-sponsored 
insurance who may be healthier 
and wealthier than the general 
population;
Information may be lost tt the 
aggregate level
Motheral and
Henderson
(1999)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1996-1997 4,091 adults (18+) 
enrolled in two 
employer-sponsored 
plans
Increase in co­
payment for brand 
name from $10-$ 15, 
smaller co-payment 
increase for generic 
drugs ($4-$5 for one 
group, and $5-$7 for 
another) for 
individuals in 
employer plans
No change in overall utilization 
but decrease use o f  brand drugs 
(discretionary only) and increased 
use o f generic drugs (discretionary 
and essential)
Individuals in employer health 
insurance plans likely to be 
healthier;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Nelson et al. 
(1984)
Prescription
drugs
(Tennessee) The 
United States
1976-1979 17,811 low-income 
individuals (Medicaid 
recipients) using 5+ 
prescriptions in year 
prior to co-payment
Introduction o f $0.50 
co-payment
26% decrease in number o f  
prescriptions obtained;
39% decrease in average cost for 
prescriptions for the state
Differences between control 
groups;
Does not account for individuals 
that chose not to consume more 
than five prescriptions
Author (Year) Outcomevariable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Newhouse
(1981)
Medical
services
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1974-1977 7,706 non-elderly 
(<62) individuals
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
Expenditure per person with full 
coverage approximately 60% 
greater than those with 95% 
coverage plan, and expenditure in 
the other plans fell between these 
two extremes;
Cost sharing reduced inappropriate 
and appropriate hospital days by 
about the same;
Individuals with free care were 
more likely to make at least one 
physician visit and have at least 
one hospital admission
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education
Newhouse
(1993)
Medical
services,
inpatient
services,
prescription
drugs
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1977-1982 3,988 non-elderly 
individuals
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
The mean predicted expenditure in 
the free plan was 46% higher than 
in the 95% plan;
The outpatient-only cost sharing 
plan reduced expenditures, mainly 
by reducing the probability o f any 
use;
The variation in prescription drug 
expenditures mainly due to the rate 
o f  provider visits, not from the 
expenditure on drugs per visit
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education
Newhouse and 
Phelps (1974)
Physician
visits,
inpatient
services
The United States 1963 854 employed 
individuals
Individuals faced 
different coinsurance 
rates and deductibles
Individuals with complete 
coverage chose hospitals with 
more expensive room and board 
rates;
Individuals with complete 
coverage also chose physicians 
with higher charges
Unknown bias from excluding 
non-labor force participants; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
inpatient and physician utilization
Newhouse and 
Phelps (1976)
Physician
visits,
inpatient
services
The United States 1963 4,552 individuals 
without deductibles in 
their health insurance 
policies
Individuals faced 
different OOP prices 
for medical care
Elasticity o f  demand for physician 
services was higher than for 
inpatient services;
Larger families were more 
sensitive to changes in the prices 
o f  physician services than to 
changes in the prices o f  inpatient 
services
Self-reported data on health care 
utilization;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
inpatient and physician utilization
Author (Year) Outcomevariable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Nolan (1993) Inpatient
services,
physician
services
Ireland 1987 3,294 households Full care was free o f  
charge, free inpatient 
services but not free 
primary care, no 
public coverage for 
hospital care; Some 
individuals have 
private insurance 
coverage
Individuals with free GP care had 
more visits than those who had to 
pay OOP;
Individuals with health insurance 
were more likely to have an 
inpatient visit and had longer 
average inpatient stays than those 
without insurance
Cross-sectional study and thus 
difficult to control for other 
confounding factors
O'Brien (1989) Prescription
drugs
(England and 
Wales) The 
United Kingdom
1969-1986 216 monthly 
observations, NHS 
beneficiaries not 
exempt from co­
payments
Change in co­
payment from £0.125 
to £2.20
A negative relationship between 
the prescription charge and the 
number o f  prescriptions dispensed 
that were not exempt from 
prescription charges
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in supply o f pharmacists 
and GPs could be important
O'Grady et al. 
(1985)
Emergency
department
services
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1974-1977 3,973 non-elderly 
(<62) individuals
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
Individuals with 95% cost sharing 
were 70% more likely to visit the 
emergency department than those 
on the free plan;
Those with coinsurance were less 
likely to visit the emergency room 
both for diagnoses categorized as 
more urgent and diagnoses 
categorized as less urgent
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education
Ong et al. (2003) Prescription
drugs
(Stockholm)
Sweden
1990-1999 Individuals o f  all ages 
(size o f sample not 
specified)
Co-payment changes 
or reforms over time
In most cases, pharmaceutical 
consumption did not decrease as 
consumer costs increased;
Only antidepressant use among 
women was permanently reduced 
after the 1997 reforms
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in supply o f pharmacists 
and GPs could be important
Overpeck and 
Kotch (1990)
Medical
services
The United States 1988 17,110 children (<18) Insurance coverage 
(coverage, none)
Compared to those with coverage, 
rates o f  totally medically attended 
injuries ranged from 1.70 at ages 
12-17 and 0.80 at ages <6 for those 
without coverage
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and family size; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Ozminkowski et Prescription The United States 1996-2000 1,807 individuals with Individuals faced A 1% increase in the share o f  drug The results may be more dramatic
al. (2004) drugs Multiple Sclerosis 
under employer- 
sponsored plans
different levels o f  
cost sharing 
depending on the 
generosity o f their 
insurance coverage
expenditure accounted for by drug 
co-payments led to an approximate 
14% decrease in the rate o f  new 
drug use
if  extended to populations that are 
not privately insured;
Limited to those with MS so 
results may differ for individuals 
that do not have MS
Author (Year)
Outcome
variable
(Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Patrick et al. 
(1992)
Inpatient
services,
physician
and
outpatient
visits
(Washington) The 
United States
Not given 1,127 low-income 
families
Insurance coverage 
(has insurance, no 
insurance)
Uninsured families made fewer 
ambulatory visits and had fewer 
hospitalizations in the 3 months 
prior to the interview;
Uninsured families reported more 
often that the emergency room was 
their usual source o f  care
May not be generalizable because 
limited to parts o f  Washington; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
inpatient and physician utilization
Phelps and 
Newhouse 
(1972)
Physician
services,
outpatient
services
(California) The 
United States
1966-1968 5,134 observations for 
all members o f the 
Palo Alto Group 
Health Plan
Introduction o f 25% 
coinsurance
Evidence that time costs 
influenced the demand for medical 
visits (female workers used less 
than female dependents)
Unable to determine if patients 
purchased supplementary 
insurance;
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and substitutes like non­
clinic doctors
Phelps and 
Newhouse 
(1974)
Inpatient
services,
physician
services,
prescription
drugs
Multiple countries 1962 All ages Introduction of 
coinsurance
Services with high time price have 
low coverage elasticities and 
relatively high time price 
elasticities;
Services with high money price 
have higher own price elasticities
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
inpatient, physician, and 
prescription drug utilization
Phelps (1975) Inpatient
services,
physician
services
The United States 1971 11,882 individuals Individuals faced 
different coinsurance 
rates
Negative relationship between 
coinsurance and hospital length of  
stay and hospital expense per 
admission;
Demand for physician visits is 
over twice as high at full coverage 
as with no insurance
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and household size; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
inpatient and physician utilization
Piette et al. 
(2004)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 2002 4,055 adults that were 
chronically ill
Individuals faced 
different out-of- 
pocket costs for 
prescription drugs and 
had prescription drug 
insurance or none
Individuals with higher out-of- 
pocket medication costs had 
greater odds o f underuse o f 
medicines in 9 o f  10 medicine 
classes;
Cost-related adherence problems 
most prevalent among individuals 
taking medication for arthritis, 
depression, back pain, asthma, 
migraines, and stomach ulcers
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization; 
Problems with reporting o f 
compliance (recall bias and social 
desirability)
Author (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) Country Study dates Study population Price variation Main results Limitations
Pilote et al. 
(2002)
Prescription
drugs
(Quebec) Canada 1994-1998 22,066 elderly (65+) 
individuals who had 
been admitted to acute 
care hospitals with 
discharge o f 
myocardial infarction
Change from CDN $2 
co-payment to 2.5% 
coinsurance fee with 
annual ceilings 
depending on income; 
Income-based 
deductible added in 
1997
Policy reform had no effect on 
prescription rates, persistence o f  
drug therapy, adherence to drug 
therapy, mortality rates, 
readmissions for complications, or 
outpatient physician and 
emergency department visits
Results only applied to use o f  
prescriptions after a myocardial 
infarction and response to co­
payments could differ for other 
ailments
Poirier et al. 
(1998)
Prescription
drugs
(Quebec) Canada 1991-1993 Elderly (65+): 9336  
users o f
antihypertensives, 
19,457 users o f  
benzodiazepines
Introduction o f CDN 
$2 co-payment up to 
CDN $100 annual 
maximum
Small decrease in refill rate for 
antihypertensives;
No change for benzodiazepines
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
Poisal and Chulis 
(2000)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1996 Elderly (65+) 
individuals (sample 
size not given)
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, employer- 
sponsored, individual- 
purchased, Medicare 
HMOs, other 
insurance, Medicare 
only)
Compared to those without 
coverage, those with coverage 
filled 19%-43% more prescriptions 
and incurred 45%-100% higher 
drug expenditures, depending on 
level o f  health status
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
Poisal and 
Murray (2001)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1997-1998 Elderly (65+) 
individuals
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, employer- 
sponsored, individual- 
purchased, Medicare 
HMOs, other public, 
Medicare only)
Medicaid beneficiaries without 
drug coverage used 18 fewer 
prescriptions than Medicaid 
beneficiaries with coverage; 
Beneficiaries without drug 
coverage spent $546 OOP 
compared with $325 OOP spent by 
beneficiaries with coverage
Total drug prices sometimes had to 
be estimated;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Puig-Junoy
(1988)
Prescription
drugs
Spain 1967-1983 17 annual 
observations, 
aggregate country data
Price changes o f 
prescription drugs 
over time
Evidence that pensioners 
purchased prescriptions on behalf 
o f  individuals facing coinsurance
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Raynaud (2002) Prescription
drugs
France 1992, 1995 
and 1997
9,000 households Supplementary 
insurance coverage 
(CMU, other 
coverage, none)
The probability o f pharmaceutical 
consumption in a year was 85% 
for those with supplementary 
coverage;
The same probability was only 
73% for those without 
supplementary coverage
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
A uthor (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation
M ain results L im itations
Raynaud (2003) Prescription
drugs
France 2000 9,000 households, 
including 500 
benefiting from CMU 
coverage
Supplementary 
insurance coverage 
(CMU, other 
coverage, none)
Pharmaceutical spending was 32% 
higher for those with CMU 
coverage compared to those with 
no supplementary coverage and 
16% higher compared to those 
with other types o f supplementary 
coverage
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Raynaud(2005) Prescription
drugs
France 2000, 2002 18,500 individuals Supplementary 
prescription drug 
coverage (CMU, 
other coverage, none)
Individuals with CMU had a 
higher probability o f incurring 
drug expenditures (90%) 
compared to those with other types 
o f supplementary coverage (85%) 
and those with no supplementary 
coverage (73%);
Those with CMU had 21% higher 
pharmaceutical spending than 
those without supplementary 
coverage
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Rector et al. 
(2003)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1998-1999 Members o f four 
employer health plans: 
1,874 using ACE1 
inhibitors, 2,826 using 
PPIs, 4,443 using 
statins
Introduction o f a 
tiered co-payment 
plan where patients 
paid a different co­
payment based on 
whether the dmg was 
preferred or not 
preferred
Use o f preferred brands did not 
increase as much in the non-tiered 
group;
Effect o f tiered co-payments did 
not depend on size o f co-payment 
differential between preferred and 
non-preferred groups
Did not control for amount o f  co­
payment or differences in co­
payments between plans;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to four employers in one 
state
Reeder and 
Nelson (1985)
Prescription
drugs
(South Carolina) 
The United States
1976-1979 62,176 low-income 
individuals (Medicaid 
recipients) using 6+ 
prescriptions in year 
prior to co-payment
Introduction o f $0.50 
co-payment
With the exception o f  the 
analgesic and sedative groups, a 
significant decline in the level of 
drug expenditures;
Decrease in long-term use and 
costs in 4 o f 10 groups: 
cardiovascular, cholinergic, 
diuretic, and psychotherapeutic
Does not account for individuals 
that chose not to consume more 
than six prescriptions
Reuveni etal. 
(2002)
Prescription
drugs
Israel 1999 779 children and 
adolescents ages 0-18 
diagnosed with acute 
infectious disease for 
which drugs were 
prescribed
Individuals facing 
different cost sharing 
requirements
One o f the main reasons for poor 
compliance with medical treatment 
was the income level o f the 
patient's family;
Families with low income, 
overcrowded living conditions, 
and more drugs per prescription 
were less likely to purchase drugs
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one health care center; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
amount o f cost sharing 
requirement would have added 
more information
A uthor (Year) Outcom evariable
(Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation M ain results L im itations
Roemer et al. 
(1975)
Physician
services,
inpatient
services
San Francisco, 
Ventura, and 
Tulare, California 
- the United States
1971-1972 10,687 Medicaid 
individuals with the 
co-payment; 29,975 
Medicaid individuals 
without the co­
payment
Introduction o f $1 co­
payment for first two 
doctor visits each 
month; $0.50 co­
payment for first two 
drug prescriptions per 
month
Individuals with co-payments 
made fewer doctor visits than 
individuals without co-payments; 
An increase in hospitalizations in 
the co-payment group compared to 
the no co-payment group
May not be generalizable because 
limited to the state o f California; 
There could be underlying 
differences between the use o f  
medical care between the cortrol 
group and the study group, even if 
both had no co-payments;
Did not control for other factors 
through regression
Rogowski etal. 
(1997)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1990 996 elderly (66+) 
individuals
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid,
prescription coverage, 
physician coverage, 
Medicare only)
Those with drug coverage: 4 times 
greater odds o f  prescrption drug 
use than for those with no 
insurance;
Those with drug coverage spent 
50% less as a share o f household 
income on prescription drugs 
compared to those with no 
insurance
No information on the extent o f  
drug coverage;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Rosenthal (1964) Inpatient
services
The United States 1950,1960 Non-federal short­
term general and 
specialist hospitals
Individuals faced 
different prices for 
inpatient care
The price o f  care had a significant 
negative effect on the demand for 
hospital care in 1960;
The variable indicating the percent 
o f  the population with insurance 
coverage was significantly and 
positively related to the demand 
for inpatient care
The price variable included was 
not the out-of-pocket price to the 
patient and may have been 
unrelated to what the consumer 
paid;
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Rosenthal (1968) Inpatient
services
(Maine, New  
Hampshire, 
Vermont, 
Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island) The 
United States
1962 15,685 hospital 
admissions
Patients faced 
different total 
inpatient bills and 
average daily room 
charges
The results suggested that there is 
likely to be a lower price elasticity 
o f demand for short hospital 
lengths o f  stay;
The price elasticity o f demand 
differed across categories o f  
admissions
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
inpatient utilization;
Did not use out-of-pocket price but 
rather the total price o f the service
Rosett and 
Huang (1973)
Medical
services
The United States 1960 2,602 households with 
positive income
Individuals faced 
different prices for 
medical care
Low-income individuals at risk o f  
illness are likely to purchase 
insurance for the worst and least 
probable risks but self-insure 
against more probable smaller 
losses;
At higher incomes, the elasticity o f  
income was greater
Unmeasured variables such as 
health status o f individuals in 
household;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
medical care utilization
A uthor (Year) Outcom evariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation Main results L im itations
Ryan and Birch 
(1991)
Prescription
drugs
(England and 
Wales) The 
United Kingdom
1979-1985 NHS beneficiaries not 
exempt from co­
payments
Change in co­
payment from £0.20 
to £2.00
From 1979-1985, prescription 
charged increased by 490% in real 
terms, while rate o f prescriptions 
dispensed per capita in the 
population not exempt from 
charges decreased by 33%
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in supply o f pharmacists 
and GPs could be important
Safran et al. 
(2002)
Prescription
drugs
(Illinois, 
Michigan, New 
York,
Pennsylvania, 
California, 
Colorado, Ohio, 
and Texas) The 
United States
2001 10,416 elderly (65+) 
individuals
Different types o f  
prescription drug 
coverage
Patients without drug coverage 
were 2.8 times more likely to skip 
doses and 2.3 times more likely to 
spend less on basic necessities; 
25% o f  low-income seniors with 
Medigap or HMO drug coverage 
reported not filling prescriptions, 
and >20% skipped doses
Self-reported information on drug 
coverage;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Scheffler(1984) Inpatient
services,
physician
services
(Pennsylvania) 
The United States
1977 5,928 non-elderly 
(<65) individuals
Introduction o f a 
$250 inpatient 
deductible, 40% 
coinsurance rate, and 
family maximum 
liability o f $500
45% decline in the probability o f  
hospital admission after cost 
sharing while length o f iipatient 
stays and hospital expenditures per 
admission increased;
35% decline in the probability o f  
having a physician visit, and the 
number o f  physician visits 
physician expenditures decreased
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one area;
There was a rumor that the cost 
sharing requirements were only 
temporary (during the time period 
o f the study), and this could have 
influenced consumption
Schoen etal. 
(2001)
Prescription
drugs
Chicago, Illinois -  
the United States
N/A 163 patients with 
cardiovascular disease 
who did not have 
prescription drug 
coverage
Patients without 
prescription drug 
coverage were given 
assistance for 
prescription drugs
The mean LDL cholesterol level 
decreased for patients on lipid- 
lowering drugs after they received 
assistance with prescriptions; 
Patient drug adherence improved 
from 49% at baseline to 73% at six 
months
Did not control for other factors 
through regression;
Study limited to group o f ill 
patients in one city -  results may 
be different for less disadvantaged 
patients
Schulz et al. 
(1995)
Prescription
drugs
(South Carolina) 
The United States
Not given 19 low-income 
individuals who were 
"affected by 
prescription cap"
Cap o f three 
prescriptions per 
month
7 patients reduced frequency o f  
dosing;
8 patients did not obtain a 
prescription at some point
Very small sample (19 
individuals);
May not be generalizable because 
limited to small site;
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
A uthor (Year) Outcomevariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation M ain results Lim itations
Scitovsky and 
McCall (1977)
Physician
services,
outpatient
services
California, the 
United States
1966-1968 3,819 non-elderly 
(<65) members o f  the 
Palo Alto Group 
Health Plan
Introduction o f 25% 
coinsurance
Some evidence thzt lowest 
socioeconomic group responded 
more to the increase in cost 
sharing
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Unable to determine if patients 
purchased supplementary 
insurance;
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and substitutes like non­
clinic doctors
Scitovsky and 
Snyder(1972)
Physician
services,
outpatient
services
California, the 
United States
1966-1968 2,567 non-elderly 
(<65) members o f the 
Palo Alto Group 
Health Plan
Introduction o f  25% 
coinsurance
Some evidence that lowest 
socioeconomic group responded 
more to the increase in cost 
sharing;
Male subscribers reduced 
utilization markedly less than other 
groups
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Unable to determine if patients 
purchased supplementary 
insurance;
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and substitutes like non­
clinic doctors
Scott etal. 
(1990)
Prescription
drugs
(Minneapolis, 
Minnesota) The 
United States
1983 145 ear infection 
episodes from near- 
poor Medicaid 
ineligible patients at 
an urban health center
Introduction o f co­
payment for 
prescription drugs 
(unknown size)
Decreases in antibiotics were 
greater for the self-paid group than 
for the Medicaid group;
For the self-paid patients, 
physician prescribing o f  die 
higher-cost antibiotics declined, 
while prescribing o f  the lower-cost 
antibiotics increased
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one urban health clinic; 
Small sample;
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
Scott etal. 
(2003)
Physician
services
New Zealand 1996-1997 7,862 adults Individuals with CSC 
card paid NZ $20 to 
NZ $30 per physician 
visit, while everyone 
else paid NZ $35 to 
NZ $45 per physician 
visit
Individuals subsidized by the 
government were more likely to 
visit the physicians once, but not 
more likely to visit the physician 
frequently;
Unemployed individuals were not 
more likely to make at least one 
physician visit but were more 
likely to be frequent users
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
physician utilization
A uthor (Year) Outcom evariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation M ain results L im itations
Selby et al. 
(1996)
Emergency
department
care
(California) The 
United States
1992-1993 30,276 non-elderly 
(<64) employees and 
dependents with HMO 
insurance
Introduction o f  $25- 
$35 co-payment for 
emergency 
department care
Emergency visits were 27% higher 
in control group 1 and 7% higher 
in control group 2 than in study 
group;
For visits defined as "always an 
emergency", little decline in 
emergency visits, but for visits 
defined as less severe, greater 
declines in the co-payment group 
than in the control group
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one region in California; 
Employees and dependents likely 
to be healthier and have higher 
income
Shapiro et al. 
(1986)
Physician
services
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1974-1977 3,539 non-elderly, 
adult individuals (17- 
61)
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
Individuals assigned to cost 
sharing plans 1/3 less likely to visit 
a physician for a minor symptom; 
Among those reporting a serious 
symptom, the percentage seeking 
care was only significantly 
different for cost sharing and free 
plans at the 10% level
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
physician utilization
Shih (1999) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1993-1997 10,214 elderly (65+) 
individuals enrolled in 
Medicare End Stage 
Renal Disease 
program
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, employer- 
sponsored, Medicare 
HMOs, other 
insurance, Medicare 
only)
9-10% increase in number o f  
prescription drugs per person with 
supplemental drug insurance 
coverage
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
physician utilization
S iuetal. (1986) Inpatient
services
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1974-1977 1,132 hospitalized 
adults (17-61)
Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
Cost sharing decreased both 
appropriate and inappropriate 
admissions and hospital days by 
about the same amount;
Cost sharing for outpatient 
services did not cause a higher rate 
o f  inappropriate admissions or 
hospital days
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
physician utilization
A uthor (Year) Outcom evariable (Region) C ountry
Study dates Study population Price variation M ain results L im itations
Smart and Stabile
(2005)
Prescription
drugs
Canada 1986, 1988, 
1990, 1992, 
1994, 1996, 
1998, 2000
91,327 individuals 
over 8 years
Change in 1987 from 
tax deductions to tax 
credits for medical 
care costs exceeding a 
pre-defined threshold 
(in 2000, CDN $1637 
or 17% o f the 
individual's net 
income, whichever is 
less)
As the after-tax price o f health 
care rose, the probability o f any 
spending on health care and 
prescription drugs fell;
As the after-tax price o f medical 
care rose by CDN $1, spending on 
prescription drugs fell by 26.4%
Unmeasured variables such as 
health status and employment
Smith (1993) Prescription
drugs
The United States 1989 212 individuals in 
employer groups 
covered by one 
national managed care 
company
Variation in co­
payment from $1 to 
$8 between different 
employer groups
Changing the co-payment from $3- 
$5 led to little change in total drug 
costs, but total prescriptions per 
person decreased by 5% and 
ingredient costs per prescription 
increased by about 5%;
Changing the co-payment from $3- 
$5 also decreased employer costs 
by 10%
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and education;
Small sample;
Individuals with employment more 
likely to be healthy
Smith and Gamer 
(1974)
Prescription
drugs
(Mississippi) The 
United States
1970-1971 241 individuals with 
Medicaid
Introduction of  
Medicaid program in 
Mississippi with free 
prescriptions
Prior to Medicaid, the average 
number o f  prescriptions was 5.43 
per person, and after the program 
began, the average number of  
prescriptions was 9.48 per person; 
Little evidence that physicians 
increased the size o f  prescriptions 
after implementation o f Medicaid
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
May not be general izable because 
limited to one area in Mississippi; 
Small sample
Smith and 
Watson (1990)
Prescription
drugs
The United 
Kingdom
1979-1984 42,901 NHS 
beneficiaries not 
exempt from co­
payments
Change in co­
payment from £0.45 
to £1.60
A negative relationship between 
the prescription charge and the 
number o f prescriptions dispensed 
that were not exempt from 
prescription charges;
As the price o f substitute 
proprietary medicines increased, 
the number of prescription 
dispensed increased
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in supply o f  pharmacists 
and GPs could be important
Soumerai et al. 
(1987)
Prescription
drugs
(New Hampshire) 
The United States
1980-1983 10,734 elderly (60+), 
low-income Medicaid 
recipients
Introduction o f cap o f  
3 reimbursable 
prescriptions per 
month;
Replacement o f cap 
by $1 co-payment
After cap: 30% decrease in 
number o f prescription, 58% 
decrease in discretionary drugs, 
28% decrease in essential drugs; 
After co-payment: return tojust 
below precap levels
May not be general izable because 
limited to one state
A uthor (Year) Outcom evariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation M ain results L im itations
Soumerai et al. 
(1991)
Prescription
drugs
(New Hampshire) 
The United States
1980-1983 411 non-elderly, low- 
income Medicaid 
recipients that were 
chronically ill
Introduction o f cap o f  
3 reimbursable 
prescriptions per 
month;
Replacement o f cap 
by $1.00 co-payment
After the introduction o f  the cap, 
there was a 30% decrease in 
number o f prescriptions, 58% 
decrease in discretionary drugs, 
28% decrease in essential drugs; 
After the introduction o f  the co­
payment, there was a return to just 
below precap levels
May not be general izable because 
limited to one state
Soumerai et al. 
(1994)
(New Hampshire) 
The United States
1980-1983 10,734 non-elderly 
(19-60), low-income 
individuals with 
schizophrenia
Introduction o f cap of  
3 reimbursable 
prescriptions per 
month; replacement 
o f  cap by $1 co­
payment
After cap: decrease o f 15%-49% in 
use o f  psychotropic drugs;
After cap: increase in use o f  
emergency mental health services 
and partial hospitalization, 
increase in mental health care 
costs 17 times greater than drug 
savings;
After co-payment: drug use and 
services reverted to precap level
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one state
Spillman (1992) Medical
services,
inpatient
services,
emergency
room
services
The United States 1980 10,009 non-elderly 
(<65) individuals
Insurance coverage 
(insurance, none)
Uninsured individuals were less 
likely to use at least one 
nonemergency service and used 
fewer nonemergency services; 
Uninsured adults were less likely 
to use any emergency services, but 
among individuals with at least 
one emergency visit, only 
uninsured men had fewer visits 
than insured men
Unmeasured variables such as 
usual source o f care; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
medical care utilization
Starmans etal. 
(1994)
Prescription
drugs
The Netherlands 1978-1986 760,000 beneficiaries 
in four Sickness Funds 
using
antihypertensives
Introduction o f co­
payment o f NLG 2.50 
for;
Removal o f 30 day 
limit on prescriptions
No effects on drug use (decrease in 
prescriptions, but simultaneous 
increase in number o f  units per 
prescription)
Unmeasured variables such as 
changes in supply o f pharmacists, 
changes in average age and sex of  
GPs could be important;
Cost sharing may have different 
effect on other drug classes
Steffensen et al. 
(1997)
Prescription
drugs
(North Jutland) 
Denmark
1993-1996 All prescriptions o f  
antibiotics
Increase in co­
payment for 
tetracyclines from 
50% to 100% and 
increase in co­
payment for other 
antibiotics from 25% 
to 50% in Jan 1996
Prescriptions o f  antibiotics 
decreased 13% from the previous 
year after the increase in co­
payments;
Prescriptions o f  tetracyclines 
dropped 42% after the loss o f  
reimbursement
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
A uthor (Year) O utcom evariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation M ain results L im itations
Steinman et al. 
(2001)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1995-1996 4,896 elderly (70+) 
individuals who 
regularly used 
prescriptions
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(none, some, full)
Whereas only 2% o f  individuals 
with full coverage reported non- 
compliance, 3% o f  individuals 
with partial coverage and 7.7% of 
individuals with no drug coverage 
reported non-compliance
Self-reported information; 
Unmeasured variables may 
account for some o f  the variance in 
rates o f medication restriction 
(such as depression)
Stuart and Grana 
(1995)
Prescription
drugs
(Pennsylvania) 
The United States
1990 2,962 elderly (65+) 
individuals enrolled in 
Medicare Part A and 
B, restricted to 
individuals reporting a 
serious health problem 
and receiving at least 
one medication for 
this
Drug insurance 
coverage (Medicaid, 
PACE, prescription 
coverage, physician 
coverage, none or 
other)
10%-15% increase in the 
probability o f  use o f prescription 
drugs (vs. OTC) with drug 
insurance coverage
No price information for OTC 
drugs;
May not be general izable because 
limited to one state; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
physician utilization
Stuart and Grana 
(1998)
Prescription
drugs
(Pennsylvania) 
The United States
1990 1,302 elderly (65+) 
low-income, Medicaid 
eligible individuals not 
enrolled in an HMO
Drug insurance 
coverage (employer- 
sponsored, Medicaid, 
or state-sponsored)
Co-payment recipients in fair 
health reported 40% fewer 
prescriptions than their 
counterparts in non-co-payment 
states;
Co-payment recipients in poor 
health reported 27% fewer 
prescriptions than their 
counterparts in non-co-payment 
states
May not be general izable because 
limited to one state;
Limited sample o f Medicaid 
beneficiaries;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
physician utilization
Stuart and Zacker 
(1999)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1992 1,302 elderly (65+) 
low-income, Medicaid 
eligible individuals not 
enrolled in an HMO
Variation in state- 
specific Medicaid co­
payments; 18 states 
without co-payment 
and 21 with ($0.50- 
$3)
12% decrease in probability o f  
prescription drug use and 7% 
decrease in prescriptions filled 
among users in co-payment states 
compared to states without co­
payments;
Coverage increased the odds o f 
drug use for 10 o f  22 conditions
Limited sample o f Medicaid 
beneficiaries;
Limited number o f  control 
variables for health status;
No information on the extent o f  
drug coverage
Stuart et al. 
(2000)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1996 Elderly (65+) 
individuals
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, employer- 
sponsored, individual- 
purchased, Medicare 
HMOs, other 
insurance, Medicare 
only)
Among those in poor health, those 
with no coverage filled 35% fewer 
prescriptions than those with 
coverage;
Continuous prescription drug 
coverage was associated with 
higher use o f  prescription drugs 
and higher unit costs
No information on the extent o f  
drug coverage;
Did not control for other factors 
with regression
A uthor (Y ear) Outcom evariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation Main results L im itations
Swedish National 
Board o f  Health 
and Welfare 
(Socialstyrelsen) 
(1997)
Prescription
drugs
Sweden 1997 5,975 adults (18-84) New medical bill 
passed in 1996 
capping total yearly 
out-of-pocket 
prescription drug 
costs at 1300 SKr and 
adding deductibles for 
prescription drugs
A little more than half o f  
households reported foregoing 
prescriptions because o f price; 
Those who were more likely to 
report price as a reason for 
foregoing a prescription were 
unemployed, students, on long­
term sick leave, early retired, or 
working at home
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Did not attempt to look at how 
new cost sharing requirements 
influenced Swedish individuals
Taira et al. 
(2006)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1999-2004 patients with a 
114,232 with managed 
care and a diagnosis o f 
hypertension that 
filled at least one 
prescription
Co-payments were $5 
for generic drugs, $20 
for preferred brand- 
name drugs, and $20- 
$265 for non- 
preferred drugs
Compliance for antihypertensive 
medications was 67% for tier 1 
drugs, 66% for tier 2 drugs, and 
55% for tier 3 drugs;
There were additional disparities 
in compliance between the most 
and least expensive drugs within a 
therapeutic class
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization; 
Compliance rates for individuals 
without managed care may be 
different
Tamblyn et al. 
(2001)
Prescription
drugs
(Quebec) Canada 1993-1997 120,000 elderly (65+) 
and low-income 
recipients o f  social 
assistance
For elderly: CDN $2 
co-payment to 
coinsurance and 
deductibles with max 
annual charge o f  
CDN $200-$925;
For social assistance: 
no co-payment to 
coinsurance and 
deductibles with max 
quarterly charge o f  
CDN $50
The incidence o f  a prescription 
drug subsidy for seniors is less 
progressive than a percentage-of- 
income cash transfer, though at 
most only mildly;
The reduction in prescription drug 
budget share upon implementation 
o f  a subsidy is only slightly laiger 
for low-income than for high- 
income households
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Thomas et al. 
(1996)
Prescription
drugs
(Northeast region) 
United States
1993 1,386 patients who 
had experienced 
abdominal pain, 
asthma, chest pain, 
hand lacerations, head 
trauma, or first- 
trimester vaginal 
bleeding
Insurance coverage 
(insurance, none)
Individuals without insurance were 
less likely to fill a prescription 
after an emergency department 
discharge
May not be general izable because 
limited to five urban teaching 
hospital emergency departments in 
the northeastern US;
No information on the extent o f 
insurance coverage
A uthor (Year) Outcom evariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation M ain results L im itations
Thomas et al. 
(2002)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 2001 29,435 elderly (65+) 
individuals with 
employer-sponsored 
prescription drug 
insurance 
administered by a 
national PBM
Individuals faced 
different levels o f  
cost sharing 
depending on the 
generosity o f their 
prescription drug 
insurance coverage
Members in plans with higher cost 
sharing had higher out-of-pocket 
costs as a percentage o f total 
expenditures;
Co-payment incentives led plan 
members to purchase less costly 
generic drugs
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Tseng et al. 
(2003)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 2001 438,802 individuals 
with Medicare+Choice 
who filled at least one 
prescription
Individuals faced 
drug reimbursement 
caps o f $750 to $2000 
per year
After exceeding the cap, patient 
average OOP costs increased from 
$79-$ 100 per month to $179-$305 
per month;
O f the twenty medications with the 
highest total prescription 
expenditures for patients, 15 were 
for chronic conditions
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Valdez (1986) Medical
services
(Areas in
Washington,
Ohio,
Massachusetts, 
and South 
Carolina) The 
United States
1974-1982 1,844 children (<14) Insurance for health 
services with different 
cost sharing (0%, 
25%, 50%, 95%)
No differences in health status 
between those with free care and 
those with cost sharing for the 
typical child participant;
For most measures o f  health status, 
no differences in health status 
between poor children with free 
care and poor children with cost 
sharing
Unmeasured variables such as 
marital status and education
Van de Voorde et 
al. (2001)
Physician
services
Belgium 1986-1995 Individuals from the 
largest sickness fund, 
the Federation o f  
Christian Mutualities
Large increase in co­
payment rates for 
public health 
insurance system in 
1984
In the short run, not all o f  the 
price-induced demand reduction 
could be countered by physician- 
induced demand for additional
services;
The general active population 
seemed to be more price sensitive 
than the subsidized (low income) 
group
There may be underlying 
differences between the 
experiment group and the control 
group;
Unmeasured variables such as 
prices o f complements/substitutes
Van der Gaag 
and Wolfe (1991)
Medical
services,
emergency
room
services,
outpatient
services,
physician
services
(New York) The 
United States
1975 2,163 individuals Insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, private 
insurance, HMO 
insurance, none)
Individuals with Medicaid visited 
the emergency room and hospital 
outpatient clinics more often than 
privately insured individuals; 
Adults with Medicaid or HMO 
coverage had more physician 
home or office visits than privately 
insured individuals
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that increase 
medical care utilization
A uthor (Year) Outcom evariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation M ain results Lim itations
Van Doorslaer 
(1984)
Prescription
drugs
Belgium 1977-1981 Belgian National 
Health Insurance 
beneficiaries
Replacement o f fixed 
co-payment with 
proportional 
coinsurance 
differentiated by 
therapeutic and 
beneficiary class
The active part o f the insured 
population was more responsive 
than the non-active portion to an 
increase in cost sharing;
Lower income individuals 
responded more to an increase in 
cost sharing
Small sample size;
Individual information may have 
been lost at the aggregate level
Van Vliet (2001) Inpatient
services,
physician
services,
prescription
drugs
The Netherlands 1990-1994 13,362 privately 
insured individuals
Insurance coverage 
with differing levels 
of generosity
Physiotherapy visits were the most 
sensitive to prices;
Prescription drugs were not 
significantly sensitive to changes 
in price
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and age
Van Vliet (2004) Medical
services,
physician
and
outpatient
services,
prescription
drugs
The Netherlands 1996 100,048 privately 
insured individuals
Insurance coverage 
with different 
deductible levels; one 
older policy had 
deductibles that were 
a fixed percentage of  
the premium per year 
(0,20, 50, 100, Or 
150), and one policy 
with fixed deductibles 
o f 0,200, 500,1000,
1500, or 2000 Dfl per 
year
With no deductibles, expenses 
would have been Dfl 2510 per 
policy, and deductibles appeared 
to reduce expected expenses by 
about 6% in this situation; 
Deductibles between 0-100 Dfl 
increased health care and 
prescription drug expenses, but 
above this level, deductibles had a 
negative impact on health care and 
prescription drug expenses
Unmeasured variables such as 
income may have led to an 
underestimation o f  the deductible 
effect;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that medical 
care utilization
Van Vliet etal. 
(1999)
Prescription
drugs
The Netherlands 1990-1994 40,278 individuals; 
one group insured 
under the 'civil 
servant' scheme; one 
group insured under 
the private health 
insurance
No deductibles 
applied for the 'civil 
service' scheme; 
privately insured had 
a choice o f health 
care provider, which 
offered different 
packages and a choice 
o f deductibles
No significant coinsurance effect 
for those insured under the 'civil 
servant' health scheme;
A significant negative effect o f  
deductibles on the utilization o f  
privately insured persons
Unmeasured variables such as 
education;
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Vera-Hem&ndez
(1999)
Physician
services
(Catalonia) Spain 1994 7,281 individuals Supplementary 
insurance coverage 
(coverage, none)
Supplementary insurance led to an 
approximate 27% increase in the 
number o f  specialist visits;
Health status had a significant 
impact on the number o f  specialist 
visits
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other factors 
that increase inpatient services
A uthor (Year) Outcom evariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation M ain results Lim itations
Watt et al. (1992) Prescription
drugs
(Wellington) New  
Zealand
1991 669 prescriptions for 
asthma patients from 
30 pharmacies
Increase in co­
payment from $2-$5 
for children, 
chronically ill, and 
low income; increase 
from $5-$ 15 for all 
others
Only 0.75% o f asthma patients 
failed to collect heir medications 
within the study period;
No patients that were exempt from 
prescription fees failed to collect 
their prescriptions or delayed their 
collection for more than seven 
days
Did not control for other factors 
through regression;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one area o f New  
Zealand
Wedig (1988) Physician
services
The United States 1980 5,322 adults (17+) Individuals faced 
different OOP prices 
and time prices for 
visits
An increase in the price for 
physician visits decreased initial 
use o f  care and total utilization of  
care;
Better health status, decreased 
initial use o f care and total 
utilization
Price estimates likely to be 
somewhat biased; 
Unmeasured variables such as 
preferences for care
Weeks (1973) Prescription
drugs
(Michigan) The 
United States
1969 Employees o f  the 
United Auto Workers 
(UAW) association 
and their dependents 
(sample size not 
given)
The UAW paid for 
most o f the cost o f  
prescription drugs 
with a $2 co­
payment; this was 
later reduced to a 
$1.07 co-payment
Individuals with the $2 co­
payment were more likely to 
receive a prescription than 
individuals without this benefit; 
The proportion o f individuals 
receiving more expensive 
prescriptions increased when cost 
sharing decreased
Did not control for other factors 
with regression;
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one area in Michigan
Williams (1966) Inpatient
services
The United States 1964 individuals enrolled in 
Blue Cross plans
Generosity o f Blue 
Cross insurance 
coverage, ranging 
from 30 to 150 days 
of coverage per 
hospital admission, 
deductibles (if  
present) ranging from 
$20 to $25, and co­
payments (if present) 
o f $4
Hospital admission rates were 
lower for plans with deductibles 
and plans with co-payment 
requirements than for full coverage 
plans;
Average lengths o f stay were 
somewhat longer in the plans with 
deductibles compared to the full 
coverage plans
Didn't control for confounding 
factors through regression; 
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that inpatient 
utilization
Winkelmann
(2004a)
Prescription
drugs
Germany 1995-1999 37,319 individuals 6 DM increase in co­
payments (which 
depended on pack 
size), leading to 
increases in co­
payments up to 200%
9-10% reduction in the expected 
number o f  doctor visits in the post­
reform period;
13% reduction in the expected 
number o f  visits o f the treatment 
group relative to the control group
Imperfect difference-in-difference 
comparison (stated by author)
A uthor (Year) O utcom evariable (Region) C ountry Study dates Study population Price variation Main results L im itations
Winkelmann
(2004b)
Prescription
drugs
Germany 1995-1999 Individuals o f all ages 
(no information on the 
sample size given)
6 DM increase in co­
payments (which 
depended on pack 
size), leading to 
increases in co­
payments up to 200%, 
co-payments later 
lowered between DM 
1 and DM 3
The probability o f having no 
doctor visits decreased by 6.7% 
between 1996 and 1998;
But, conditional on use, the 
number o f doctor visits only 
decreased by 2.6%
Unmeasured variables, such as 
employment, which could have 
measured the time cost o f  visits; 
Changes may not have solely been 
due to the increase in co-payments 
as a number o f  other policy 
changes occurred simultaneously
Wolfson et al. 
(1982)
Medical
services
(Unknown state) 
The United States
1977-1980 Children (<22) 
enrolled in the state’s 
Crippled Children's 
Division (CCD) 
(sample size not 
given)
Introduction o f co­
payment ranging from 
$10 to full cost o f  
service, depending on 
family size and 
income
No statistically significant changes 
in the distribution o f services 
provided to program users; 
Lower-income, medically needy 
individuals were not deterred from 
using services
Pre-intervention period may have 
been too short for testing o f  
differences;
Unmeasured variables such as 
waiting times and distance to 
provider
Yang etal. 
(2004)
Prescription
drugs
The United States 1992-1998 14,439 elderly (65+) 
individuals
Supplemental drug 
insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, private 
drug coverage, 
private physician 
coverage, Medicare 
only)
Drug coverage had no effect on 
whether an individual purchased 
any prescription drugs, but did 
effect his expenditures
Cross-sectional study, thus 
difficult to control for other 
unmeasured factors that influence 
prescription drug utilization
Yergan et al. 
(1988)
Inpatient
services
The United Stales 1972 4,369 patients with a 
diagnosis o f 
pneumonia
Insurance coverage 
(Medicaid, Medicare, 
Blue Cross, none)
Controlling for the hospital where 
the patient received the treatment, 
no differences in services by 
insurance status;
Self-pay patients had the highest 
mortality rate followed by 
Medicare patients, while Blue 
Cross patients had the lowest 
mortality rate
Unmeasured variables such as 
income and marital status;
No information on the extent o f 
insurance coverage
Young and 
Cohen (1991)
Inpatient
services
(Massachusetts) 
The United States
1987 4,972 non-Medicaid, 
non-elderly (<65) 
patients admitted to a 
hospital on an 
emergency basis and 
diagnosed with acute 
myocardial infarction
Insurance coverage 
(FFS coverage, HMO 
coverage, none)
The length of inpatient stay was 
significantly shorter for HMO 
patients than for FFS and 
uninsured patients;
The odds o f  death for uninsured 
individuals were 57% greater than 
for FFS patients and 48% greater 
than for HMO patients
May not be generalizable because 
limited to one Massachusetts 
hospital;
May not have sufficiently 
controlled for health status, as 
healthier individuals are more 
likely to obtain HMO insurance 
than FFS insurance
Appendix C
Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 5
This appendix provides additional background information for Chapter 5. Because 
many of the values for premiums and levels of cost sharing reported throughout 
Chapter 5 are adjusted for inflation, we first provide a table of the inflation adjustment 
factors. We also provide a table of state-specific information on the size and depth of 
Medicaid coverage for a more detailed picture of Medicaid coverage in the US. 
Finally, we offer a description of the main types of health insurance providers in the 
US.
C.l. Deflation factors from the consumer price indices used in Chapter 5
Appendix Table C.l lists the consumer price indices from the United States (US-CPI), 
Canada (CA-CPI), and British Columbia (BC-CPI) for all expenditure classes 
(Council of Economic Advisors, 2007; Statistics Canada, 2007). To calculate the 
deflation factor, the CPI value for 2005 is used as the base for all three indices.
Appendix Table C. 1. Deflation factors from the US-CPI, CA-CPI, and BC-CPI
Year US-CPI
US-CPI
deflation
factorb
CA-CPI CA - Deflation factor1* BC-CPI
BC - Deflation 
factor1*
1989 124.0 1.58 89.0 1.43 87.7 1.43
1990 130.7 1.49 93.3 1.36 92.4 1.36
1991 136.2 1.43 98.5 1.29 97.4 1.29
1992 140.3 1.39 100.0 1.27 100.0 1.25
1993 144.5 1.35 101.8 1.25 103.5 1.21
1994 148.2 1.32 102.0 1.25 105.5 1.19
1995 152.4 1.28 104.2 1.22 107.9 1.16
1996 156.9 1.24 105.9 1.20 108.9 1.15
1997 160.5 1.22 107.6 1.18 109.7 1.14
1998 163.0 1.20 108.6 1.17 110.0 1.14
1999 166.6 1.17 110.5 1.15 111.2 1.13
2000 172.2 1.13 113.5 1.12 113.3 1.11
2001 177.1 1.10 116.4 1.09 115.2 1.09
2002 179.9 1.09 119.0 1.07 117.9 1.06
2003 184.0 1.06 122.3 1.04 120.4 1.04
2004 188.9 1.03 124.6 1.02 122.8 1.02
2005 195.3 1.00 127.3 1.00 125.3 1.00
2006 201.8a 0.97 129.9 0.98 127.5 0.98
“estimated using a trend line, bcomputed by :C P I2005/C P I ,
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C.2. State-specific information related to the Medicaid program
Appendix Table C.2 includes the latest state-level information related to the number 
of Medicaid enrollees, Medicaid payments per enrollee, co-payments for physician 
and inpatient visits, and median incomes for each of the 50 states.
Appendix Table C.2. State-specific information related to the size and depth o f 
Medicaid coverage, 2004
State Enrollees as %  of sta te population*
M edicaid 
paym ents per 
enrolleeh
Physician visit 
co-payment* Inpatien t visit co-payment*
M edian state 
income
Alabama 13 $2,983 $1 $50/admission $34,135
Alaska 15 $5,568 $3
$50/day up to lesser o f  
$200/admission or 50% o f  first 
day's payment
$51,571
Arizona 14 $2,723 $1 None $40,558
Arkansas 16 $3,276 10% o f  first day's per diem rate up to specified limit $32,182
California 16 $2,472 $1 None $47,493
Colorado 8 $4,653 $2 Lesser o f  $ 10/day or 50% o f  average allowable daily rate $47,203
Connecticut 11 $6,740 None None $53,935
Delaware 10 $4,333 None None $47,381
District o f  
Columbia 19 $4,436 None None $40,127
Florida 11 $3,337 $2 $3/admission $38,819
Georgia 13 $3,079 $2
$ 12.50/non-emergency 
admission $42,433
Hawaii 10 $3,241 None None $49,820
Idaho 12 $3,996 None None $37,572
Illinois 9 $4,153 $2 $2-$3/day unless per diem less than $275 $46,590
Indiana 11 $4,199 None None $41,567
Iowa 10 $5,078 $3 None $39,469
Kansas 9 $4,846 $2 $48/admission $40,624
Kentucky 14 $4,349 $2 None $33,672
Louisiana 15 $3,204 None None $32,566
Maine 19 $4,910 None $3/day up to $30/month $37,240
Maryland 8 $5,870 None None $52,868
Massachusetts 13 $5,240 None $3/admission $50,502
Michigan 13 $2,877 None None $44,667
Minnesota 9 $6,345 $3 None $47,111
Mississippi 19 $3,505 None
$ 10/day up to half o f  first day's 
per diem/admission $31,330
Missouri 13 $3,694 $1
$ 10/admission, except 
emergencies and transfers $37,934
Montana 14 $4,810 $4 $ 100/admission $33,024
Nebraska 10 $4,551 $2 None $39,250
Nevada 7 $3,133 None None $44,581
New
Hampshire 6
$6,432 None None $49,467
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State Enrollees as %  of sta te population1
M edicaid 
paym ents per 
enrolleeb
Physician visit 
co-payment* Inpatien t visit co-payment*
M edian state 
income
New Jersey 8 $5,516 None None $55,146
New Mexico 18 $3,501 $7
for certain groups: 
$30/admission with annual 
maximum across all services 
based on income
$34,133
New York 16 $7,506 None $25/admission $43,393
North Carolina 12 $4,312 $3 None $39,184
North Dakota 8 $5,761 $2 $75/admission $34,604
Ohio 11 $5,211 None None $40,956
Oklahoma 11 $3,071 $1 $3/day $33,400
Oregon 11 $3,326 $3 for certain groups: $3/admission $40,916
Pennsylvania 10 $4,965 $0.50-$3 $3/day up to $21/admission $40,106
Rhode Island 16 $6,072 None None $42,090
South Carolina 14 $3,009 $3 $25/admission $37,082
South Dakota 11 $4,329 $2 None $35,282
Tennessee 16 $2,624 $5-$25
for certain groups:
$ 100/admission, B2 - 
$200/admission
$36,360
Texas 12 $3,428 None None $39,927
Utah 9 $3,918 $3-$5 for certain groups: $220/admission $45,726
Vermont 18 $3,839 None None $40,856
Virginia 7 $4,110 $l-$3 $ 100/admission $46,677
Washington 13 $2,650 None None $45,776
West Virginia 15 $4,013 None None $29,696
Wisconsin 11 $4,614 $0.50-$3 $3/day up to $75/admission $43,791
Wyoming 11 $4,000 $1 None $37,892
Sources: Academy Health (2006), KFF (2006d), US Census Bureau (2007a) 
afor the year 2004, bfor the year 2002 (the latest available year)
Enrollment as a percent o f the state population ranged from 6 percent of the state 
population (New Hampshire) to 19 percent of the state population (Maine). On 
average 12.25 percent of the state population was enrolled in Medicaid, while the 
median enrollment was 12 percent. An interesting observation is that 16 of the states 
with income below the median level ($40,624) enrolled 12 percent or more of the 
state population in Medicaid, while only eight states with income above the median 
level covered 12 percent of the state population. Meanwhile, Medicaid payments per 
enrollee ranged from $2,472 (California) to $7,506 (New York). The average 
Medicaid payment per enrollee was $4,271, and the median payment per enrollee was 
$4,153. There were 10 states with income below the median level that provided 
Medicaid payments above the median state payment, and five of these states had 
Medicaid enrollments of less then 12 percent of the population. There were 13 states 
with income above the median level that provided Medicaid payments at or above the 
state payment, and 10 of these states had Medicaid enrollments of less then 12 percent 
of the population. Thus, it appears that many states make a tradeoff between the
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percentage of the population covered and the amount of insurance coverage offered to 
Medicaid beneficiaries.
In 2004 there were 28 states that imposed co-payments for physician services. Most of 
these co-payments ranged from $0.50 to $1, although Tennessee charged co-payments 
up to $25 for certain Medicaid beneficiaries and certain physician services (KFF, 
2004). Cost sharing for inpatient hospital services was even higher, although fewer 
states (24) charged co-payments for hospital services. The out-of-pocket requirements 
for inpatient services ranged from $3 per hospital admission in many states to $220 
per admission for certain beneficiaries in Utah (KFF, 2004).
C.3. The main types of private health insurance providers in the US
Commercial health insurers, otherwise known as indemnity plans, are generally 
organized as stock companies (owned by stockholders) or as mutual insurance 
companies (owned by their policyholders). A prominent example of a commercial 
health insurer is Aetna, a publicly traded health insurance company. HMOs, PPOs, 
and POSs are all forms of managed care plans. A managed care plan entails an 
arrangement between a selected group of medical providers and the insurer. 
Individuals who are insured under managed care plans are offered financial incentives 
to choose health care providers within this, selected network. In health maintenance 
organizations the insurer pays the provider a fixed monthly fee for each insured 
patient that the provider has agreed to cover, regardless of the level of care provided. 
Patients insured by an HMO generally must seek care from a selected network of 
providers if they are to receive reimbursement. In a PPO there is also a group of 
network providers and patients pay less out-of-pocket to visit these providers, giving 
patients the option to visit providers outside of their network. Reimbursement for 
medical providers in a PPO is based on actual visits and use rather than a fixed 
monthly fee per covered patient. Finally, a POS is similar to an HMO in that patients 
pay very little out-of-pocket for in-network providers. However, if the patient’s 
primary physician refers the patient to an out-of-network provider, the patient can still 
receive substantial reimbursement. The patient also has the option of referring himself 
to an out-of-network provider, although his out-of-pocket fees for this option will be 
greater.
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Appendix D: Appendix to Chapter 6
As a supplement to Chapter 6, this appendix provides additional information on issues 
such as the econometric specification, the code used to run the Semykina and 
Wooldridge (2006) model in STATA, and the full results from the empirical analyses. 
The first few sections provide detailed information on relevant considerations for the 
econometric specification, mainly sample selection, endogeneity, and unobserved 
heterogeneity. With these considerations in mind, we developed an econometric 
model in Chapter 6 based on Semykina and Wooldridge (2006). Because there is no 
command in STATA yet available to run this model, this appendix provides the 
STATA program that we coded for this purpose. The full results of the Semykina and 
Wooldridge (2006) model in addition to the specification tests, the first-stage probits, 
and the equation to predict the endogenous (co-payment) variable are also included in 
Appendix Sections D.6 to D.9.
D.l. Heckman sample selection regression model
The following section outlines the Heckman sample selection model. In the first stage 
of this method, the individual determines whether not to participate. In the second 
stage, he decides how much to consume. The first stage of the model is represented by:
b' = w,y + e, (D.l),
where bi is the net benefit of participation, wi are the explanatory variables for the 
participation decision, and s, is the random error term. The second stage of the model 
is represented by:
y, = *fP+«, y, = y, for b' > o (D.2).
y t is not observed for b* < 0
In equation (D.2) y { is the outcome variable (the total number of prescriptions that 
the individual obtains in a given year including initial purchases and refills), xt are 
the explanatory variables, and w, is the random error term. Based on equations (D.l) 
and (D.2):
E(u,\bJ > o)= E (u ,\e ,> -w ly) (D.3).
If ui and 8, are distributed independently, the above expression reduces to ^(w, ), and 
the selection process does not interfere with the regression model (Dougherty, 2002). 
However, if  ut and s ; are correlated, then OLS is inconsistent. Heckman (1979) 
developed a procedure to account for this bias, and he used the result that:
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^(“ / k  > -w ,y )= — X, (D.4)
to develop an estimator. In equation (D.4) a Me is the population covariance of w, and 
8,, cre is the standard deviation of e, , and Xf is the inverse of Mill’s ratio, given by:
f ( y  )
(D-5)-
The variable v, is:
v ,= -^ -  (D.6),
and the function f ( v i) is the density function for s, normalized by its standard 
deviation, ^(v,) is the cumulative density function, i.e. the probability that b* > 0, 
Substituting equation (D.4) into equation (D.2), we obtain:
E{y, |s, >M',y)=x,p + ^ X ,  (D.7).
Therefore, the sample selection problem can be viewed as one of omitted variable bias 
where X, is the omitted variable.
Testing for the presence of sample selection is generally straightforward: if  the t- 
statistic on the inverse Mill’s ratio is significant, then the sample selection correction 
is needed. Statistical packages incorporate a likelihood ratio test as well.
Alternatively, the double hurdle model is sometimes employed to account for 
unobserved values of the dependent variable, but this specification is not appropriate 
for our analysis as the double hurdle model assumes that the observed zeros are true 
zeros (Jones, 2001). Another alternative to the Heckman methodology is the two-part 
model developed by Duan et al. (1983). This specification was created to model the 
demand for health care and is motivated by the conditional mean independence 
assumption:
E{y,\y, > 0,x, = x tp )  (D.8).
There has been extensive debate in the literature regarding the choice between the 
two-part model and the sample selection model (Jones, 2001). One argument has been 
that two-part models are more appropriate for sequential decisions, although Maddala 
(1985) argues that even when decisions are sequential, the decisions will be correlated 
if there are omitted variables common to both. Leung and Yu (1996) used Monte 
Carlo simulations to compare these two differing methods and determined that the
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choice of model depends on the empirical context. Specifically, the sample selection 
model performs poorly when there is collinearity, which can arise in certain contexts: 
when there is a large degree of censoring, when there are few exclusion restrictions, 
when there is little variability between regressors, or when there are weak instruments 
(Leung and Yu, 1996). In the absence of collinearity, which can be verified using the 
condition number, the t-test on the inverse Mills ratio is an indicator of which 
specification is more appropriate.
D.2. Testing for multicollinearity
Two methods for detecting multicollinearity are the condition index and the variance 
inflation factor (VIF). The condition number (at, ) is the condition index with the 
largest value, which is given by the equation:
where ^ max and (pm-n are the maximum and minimum eigenvalues1, respectively.
When multicollinearity is non-existent, the eigenvalues, condition indices, and 
condition number will all equal one, where the condition index summarizes the 
findings from the condition numbers. The greater the collinearity, the higher the 
condition numbers and the condition index. An informal rule is that if the condition 
number is greater than 20, multicollinearity is likely a problem (Belsley et al., 1980).
Another way to diagnose multicollinearity is to use the Variance Inflation Factor. The 
value of this statistic is given by:
explanatory variables that are included in the model. The higher the VIF, the greater 
the multicollinearity in the model. Generally, a VIF greater than 10 indicates a serious 
multicollinearity problem (Belsley et al., 1980).
D.3. Instrumental variables methods to account for endogeneity
When the error term in the regression is not independent of x t , there is a problem of 
endogeneity, which can be represented by:
max (D.9),
(D.10),
where R? is the unadjusted R 2 obtained when we regress x, against all other
y, = x,P + c , 8  +  m, CD-I 1)
An eigenvalue, <p, is the scalar that solves the matrix equation:
A X  = (pX,
where A  is a [aXb] matrix and A" is a [bXl] vector known as the eigenvector.
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ct = z,. a  + y fK + mt (D.12),
where y i is the outcome variable (the total number of prescriptions purchased), xt are 
the variables that explain consumption, and c, is the endogenous variable (the co­
payment), which is determined by z( and y , . The reduced form equation is:
The reduced form equation illustrates that c( is not independent of the error term ut
in equation (D.l 1), indicating that OLS estimates will be inconsistent (Greene, 2003). 
To account for this endogeneity, one option is to use an instrumental variables (IV) 
regression. IV methods involve estimating the equation:
calculating the predicted value of ci , plugging this predicted value back into (D.l 1) 
for c ,, and running an OLS regression to obtain the parameter values in (D.l 1) 
(Dougherty, 2002). The variances need to be adjusted by the formula:
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test can be used to test whether a specific variable is 
endogenous to the regression. To carry out this test, we estimate:
regress all of the instruments on the suspected endogenous variable, calculate the 
residuals from this regression, and then run a regression of the residuals, the 
potentially endogenous variable, and the exogenous variables on the main explanatory 
variable of interest. If the coefficient on the residuals is significant, then an IV 
regression is appropriate.
D.4. Panel data regression models
This section develops the basic model for panel data. Start by assuming that we have a 
sample of N  individuals over T time periods, where the dependent variable is y it, the
independent variables are represented by xku, and i = 1,..., N , t = 1,...,jT , and
2 In this chapter, k always represents the number of explanatory variables in the main regression (and 
doesn’t include the constant)
z,a + (x,p + w, )k + tu,
(D.l 3).
1 - 5 k
c, = z,a  + tBf (D.14),
RMSl^  
{RMSE^f
(D.l 5).
X -statistic — {fi0Ls Piv )* (V ^ ols ) ifioLS Pi
and the %2 -statistic is distributed with k degrees of freedom2. Alternatively, we can
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k = 1,..., K  ( Hsiao, 2003). In its most general form, the linear model for panel data is 
represented by:
y„ =g»+*«P+',fl (D-iT)
where uit represents the non-random component of y it. The simplest model assumes 
that the intercept and slope coefficients are constant across cross-sectional units for all 
time periods ( g  = g it), and the researcher can simply run a pooled OLS regression. If
this assumption does not hold, the pooled least-squares estimator may lead to biased 
and inconsistent estimates.
The assumptions that we make regarding g it are important as this determines whether 
a fixed or random effects framework is more appropriate. If we believe that g it
represents unmeasured individual-specific variables, such as preferences for types of 
health care or risk-aversion, then a fixed effects framework is more appropriate. If we 
believe that g jt is instead some random variable that influences all individuals in each 
year, then random effects is more appropriate. In a simple linear situation, the 
assumption regarding g jt is testable, and this test is discussed below.
Before proceeding with a panel data model, it is important to determine if  a pooled 
estimator is more efficient. One option is to test whether the intercept coefficients are 
constant across cross-sectional units, which would indicate that pooled OLS is more 
efficient than fixed effects. This is carried out with an F-test:
17 ,  "  Spooled  V ( W “  0  m  1 0 ^
F -S ta t lS t lC  =  7 --------- - r 7 ------------------ r (D. 18),
(l - R ^ DV) / ( n T - n - k )
where n is the number of observations in each time period, T  is the number of time 
periods, and k is the number of regressors. The F-statistic is distributed with n - 1 and 
n T - n - k  degrees of freedom.
Once it is established that pooled OLS is less efficient than a panel data estimator, we 
need to examine the appropriateness of a fixed effects over a random effects 
framework. One test for this comparison is the Hausman test, where the null 
hypothesis is that the coefficients from the random effects and fixed effects models 
are similar and thus both models are consistent. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the 
explanatory variables in the model are correlated with the error terms such that the 
random effects estimator produces biased coefficients, and a fixed effects model is 
more appropriate. The formula for the Hausman test is:
X 1 -statistic = (fiFE -  Pm )  (VCFE -  VCm )_1 (fiFE -  Pm ) (D. 19),
and the x 2 -statistic is distributed with k degrees of freedom (Baltagi and Li, 1990).
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A problem with the Hausman test is that if we reject the null hypothesis, it is not clear 
whether the difference between the specifications is caused by misspecification of the 
model or whether this is caused by the assumption of no correlation between the 
individual-specific error term and the explanatory variables. Another way to compare 
random and fixed effects is to consider the fact that random effects constrains the 
within- and between-effects to be the same. The null hypothesis is that the between- 
and within-effects are equal. This test is performed by decomposing each explanatory 
variable into its within- and between-effects, running a random effects regression, and 
testing whether each of the decomposed effects are equal using a t-test3.
When the intercept varies over individuals but not time, the fixed effects model is:
y„ = g ,  + *„P + «„> (D.20),
where i = and t = 1 , . . . , T . An important assumption of the model is that uit is
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, including the fixed effect g, and is an 
independently and identically distributed random variable with a mean of zero and 
variance g 2u . The simplest method of estimating the fixed effects model is to include
a dummy variable for each of the individual cross-sectional units and run an OLS 
regression, otherwise known as the least-squares dummy-variable (LSDV) model.
Alternatively, we can estimate the deviations from the group means as \yu - y \  and
[xit -  xt ] and run an OLS regression of [y„ -  y t ] on[x., -  x j .  The parameter estimates
from both methods will be identical (Greene, 2003; Hsiao, 2003). A third possibility 
is the difference-in-difference estimator, which is an OLS regression on:
Ay„ = Ax(/p* + Auit (D.21).
For T= 2 periods, the difference-in-difference model is identical to the first two 
methods (Wooldridge, 2002). Finally, a fourth option is to regress the explanatory 
variables along with their time means, xi , on the dependent variable.
D.5. STATA code to implement FE-2SLS correcting for sample selection bias
The section provides the code that was used to run Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) 
model (SS FE-2SLS). Inside of the following symbols, there are comments on the 
different aspects of the code to help the user better understand the program:
3Testing whether a random or fixed effects framework is more appropriate is not a straightforward for 
the preferred model. We assume that if individual-specific effects appear to be more appropriate in the 
linear case, then by extension fixed effects is more appropriate than random effects in a non-linear case. 
Thus, we still provide the results of the fixed and random effects specification tests for a simple linear 
panel data model.
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j  * * * * * * * * * * * * *  & i t * * *  -k  * * * * *  -k  k
(a)
k k k k - k k k k k k k k k k k k k i e i e k - k k k k k k ^
// (b)
/********************************************************************
* PROGRAM TO RUN THE ‘SS FE-S2LS’ MODEL
********************************************************************/
// generates the base variables used in the model
scalar time_lambdas = 1
scalar num_time_pers = 9
gen selection_indicator=0
replace selection_indicator=l if rxtot>0
// # periods the person had positive drug spending 
by pid: egen keep_obs = sum(selection_indicator)
// defines all o f the variable lists
local varlist_ins age_30to39 age_40to49 age_50to64 age_65to74 age_gt74 
ln_income_pp bad_hlth morb non_mcr_pub self_employed 
local varlist_main age_30to39 age_40to49 age_50to64 age_65to74 age_gt74 
ln_income_pp bad_hlth morb
// generates the time dummies 
local i=l 997 
while 'i'<2005 { 
quietly gen T _ 'i-0  
quietly replace T_'i' = 1 if y e a r= 'i ' 
local i = 'i'+ l
}
// generates the mean variables for the selection probit estimations 
local j= l
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_ins' { 
quietly egen ms_'var' = mean('var'), by(pid) 
local j = j'+ l
}
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* PROCEDURE 1: RUN THE FIRST STAGE PROBITS
// generates the inverse Mills ratio for each year 
gen lambda = . 
local i = 1996 
while 'i'<2005 { 
quietly probit selection_indicator 'varlist_ins' ms_ if y e a r= 'i ' 
quietly predict rhat, xb
quietly replace lambda = normden(rhat)/norm(rhat) if selection_indicator==l &
year == 'i'
drop rhat 
local i = 'i'+ l
>
// generates interaction terms for lambda 
if time_lambdas == 1 { 
local i = 1997 
while 'i'<2005 { 
quietly gen lambda_'i' = T_'i'lambda 
local i = 'i'+ l
}
}
y> |e9)e9(e3 |c3)e9 |e3 |e3 |e3(e^e3)c3)e3fc3)e3 |e3fc3 |e3)e3)«3 |c3(c3 |e9)e3 |c3 |c3 |c3)e9)e3 |e9 |e3 ic3 |e3 |c9)e3 |e3 ie3)c9 |e 9 (c% 9)c3 |c3 |e9 |e3 |c9 |e3 |e3(e3 |e3 |e3 ie3 |e3 ie9fc3)e3)c3)e3 ie3 ie3 ie3 |e 3 lc 3 ic9 ic 3)c9ic3 ic ’(e
* PROCEDURE 2: RUN THE SECOND STAGE AND CORRECT THE
* STANDARD ERRORS
********************************************************************/
// generates the mean variables (of the instruments) 
local j = 1
foreach var o f varlist 'varlist_ins' { 
quietly egen mi_'var' = mean('var'), by(pid) 
local j = 'j'+ l
}
// runs the regression without correcting for the Heckman standard errors
regress ln_rxtot ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda T_* mi_* ('varlist_ins' lambda T_*
mi_) if keep_obs>l & selection_indicator==l, robust cluster(pid)
// obtain the coefficient on the Mills ratio 
if time_lambdas==l { 
scalar b_millsl996 = _b[lambda] 
local i = 1997 
while 'i'<2005 {
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scalar b_mills'i' = _b  [lam bda'i'] + b_millsl996 
local i='i'+l
}
}
if time_lambdas == 0 { 
local i = 1996 
while 'i'<2005 { 
scalar b_mills'i' = _b [lambda] 
local i='i'+l
}
}
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /  
* Generates the diagonal matrix with Hessians
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /
// count the number o f Heckman regressors 
local c=0
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_ins' { 
local c = 'c '+ l
}
scalar stage_l = 'c' 
gen cons = 1
// defines the list of regressors used in the first stage 
local varlist_il 'varlist_ins' ms_ cons 
local varlist_i3 
local varlist_i4
// generates matrix H, a square matrix o f dimension [# regressors in 1 st stage 
probit —BY— # time periods] 
mat H = I((2 stage_ 1+1) * num_time_pers)
local i = 1996 
while 'i'<2005 { 
quietly probit selection_indicator 'varlist_ins' ms_ if year == 'i' 
predict rhat, xb 
mat H 'i' = e(V)
quietly generate tempvarl = normden(rhat) / norm(rhat) if  selection_indicator =  1
& year == 'i'
quietly generate tempvar2 = -normden(rhat) / (1 - norm(rhat)) if
selection_indicator == 0 & year == 'i' 
assert lambda = tempvarl if selection_indicator == 1 & year == 'i' 
local j = 'i' - 1996
mat H[(2stage_l + l) 'j ' + l,(2stage_l + l) 'j ' + 1] = H'i'
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foreach var of varlist 'varlist_ir { 
quietly generate g_'var’'j' = 0 if selection_indicator =  1 
quietly replace g_'var''j' = -lambda (lambda + rhat)b_mills'i''var' if
selection_indicator == 1 & year == 'i'
quietly generate q_'var''j' = .
quietly replace q_'var''j' = tempvarl 'var' if selection_indicator =  1 &
year =  'i'
quietly replace q_'var''j' = tempvar2'var' if selection_indicator == 0 & year == 'i' 
sort pid year
quietly by pid: replace q_'var''j' = q_'var''j'['j' + 1] if year ~= 'i' 
local varlist_i3 'varlist_i3' g_ 'var'j' 
local varlist_i4 'varlist_i4' q_'var''j'
}
drop rhat tempvarl tempvar2 
mat drop H'i' 
local i = 'i' + 1
}
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_i4' { 
quietly replace ' var-0  if 'var' == .
}
keep if keep_obs>l & selection indicator =  1
*************************;*******************************************/
* Replicates the second stage equation using matrices
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * j
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /
* W is a matrix of the second-stage regressors
* # vars in W = l(rxcopay) + count(varlist) + l(for lambda) +
* 7(time_lambda) + 7(time) + count(m_varlist) + 1 (constant)
* Z is a matrix of the second-stage instruments
*
* WZ is the upper right (or lower left) corner of the temp matrix
* It is chosen as:
* rows: l..<# regressors in the 2nd stage>
* columns: <# regressors in the 2nd stage> + 1..
*
* Here and everywhere below, the # regressors includes the constant
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * j
II counts the number of instruments
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local c = 0
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_ins' { 
local c = 'c'+l
}
scalar INST = 'c'
•// counts the number o f regressors that are in the main part of the regression 
local c = 0
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_main' { 
local c = 'c'+ l
}
scalar MAIN = 'c'
matrix accum TEMP = ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda T_* mi_* cons 'varlist_ins'
lambda T_* mi_* cons, nocons
scalar M = 1 + MAIN + 1 + time_lambdas(num_time_pers-l) + (num_time_pers-l) + 
INST + 1
matrix WZ = TEMP[1..M, M + 1...] 
matrix drop TEMP
* matrix ZZ = Z'Z
* matrix Zy = Z'y
matrix accum ZZ = 'varlist_ins' lambda* T_* mi_* cons, nocons
matrix vecaccum yZ = ln_rxtot 'varlist_ins' lambda* T_* mi_* cons, nocons
matrix IV BETA = inv(WZinv(ZZ)WZ')WZinv(ZZ)yZ'
quietly regress ln_rxtot ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda* T_* mi_* 'varlist_ins' 
lambda mi_* T_* 
predict ehat, res
********************************************************************/
* Replicates the robust variance matrix using matrices
* Define a new varlist_lr, which is the list of variables used as instruments at the
* second stage
* varlist_2r is the list of interaction terms
********************************************************************/
local varlist_lr 'varlist_ins' lambda T_* mi_* cons 
local varlist 2r
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local j = 1
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_lr' { 
quietly gen eh_'var' = 'var'ehat 
quietly egen t_'var' = sum(eh_'var'), by(pid) 
local varlist_2r 'varlist_2r' t_'var' 
local j = 'j' + 1
}
drop eh_*
// scalar g is the number o f individuals in the selected sample 
sort pid year 
by pid: gen num=_n
gen countid = (num == 1) 
sum countid 
scalar g = r(sum) 
drop countid
matrix accum ZEEZ = 'varlist_2r' if num == 1, nocons
// obtain standard errors corrected for the first stage estimation 
matrix A = WZinv(ZZ)WZ' 
matrix TERM1 = ZEEZ
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /
* The number of variables in varlist_2r should be equal to the number of
* instruments at the second stage
* The number of variables in varlist_i4 should be equal to # lst-stage regressors
* # time periods
matrix accum TEMP = 'varlist_2r' 'varlist_i4' if num == 1, nocons
// extract the upper right hand comer of the TEMP matrix 
matrix ZEQ = TEMP[1..INST + 1 + time_lambdas(num_time_pers - 1) + 
(num_time_pers-l) + IN S T + 1 , IN S T + 1  + 
time_lambdas(num_time_pers - 1) + (num_time_pers - 1) +
INST + 1 + 1...] 
matrix drop TEMP
matrix accum TEMP = 'varlist_lr' 'varlist_i3', nocons
// extract the upper right hand corner o f the TEMP matrix
280
Appendix D
matrix ZG = TEMP [1..INST + 1 + time_lambdas(num_time_pers -1 ) + 
(num_time_pers - 1) + INST + 1, INST + 1 + 
time_lambdas(num_time_pers -1) + (num_time_pers -1 ) +
INST + 1 + 1...] 
matrix drop TEMP
matrix TERM2 = ZEQ*H*ZG'
matrix accum QQ = 'varlist_i4' if num =  1, nocons
matrix TERM4 = ZG*H*QQ*H*ZG'
matrix B = WZ*inv(ZZ)*(TERMl - TERM2 - TERM2’ + TERM4)*inv(ZZ)*WZ'
matrix V2 = inv(A)Binv(A)(e(N) -1 )g / ((g - l)(e(N) - M)) 
mata:
{
mata_V2 = st_matrix("V2") 
mata_Beta = st_matrix("IV_BETAM)
>
end
drop q_* g_* ttt_*
quietly regress ln_rxcopay 'varlist_ins' lambda T_* mi_* if keep_obs>l & 
selection_indicator=T, robust cluster(pid) 
quietly predict ln_rxcopay_hat, xb
if time_lambdas == 1 { 
local out_varlist ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' Tambda_varlist' 'T_varlist' 'mi_varlist' 
_cons
local pred_varlist ln_rxcopay_hat 'varlist_main' Tambda_varlist' 'T_varlist'
}
if time_lambdas == 0 { 
local out_varlist ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda 'T_varlist' 'mi_varlist' _cons 
local pred_varlist ln_rxcopay_hat 'varlist_main' lambda 'T_varlist'
}
quietly ci ln_rxtot
mata: mata_se_y = st_numscalar("r(se)M) 
mata: mata_var_y = mata_se_ymata_se_y
local c = 0
foreach var o f varlist 'varlist_main' { 
local c = 'c ' + 1
>
scalar MAIN = 'c' 
local c = 0
foreach var o f varlist 'mi_varlist' {
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local c = 'c '+l
}
scalar mean_vars = 'c' '
matrix beta_l = IV_BETA[1..MAES1 + 1 + 1 + ((num_time_pers - l)time_lambdas) 
+ (num_time_pers -1 ),.]  
matrix beta_2 = IV_BETA[MAIN + 1 + 1 + ((num_time_pers - l)time_lambdas) + 
(num_time_pers - 1) + mean_vars + 1..MAIN + 1 + 1 + 
((num_timejpers -1 ) time_lambdas) + (num_time_pers 1) + 
mean_vars + 1,.] 
mata: mata_beta_l = st_matrix("beta_l") 
mata: mata_beta_2 = st_matrix("beta_2")
mata: beta_new = mata_beta_l \ mata_beta_2 
mata: beta_new
mata: x_varlist_l = st_local("pred_varlist") 
mata: x_varlist_2 = st_data(., tokens(x_varlist_l)) 
mata: rows_xs = rows(x_varlist_2)
mata: constant = J(rows_xs, 1,1) 
mata: x = (x_varlist_2, constant)
mata: y_pred = xbeta_new
mata: var_y_pred = ((l/rows_xs)colsum(y_pred:y_pred)) - ((colsum(y_pred) / 
rows_xs)A2)
mata: y_pred_new = st_addvar("float","ln_y_pred") 
mata: st_store(., y_pred_new,y_pred)
correlate ln_yjpred ln_rxtot if keep_obs>l & selection_indicator =  1 
mata: mata_corr = st_numscalar(Mr(rho)") 
mata: mata r2 = mata corrmata corr
jeicicicJcickicicicicicicifleJc'ifkicjclcicjcjc'JcJcjcieicicieiclcJcjc'kJejc'kjticjciciejcicicjeisJcJeicJcJcicicjcic'js'iciejeicicicicjcJcf
* Outputs the results
•k'k'klcic& Jeleie'Jc& Jclclfielfk'kicll'icjcjc-kJcjcjckicicje'kje'k'kjc'icJcjcJcicjcjciejc'icicicJcJijcicjeicjcjcicJcjcjcjcieic'kjcieiejef
mata: v_a = st_local("out_varlist")
mata: vamame = J(0, 0 ,.)
mata: variable_vector(v_a, vamame)
mata:
{
st_err_adj = sqrt(diagonal(mata_V2))
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t_value_adj = mata_Beta:/ st_err_adj 
p_value_adj = get_pvalue(t_value_adj)
printf("Heckman Fixed effects output with standard errors adjusted\n")
printf("\n")
printf("R2 =")
printf("%8.4g\n", mata_r2)
printf("\n")
printf("{hline 21}{c +}{hline 55}\n") 
printf("ln_rxtot {c |}Coef. Std. Err. t-value
p-value\n") 
printf("{hline 21} {c +} {hline 55}\n”) 
i = 1
while (i<=rows(t_value_adj)) {
printf("%-20s {c |}%8.4g %8.4g %8.4g %8.4g\n", vamame[i],
mata_Beta[i], st_err_adj[i], t_value_adj[i], p_value_adj[i]) 
i++
}
printfC{hline 21} {c +} {hline 55}\n")
}
end
D.6. Results of specification tests
This section discusses the results of the specification tests for the appropriateness of 
various assumptions related to the model. As we decided to examine three different 
samples: the adult, elderly, and low-income groups, it was important to determine 
whether each of these was a random sample. We used the runs test, where a run is a 
series of similar responses. The null hypothesis of the runs test is that the number of 
runs is outside the range of runs that we would expect by chance. Appendix Table D.l 
lists the z-values and p-values of the various runs tests that we ran on the data.
Appendix Table D. 1. Results o f runs tests for specific samples
s  . Number of prescription drugs
_^____________________ obtained_____________________
. u -131.60
adults (p-0.000)
1^  1 -54.39
elderly (p-0.000)
. -58.58
low-income ( p * 0 .m )
The results of the test on the three different samples indicated that none of the 
samples were non-random, and we could proceed with our estimation.
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We also employed other tests for the specification of the model, the assumption of an 
endogenous co-payment variable, and the choice of main variables and instruments 
(Appendix Table D.2).
Appendix Table D.2. Results from various specification tests
Test Models compared Results: adult sample Results: elderly sample Results: low-income sample
Wald test for appropriateness 
o f fixed effects
FE-2SLS (with SS) 
and 2SLS (with SS)
X2(l0) = 1,701
(p=0.000)
X2(6 )= 3 9 0
(p=0.000)
X2(10) = 456
(p=0.000)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for 
endogeneity
FE-OLS (with SS) 
and FE-2SLS (with 
SS)
t =  9.22
(p=0.000)
t =  1.85 
(p=0.065)
t =  10.10
(p=0.000)
Semykina -Wooldridge test 
(Wald test) for sample 
selection
FE-2SLS (no SS) and 
FE-2SLS (with SS)
X2(9) = 314.7
(p=0.000)
X2(9) =  42.93
(p=0.000)
X2(9) = 62.40
(p=0.000)
Condition index to test for 
multicollinearity Cl = 18.3 Cl = 14.4 Cl = 14.6
Variance Inflation Factor to 
test for multicollinearity VIF = 7.05 VIF = 5.33 VIF = 5.01
Because of the panel nature of our data, we first tested for the appropriateness of a 
fixed effects model as compared to pooled ordinary least squares. The null hypothesis 
of the test is that all of the time-means parameters are zero. For each o f the three 
samples, the Wald statistic from this test indicated that we could reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that a fixed effects model is more appropriate than a pooled 
model4.
We then used a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to examine the null hypothesis that the co­
payment was exogenous5. The statistic reported in Appendix Table D.2 is the t- 
statistic from the error term on the estimated co-payment residual variable, and the 
results indicate that the co-payment variable is endogenous in the adult and low- 
income samples. The co-payment residual is only significant at the 10 percent level in 
the elderly sample. The problem with this test is that it does not distinguish between 
endogeneity due to the endogenous co-payment variable and endogeneity due to 
sample selection. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no sample selection, then 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is valid for testing the endogeneity of the co-payment.
4 In addition, we tested for whether a fixed or random effects specification was more appropriate, 
although we only provide the results o f  the linear case (as opposed to the specification that accounts for 
endogeneity and sample selection). The results o f the Hausman specification test for all three samples 
yielded p-values o f  0.000, indicating that a fixed effects framework was more appropriate.
5 An important note is that because there is potentially correlation between the individual-specific 
effects and some o f  the explanatory variables, we used a fixed effects estimator that corrected for 
sample selection for this test as it would be impossible to disentangle the endogeneity bias from 
omitted variable bias with the pooled OLS estimators.
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As no test yet exists to distinguish between these two possibilities, we choose to treat 
the co-payment as endogenous.
In terms of sample selection, we used a Wald test proposed by Semykina and 
Wooldridge (2006). The null hypothesis of the test is that the explanatory variables 
are not correlated with the error term in the main equation, i.e. E(xit,ujt) = 0 . The
reported values in Appendix Table D.2 indicate that for all three samples, sample 
selection is a problem. Moreover, when we adjust for serial correlation, the joint Wald 
test on all of the Mills ratio terms further confirms this result.
We also used a condition index where a condition index of 20 or greater generally 
indicates a possible multicollinearity problem (Greene, 2003). For all specifications, 
the condition index was less than 20. A second check for multicollinearity is the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which indicates that multicollinearity is an issue for 
VIF values greater than 10. The mean VIF for each specification was less than 10, and 
again we concluded that multicollinearity is not a significant issue.
D.7. First-stage probit results for probability of any prescription drug use
This section provides the results for each of the individual year probits (1996-2004) 
that make up the first stage of the FE-2SLS model; the probits for each sample are 
used to predict the Mills lambda, which is substituted into the main equation of 
interest. The probit results for each of the three samples (the general population, the 
elderly, and the low-income group) are provided in separate tables. The probit 
estimates for the revised elderly sample model are also included as a separate table.
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Appendix Table D.3. Probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure predicting 
probability o f prescription drug use (adult sample)a b c
Explanatory variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
age 30 to 39 -0.339s
(0.161)
0.233*
(0.122)
-0.472S
(0.147)
-0.023
(0.138)
-0.263*
(0.139)
age 40 to 49 -0.502s
(0.226)
-0.048
(0.169)
-0.541s
(0.204)
0.343*
(0.195)
-0.336*
(0.191)
age 50 to 64 -0.388(0.284)
-0.069
(0.214)
-0.666s
(0.257)
0.423*
(0.253)
-0.556s
(0.249)
age 65 to 74 -0.117(0.390)
0.105
(0.299)
-0.746s
(0.366)
0.228
(0.357)
-0.210
(0.349)
age greater than 74 0.648
(0.511)
0.137
(0.410)
-0.792
(0.492)
-0.011
(0.474)
-0.490
(0.485)
(log) income per person in family 0.050s
(0.016)
-0.000
(0.012)
0.019
(0.016)
0.005
(0.016)
0.022
(0.015)
poor health 0.162s
(0.076)
0.206s
(0.059)
-0.088
(0.072)
0.154s
(0.075)
0.109
(0.073)
diagnosis o f  at least one o f  leading 
causes o f death
0.392s
(0.111)
0.585s
(0.088)
0.483s
(0.104)
0.867s
(0.101)
0.679s
(0.101)
has public insurance (non Medicare) 0.410s
(0.117)
0.377s
(0.089)
0.132
(0.108)
0.162
(0.110)
0.404s
(0.104)
self-employed 0.065(0.259)
0.056
(0.178)
0.235
(0.200)
0.114
(0.199)
-0.050
(0.192)
(mean) age 30 to 39 0.524S
(0.164)
-0.035
(0.125)
0.672s
(0.150)
0.285s
(0.141)
0.522S
(0.143)
(mean) age 40 to 49 0.733s
(0.228)
0.379s
(0.172)
0.917S
(0.206)
0.013
(0.197)
0.664S
(0.193)
(mean) age 50 to 64 0.873s
(0.286)
0.609s
(0.216)
1.207s
(0.260)
0.147
(0.255)
1.153s
(0.251)
(mean) age 65 to 74 0.919s
(0.389)
0.691S
(0.303)
1.541s
(0.371)
0.698*
(0.360)
1.119s
(0.353)
(mean) age greater than 74 0.106(0.510)
0.711*
(0.414)
1.743S
(0.495)
0.980s
(0.478)
1.504s
(0.490)
(mean) (log) income per person in 
family
-0.018
(0.016)
0.036s
(0.013)
0.026
(0.016)
0.040s
(0.016)
0.023
(0.016)
(mean) poor health 0.435s
(0.090)
0.487S
(0.068)
0.801S
(0.086)
0.486S
(0.087)
0.587s
(0.086)
(mean) diagnosis o f  at least one of  
leading causes o f  death
0.720s
(0.115)
0.504s
(0.093)
0.589S
(0.111)
0.241s
(0.105)
0.478s
(0.107)
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
-0.215*
(0.124)
-0.133
(0.092)
0.174 
(0113)
0.166
(0.117)
-0.074
(0.109)
(mean) self-employed -0.007(0.344)
-0.165
(0.247)
-0.581s
(0.268)
-0.286
(0.282)
-0.018
(0.245)
constant -0.221s
(0.031)
-0.366s
(0.025)
-0.404s
(0.030)
-0.399s
(0.029)
-0.413S
(0.029)
N 15,560 23,456 16,198 16,901 17,354
Log-likelihood -8,748 -13,253 -9,012 -9,457 -9,620
probability > %2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 3 0 , individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one of the leading causes o f  death,
cthe mean variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f  each variable for each individual in the 
sample 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D. 3. Probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure predicting 
probability o f prescription drug use (adult sample - continuedT' ,c
Explanatory variable 2001 2002 2003 2004
age 30 to 39 -0.226
(0.127)
-0.013
(0.117)
-0.210
(0.130)
-0.023
(0.180)
age 40 to 49 -0.417s
(0.173)
-0.060
(0.160)
-0.239
(0.178)
-0.402*
(0.240)
age 50 to 64 -0.041
(0.220)
-0.147
(0.205)
-0.395*
(0.229)
-0.222
(0.307)
age 65 to 74 -0.142(0.302)
-0.041
(0.292)
-0.329
(0.324)
0.189
(0.420)
age greater than 74 -0.476(0.419)
0.174
(0.408)
-0.131
(0.459)
-0.033
(0.534)
(log) income per person in family 0.006(0.013)
-0.022*
(0.012)
0.011
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.018)
poor health 0.125s
(0.063)
0.124s
(0.057)
0.175s
(0.059)
0.048
(0.084)
diagnosis o f at least one o f  leading 
causes o f death
0.717s
(0.086)
0.669s
(0.084)
0.538S
(0.091)
0.933s
(0.129)
has public insurance (non Medicare) 0.222s
(0.088)
0.317S
(0.082)
0.236s
(0.085)
0.356s
(0.118)
self-employed -0.224(0.169)
-0.070
(0.151)
0.060
(0.156)
0.075
(0.220)
(mean) age 30 to 39 0.452s
(0.130)
0.251s
(0.120)
0.431s
(0.132)
0.251
(0.182)
(mean) age 40 to 49 0.759s
(0.175)
0.421s
(0.162)
0.624s
(0.180)
0.793 s 
(0.242)
(mean) age 50 to 64 0.602s
(0.222)
0.770s
(0.207)
1.015s
(0.231)
0.898s
(0.309)
(mean) age 65 to 74 0.967s
(0.304)
1.038S
(0.296)
1.270s
(0.327)
0.914s
(0.424)
(mean) age greater than 74 1.537s
(0.421)
0.892S
(0.412)
1.308s
(0.461)
1.352s
(0.540)
(mean) (log) income per person in 
family
0.042S
(0.014)
0.072s
(0.013)
0.048S
(0.014)
0.064s
(0.018)
(mean) poor health 0.480s
(0.073)
0.499S
(0.068)
0.335s
(0.069)
0.444s
(0.090)
(mean) diagnosis o f  at least one o f  
leading causes o f death
0.485S
(0.091)
0.547s
(0.090)
0.584s
(0.096)
0.199
(0.133)
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
0.088
(0.092)
-0.035
(0.087)
0.125
(0.089)
-0.011 
(0.121)
(mean) self-employed -0.118(0.242)
-0.085
(0.197)
-0.492s
(0.218)
-0.163
(0.229)
constant -0.368s
(0.025)
-0.451s
(0.023)
-0.502s
(0.025)
-0.561s
(0.025)
N 23,361 26,964 23,271 23,535
Log-1 ikelihood -12,732 -14,629 -12,713 -12,704
probability > x2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
“standard errors in parentheses, Excluded dummy variables are age less than 30, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the leading causes o f  death,
cthe mean variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f  each variable for each individual in the 
sample 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D. 4. Probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure predicting 
probability o f prescription drug use (elderly sample)a,b,c
Explanatory variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
age greater than 74 0.786s
(0.325)
0.007
(0.278)
0.081
(0.324)
-0.252
(0.308)
-0.245
(0.335)
(log) income per person in family 0.034(0.049)
0.058
(0.038)
-0.077
(0.052)
0.007
(0.055)
0.024
(0.054)
poor health 0.113(0.193)
0.160
(0.149)
-0.050
(0.185)
0.311
(0.194)
0.145
(0.203)
diagnosis o f at least one o f leading 
causes o f death
0.297
(0.279)
0.504s
(0.222)
-0.048
(0.269)
0.457
(0.247)
0.675s
(0.279)
has public insurance (non Medicare) -0.033(0.322)
0.114
(0.267)
-0.033
(0.339)
-0.240
(0.306)
0.010
(0.300)
changed insurance coverage this year -0.038(0.170)
0.026
(0.130)
-0.254
(0.164)
0.098
(0.162)
-0.132
(0.162)
(mean) age greater than 74 -0.825
(0.331)
0.059
(0.285)
0.079
(0.331)
0.316
(0.317)
0.329
(0.343)
(mean) (log) income per person in 
family
-0.017
(0.051)
-0.029
(0.039)
0.130s
(0.054)
0.034
(0.057)
0.051
(0.055)
(mean) poor health 0.428*(0.219)
0.506s
(0.171)
0.772S
(0.220)
0.152
(0.214)
0.584s
(0.233)
(mean) diagnosis o f  at least one o f  
leading causes o f  death
0.788s
(0.278)
0.463 s 
(0.235)
0.837s
(0.284)
0.466*
(0.256)
0.392
(0.294)
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
-0.045
(0.346)
-0.006
(0.275)
0.042
(0.360)
0.259
(0.332)
-0.087
(0.313)
(mean) changed insurance coverage 
this year
-0.120
(0.228)
-0.059
(0.155)
0.123
(0.206)
-0.281
(0.210)
0.053
(0.199)
constant 0.755®*
(0.101)
0.510s
(0.080)
0.458**
(0.099)
0.651®*
(0.101)
0.403s
(0.099)
N 2,475 3,762 2,598 2,644 2,783
Log-Iikelihood -825 -1301 -844 -842 -840
probability > x2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 75, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the leading causes o f  death, 
°the mean variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f each variable for each individual in the
sample 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D. 4. Probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure predicting
probability o f prescription drug use (elderly sample - continued)a,b c
Explanatory variable 2001 2002 2003 2004
age greater than 74 -0.441
(0.311)
0.085
(0.292)
0.246
(0.322)
-0.241
(0.435)
(log) income per person in family 0.045(0.043)
-0.039
(0.039)
-0.032
(0.041)
0.054
(0.064)
poor health 0.028(0.169)
0.078
(0.164)
0.366s
(0.167)
-0.256
(0.255)
diagnosis o f at least one o f  leading 0.571s 0.645S 0.295 1.021S
causes o f  death (0.224) (0.233) (0.248) (0.437)
has public insurance (non Medicare) -0.276(0.235)
0.479S
(0.242)
0.282
(0.327)
-1.181s
(0.500)
changed insurance coverage this year -0.235*(0.136)
0.179
(0.126)
-0.166
(0.137)
-0.055
(0.204)
(mean) age greater than 74 0.681s
(0.317)
-0.005
(0.299)
-0.019
(0.328)
0.451
(0.443)
(mean) (log) income per person in 0.013 0.071* 0.100s -0.017
family (0.045) (0.041) (0.043) (0.066)
(mean) poor health 0.573S
(0.197)
0.598s
(0.191)
0.076
(0.188)
0.628s
(0.277)
(mean) diagnosis o f at least one o f 0.260 0.349 0.627s -0.043
leading causes o f death (0.230) (0.243) (0.259) (0.446)
(mean) has public insurance (non 0.302 -0.512 -0.294 1.363s
Medicare) (0.247) (0.259) (0.335) (0.512)
(mean) changed insurance coverage 0.183 -0.439S -0.108 -0.250
this year (0.184) (0.157) (0.171) (0.218)
constant 0.499s 0.774s 0.559s 0.820s
(0.087) (0.085) (0.092) (0.092)
N 3,659 4,144 3,572 3,607
Log-likelihood -1089 -1126 -950 -873
probability > x 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 75, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the leading causes o f  death, 
cthe mean variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f each variable for each individual in the 
sample
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D. 5. Revised probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure
predicting probability o f prescription drug use (elderly sample)a b,c
Explanatory variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
age greater than 79 -0.381(0.474)
0.252
(0.358)
0.771
(0.532)
0.506
(0.433)
-0.816S
(0.394)
(log) income per person in family 0.050
(0.053)
0.055
(0.040)
-0.059
(0.054)
0.005
(0.060)
0.063
(0.057)
retired 0.084
(0.231)
-0.153
(0.185)
0.177
(0.232)
-0.019
(0.246)
-0.296
(0.262)
poor health 0.147(0.211)
0.187
(0.160)
-0.156
(0.196)
0.307
(0.208)
0.240
(0.220)
limitation to an activity o f  daily living -0.162(0.443)
0.209
(0.308)
0.413
(0.385)
0.094
(0.409)
0.141
(0.556)
pre-defined high-cost and/or high- 
prevalence disease
0.908s
(0.260)
0.783s
(0.225)
0.445*
(0.266)
0.906S
(0.248)
0.843S
(0.279)
has public insurance (non Medicare) -0.014
(0.353)
-0.052
(0.291)
0.098
(0.368)
-0.236
(0.327)
0.038
(0.318)
changed insurance coverage this year 0.079(0.184)
0.002
(0.140)
-0.327*
(0.175)
0.097
(0.172)
-0.171
(0.173)
(mean) age greater than 79 0.457(0.472)
-0.223
(0.368)
-0.747
(0.537)
-0.494
(0.437)
0.852S
(0.410)
(mean) (log) income per person in 
family
-0.030
(0.055)
-0.028
(0.041)
0 .115S 
(0.057)
0.046
(0.062)
0.018
(0.058)
(mean) retired 0.175(0.247)
0.248
(0.195)
-0.121
(0.247)
0.094
(0.259)
0.361
(0.273)
(mean) poor health 0.273(0.240)
0.425
(0.186)
0.895s
(0.236)
0.094
(0.230)
0.458*
(0.253)
(mean) limitation to an activity o f  daily 
living
0.688
(0.475)
-0.012
(0.347)
-0.452
(0.403)
0.052
(0.454)
0.601
(0.588)
(mean) pre-defined high-cost and/or 
high-prevalence disease
0.561s1
(0.261)
0.579s
(0.235)
0.807S
(0.278)
0.394
(0.255)
0.511*
(0.289)
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
-0.117
(0.379)
0.120
(0.299)
-0.118
(0.390)
0.244
(0.355)
-0.149
(0.331)
(mean) changed insurance coverage this 
year
-0.180
(0.249)
-0.004
(0.166)
0.215
(0.220)
-0.202
(0.222)
0.111
(0.211)
constant 0.220*(0.123)
0.165*
(0.096)
0.135
(0.115)
0.269S
(0.119)
0.045
(0.117)
N 2,475 3,762 2,598 2,644 2,783
Log-1 ikelihood -720 -1147 -749 -749 -742
probability > x2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 79, individual is not
retired, individual reports being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  
the leading causes o f  death, individual does not report at least one limitation to activity o f  daily living 
cthe mean variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f each variable for each individual in the 
sample
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D. 5. Revised probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure
predicting probability o f prescription drug use (elderly sample -  continued)a b c
Explanatory variable 2001 2002 2003 2004
age greater than 79 0.329(0.377)
-0.274
(0.375)
0.002
(0.454)
-0.392
(0.609)
(log) income per person in family 0.030
(0.047)
-0.023
(0.043)
-0.046
(0.045)
0.052
(0.069)
retired 0.397*(0.219)
-0.188
(0.205)
0.256
(0.214)
0.114
(0.311)
poor health 0.001(0.184)
0.070
(0.177)
0.370S
(0.182)
-0.072
(0.278)
limitation to an activity o f daily living 0.169(0.380)
-0.012
(0.326)
-0.909s
(0.338)
0.691s
(0.601)
pre-defined high-cost and/or high- 
prevalence disease
1.017s
(0.219)
1.011s
(0.226)
0.765s
(0.257)
0.925s
(0.471)
has public insurance (non Medicare) -0.390(0.251)
0.603s
(0.261)
0.296
(0.363)
-1.282
(0.550)
changed insurance coverage this year -0.176(0.145)
0.100
(0.136)
-0.158
(0.149)
0.050
(0.218)
(mean) age greater than 79 -0.156(0.383)
0.332
(0.387)
0.120
(0.464)
0.422
(0.623)
(mean) (log) income per person in 
family
0.029
(0.049)
0.058
(0.045)
0.114s
(0.046)
-0.015
(0.071)
(mean) retired -0.335(0.230)
0.233
(0.216)
-0.060
(0.227)
0.178
(0.320)
(mean) poor health 0.533(0.214)
0.535s
(0.206)
0.085
(0.204)
0.434
(0.304)
(mean) limitation to an activity o f  
daily living
0.338
(0.402)
0.413
(0.393)
0.846s
(0.402)
-0.691
(0.633)
(mean) pre-defmed high-cost and/or 
high-prevalence disease
0.222
(0.225)
0.325
(0.234)
0.615S
(0.265)
0.570
(0.479)
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
0.368
(0.264)
-0.711S
(0.280)
-0.320
(0.370)
1.435s
(0.563)
(mean) changed insurance coverage 
this year
0.134
(0.197)
-0.347s
(0.168)
-0.067
(0.185)
-0.266
(0.234)
constant 0.201§
(0.101)
0.415S
(0.099)
0.156
(0.105)
0.344s
(0.107)
N 3,659 4,144 3,572 3,607
Log-likelihood -966 -991 -821 -733
probability > x2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 79, individual is not
retired, individual reports being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  
the leading causes o f  death, individual does not report at least one limitation to activity o f daily living 
cthe mean variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f each variable for each individual in the 
sample
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D. 6. Probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure predicting
probability o f prescription drug use (low-income sample)a’b,c
Explanatory variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
age 30 to 39 -0.080(0.357)
0.246
(0.262)
-0.013
(0.314)
0.265
(0.338)
-0.597*
(0.346)
age 40 to 49 0.191(0.556)
-0.260
(0.397)
-0.077
(0.457)
0.082
(0.477)
-0.714
(0.492)
age 50 to 64 0.307(0.798)
0.015
(0.591)
0.058
(0.721)
-0.738
(0.760)
0.237
(0.802)
age 65 to 74 0.472(1.010)
0.868
(0.769)
-0.541
(0.938)
-1.845
(0.978)
0.953
(1.020)
age greater than 74 0.864(1.207)
0.747
(0.938)
0.254
(1.233)
-2.330*
(1.179)
0.219
(1.193)
(log) income per person in family 0.035(0.038)
0.006
(0.029)
0.005
(0.038)
-0.054
(0.043)
0.108s
(0.042)
poor health 0.367S
(0.138)
0.254s
(0.105)
-0.212
(0.140)
0.171
(0.147)
0.281S
(0.142)
diagnosis o f at least one o f  leading 
causes o f death
0.200
(0.280)
0.493S
(0.218)
0.725s
(0.281)
1.051s
(0.251)
0.551s
(0.265)
has public insurance (non Medicare) 0.323S
(0.175)
0.468s
(0.140)
0.191
(0.178)
0.302s
(0.180)
0.215
(0.175)
changed insurance coverage this year -1.352(0.916)
0.130
(0.446)
0.138
(0.451)
0.014*
(0.503)
-0.808
(0.559)
(mean) age 30 to 39 0.231(0.361)
-0.125
(0.266)
0.126
(0.321)
-0.026
(0.344)
0.824s
(0.352)
(mean) age 40 to 49 -0.013(0.558)
0.455
(0.400)
0.343
(0.463)
0.254
(0.481)
0.942*
(0.498)
(mean) age 50 to 64 0.260(0.799)
0.445
(0.595)
0.388
(0.725)
1.220
(0.764)
0.313
(0.805)
(mean) age 65 to 74 0.360(1.010)
-0.042
(0.772)
1.485
(0.948)
2.723S
(0.981)
-0.103
(1.026)
(mean) age greater thai 74 0.016(1.207)
0.200
(0.943)
0.917
(1.236)
3.389s
(1181)
0.831
(1.201)
(mean) (log) income per person in 
family
0.010
(0.039)
0.031
(0.030)
0.055
(0.039)
0.116s
(0.045)
-0.035
(0.043)
(mean) poor health 0.200(0.154)
0.465s
(0.117)
0.940S
(0.161)
0.291*
(0.162)
0.392s
(0.156)
(mean) diagnosis o f  at least one o f  
leading causes o f  death
0.950S
(0.289)
0.550s
(0.224)
0.418
(0.290)
-0.015
(0.256)
0.658s
(0.276)
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
0.149
(0.185)
-0.076
(0.145)
0.310
(0.186)
0.174
(0.189)
0.343s
(0.182)
(mean) changed insurance coverage 
this year
1.408s
(1.047)
-0.146
(0.525)
-0.208
(0.563)
-0.162
(0.627)
0.513
(0.640)
constant -0.504s
(0.056)
-0.507s
(0.044)
-0.583s
(0.056)
-0.587s
(0.056)
-0.666s
(0.056)
N 4,289 6,591 4,086 4,173 4,332
Log-1 ikelihood -2,231 -3,453 -2,060 -2,205 -2,156
probability > x2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 75, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f the leading causes o f death; 
cthe mean variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f each variable for each individual in the 
sample
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D. 6. Probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure predicting
probability o f prescription drug use (low-income sample - continued)a b c
Explanatory variable 2001 2002 2003 2004
age 30 to 39 -0.151
(0.297)
-0.328
(0.244)
-0.188
(0.244)
-0.046
(0.360)
age 40 to 49 -0.507(0.429)
-0.702*
(0.362)
-0.143
(0.363)
-0.439
(0.504)
age 50 to 64 0.428(0.645)
-1.114s
(0.535)
-0.553
(0.535)
0.111
(0.773)
age 65 to 74 0.128(0.898)
-0.759
(0.761)
-0.756
(0.763)
0.182
(1.047)
age greater than 74 -0.839(1.151)
-0.789
(0.9331
0.005
(0.947)
-1.191
(1.290)
(log) income per person in family -0.002(0.034)
-0.060s
(0.028)
0.000
(0.027)
-0.023
(0.040)
poor health 0.030(0.121)
0.054
(0.102)
0.135
(0.100)
-0.051
(0.145)
diagnosis o f at least one o f  leading 
causes o f death
0.973s
(0.226)
0.665s
(0.196)
0.356*
(0.198)
1.236s
(0.301)
has public insurance (non Medicare) 0.308s
(0.157)
0.335*
(0.137)
0.210*
(0.131)
0.378
(0.186)
changed insurance coverage this year -0.480(0.458)
0.528
(0.404)
-0.105
(0.364)
-0.013
(0.477)
(mean) age 30 to 39 0.337(0.302)
0.544s
(0.248)
0.382
(0.249)
0.225
(0.363)
(mean) age 40 to 49 0.696*(0.432)
0.878s
(0.366)
0.442
(0.367)
0.699
(0.508)
(mean) age 50 to 64 0.148(0.647)
1.650s
(0.538)
1.053s
(0.539)
0.463
(0.777)
(mean) age 65 to 74 0.809(0.901)
1.649s
(0.765)
1.603S
(0.767)
1.036
(1.053)
(mean) age greater than 74 1.806
(1.155)
1.883^
(0.936)
1.278
(0.950)
2.660S
(1.299)
(mean) (log) income per person in 
family
0.062*
(0.035)
0.121S
(0.030)
0.069s
(0.029)
0.092s
(0.041)
(mean) poor health 0.661s
(0.137)
0.638S
(0.117)
0.439S
(0.112)
0.686s
(0.153)
(mean) diagnosis o f  at least one o f 
leading causes o f  death
0.215
(0.230)
0.611s
(0.205)
0.869s
(0.207)
-0.051
(0.307)
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
0.211
(0.163)
0.148
(0.143)
0.406S
(0.136)
0.240
(0.190)
(mean) changed insurance coverage 
this year
0.414
(0.522)
-0.853
(0.468)
-0.316
(0.419)
-0.202
(0.525)
constant -0.581s
(0.048)
-0.677s
(0.043)
-0.759s
(0.043)
-0.808s
(0.043)
N 5,907 7,277 7,184 7,273
Log-1 ikelihood -2,939 -3,631 -3,584 -3,546
probability > x2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; excluded dummy variables are age less than 75, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the leading causes o f  death; 
cthe mean variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f each variable for each individual in the 
sample
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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D.8. Estimates of the endogenous co-payment variable
After the Mills lambda is estimated in the first stage of the Semykina and Wooldridge 
(2006) model, the next step is to estimate the endogenous variable to obtain a 
prediction that will be used in the main equation. This section provides the results of 
the estimations to predict the endogenous co-payment variable for each of the three 
samples (general population, the elderly, and low-income group).
Appendix Table D. 7. Estimates for the log o f the prescription drug co-payment (all 
three samples)
Explanatory variable Adult sample Elderly sample
Elderly sample 
(revised)
Low-income
sample
age between 30 and 39 0.001*(0.045)
-0.035
(0.132)
age between 40 and 49 0.104s
(0.058)
0.164
(0.168)
age between 50 and 64 0.141S
(0.066)
0.034
(0.201)
age between 65 and 74 0.180*(0.077)
-0.198
(0.224)
age above 74 0.169(0.090)
-0.031
(0.045)
-0.271
(0.252)
age above 79 -0.015(0.049)
(log) income per person in family -0.001(0.003)
-0.001
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.002
(0.007)
retired -0.023(0.026)
individual reports poor health -0.008
(0.013)
0.017
(0.022)
0.013
(0.022)
-0.009
(0.027)
individual diagnosed with at least one 
o f leading causes o f death
-0.004
(0.019)
0.012
(0.034)
0.064
(0.051)
individual faces at least one limitation 
to an activity o f  daily living
0.099s
(0.037)
pre-defined high-cost and/or high- 
prevalence disease
0.005
(0.048)
has public insurance (non Medicare) -0.465§
(0.026)
-0.377s
(0.043)
-0.382s
(0.043)
-0.700s
(0.051)
changed insurance coverage this year 0.086s
(0.022)
0.086s
(0.022)
0.266s
(0.029)
self-employed 0.016*
(0.002)
year is 1997 0.130s
(0.022)
-0.296S
(0.182)
0.152s
(0.030)
0.249s
(0.046)
year is 1998 0.169s
(0.026)
-0.074S
(0.152)
0.180s
(0.037)
0.304s
(0.053)
year is 1999 0.210s
(0.026)
-0.165s
(0.197)
0.178s
(0.037)
0.353s
(0.057)
year is 2000 0.289s
(0.026)
-0.033s
(0.206)
0.236s
(0.035)
0.395s
(0.053)
year is 2001 0.321s
(0.024)
0.194s
(0.190)
0.266S
(0.034)
0.434S
(0.051)
year is 2002 0.326s
(0.023)
0.045s
(0.187)
0.298S
(0.032)
0.416s
(0.047)
year is 2003 0.455S
(0.024)
0.199s
(0.184)
0.433s
(0.033)
0.573S
(0.049)
year is 2004 0.288s
(0.028)
0.375s
(0.197)
0.321s
(0.039)
0.271S
(0.056)
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Explanatory variable Adult sample Elderly sample Elderly sample (revised)
Low-income
sample
lambda -0.229§
(0.059)
0.071
(0.270)
-0.280*
(0.157)
0.093
(0.108)
lambda 1997 -0.024(0.042)
0.153
(0.038)
-0.094
(0.118)
-0.283S
(0.097)
lambda 1998 0.002(0.050)
0.201
(0.046)
-0.084
(0.153)
-0.209*
(0.110)
lambda 1999 -0.054(0.050)
0.200
(0.047)
0.079
(0.159)
-0.221* 
(0.114)
lambda 2000 -0.135(0.049)
0.229
(0.044)
0.180
(0.152)
-0.360s
(0.113)
lambda 2001 -0.062(0.046)
0.289
(0.042)
0.212
(0.145)
-0.382s
(0.1071
lambda 2002 -0.050
(0.045)
0.295
(0.041)
0.215
(0.143)
-0.315s
(0.099)
lambda 2003 0.054
(0.046)
0.400*
(0.043)
0.189
(0.147)
-0.190*
(0.099)
lambda 2004 0.057(0.053)
0.308
(0.049)
-0.021
(0.204)
-0.101
(0.113)
(mean) age 30 to 39 -0.060(0.048)
0.103
(0.136)
(mean) age 40 to 49 -0.139
(0.060)
0.018
(0.173)
(mean) age 50 to 64 -0.137
(0.069)
0.169
(0.206)
(mean) age 65 to 74 0.029(0.081)
0.470s
(0.229)
(mean) age greater than 74 0.087(0.093)
0.099**
(0.048)
0.562S
(0.258)
(mean) age above 79 0.124(0.052)
(mean) (log) income per person in 
family
0.006
(0.004)
0.010
(0.007)
0.009
(0.007)
0.003
(0.008)
(mean) retired -0.002
(0.031)
(mean) poor health 0.075**
(0.018)
-0.056*
(0.031)
-0.049
(0.030)
0.099s
(0.037)
(mean) diagnosis o f  at least one o f  
leading causes o f  death
-0.021
(0.020)
-0.025
(0.037)
-0.031
(0.054)
(mean) individual faces at least one -0.090*
limitation to an activity o f daily living (0.049)
(mean) pre-defined high-cost and/or 
high-prevalence disease
0.005
(0.044)
(mean) has public insurance (non -0.378s -0.553s -0.554s -0.565S
Medicare) (0.028) (0.048) (0.048) (0.054)
(mean) changed insurance coverage 0.355s 0.349S 0.226s
this year (0.037) (0.037) (0.043)
(mean) self-employed 0.235s
(0.083)
constant 2.575s 2.736S 2.736s 2.418S
(0.047) (0.066) (0.073) (0.087)
N 90,088 21,780 21,780 16,786
R2 0.143 0.152 0.155 0.283
“standard errors in parentheses, excluded dummy variables are age less than 75, (age less than 79 for 
revised elderly regression), (individual is not retired for revised elderly regression), individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f the leading causes o f  death, 
(individual does not report at least one limitation to activity o f  daily living for revised elderly 
regression)
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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D.9. Estimates of the number of prescription drugs purchased
This section of the Appendix provides more detailed results for the analyses presented 
in Section 6.5.2. Specifically, all of the covariates included in the regressions, 
including time dummies and the Mills lambda, are listed in the tables below. The 
results are given for each of the three samples (general population, the elderly, and 
low-income group).
Appendix Table D. 8. Estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription drugs 
obtained equation (adult sample)a,b,c
Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(log) drug co-payment 0.058S
(0.004)
-0.284s
(0.014)
0.036S
(0.004)
-0.262S
(0.037)
-0.250S
(0.039)
age between 30 and 39 0.207S
(0.012)
0.226s
(0.013)
-0.030
(0.033)
-0.039
(0.033)
-0.052
(0.036)
age between 40 and 49 0.4619
(0.012)
0.503s
(0.013)
-0.010
(0.042)
0.007
(0.041)
-0.030
(0.046)
age between 50 and 64 0.7498
(0.012)
0.812s
(0.013)
0.079
(0.049)
0.102s
(0.048)
0.039
(0.053)
age between 65 and 74 0.878S
(0.014)
1.009S
(0.016)
0.113*
(0.056)
0.146s
(0.056)
0.051
(0.061)
age above 74 0.948s
(0,015)
1.094S
(0.016)
0.075
(0.064)
0.099
(0.068)
-0.029
(0.069)
(log) income per person in family 0.023
(0.001)
0.028S
(0.001)
0.003
(0.002)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
individual reports poor health 0.558s
(0.009)
0.534S
(0.010)
0.060S
(0.009)
0.061s
(0.010)
0.060s
(0.010)
individual diagnosed with at least 
one o f  leading causes o f death
0.520s
(0.009)
0.534s
(0.009)
0.204s
(0.012)
0.218s
(0.014)
0.194s
(0.017)
year is 1997 -0.016*(0.009)
0.019*
(0.010)
-0.038s
(0.008)
0.006
(0.013)
0.087s
(0.019)
year is 1998 0.018(0.014)
0.071s
(0.015)
-0.067s
(0.014)
0.012
(0.019)
0.154s
(0.029)
year is 1999 0.034*(0.014)
0.100s
(0.015)
-0.065s
(0.018)
0.020
(0.022)
0.255s
(0.029)
year is 2000 0.051s
(0.014)
0.133s
(0.015)
-0.066S
(0.021)
0.029
(0.027)
0.226s
(0.030)
year is 2001 0.127S
(0.013)
0.230s
(0.014)
-0.036
(0.024)
0.081s
(0.031)
0.323s
(0.029)
year is 2002 0.159s
(0.012)
0.255S
(0.014)
-0.038
(0.025)
0.079s
(0.033)
0.383s
(0.028)
year is 2003 0.188s
(0.013)
0.335s
(0.015)
-0.064s
(0.027)
0.100s
(0.036)
0.445S
(0.031)
year is 2004 0.181S
(0.015)
0.270s
(0.017)
-0.073S
(0.029)
0.038
(0.032)
0.430s
(0.031)
lambda 0.162s
(0.061)
lambda 1997 -0.136s
(0.036)
lambda 1998 -0.175s
(0.051)
lambda 1999 -0.214S (0.051J
lambda 2000 -0.196s
(0.051)
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Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
lambda 2001 -0.216s
(0.048)
lambda 2002 -0.278s
(0.046)
lambda 2003 -0.258s
(0.047)
lambda 2004 -0.337s
(0.053)
(mean) age 30 to 39 0.271s
(0.040)
(mean) age 40 to 49 0.512s
(0.050)
(mean) age 50 to 64 0.734s
(0.058)
(mean) age 65 to 74 0.902s
(0.067)
(mean) age greater thai 74 1.056s
(0.075)
(mean) (log) income per person in 
family 1
1
(mean) poor health 0.618s
(0.018)
(mean) diagnosis o f  at least one o f  
leading causes o f  death
0.334s
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
-0.017
(0.034)
(mean) self-employed -0.179s
(0.081)
constant 1.242S
(0.016)
1.982S
(0.034)
2.243S
(0.041)
2.919s
(0.102)
1.814s
(0.000)
N 90,088 90,088 90,088 90,088 90,088
R2 0.298 0.207 0.229 0.027 0.117
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 30, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the leading causes o f death, 
year is 1996 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D. 9. Estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription drugs
obtained equation (elderly sample)a b
Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects 
2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(log) drug co-payment 0.031§ 
(0.008)
-0.186®
(0.023)
0.022®
(0.008)
-0.129*
(0.079)
-0.096
(0.080)
individual is above the age o f  74 0.080§
(0.015)
0.090®
(0.016)
-0.064®
(0.029)
-0.068*
(0.035)
-0.098®
(0.030)
(log) income per person in 
family
0.021§ 
(0.003)
0.023®
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
individual reports poor health 0 .418§ 
(0.015)
0.389®
(0.016)
0.044®
(0.015)
0.047®
(0.017)
0.039®
(0.015)
individual diagnosed with at 
least one o f  leading causes o f  
death
0.495§
(0.015)
0.497®
(0.016)
0.135®
(0.022)
0.139®
(0.023)
0.105®
(0.027)
year is 1997 -0.003(0.018)
0.023
(0.019)
-0.004
(0.015)
0.023
(0.018)
0.001
(0.033)
year is 1998 0.050*
(0.028)
0.084®
(0.029)
-0.015
(0.026)
0.029
(0.033)
0.056
(0.051)
year is 1999 0.072**
(0.028)
0.117®
(0.029)
-0.019
(0.034)
0.032
(0.042)
0.064
(0.052)
year is 2000 0.056®
(0.028)
0.117®
(0.029)
-0.057
(0.040)
0.001
(0.051)
0.083*
(0.050)
year is 2001 0.175®
(0.026)
0.241®
(0.027)
0.003
(0.046)
0.059
(0.051)
0.206®
(0.050)
year is 2002 0.235®
(0.025)
0.298®*
(0.027)
0.030
(0.048)
0.085*
(0.049)
0.283®
(0.048)
year is 2003 0.281®
(0.026)
0.368®
(0.028)
0.043
(0.052)
0.104*
(0.054)
0.366F
(0.053)
year is 2004 0.277**
(0.030)
0.336r
(0.032)
0.085
(0.055)
0.121®
(0.048)
0.334®
(0.055)
lambda -0.253
(0.189)
lambda 1997 0.154(0.124)
lambda 1998 0.136
(0.197)
lambda 1999 0.223(0.208)
lambda 2000 0.142(0.194)
lambda 2001 0.062(0.191)
lambda 2002 -0.028(0.188)
lambda 2003 -0.249(0.202)
lambda 2004 -0.096(0.249)
(mean) age greater than 74 0.174®
(0.035)
(mean) (log) income per person 
in family
0.018®
(0.006)
(mean) poor health 0.445®
(0.029)
(mean) diagnosis o f  at least one 
o f  leading causes o f  death
0.363®
(0.032)
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Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
0.059
(0.078)
(mean) changed insurance 
coverage this year
-0.0965 ' 
(0.048)
constant 2 .2 10§ 
(0.035)
2.773§
(0.066)
2.798§
(0.046)
3.188§
(0.213)
2.567§
(0.231)
N 21,780 21,780 21,780 21,780 21,780
R2 0.148 0.152 0.094 0.023 0.084
Standard errors in parentheses, ‘’excluded dummy variables are age less than 75, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f the leading causes o f  death, 
year is 1996 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D.10. Revised estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription
drugs obtained equation (elderly sample)a b
Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(log) drug co-payment 0.029§
(0.008)
-0.150®
(0.022)
0.021®
(0.008)
-0.133*
(0.079)
-0.108
(0.079)
age greater than 84 0.017
(0.017)
0.033*
(0.018)
-0.038
(0.032)
-0.038
(0.036)
-0.066®
(0.032)
(log) income per person in 
family
0.023§
(0.003)
0.024®
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.004)
0.005
(0.005)
retired -0.006
(0.015)
0.003
(0.015)
-0.027
(0.018)
-0.030*
(0.016)
-0.034*
(0.018)
poor health 0.407®
(0.016)
0.386®
(0.016)
0.041®
(0.015)
0.044®
(0.016)
0.037®
(0.015)
limitation to an activity o f  daily 
living
0.342§
(0.027)
0.321®
(0.027)
0.082®
(0.029)
0.098®
(0.034)
0.089®
(0.030)
pre-defined high-cost and/or 
high-prevalence disease
0.584®
(0.017)
0.592®
(0.017)
0.191®
(0.026)
0.198®
(0.026)
0.139®
(0.041)
year is 1997 -0.014
(0.018)
0.008
(0.018)
-0.009
(0.015)
0.018
(0.018)
0.008
(0.027)
year is 1998 0.027
(0.028)
0.056*
(0.028)
-0.025
(0.026)
0.018
(0.039)
0.037
(0.040)
year is 1999 0.064®
(0.027)
0.101®
(0.028)
-0.034
(0.034)
0.017
(0.048)
0.068*
(0.040)
year is 2000 0.054®
(0.027)
0.104®
(0.029)
-0.074*
(0.040)
-0.017
(0.050)
0.075*
(0.041)
year is 2001 0.160®
(0.025)
0.215®
(0.027)
-0.021
(0.046)
0.034
(0.049)
0.191®
(0.041)
year is 2002 0.215® 
__(0.025)
0.267®
(0.026)
0.002
(0.048)
0.054
(0.054)
0.257®
(0.040)
year is 2003 0.253®
(0.026)
0.325®
(0.027)
0.008
(0.052)
0.067
(0.056)
0.319®
(0.047)
year is 2004 0.261®
(0.029)
0.311®
(0.031)
0.048
(0.055)
0.079
(0.056)
0.318®
(0.045)
lambda -0.278*
(0.159)
lambda 1997 0.104
(0.095)
lambda 1998 0.163
(0.151)
lambda 1999 0.205
(0.154)
lambda 2000 0.210
(0.146)
lambda 2001 0.138
(0.144)
lambda 2002 0.062
(0.141)
lambda 2003 -0.034
(0.149)
lambda 2004 -0.036
(0.182)
(mean) age greater than 84 0.084®
(0.039)
(mean) (log) income per person 
in family
0.021®
(0.006)
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Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(mean) retired 0.043*
(0.025)
(mean) poor health 0.452§
(0.027)
(mean) limitation to an activity 
o f  daily living
0.251§ 
(0.046)
(mean) pre-defined high-cost 
and/or high-prevalence disease S
I
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
0.012
(0.077)
(mean) changed insurance 
coverage this year
-0.095§
(0.047)
constant 2.035§
(0.037)
2.490§
(0.066)
2 .731§ 
(0.050)
3.127§
(0.203)
2.416§
(0.231)
N 21,780 21,780 21,780 21,780 21,780
R2 0.171 0.140 0.135 0.048 0.120
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 79, individual is not 
retired, individual reports being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  
the leading causes o f  death, individual does not report at least one limitation to activity o f  daily living, 
year is 1996
Significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table D.l I. Estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription drugs
obtained equation (low-income sample)a b c
Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(log) drug co-payment 0.002(0.007)
-0.261®
(0.016)
-0.261®
(0.012)
-0.239®
(0.054)
-0.199®
(0.046)
age between 30 and 39 0.256§
(0.031)
0.304®
(0.033)
0.304®
(0.026)
-0.148*
(0.081)
-0.151*
(0.082)
age between 40 and 49 0.600®
(0.034)
0.690®
(0.036)
0.690®
(0.027)
-0.168
(0.118)
-0.188*
(0.112)
age between 50 and 64 0.903®
(0.032)
1.016®
(0.034)
1.016®
(0.026)
-0.034
(0.136)
-0.087
(0.127)
age between 65 and 74 0.934®
(0.034)
1.085®
(0.037)
1.085®
(0.028)
0.002
(0.146)
-0.078
(0.142)
age above 74 0.951®
(0.033)
1.134®
(0.036)
1.134®
(0.028)
-0.073
(0.142)
-0.194
(0.157)
(log) income per person in 
family
0.047®
(0.004)
0.046®
(0.004)
0.046®
(0.003)
0.003
(0.004)
0.003
(0.005)
individual reports poor health 0.525®
(0.018)
0.494®
(0.019)
0.494®
(0.015)
0.070®
(0.018)
0.069®
(0.018)
individual diagnosed with at 
least one o f  leading causes o f  
death
0.532®
(0.019)
0.541®
(0.020)
0.541®
(0.015)
0.199®
(0.027)
0.138®
(0.035)
year is 1997 -0.053®
(0.022)
-0.021
(0.024)
-0.021
(0.031)
-0.004
(0.025)
0.042
(0.037)
year is 1998 -0.047(0.034)
0.008
(0.036)
0.008
(0.034)
-0.003
(0.042)
0.072
(0.055)
year is 1999 0.039(0.034)
0.115®
(0.037)
0.115®
(0.035)
0.008
(0.054)
0.191®
(0.058)
year is 2000 0.023(0.034)
0.104®
(0.036)
0.104®
(0.034)
-0.010
(0.064)
0.150®
(0.055)
year is 2001 0.111®
(0.031)
0.197®
(0.033)
0.197®
(0.032)
0.022
(0.077)
0.295®
(0.053)
year is 2002 0.179®
(0.030)
0.247®
(0.031)
0.247®
(0.031)
0.039
(0.079)
0.387®
(0.050)
year is 2003 0.214®
(0.030)
0.323®
(0.032)
0.323®
(0.031)
0.034
(0.082)
0.429®
(0.053)
year is 2004 0.237®
(0.035)
0.272®
(0.037)
0.272®
(0.035)
-0.064
(0.081)
0.410®
(0.055)
lambda 0.065(0.106)
lambda 1997 -0.150®
(0.074)
lambda 1998 -0.164(0.101)
lambda 1999 -0.209®
(0.105)
lambda 2000 -0.121(0.104)
lambda 2001 -0.302®
(0.100)
lambda 2002 -0.371®
(0.093)
lambda 2003 -0.322®
(0.092)
lambda 2004 -0.351®
(0.104)
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Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2SLS
SS Fixed 
Effects 2SLS
(mean) age 30 to 39 0.423§
(0.090)
(mean) age 40 to 49 0.800§
(0.120)
(mean) age 50 to 64 0.969§
(0.136)
(mean) age 65 to 74 1.021§ 
(0.154)
(mean) age greater than 74 1.171S
(0.170)
(mean) (log) income per person 
in family
0.044§
(0.006)
(mean) poor health 0.5351
(0.033)
(mean) diagnosis o f  at least one 
o f leading causes o f death
0.349§
(0.039)
(mean) has public insurance (non 
Medicare)
0.014
(0.059)
(mean) changed insurance 
coverage this year
-0.108s
(0.039)
constant 1.296s
(0.034)
1.786§
(0.046)
1.786§
(0.039)
3.200§
(0.163)
1.691S
(0.125)
N 16,786 16,786 16,786 16,786 16,786
R2 0.355 0.112 0.173 0.040 0.099
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age less than 30, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f the leading causes o f  death, 
year is 1996 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix E: Appendix to Chapter 7
In line with Appendix D, this appendix is meant to provide supplementary material to 
Chapter 7, although the focus of this appendix is on British Columbia. We include the 
STATA code used to run the empirical model, the full results from the empirical 
analysis, and information on an alternative econometric specification that we 
considered. The empirical model is based on Semykina and Wooldridge (2006), but 
the program code is slightly different as the model does not correct for endogeneity. 
The next section provides the STATA program code used to implement the model. 
Sections E.2 through E.4 then present the full results of the empirical analysis, 
including the specification tests, the first-stage probits, and the full econometric 
model. Because we also considered a dynamic specification but chose not to include 
this aspect in the final models from Chapter 7, Section E.5 develops the dynamic 
specification and includes the results.
E.l. STATA code to implement fixed effects model correcting for sample 
selection bias
This section o f the Appendix provides the code that was used to run the Semykina and 
Wooldridge (2006) model (SS FE). In order to help the user better understand the 
program, there are comments on aspects of the code inside of the following symbols:
/**************************
* (a)
**************************/
// (b)
/********************************************************************
* PROGRAM TO RUN THE ‘SS FE’ MODEL
********************************************************************/
// generates the base variables used in the model
scalar time_lambdas = 1
scalar num_time_pers =11
gen selection_indicator=0
replace selection_indicator=l ifrxtot>0
// # periods the person had positive drug spending 
by studyid: egen keep_obs = sum(selection_indicator)
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// defines the variable list
local varlist_main age_65to74 age_75to84 socio_dep2 socio_dep3 socio_dep4 
socio_dep5 morb_us died_this_year socio morb
// generates the time dummies 
local i=l 993 
while 'i'<2003 { 
quietly gen T _ 'i-0  
quietly replace T_'i' = 1 if year=='i' 
local i = 'i'+ l
}
// generates the mean variables for the selection probit estimations 
local j= l
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_main' { 
quietly egen ms_'var' = mean('var'), by(studyid) 
local j = 'j'+ l
}
scalar NUM JNSTR = 'j'-l
/ ♦ H e * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* PROCEDURE 1: RUN THE FIRST STAGE PROBITS
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /
// generates the inverse Mills ratio for each year 
gen lambda = . 
local i = 1992 
while 'i'<2003 { 
quietly probit selection_indicator 'varlist_ins' ms_ if year=='i' 
quietly predict rhat, xb
quietly replace lambda = normden(rhat)/norm(rhat) if selection_indicator==l &
year == 'i'
drop rhat 
local i = 'i'+ l
}
// generates interaction terms for lambda 
if time_lambdas == 1 { 
local i = 1993 
while 7<2003 {
quietly gen lambda_'i' = T_'i'* lambda 
local i = 'i'+ l
}
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/He*******************************************************************
* PROCEDURE 2: RUN THE SECOND STAGE AND CORRECT THE
* STANDARD ERRORS
// runs the regression without correcting for the Heckman standard errors 
regress ln_rxtot ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda* T_* ms_* if keep_obs>l & 
selection_indicator==l, robust cluster(studyid)
// obtain the coefficient on the Mills ratio 
if time_lambdas==l { 
scalar b_millsl992 = _b [lambda] 
local i = 1993 
while 'i'<2003 { 
scalar b_mills'i' = _b[lambda_'i'] + b_millsl992 
local i= 'i'+l
>
}
if time_lambdas==0 { 
local i = 1992 
while 'i'<2003 { 
scalar b_mills'i' = _b [lambda] 
local i='i'+l
}
}
♦He******************************************************************/
* Generates the diagonal matrix with Hessians
********************************************************************/
// count the number o f Heckman regressors 
local c=0
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_main' { 
local c = 'c '+ l
>
scalar stage_l = 'c' 
gen cons = 1
// defines the list o f regressors used in the first stage 
local varlist_il 'varlist_main' ms_* cons 
local varlist_i3 
local varlist_i4
// generates matrix H, a square matrix of dimension [# regressors in 1 st stage 
probit --B Y - # time periods]
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mat H = I((2*stage_l+l)*num_time_pers)
local i=1992 
while 'i'<2003 {
quietly probit selection_indicator 'varlist_main' ms_* if year =  'i' 
predict rhat, xb 
mat H'i' = e(V)
quietly generate tempvarl = normden(rhat) / norm(rhat) if  selection_indicator =  1
& year == 'i'
quietly generate tempvar2 = -normden(rhat) / (1 - norm(rhat)) if
selection_indicator == 0 & year == 'i' 
assert lambda = tempvarl if selection_indicator == 1 & year =  'i' 
local j = 'i' -1992
mat H[(2stage_l + l) 'j ' + l,(2stage_l + l) 'j ' + 1] = H'i'
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_il' { 
quietly generate g_'var’'j' = 0 if selection_indicator =  1 
quietly replace g_'var''j' = -lambda (lambda + rhat)b_mills'i''var' if
selection_indicator =  1 & year == 'i'
quietly generate q_'var''j' = .
quietly replace q_'var''j' = tempvarl'var' if selection_indicator =  1 &
year == 'i'
quietly replace q_ 'var'j' = tempvar2'var' if selection_indicator == 0 & year == 'i' 
sort pid year
quietly by pid: replace q_'var''j' = q_'var,'j'['j' + 1] if year ~= 'i' 
local varlist_i3 'varlist_i3' g_'var''j' 
local varlist_i4 'varlist_i4' q_'var''j'
}
drop rhat tempvarl tempvar2 
mat drop H 'i1 
local i = 'i' + 1
}
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_i4' { 
quietly replace ' v ar-0  if 'var' =  .
}
keep ifkeep_obs>l & selection_indicator == 1
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********************************************************************/
* Replicates the second stage equation using matrices
********************************************************************/
/it*******************************************************************
* matrix XX = X'X
* matrix Xy = X'y
matrix accum XX = ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda* T_* ms_* cons, nocons 
matrix vecaccum yX = ln_rxtot ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda* T_* ms * cons,
nocons
matrix BETA = inv(XX)*yX'
quietly regress ln_rxtot ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda* T_* ms_* 
predict ehat, res
// checked and this is identical to when I run the regression! 
matrix list BETA
********************************************************************/
* Replicates the robust variance matrix using matrices
* Define a new varlist_lr, which is the list of main variables in the main equation
* varlist_2r is the list of interaction terms
sort studyid year 
by studyid: gen num=_n
// scalar g is the number of individuals in the selected sample 
gen countid = (num==l) 
sum countid 
scalar g = r(sum)
// count the number of regressors that are in the main part of the regression 
local c=0
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_main' { 
local c = 'c '+ l
}
scalar MAIN = 'c'
scalar M = 1 + MAIN + 1 + time_lambdas*(num_time_pers - 1) + (num_time_pers -  
1)+1
local varlist_lr ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda* T_* ms_* cons
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local varlist_2r 
local j= l
foreach var of varlist 'varlist_lr' { 
quietly gen eh_'var' = 'var'*ehat 
quietly egen ttt_'var' = sum(eh_'var'), by(studyid) 
local varlist_2r 'varlist_2r' ttt_'var' 
local j = j'+ l
}
drop eh_*
matrix accum XEEX = 'varlist_2r' if num==l, nocons
// obtain standard errors corrected for the first stage estimation 
matrix TERM1 = XEEX
* The number of variables in varlist_2r should be equal to the number of
* instruments at the second stage
* The number of variables in varlist_i4 should be equal to # lst-stage regressors
* # time periods
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /
matrix accum TEMP = 'varlist_2r' 'varlist_i4' if num==l, nocons
// extract the upper right hand comer o f the TEMP matrix 
matrix ZEQ = TEMP[1..M + NUM INSTR, M+NUMJNSTR+1...] 
matrix drop TEMP
matrix accum TEMP = 'varlist_lr' 'varlist_i3', nocons
// extract the upper right hand corner o f the TEMP matrix
matrix ZG = TEMP[1.. M + NUM JNSTR, M + NU M JN STR + 1...]
di "Number of rows in ZG="rowsof(ZG)
di "Number of columns in ZG="colsof(ZG)
matrix drop TEMP
matrix TERM2 = ZEQ*H*ZG'
matrix accum QQ = 'varlistJ4 ' if num==l, nocons
matrix TERM4 = ZG*H*QQ*H*ZG'
matrix V2 = inv(XX)*(TERMl - TERM2 - TERM2' + TERM4)*inv(XX)!,e 
(e(N) -  l)*g/((g - l)*(e(N) - M))
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mata:
{
mata_V2 = st_matrix("V2") 
mata_Beta = st_matrix("BETA")
}
end
drop q_* g_* ttt_*
if time_lambdas==l { 
local out_varlist ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' 'lambda_varlist' 'T_varlist' 'ms_varlist' 
_cons
local pred_varlist ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' 'lambda_varlist' 'T_varlist'
}
if time_lambdas=0 { 
local out_varlist ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda T_varlist' 'ms_varlist' _cons 
local pred_varlist ln_rxcopay 'varlist_main' lambda T_varlist'
}
quietly ci ln_rxtot
mata: mata_se_y = st_numscalar("r(se)") 
mata: mata_var_y = mata_se_y*mata_se_y
matrix beta_l = BETA[1..M-1,J
matrix beta_2 = BETA[M + NUM_INSTR.. M + NUM_INSTR,.]
mata: mata_beta_l = st_matrix("beta_l")
mata: mata_beta_2 = st_matrix("beta_2")
mata: beta_new= mata_beta_l \ mata_beta_2
mata: beta_new
mata: x_varlist_l = st_local(,fpred_varlist") 
mata: x_varlist_2 = st_data(.,tokens(x_varlist_l)) 
mata: rows_xs = rows(x_varlist_2)
mata: constant = J(rows_xs,l,l) 
mata: x = (x_varlist_2,constant)
mata: y_pred = x*beta_new
mata: var_y_pred = ((l/rows_xs)*colsum(y_pred:*y_pred)) -  
((colsum(y_pred)/rows_xs)A2)
mata: y_pred_new = st_addvar("float'7!ln_y_pred") 
mata: st_store(.,y_pred_new,y_pred)
correlate ln_y_pred ln_rxtot if keep_obs>l & selection_indicator=l 
mata: mata_corr = st_numscalar(Mr(rho)") 
mata: mata_r2 = mata_corr*mata_corr
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* Outputs the results
jcjelc'ieji&icjc'ieieJcicjcjcJeieic'ieJcjckjeicje&Jsic&'iejffckjcicicjt'Jeic'jclcicjc'jc'jejeJc'jeJcjcjc'icjcicjcie'kjeiejcjejeJejc'kickickf
mata: v_a = st_local("out_varlist")
mata: varname = J(0,0,.)
mata: variable_vector(v_a, vamame)
mata:
{
st_err_adj = sqrt(diagonal(mata_V2)) 
t_value_adj = mata_Beta:/ st_err_adj 
p_value_adj = get_pvalue(t_value_adj)
printf("Heckman Fixed effects output with standard errors adjusted\n")
printf("\n")
printf("R2 =")
printf("%8.4g\n", mata_r2)
printf("\n")
printf("{hline 21} {c +} {hline 55}\n") 
printf("ln_rxtot {c |}Coef. Std. Err. t-value
p-value\n") 
printf("{hline 21}{c +}{hline 55}\n") 
i = 1
while (i<=rows(t_value_adj)) {
printf("%-20s {c |}%8.4g %8.4g %8.4g %8.4g\n", vamame[i],
mata_Beta[i], st_err_adj[i], t_value_adj[i], p_value_adj[i]) 
i++
}
printf(" {hline 21} {c +} {hline 55}\n")
}
end
E.2. Results of specification tests
The results of the specification tests for the appropriateness of various assumptions 
related to the model are covered in this section of the Appendix. As we restricted our 
sample to those who were over the age of 65, it was important to determine whether 
this was a random sample. To do so we used a runs test, where the null hypothesis is 
that the number of runs is outside the expected range. More detail on this procedure is 
available in Section D.6 of Appendix D. The resulting value from the runs test was -  
1,354 (p=0.000), indicating that the sample was not non-random, and we could 
proceed with the estimation.
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We also employed other tests for the specification of the model and the choice of the 
main variables and instruments (Appendix Table E.l).
Appendix Table E. 1. Results from various specification tests
Test Models compared Results
Wald test for appropriateness o f  
fixed effects
FE-OLS (with SS) and 
OLS (with SS)
X 2( 8 ) =  77,383
(p=0.000)
Semykina -Wooldridge test 
(Wald test) for sample selection
FE-OLS (no SS) and SS 
FE (with SS)
X2( l l) =  23,611
(p=0.000)
Condition index to test for 
multicollinearity Cl =  8.88
Variance Inflation Factor to test 
for multicollinearity VIF = 1.90
As we had the option of using panel data techniques, we tested for the validity of a 
fixed effects approach as opposed to a pooled OLS that did not account for the 
unobserved effects. The null hypothesis is that all of the time-means parameters are 
zero, and we find a Wald statistic that is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that a fixed effects model is more appropriate than pooled OLS1.
The next step in the construction of a model was to test whether sample selection was 
an issue, and we used a Wald test proposed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2006). The 
null hypothesis of the test is that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the 
error term in the main equation, i.e. E(xit,u it) = 0. The reported values in Appendix 
Table E.l indicate that sample selection is an important aspect of the model.
Section D.l of Appendix D discussed how the existence of multicollinearity can make 
the interpretation of the t-value on the inverse Mills ratio suspect. As it is important to 
test for this pitfall, we use a condition index, where a condition index of 20 or greater 
generally reveals that multicollinearity is a problem (Greene, 2003). For both 
dependent variables, we calculate a condition index of 8.88, indicating that according 
to this test multicollinearity is not an issue with the estimation. An additional tool to 
check for multicollinearity is the Variance Inflation Factor, where VIF values greater 
than 10 are suspect. As the mean VIF for each specification was 1.90, we were again 
able to conclude that multicollearity is not something we need to correct.
1 We also tested for whether a fixed or random effects specification was more appropriate, although we 
only provide the results o f the linear case (as opposed to the specification that accounts for sample 
selection). The results o f  the Hausman specification test yielded a p-value o f  0.000, indicating that a 
fixed effects framework was more appropriate.
312
Appendix E
E.3. First-stage probit results for probability of any prescription drug use
This section provides the results for the individual year-probits (1992-2002). The 
probit results are used to predict a vector of Mills lambdas, which is then plugged into 
the second-stage equation that predicts the number of prescription drugs purchased.
Appendix Table E.2. Probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure predicting 
probability o f prescription drug use a,b,c
Explanatory variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
age between 65 and 74 -0.023**
(o.oi n
-0.021*
(0.011)
-0.033®
(0.011)
0.014
(0.010)
-0.056®
(0.010)
-0.099®
(0.010)
age between 75 and 84 -0.270®
(0.022)
-0.261®
(0.022)
-0.217®
(0.022)
-0.114®
(0.020)
-0.163®
(0.019)
-0.163®
(0.018)
second socioeconomic quintile 0.036®
(0.010)
0.029®
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.012)
0.008
(0.012)
0.010
(0.011)
0.002
(0.011)
third socioeconomic quintile 0.028®
(0.011)
0.028®
(0.010)
-0.016
(0.013)
-0.026®
(0.013)
-0.020
(0.013)
-0.006
(0.012)
fourth socioeconomic quintile 0.062®
(0.011)
0.056®
(0.011)
-0.024*
(0.015)
-0.054®
(0.014)
-0.040®
(0.014)
-0.035®
(0.013)
fifth socioeconomic quintile 0.082®
(0.013)
0.092®
(0.012)
-0.039®
(0.017)
-0.055®
(0.016)
-0.060®
(0.015)
-0.026*
(0.015)
individual diagnosed with at least 
one o f  pre-defined high-cost 
and/or high-prevalence disease
0.593®
(0.007)
0.591®
(0.007)
0.547®
(0.007)
0.379®
(0.007)
0.363®
(0.006)
0.382®
(0.006)
individual died this year -0.697®
(0.022)
-0.395®
(0.016)
-0.324®
(0.015)
-0.267®
(0.013)
-0.230®
(0.013)
-0.257®
(0.012)
(mean) age between 65 and 74 0.169®
(0.013)
0.181®
(0.013)
0.217®
(0.014)
0.008
(0.013)
0.010
(0.014)
0.022
(0.014)
(mean) age between 75 and 84 0.372®
(0.022)
0.389®
(0.022)
0.334®
(0.023)
0.256®
(0.021)
0.228®
(0.021)
0.155®
(0.021)
(mean) second socioeconomic 
quintile
-0.042®
(0.013)
-0.044®
(0.013)
-0.038®
(0.017)
0.021
(0.016)
0.014
(0.016)
0.047®
(0.015)
(mean) third socioeconomic 
quintile
-0.035®
(0.013)
-0.045®
(0.013)
0.005
(0.018)
0.073®
(0.017)
0.065®
(0.017)
0.076®
(0.016)
(mean) fourth socioeconomic 
quintile
-0.074®
(0.014)
-0.072®
(0.014)
0.013
(0.019)
0.100®
(0.018)
0.075®
(0.017)
0.104®
(0.016)
(mean) fifth socioeconomic 
quintile
-0.057®
(0.015)
-0.067®
(0.015)
0.079®
(0.019)
0.197®
(0.019)
0.205®
(0.018)
0.201®
(0.017)
(mean) individual diagnosed with 
at least one o f  pre-defined high- 
cost and/or high-prevalence 
disease
0.892®
(0.010)
1.001®
(0.010)
1.137®
(0.011)
0.891®
(0.010)
0.942®
(0.010)
0.967®
(0.009)
(mean) individual died this year 0.355®
(0.023)
-0.081®
(0.028)
-0.246®
(0.031)
-0.542®
(0.032)
-0.664®
(0.034)
-0.758®*
(0.034)
constant 0.335®
(0.009)
0.332®
(0.009)
0.299®
(0.009)
0.314®
(0.008)
0.326®
(0.007)
0.319®
(0.007)
N 406,866 417,822 409,323 428,244 445,915 470,519
Log-likelihood -152,906 -155,452 -152,539 -189,152 -198,577 -207,128
probability > x 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; bexcluded dummy variables are age greater than 84, individual lives in
a postcode that is in the lowest socioeconomic quintile in British Columbia, individual has not been 
diagnosed with at least one o f  the pre-defined high-cost and/or high-prevalence diseases; cthe mean 
variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f  each variable for each individual in the sample 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
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Appendix Table E.2. Probit estimates for first stage o f FE-2SLS procedure predicting
probability o f prescription drug use (continued) a,b’c
Explanatory variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
age between 65 and 74 -0.149s
(0.010)
-0.155S
(0.010)
-0.091s
(0.010)
-0.028S
(0.009)
0.128s
(0.008)
age between 75 and 84 -0.164s
(0.018)
-0.124s
(0.018)
0.053s
(0.019)
0.147s
(0.018)
0.306S
(0.016)
second socioeconomic quintile 0.000(0.010)
0.008
(0.010)
-0.009
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.012
(0.010)
third socioeconomic quintile -0.004(0.011)
0.016
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.011)
fourth socioeconomic quintile -0.033s
(0.012)
0.029s
(0.012)
0.025s
(0.013)
0.014
(0.013)
0.021*
(0.012)
fifth socioeconomic quintile -0.015(0.014)
0.001
(0.013)
-0.024*
(0.014)
-0.009
(0.014)
-0.011
(0.013)
individual diagnosed with at least 
one o f pre-defined high-cost 
and/or high-prevalence disease
0.384§
(0.006)
0.450S
(0.006)
0.448S
(0.006)
0.508S
(0.006)
0.512S
(0.006)
individual died this year -0.229S
(0.012)
-0.180s
(0.012)
-0.211S
(0.012)
-0.133s
(0.012)
0.093s
(0.013)
(mean) age between 65 and 74 0.068S
(0.014)
0.025*
(0.014)
-0.095s
(0.014)
-0.232s
(0.014)
-0.248s
(0.013)
(mean) age between 75 and 84 0.074S
(0.022)
-0.082s
(0.022)
-0.367s
(0.023)
-0.566s
(0.023)
-0.534s
(0.021)
(mean) second socioeconomic 0.046s 0.041s 0.064s 0.058s 0.018
quintile (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
(mean) third socioeconomic 0.073s 0.059s 0.098S 0.092s 0.028s
quintile (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
(mean) fourth socioeconomic 0.098S 0.040S 0.055s 0.073s -0.036s
quintile (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
(mean) fifth socioeconomic 0.186s 0.171s 0.205s 0.186S 0.017
quintile (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
(mean) individual diagnosed with 
at least one o f  pre-defined high- 
cost and/or high-prevalence 
disease
1.023§
(0.009)
0.967S
(0.009)
0.977S
(0.010)
0.909S
(0.009)
0.950S
(0.008)
(mean) individual died this year -0.966s
(0.036)
-1.368S
(0.035)
-1.320S
(0.041)
-1.645s
(0.046)
-2.125s
(0.052)
constant 0.342S 0.397S 0.425s 0.450s 0.108s
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
N________________________________486,318 485,410 493,180 506,365 519,988
Log-1 ikelihood____________________-208,750 -202,828 -199,653 -200,904 -249,206
probability > y) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
“standard errors in parentheses; bexcluded dummy variables are age greater than 84, individual lives in 
a postcode that is in the lowest socioeconomic quintile in British Columbia, individual has not been 
diagnosed with at least one o f  the pre-defined high-cost and/or high-prevalence diseases; cthe mean 
variables are calculated by taking the time mean o f  each variable for each individual in the sample 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
E.4. Second-stage fixed effects regression results for log of prescription drug use
After estimation of the Mills lambda, the Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) 
estimation requires that the Mills lambda be inserted into the main equation (i.e. the 
equation which predicts the number of prescription drugs that the individual obtains in 
a given year). The Mills lambda can also be interacted with time. To account for
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unobserved heterogeneity, the regression includes the time means of the first-stage 
independent variables. The abbreviated results of this regression are available in 
Section 6.7.2 of Chapter 6, but this section includes more detailed results that report 
the coefficients for the Mills lambda and the interactions of the Mills lambda with 
time, the time variables, and the time means.
Appendix Table E. 3. Estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription drugs 
obtained equationa,b,c
Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects SS Fixed Effects
(log) drug co-payment -0.306S
(0.002)
-0.167S
(o.oon
-0.295S
(0.002)
age between 65 and 74 0.188s
(0.002)
-0.017s
(0.001)
0.074s
(0.002)
age between 75 and 84 0.358**
(0.003)
0.010s
(0.002)
0.141s
(0.003)
second socioeconomic quintile -0.041s
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
third socioeconomic quintile -0.041s
(0.002)
0.003s
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
fourth socioeconomic quintile -0.053s
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.010s
(0.002)
fifth socioeconomic quintile -0.065S
(0.003)
is -0.007S
(0.002)
individual diagnosed with at least 
one o f pre-defined high-cost and/or 
high-prevalence disease
0.458§
(0.001)
0.165s
(0.001)
0.188§
(0.003)
individual died this year -0.079S
(0.003)
-0.418s
(0.002)
-0.429s
(0.003)
year is 1993 -0.018s
(0.001)
0.027S
(0.001)
© 
g
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year is 1994 -0.360s
(0.002)
-0.122s
(0.001)
-0.230s
(0.003)
year is 1995 -0.556s
(0.003)
-0.176S
(0.002)
-0.411S 
(0.004)
year is 1996 -0.002(0.002)
0.184s
(0.001)
0.170s
(0.003)
year is 1997 0.034s
(0.002)
0.274s
(0.001)
0.260S
(0.003)
year is 1998 0.061S
(0.002)
0.347S
(0.001)
0.318s
(0.003)
year is 1999 0.089s
(0.002)
0.433s
(0.001)
0.380S
(0.003)
year is 2000 0.117s
(0.002)
0.512S
(0.001)
0.442s
(0.003)
year is 2001 0.185s
(0.002)
0.619s
(0.002)
0.531s
(0.004)
year is 20'02 0.468s
(0.002)
0.787s
(0.002)
0.770s
(0.004)
lambda 0.525s
(0.019)
lambda 1993 -0.182s
(0.008)
lambda 1994 -0.189s
(0.009)
lambda 1995 -0.165S 
(0.010)
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Explanatory variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects SS Fixed Effects
lambda 1996 -0.2275
(0.010)
lambda 1997 -0.321
(0.010)
lambda 1998 -0.347s
(0.011)
lambda 1999 -0.382s 
(0.01 n
lambda 2000 -0.419s
(0.011)
lambda 2001 -0.417s
(0.011)
lambda 2002 -0.296s
(0.011)
(mean) age between 65 and 74 0.149s
(0.004)
(mean) age between 75 and 84 0.249s
(0.005)
(mean) second socioeconomic 
quintile
-0.058S
(0.004)
(mean) third socioeconomic quintile -0.045S
(0.004)
(mean) fourth socioeconomic 
quintile
-0.046S
(0.004)
(mean) fifth socioeconomic quintile -0.045s
(0.004)
(mean) individual diagnosed with at 
least one o f pre-defined high-cost 
and/or high-prevalence disease
0.730S
(0.006)
(mean) individual died this year 1.854s
(0.012)
(mean) (log) drug co-payment 0.290S
(0.002)
constant 2.696S 
( a 004)
2.427s
(0.002)
2.095s
(0.010)
N 4,071,186 4,071,186 4,071,186
R2 0.122 0.043 0.060
“standard errors in parentheses, bexcluded dummy variables are age greater than 84, individual reports 
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the pre-defined high-cost 
and/or high-prevalence diseases, year is 1992, cthe mean variables are calculated by taking the time 
mean o f each variable for each individual in the sample 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
E.5. Explanation and results of the dynamic fixed effects model accounting for 
sample selection
E.5.1. Dynamic panel data models
As an alternative to the fixed effects sample selection model, we initially tried a 
dynamic model to account for repeated consumption over time. For example, as an 
individual becomes comfortable with a new prescription, he is more likely to continue 
consuming that drug in the next period and less likely to choose other non­
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prescription alternatives to regain his health. This section provides an overview of the 
dynamic model and the results.
A dynamic panel data model is specified in the following manner:
y„ = g , +  *„P+aJVi + «* (E.l),
where i = 1,..., N  and t = l , . . . , r . The dynamic element of the model is y , . , which is 
the y it variable lagged one period. We assume that uit is an independently and 
identically distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a variance of .
As there are biases associated with both OLS and fixed effects regressions on (E.l)
(Bond, 2002)2, instrumental variables estimators and generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimators have been developed. Both methods involve taking the first 
differences to remove the individual effects3:
Ayit = Ag, + Ax;fp + Ay,Moc + A uit (E.2).
The first-differenced model still suffers from correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the error term. However, if the time series contains enough 
periods, the differences ( Ay,. ,_2) or one or more of the lagged dependent variables
(y,. t_2, y ;. ,_3, etc) can be used as instrumental variables for the first-differenced lag
dependent variable ( Ay, M) (Greene, 2003). But, when there are more than three time
periods, the instrumental variables method is not asymptotically efficient (Bond, 
2002). The 2SLS method also neglects information from the levels of y it (Ahn and 
Schmidt, 1995).
Because of the problem with 2SLS when there are more than three time periods, the 
first-differenced GMM estimator has been used to obtain an asymptotically efficient 
estimator. Instead of using values of y„ lagged two or more periods, the GMM 
estimators take advantage of the moment condition:
e (z 'iAu,)= 0  for (E.3).
The rows of Z, each correspond to the first-differenced equations for periods t = 
3,4,...,T. To estimate the coefficients, we use an estimator of the form (Bond, 2002):
2 For a more detailed explanation of the biases associated with running OLS and fixed effects on a 
dynamic model, see Bond (2002).
3 Whenever we use the convention a ajs > the observation of a  in period s  -1  is subtracted from the 
observation of a in period s  so that a a,s = als -  als_{
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f  1 N \ f 1 N
— YAw'Z, Q — Y z 'AU:
\ T  ^  1 1  L u  i »B = N t ; /
(E.4),
where Q is the weighting matrix and is estimated by:
Q =
‘ 1 N
- Y z ' i H Z ,  
N tt  1 '
-l
(E.5).
The H  in the weighting matrix is a square matrix that is (T -  2) rows and columns and 
has twos on the main diagonal, ones on the first off-diagonals, and zeros elsewhere 
(Bond, 2002). The model is thus estimated in one step4.
There are a number of potential pitfalls related to a dynamic panel data model, 
including autocorrelation, endogenous variables, and persistent series. In a dynamic 
panel E{uitui t_x) does not need to be zero because Aw,., is mathematically related to
AwlM through the shared ujt_l term. However, the assumption that fs(w„w,,_2)=  0 is 
important and thus we need to determine whether there is correlation between the 
uit_x in Aw„ and the ui t_2 in Aw,. ,_2. Arellano and Bond (1991) have developed a test 
for second order serial correlation that is applied to the residuals in differences, where 
the null hypothesis is that E(puui t_2) = 0. The result of this test is automatically given 
in STATA when we run the GMM estimator for a dynamic model.
Endogeneity is also a potential issue in the dynamic model. If the xit are endogenous, 
computation of the GMM estimator involves the lagged values xi t_2, x t J_3 and longer 
lags. Alternatively, if we make a stronger assumption that the xit are predetermined, 
then x, M can be added as a valid instrument. Finally, if  we assume that the xjt are
strictly exogenous, then the complete time series x] = (xn,x j2,...,xjT) can be used as 
instruments. Difference Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions have been 
developed to test the validity of each of these assumptions. If we let S  be the Sargan 
statistic under the stronger assumption and S * be the Sargan statistic obtained under 
the weaker assumption, the value of:
Ds = S - S *  (E.6),
4 A two-step GMM estimator has also been developed where Q  =
Aw, are estimates of the first-differenced residuals from a preliminary consistent estimator (Bond,
2002). Because this weighting matrix is dependent on the estimated residuals, the asymptotic 
distribution approximations are less reliable than for the one-step GMM estimator (Bond, 2002).
l£ (z ; wtrv ■Aw. Aw
- I
and
318
Appendix E
is asymptotically %2 and tests the null hypothesis that the additional moment 
conditions of the stronger assumption hold.
Another potential problem is that of persistent series, specifically that a  = 1 (also 
called a near unit root property). Ignoring the independent variables xit, an alternative 
specification is:
y„ = (l -  a)g, + 09V , + u« (E-7).
where i = 1,...,// and t = . As a  -> 1 the process becomes nonstationary and is
known as a random walk. In this situation the instrumental variables for the equations 
in first differences are likely to be weak, biasing the estimator (Bond, 2002). We can 
test for unit roots by running an OLS regression on:
y„ = (l -  o)g, + + ay,,., + u„ (E.8),
and using a t-test to determine if a  is significantly different from one (Bond et al.,
2002). However, the OLS estimator is biased upwards unless a  = 1 (in which case the 
fixed effect drops out). To account for this, Breitung and Meyer (1994) have proposed 
a modified Dickey-Fuller statistic. This requires subtracting the first observation (yn ) 
from both sides of equation (E.8), which yields:
y„ - y ,i  = - ( l ~ o -h n  - g , )+ * „ ? + “ (>',,,-i ~ y n )+ uu (E-9).
Although the OLS estimate from (E.9), denoted a , is also biased, the asymptotic bias 
is given by:
p l i m ^ . 5 ^  (E.10).
Thus, a  can be used to test for a  = 1. Monte Carlo results from Bond et al. (2002) 
indicate that the t-test from the OLS estimation performs well when the variance of 
the unobserved heterogeneity (g,) is relatively small. The Breitung and Meyer (1994)
test does not suffer from this problem when the variance is larger, although the power 
of this test is low (Bond et al., 2002).
If nonstationarity is a problem with the series, then the system-GMM estimator is 
preferred (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This method 
involves transforming the instruments to make them exogenous to the fixed effects 
rather than transforming the regressors to difference out the fixed effects (Roodman,
2006). If we assume that the instrumenting variables (.zit) are endogenous, then
Az. M can be used as an instrument, and earlier realizations of Az it can also be used. 
If we assume that the z lt are predetermined, then Azrt and earlier realizations of Azjt 
can be used as instruments. The system-GMM estimator thus involves building a
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stacked dataset with the differenced individual-level observations on top and the 
untransformed (levels) observations below. The additional moment conditions for this 
estimator are:
Because we determine that nonstationarity is not a problem with the dataset, we do 
not provide any further information on the system-GMM in this section.
E.5.2. Combining sample selection and dynamic panel data techniques
As outlined in the previous sections, there are a number of considerations relevant to 
the type of data being used and the outcome being tested. To account for a lagged 
dependent variable along with unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection,
The variables from (E .l3) and (E .l4) represent the following: y lt is the number of 
prescription drugs obtained, xit are the explanatory variables that determine y it, (3 
are the coefficients on x it, y t x is the lagged variable with a coefficient of a , g, is 
the individual-specific term, and uit is the error term. In the second equation which 
determines whether prescription drug consumption is positive, zit are the instruments, 
which are assumed to be strictly exogenous conditional on g i , r |( is the individual- 
specific term, and e„ is the error term.
When cov(s ituit) * 0 OLS (or fixed effects) estimates are inconsistent, and a
correction is needed that essentially accounts for an omitted variable. This involves 
calculating the inverse Mills ratio:
(E.l 1),
and
(E.12).
another similar specification developed by Ramon Garcia et al. (2006)5 is needed for 
this situation. The specification considers the following dynamic model:
y» =  Si +  + y itt-i a  +  Uu y u =  y \  f o r  ■*« = 1
y lt is not observed for su = 0 (E .l3),
s„ = 1(11,+  z„y + e„ > 0] for t = 1,..., T (E.14).
(E.l 5),
5 We have explicit permission from the author to quote this work even though it is a work in progress.
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and estimating:
y„ =g/+*„P + :> V i“  + *-»P + “« fotSj, = 1 (E.l 6)
to correct for sample selection bias. Equation (E .l6) can either be estimated by 
difference-GMM or system-GMM. The sample selection correction method typically 
requires that the standard errors in the main estimation equation be corrected. 
However, correction of the standard errors in a dynamic panel data model is difficult, 
and the difference in standard errors between the adjusted and unadjusted output is 
likely to be small. Additionally, as can be seen below, two of the estimators suggested 
account for heteroskedasticity in the error term, and robust standard errors can be 
reported in STATA6.
Ramon Garcia et al. (2006) detail four different methods for calculating Xu ,
depending on the assumptions regarding the exogeneity of the regressors, 
heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation. Under the assumption of strictly exogenous 
regressors, no heteroskedasticity, and no autocorrelation, we can estimate lambda via:
(1) A year by year probit with contemporaneous regressors, or
(2) A random effects probit.
For a more general model the authors indicate that the selection equation can be 
estimated by:
(3) a reduced-form year by year probit, which includes all available lags of either the 
exogenous or predetermined variables
(4) a year-by-year probit in the spirit of Wooldridge’s (2002) correction strategy
As autocorrelation is present in our estimation, we use procedure (4) to estimate the 
first stage probits. The reason for this choice is to maintain some consistency between 
the dynamic estimations from this section and the static estimations from Chapter 7. 
The Wooldridge (2002) estimation involves a separate probit for each year of the 
sample, and the regressors in the probit are the first stage independent variables along 
with their time means.
To determine whether a sample selection correction is needed, we follow a test 
developed by Wooldridge (1995). This involves calculating the Mills lambda and then 
including this correction term in the difference-GMM equation or system-GMM 
equation (if a  -> 1). If the coefficient on the Mills lambda is significant, then sample 
selection is an issue, and steps to correct for the problem need to be taken.
E.5.3. Results
This section of the Appendix provides the results of the dynamic fixed effects model 
that corrects for sample selection. The first-stage probit calculations were identical to
6 These conclusions regarding the correction of standard errors in the main equation are from a 
personal communication with Sergi Jim&iez-Martin, one of the authors in the Ram6n Garcia et al. 
(2006) paper.
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the probits used in the Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) estimation in Section E.3 
and thus are not provided here. The user-written command [xtabond2] (Roodman,
2003) was used to obtain the difference-GMM estimates for the restricted sample, i.e. 
the sample restricted to individuals with positive drug consumption.
As discussed above it is important to test for nonstationarity. We used the simple OLS 
test and the Breitung and Meyer (1994) modified Dickey Fuller test for the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable equals one. We reject 
the null hypothesis for both tests7, indicating that we can proceed with difference- 
GMM estimation.
We also tested whether a sample selection correction was needed using the 
Wooldridge (1995) test. The results of the Wooldridge (1995) test were that the 
coefficient on the Mills lambda was significant (t=-4.90, p=0.000), indicating that 
sample selection is an issue.
There was also a possibility that some of the independent variables were endogenous 
or predetermined. We hypothesized that the socioeconomic status of the individual 
and morbidity were potentially correlated with the number of prescriptions she 
purchased. Using the difference Sargan test, we tested for the endogeneity of both of 
these variables separately and jointly, and in all cases we rejected the additional 
moment restrictions imposed by the endogeneity assumption8.
Appendix Table E.4 lists the results of three different specifications based on the 
dynamic fixed effects model accounting for sample selection9. As highlighted in the 
table, Models 1 and 2 suffer from autocorrelation and identification problems. We 
tried a number of model changes to reduce these problems, including further lagging 
the dynamic variable, including lags of the other independent variables, restricting the 
number of lags of the dynamic variable, and restricting the instrument set. Model 2 is 
an example of the output when we lag the dependent variable up to seven periods. For 
Model 3 we attempted to correct for autocorrelation and identification problems 
through (i) restricting the number of lags of the dynamic variable to five periods and 
deeper10 and (ii) including only the co-payment variable, the time variables, and the
7 Using the simple OLS test, t=-l 161 (p=0.000). Using the Breitung and Meyer (1994) test, t=-l 100
(p=0.000).
8 The result o f the difference Sargan test for the exogeneity of socioeconomic position was 4,249 
(p=0.000), the result of the difference Sargan test for the exogeneity of morbidity was 6,688 (p=0.000), 
and result of the difference Sargan test for the exogeneity of both socioeconomic position and 
morbidity was 10,633 (p=0.000). Because the assumption that a variable is endogenous is weaker than 
the assumption that a variable is predetermined, after rejecting the endogeneity of any variables, there 
was no need to test whether any variables were predetermined.
9 We attempted to use the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction for the variance of the two-step 
GMM estimator; however, the computation used up more memory than was available in the 64-bit 
Stata platform. Instead, we use the one-step estimator, which should provide similar results given that 
the efficiency gains from using the two-step estimator seem to be small (Bond, 2002).
10 We also tried restricting the lags even further, but this still did not correct for the identification 
problems. Three is the minimum number of lags needed to reduce autocorrelation problems.
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constant as instruments11. In the end, we were only able to eliminate the second-order 
autocorrelation problem, but identification still remained an issue with Model 3.
Appendix Table E. 4. Dynamic estimates for the log o f total number ofprescription 
drugs obtained equationa,b,c
Explanatory variable SS FE-Dynamic 
(Model 1)
SS FE-Dynamic 
(Model 2)
SS FE-Dynamic 
(Model 3)
lag o f  (log) number o f  drugs 
consumed, 1 period
0.268®*
(0.001)
0.388s
(0.004)
0.362s
(0.121)
lag o f  (log) number o f  drugs 
consumed, 2 periods
0.048s
(0.002)
lag o f  (log) number o f  drugs 
consumed, 3 periods
0.018s
(0.002)
lag o f  (log) number o f  drugs 
consumed, 4 periods
0.005s
(0.002)
lag o f  (log) number o f  drugs 
consumed, 5 periods
If
lag o f  (log) number o f  drugs 
consumed, 6 periods
0.008s
(0.002)
lag o f  (log) number o f  drugs 
consumed, 7 periods
0.004s
(0.0021
(log) drug co-payment -0.074s
(0.001)
-0.177s
(0.003)
-0.069S
(0.021)
age between 65 and 74 0.000(0.002)
0.009s
(0.003)
0.009
(0.021)
age between 75 and 84 0.009s
(0.003)
-0.009
(0.006)
0.310
(0.965)
second socioeconomic quintile 0.004s
(0.002)
0.004
(0.010)
4.455
(3.157)
third socioeconomic quintile 0.006S
(0.002)
0.009
(0.010)
1.883
(3.285)
fourth socioeconomic quintile 0.002(0.002)
0.010
(0.011)
2.699
(1.658)
fifth socioeconomic quintile -0.001(0.002)
0.012
(0.012)
6.857
(4.670)
individual diagnosed with at least 
one o f pre-defined high-cost and/or 0.107§ 0.071§ -0.273
high-prevalence disease (0.002) (0.005) (0.914)
individual died this year -0.082s
(0.002)
0.014s
(0.002)
-0.926
(1.014)
lambda -0.574s
(0.003)
-0.660s
(0.006)
-0.118
(0.166)
year is 1995 -0.153 s 
(0.012)
-0.080
(0.073)
year is 1996 0.057s
(0.002)
0.011
(0.144)
year is 1997 0.298s
(0.005)
0.015
(0.213)
year is 1998 0.438s
(0.007)
-0.019
(0.287)
year is 1999 0.549s
(0.008)
0.056
(0.330)
year is 2000 0.682s
(0.010)
0.034
(0.402)
11 We also tried restricting the instrument set to other variables, but this did not lead to any 
improvements in the model.
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Explanatory variable SS FE-Dynamic (Model 1)
SS FE-Dynamic 
(Model 2)
SS FE-Dynamic 
(Model 3)
year is 2001 0.798S
(0.011)
-0.324S
(0.026)
0.040
(0.475)
year is 2002 0.944s
(0.013)
”Sg11 0.015
(0.547)
constant 1.072s
105Omo
0.061
(0.016) (0.005) (0.086)
Arellano- Bond autocorrelation test, 16.84 -6.86 1.01
AR(2) in first differences (p-value = 0.000) (p-value = 0.000) (p-value =0.311)
Hansen test o f  overidentifying 1,734 362.0 48.33
restrictions (p-value = 0.000) (p-value = 0.000) (p-value = 0.000)
N 2,731,118 2,731,118 2,731,118
F-statistic 6,182 1,544 571.6
Prob > F
a  ^ i j _____  • _ ___-v
0.000
b" -V /  ______
0.000 0.000
being in good health, individual has not been diagnosed with at least one o f  the pre-defined high-cost 
and/or high-prevalence diseases, year is 1992, cthe mean variables are calculated by taking the time 
mean o f each variable for each individual in the sample 
Significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level
The results are not stable over different specifications, and because of this, we will not 
offer an explanation of the results. It is important to note that when more lags are 
added to the model (Model 2), the variables change significantly and even switch 
signs in some cases (age and income, for example). In particular, the coefficients on 
variables that are not included in the instrument set in Model 3 vary significantly 
between Models 1 and 3. For instance, while age has a negative effect in Model 1, it 
has a much larger positive effect in Model 3. The same is also true for morbidity and 
the variable indicating whether the individual died in the given year.
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